JUDGEMENT KAUL, J. After the State Legislature had passed what is now Act No. 13 of 1951 (Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act) it was reserved by the Rajpramukh under Art. 31 (4) of the Constitution for the consideration of the President. It received the President's assent on the 5th June 1951. This, as its preamble states, is : "An Act to provide for the public purposes of the improvement of agriculture and financial condition of the agriculturists by abolition and acquisition of the rights of proprietors in villages Muhals, chacks or blocks settled on Zamindari system which is only a system of keeping an intermediary between the States and the tenants injurious to the betterment of agriculture as well as the agriculturists in Madhya Bharat and for other matters connected therewith." Section 3 of the said Act provides as follows : "1. Save as otherwise provided in this Act and subject to the provisions of S. 8, on and from a date to be specified by a notification by the Government in this behalf (hereinafter referred to as the date of vesting) all proprietary rights in a village, Muhal, land Chak or block in Madhya Bharat vesting in the proprietor of such village, Muhal, land Chak or Block, as the case may be, or in a person having interest in such proprietary right through the proprietor shall pass from such proprietor or such other person, to and vest in the State free of all encumbrances. 2. After issue of a notification under sub-s. (1), no right shall be acquired in or over the land to which the said notification relates, except by succession or under a decree or order of a Court or under a grant of contract in writing made or entered into by or on behalf of the Govt. and no fresh clearings or cultivation or for any other purpose shall be made in such land except in accordance with such rules as may be made by the Government in this behalf. 3. The Government may by notification published in the Government Gazette vary the date specified under sub-s. (1) at any time before such date." 2. Shree Ram Dubey is a Zamindar in District Gird of Madhya Bharat. 3. The Government may by notification published in the Government Gazette vary the date specified under sub-s. (1) at any time before such date." 2. Shree Ram Dubey is a Zamindar in District Gird of Madhya Bharat. As his rights were likely to be materially affected by any notification issued under S. 3 (2) and other provisions of the Act, he has made the present application under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of this piece of Legislation. It is prayed that a writ in the nature of Mandamus or an order be issued to the Government of Madhya Bharat directing it to forbear "from issuing any notification under S. 3 of the said Act or from giving any effect in general to the said pretended Act". There is also a prayer for issue of an injunction restraining the Government of the State "from taking possession of the properties of the petitioner under the said Act". Though the relief para of the application contains a number of sub-paragraphs the above two prayers substantially cover all the reliefs that are asked for except the petitioner's claim for costs. 3. Though the application made, mentioned more than a score of grounds on which the constitutionality of the Act was challenged, the petitioner's learned counsel Mr. Somayya confined himself only to 7 of them at the hearing. They are as follows : "1. The said Act is beyond the Legislative competence of the State Legislature of Madhya Bharat. 2. The interference of the said Act is not for a public purpose. 3. The said Act does not specifically provide for any compensation to, inter alia, proprietors and Chakdars and Blockdars whose estates are to vest in the State as aforesaid. 4. The Bill passed which became the Act afterwards is not the Bill which was originally introduced in the so called Interim Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat. 5. The so called Interim Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat was not properly constituted under the Covenant. Therefore, the Bill "Zamindari Unmulan Bill" as introduced in the so called Interim Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat could not be considered and passed by the present Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat. It ought to have been freshly introduced. 6. The so called Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat is not a properly constituted Legislature of Madhya Bharat under the Constitution of India. It ought to have been freshly introduced. 6. The so called Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat is not a properly constituted Legislature of Madhya Bharat under the Constitution of India. It is presided over by a person............who has not taken the oath of membership of the Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat under Art. 188 of the Constitution of India, and who is not entitled to continue as the speaker of the Assembly under the said Constitution. The members of the said Legislative Assembly, as well, have not taken the oath as required under the Constitution of India as applied to Part B States, under Part VII. Thus the so called Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat is not a competent authority to pass any Enactment which can have the force of law in Madhya Bharat, and therefore the said Act by the said Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat is void and inoperative. 