JUDGMENT Chandiraman, J. - All, there six appeals involve a common question of law and arise from the suit of one and the same plaintiff against the various appellants whom he alleged to be rank trespassers. 2. The plaintiff-respondent filed six suits "for recovery of po. session of certain plots of land against the various appellants alleging that he himself had obtained; from the zamindars a patta in respect of the plots, that the appellants were orginally sub-tenants of one Mst. Hansa who was the tenant of the land before the plaint ff, that Mst. Hansa relinquished the holding, but the appellants did not give up the land and continued to remain in possession since the beginning of 1350F and that they were trespassers. The defendants appellants admitted that they were sub-tenants of Mst. Hansa and that Mst. Hansa had relinquished Her holding. According to them the relinquishment took place in the beginning of (sic) since when they had been in possession and as the suits had been filed in July, 1945, they were barred by time It was also said that u/s (sic) of the U. P. Tenancy Act, the defendants had become hereditary tenants. Both the Courts below have held that Mst. Hansa relinquished her holding in June, 1943, and that the limitation began to run from July, 1943 and as the suits were filed in July, 1945, the suits were within time, 3. In any case it was held that the suits having been filed in the Civil Court the period of limitation was not governed by the Tenancy Act but by the Limitation Act and the period was in this case 12 years. It was held that the plaintiff is a tenant. In these circumstance the suits of the plaintiff were all decreed. 4. The only point now urged in appeal before me is that in view of Explanation II added to Section 180 by the U. P. Amending Act, No. X of 1947, the suits should have been filed only in the Revenue Court and if that is the only Court in which the suits could be filed the Sures are clearly beyond time. Mr. Banerji, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, says that in vew of the recent Full Bench decision he concedes that if the suite are cognizible only by the revenue court they are clearly barred by time. Mr. Banerji, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, says that in vew of the recent Full Bench decision he concedes that if the suite are cognizible only by the revenue court they are clearly barred by time. Explanation II in Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act added by Section 18 of the U. P. Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, (No. X of 1947) show that even a tenant can file a suit for ejectment of a trespasser in the Revenue Court u/s 180 U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939. According to the decision of the Full Bench of the Chief Court in Ori Lal v. Ganeshi 1947 A. W. R. (C. C.) 7=O.W.N. 42. Section 180 did not contemplate a suit by a tenant who was dispossessed of the whole or a part of the holding by persons other than those referred to in Section 183 of the Act, and such a suit lay in the Civil Court alone. The learned Counsel for the appellants contends that the effect of the addition of the Explanation is that the Explanation shall always be deemed to have been in the Act from the very beginning or in other words the effect of the Explanation is retrospective so that a suit originally instituted in the Civil Court and not yet disposed of owing to the pendency or an appeal shall still be governed by the provision of Section 180 and the suit shall be cognizable only by the Revenue Court. Learned Counsel relied on the statement of the law on page 341 of Craise on Statute Law to the effect: Where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute or, as Parke J. said in Rex v. Dursly 1832 AIR 1949 All 542 . B. AD. 469. 'to explain a former statute', the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the prior Act was passed........... Where an Act is in its nature declaratory the presumption against construing it retropectively is inapplicable. 5. The contention of the learned Counsel in respect of the present appeals is not sound. The amending Act No. X of 1947 dil not merely add an Explanation. Actually the previously existing Section 180 was taken out in its place another section with several alterations and modifications was introduced. 5. The contention of the learned Counsel in respect of the present appeals is not sound. The amending Act No. X of 1947 dil not merely add an Explanation. Actually the previously existing Section 180 was taken out in its place another section with several alterations and modifications was introduced. The effect of addition of Explanation II to Section 180 was considered by a Bench of this Court on the 23rd December, 1948 in Basdeo Singh v. Bharat Singh (,) and I was a member of that Bench. In this case it was observed; 'The old section, we find, has been very materially altered and the explanations now appended must be deemed to apply to the provisions in its altered form, The explanation must, therefore, be deemed to elucidate Section 180 as it now stands after alteration, and in that sense it must be conceded that the explanation does not enlarge its scope,............In this case we are unable to read in Explanation II an intention that Section 180 as it now stands should be deemed to have always stood in its present form. In course of his arguments the appellants I learned Counsel cited a number of cases which dealt with declaratory explanatory Acts. Act X of 1947 is not of that and it is unnecessary for us to examine those cases. 6. No good reason has been shown why this decision of the Bench should not be accepted. In this view of the matter it is clear that Explanation II has not got any retrospective effect and that the suits were rightly instituted in the Civil Court and that being so the period of limitation was 12 years and the suits were well within time. The appeals must fail and are hereby dismissed.