7. The amendment of Constitution of India Act of 1951 is ultra vires the powers of the President and the Provisional Parliament under the Constitution. The people of India having delegated the power to amend the Constitution in the body designated in Art. 368, the President has no power to amend Art. 368 so as to authorise the Provisional Parliament to amend the Constitution. The words "for the purpose of removal of difficulty" in Art. 392 did not authorise the President to remove such difficulty as has been deliberately imposed by the Constitution." 4. Shortly stated the points urged at the hearing were as follows : (1) The Madhya Bharat Legislative Assembly as it existed before the Constitution of India came into force was not properly constituted. (2) Even after the Constitution of India came into force the Madhya Bharat Legislature could not be said to be a legal and validly constituted body. (3) The impugned Act is bad in as much as it did not receive the assent of the Rajpramukh. (4) The Act is not saved by Art. 31 (A) of the Constitution. (5) The Act is confiscatory and discriminatory in character as it does not provide for any compensation for some items of property. (6) That the Bill which later on became an Act was not the Bill that was originally introduced in the Assembly. 5. (4) The Act is not saved by Art. 31 (A) of the Constitution. (5) The Act is confiscatory and discriminatory in character as it does not provide for any compensation for some items of property. (6) That the Bill which later on became an Act was not the Bill that was originally introduced in the Assembly. 5. For a proper appreciation of some of the points thus raised it is necessary to give a short account of the formation of the State of Madhya Bharat and the creation of the body which worked as the Legislative Assembly in this State. 6. It is common knowledge that by the 15th of August 1947 all the Indian States barring the States of Hyderabad, Kashmere and Junagarh had acceded to the Dominion of India. The States which had acceded could be fitted into the Constitutional structure of India only after their consolidation into sizable administrative units and their democratization. As a part of this process, in April, 1948, the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore, and a number of other States in Central India entered into a Covenant for the establishment of a United State comprising the territories of their respective States with a common Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. This State when established was to be called the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat). The Executive authority of the United State of Madhya Bharat was to be exercised by the Rajpramukh either directly or through the officers subordinate to him. The then Ruler of Gwalior was to be the first Rajpramukh and he was to enter upon the duties of his office on the 11th day of May 1948. There was to be a Council of Ministers to aid and advice the Rajpramukh in the exercise of his functions. The Ruler of each covenanting State was, as soon as may be practicable, and in any event not later than the 1st of July 1948. to make over the administration of his State to the Rajpramukh. Thereupon all rights, authority and the jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler of which appertained or were incidental to the Government of the covenanting State became vested in the United State and shall thereafter be exercisable only as provided by the Covenant or by the Constitution to be framed thereunder. to make over the administration of his State to the Rajpramukh. Thereupon all rights, authority and the jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler of which appertained or were incidental to the Government of the covenanting State became vested in the United State and shall thereafter be exercisable only as provided by the Covenant or by the Constitution to be framed thereunder. The Rajpramukh was under Art. 8 of the Covenant to execute as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than the 15th of June 1948, on behalf of the United State of Madhya Bharat an Instrument of Accession in accordance with the provisions of S. 6 of the Government of India Act of 1935 and in place of the Instruments of Accession of the several covenanting States, and by such Instrument to accept as matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature might make laws for the United State all the matters mentioned in list I and List III of the Seventh Schedule of the said Act except entries in List I relating to any tax or duty. The Covenant provided by Article X that the Rajpramukh shall not later than the 1st day of August 1948 constitute an Interim Legislative Assembly for the United State of Madhya Bharat which shall consist of 40 members elected by the Gwalior Legislative Assembly, 15 members elected by the members of Indore Legislative Assembly and 20 members elected by an electoral college to be constituted by the Rajpramukh in consultation with the Government of India to represent the covenanting States other than Gwalior and Indore. The election of these members was to be by proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote. The Rajpramukh was authorised to make rules for carrying into effect the foregoing provisions and securing the due constitution of the Interim Legislative Assembly. It was originally agreed that as soon as may be practicable there should be formed a Constituent Assembly to frame a Constitution for the United State. The Rajpramukh was authorised to make rules for carrying into effect the foregoing provisions and securing the due constitution of the Interim Legislative Assembly. It was originally agreed that as soon as may be practicable there should be formed a Constituent Assembly to frame a Constitution for the United State. By an amendment of the Covenant however, it was stipulated that instead of a separate Constitution being framed for the United State, the Constitution of India adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India shall be the Constitution for the United State of Madhya Bharat and instead of the Constituent Assembly referred to in Art. 10 (i) of the Covenant it was provided that there shall be a Legislature for the United State, consisting of the Rajpramukh and a Legislative Assembly. 7. This Covenant entered into among the Rulers of various States was concurred in by the Government of India which guaranteed all its provisions (See White Paper on Indian States issued by the Ministry of States at pages 252 to 262). 8. In accordance with the terms of this Covenant the Rajpramukh entered upon the functions of his office on the 11th of May, 1948, and the Rulers of various States who were parties to the Covenant handed over the administration of their States by the 1st day of July, 1948. As required by Schedule IV of the Covenant which makes provision for the constitution of the Interim Legislative Assembly 40 members were elected by the Gwalior State legislative Assembly, on the 8th May, 1948, and 15 members by the Indore Legislative Assembly. Of the remaining 20 members 14 were elected by the Prajamandal and 6 by the Madhya Bharat Provincial Congress Committee. This was done in consultation with the Government of India. On the 19th of October, 1948, the personnel and formation of the Interim Legislative Assembly were notified by the Rajpramukh. 9. I will now turn to consider the various contentions raised by Mr. Somayya on behalf of the applicant against this background of facts. 10. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner : (1) That under Art. X, Para. 9. I will now turn to consider the various contentions raised by Mr. Somayya on behalf of the applicant against this background of facts. 10. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner : (1) That under Art. X, Para. (2) it was the Rajpramukh who was to constitute an interim Legislative Assembly for the United State and he assumed the functions of his Office only on the 11th of May 1948, the election by the Legislative Assembly of 40 and 15 members respectively by the Legislative Assemblies of Gwalior and Indore of the 8th and the 9th of May 1948 was not in accordance with the provision of the Article and hence invalid. (2) That as provided by Sch. IV to the Covenant 20 members were to be elected by an electoral college to be constituted by the Rajpramukh in consultation with the Government of India to represent Covenanting States other than Gwalior and Indore. No such electoral college was constituted and thus the' members who were said to represent Covenanting States other than Gwalior and Indore were not elected as required by the Covenant. (3) Under Art. X Paragraph (2) of the Covenant the Rajpramukh was required to constitute an Interim Legislative Assembly not later than the first day of August 1948. This was done (sic) and any Legislative Assembly constituted subsequently could not be in accordance with the terms of the Covenant and therefore not a validly constituted body; and (4) that after the 25th of January 1950 when the new Constitution came into force the members of the Madhya Bharat Legislative Assembly did not comply with the provisions of Art. 188 of the Constitution and that its Speaker Ram Sahay was not elected as its Speaker after the new Constitution came into force, 11. I am clear that there is no substance in any of these objections. I will deal with each of them in the order in which they have been stated. 12. 1. Shri Sommayya's objection, so far as I could follow him, was that so long as the Rajpramukh had not entered upon the functions of his Office it was not open to the Legislative Assemblies of Gwalior and Indore to elect 49 and 15 members respectively for the Interim Legislative Assembly. I find no warrant for any such conclusion in the language of Art. X (2). I find no warrant for any such conclusion in the language of Art. X (2). It says : "The Rajpramukh shall constitute not later than the first day of August 1948 an interim Legislative Assembly for the United State in the manner indicated in Sch. IV." 13. Schedule IV makes provision for the Constitution of the Interim Legislative Assembly. It runs thus : "The Legislative Assembly shall consist of : (a) forty members elected by the members of the Gwalior Legislative Assembly; (b) fifteen members elected by the members of the Indore Legislative Assembly; and (c) 20 members elected by the electoral college to be constituted by the Rajpramukh in consultation with the Government of India to represent Covenanting States other than Gwalior and Indore." I do not find anything either in the language of the main Article or in that of the Schedule to warrant a conclusion that the Rajpramukh could not accept for the Interim Legislative Assembly 40 members elected by the members of the Gwalior Legislative Assembly and 15 members elected by the members of the Indore Legislative Assembly unless such members were elected after the 11th of May 1948, when the Rajpramukh entered upon the functions of his office. The Article requires the Rajpramukh to constitute an Interim Legislative Assembly and the Schedule gives the constitution of the Assembly to be constituted. There is not a word either in the Schedule or in the main Article to suggest that its members must be elected after the Rajpramukh had entered upon the functions of his Office. All that the Rajpramukh had to see when he constituted the Interim Legislative Assembly was that the members of his Assembly fulfilled the qualifications mentioned in the Schedule. There is nothing to show that the provisions of Para. (2) of Sch. IV were not followed in the election of these members of the Gwalior and the Indore Legislative Assemblies. 14. Under Article X Paragraph (3) the Rajpramukh had the power to make and promulgate Ordinances for the good government of the United State. In exercise of these powers on the 30th of October 1948 the Rajpramukh by an Ordinance No. 18 of 1948 made provision for the working of the said Interim Legislative Assembly and for some other matters consequential and incidental to it. In exercise of these powers on the 30th of October 1948 the Rajpramukh by an Ordinance No. 18 of 1948 made provision for the working of the said Interim Legislative Assembly and for some other matters consequential and incidental to it. The Preamble of this Ordinance runs as follows : "Whereas Article X of the Covenant of 22nd April, 1948, entered into by the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in Central India for the formation of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat) which is hereinafter referred to as the 'Covenant' provides that until the formation of a Constituent Assembly for the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat) there shall be constituted for the said State an Interim Legislative Assembly in the manner specified in Sch. IV to the said Covenant; And whereas in accordance with the aforesaid provisions the said Legislative Assembly has already been duly constituted." This leaves no room for doubt that after the Rajpramukh had entered upon the functions of his office he accepted the members elected by the Gwalior and the Indore Assemblies as members of the new Legislative Assembly and set upon what was done on the 8th and the 9th of May 1948 by the Gwalior and Indore Legislative Assemblies the seal' of his approval. This ratification, if such a term can appropriately be applied to what was done by him, is a complete answer to any such argument as was advanced by Mr. Somayya. 15. I should before proceeding further like to say a few words as to the approach of the learned counsel to the matter before us. He attempted to interpret the Covenant as if it were a Statute passed by a Parliament. We should not forget the origin of this document, the circumstances in and the purposes for which it was brought into existence. The parties to it were Rulers of a number of Central India States who had absolute authority to enter into such a Covenant in regard to their respective States. They could, at the time of which we are speaking, by mutual consent and concurrence of the Government of India amend, alter or abrogate the Covenant. At the period of which we are speaking, it was for them to interpret the Covenant and to determine how it was to be given effect to. They could, at the time of which we are speaking, by mutual consent and concurrence of the Government of India amend, alter or abrogate the Covenant. At the period of which we are speaking, it was for them to interpret the Covenant and to determine how it was to be given effect to. The Raj Pramukh was their mouthpiece and if he has put upon the terms of the Covenant any interpretation and given effect to its provisions in a particular manner which has been accepted by all of them either expressly or by tacit consent in refraining from raising any objection to what was done by the Raj Pramukh this in the absence of very strong reasons to the contrary, must be accepted as the proper interpretation of the meaning and the purposes of the Covenant. The Covenant before us is more akin to a treaty entered into by various States rather than a Statute passed by a Legislature and accordingly it is only appropriate if the rules to be applied to its construction are those applicable to treaties rather than those applied to interpretation of Legislative enactments. The method of interpretation appropriate to such a document is what Schwarzenberger calls 'Functional Interpretation' in his International Law (Second Edition, Volume I, pages 219-20). He refers there with approval to the observations made by the Permanent Courts of International Justice in the case of Chorzow Factory (1927) where the Court interpreting an Article of the Geneva Convention of 1922 observed : "For the interpretation of Art. 23, account must be taken not only of the historical development of arbitration treaties, as well as of the terminology of such treaties, and of the grammatical and logical meaning of the words used, 'but also and more especially of the function which, in the intention of the contracting parties, is to be attributed to this provision'." 16. The main purpose of interpreting any such Covenant should be to put an interpretation which would give the fullest effect to the document. "It must fulfill the functions which the parties had intended it to fulfill. The main purpose of interpreting any such Covenant should be to put an interpretation which would give the fullest effect to the document. "It must fulfill the functions which the parties had intended it to fulfill. An interpretation which would run counter to the establishment (sic) aims of the treaty (Covenant) is to be avoided." Any attempt to apply all the technical rules ordinarily used for the interpretation of a Statute or to put a legalistic and narrow interpretation upon such a document would be improper and defeat the intention of the parties thereto and the purposes for which it was brought into existence. I am, however, as already stated earlier, of opinion that even if we put a literal interpretation on Article X there is nothing in it or Schedule IV which would support Mr. Somayya's contention. 17. 2. The second point raised by Mr. Somayya was that according to Schedule IV, 20 members should have been elected by an electoral college to be constituted by the Rajpramukh in consultation with the Government of India to represent Covenanting States other than Gwalior and Indore. This it was contended was not done. We have before us an affidavit filed over the signature, of an Under Secretary to the Madhya Bharat Government. Shri Shambhunath Chaturvedi, the relevant portion whereof reads as follows : "The third groups consisted of 19 Covenanting States. The members to represent this group had to be elected by an electoral college constituted by the Rajpramukh in consultation with the Government of India. On exploration of this field, the Rajpramukh was unable to discover any public bodies from which readily to constitute an electoral college. A workable formula was, therefore, evolved for setting up an ad loc electoral college in consultation with the Government of India. Public opinion was sounded by the Secretary to the State Ministry for that purpose. In accordance with the consensus of public opinion gathered from the Regional Council of the Central India States 'Peoples' Conference and other representatives, the Prajamandal Organisation was reported fairly to reflect the democratic trends and could serve as an electoral college. That body was, therefore, asked to elect 14 members who were thus elected. To afford representation to other sections of public opinion, if any, the Raj Pramukh was authorised to make nomination of 6 members in consultation with the Premier of Madhya Bharat. That body was, therefore, asked to elect 14 members who were thus elected. To afford representation to other sections of public opinion, if any, the Raj Pramukh was authorised to make nomination of 6 members in consultation with the Premier of Madhya Bharat. The Government of India, on the point being taken up with them by the Premier of Madhya Bharat, agreed that the 6 vacancies be filled by the nominees of the Madhya Bharat Provincial Congress Committee. (Vide D. O. Letter No. D. 14681-P. 48). The vacancies were thus filled. This scheme constituted in terms an ad-hoc electoral College as the only practical solution of political problem and the only working hypothesis. The representatives of the third group were, thus, validly elected by the 14th October, 1948 and on the 19th October, 1948 the personnel and the formation of the Interim Legislative Assembly were notified by the Rajpramukh." It may be mentioned that the accuracy of this affidavit was challenged by a counter affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner. I have however no hesitation in accepting Shri Shambhunath Chaturvedi's affidavit, the contents whereof are at least in part supported by a demiofficial letter from Shri V. Shankar who was acting as Secretary to the Minister for States in 1948 and true copy whereof has been filed before us. The Rajpramukh was to constitute an electoral college in consultation with the Government of India to represent Covenanting States other than Gwalior and Indore. The power of the Raj Pramukh in forming the electoral college was unrestricted. All that was required was that he should do so in consultation with the Government of India. An electoral college is nothing more than a body of electors to choose one or more persons for a certain office or for an assembly. There is no invariable rule for constituting an electoral college. The extract from the affidavit of Shri Chaturvedi quoted above sets out the circumstances and the manner in which these 20 members to represent States other than Gwalior and Indore were chosen. 14 of them were elected by the 'Prajamandal' and 6 by the Madhya Bharat Provincial Congress Committee. In the absence of any fixed rule for constituting an electoral college it is difficult to see the point in Mr. Somayya's objection. 14 of them were elected by the 'Prajamandal' and 6 by the Madhya Bharat Provincial Congress Committee. In the absence of any fixed rule for constituting an electoral college it is difficult to see the point in Mr. Somayya's objection. The electoral college which sent, these 20 members consisted of two divisions - one the 'Prajamandal' and the other the Madhya Bharat Provincial Congress Committee.' - Possibly Mr. Somayya's objection was that all the members of the electoral college should have participated in electing each of the 20 members for the Interim Legislative Assembly who were to represent the group of States other than Gwalior and Indore. It is true that the words used in the Schedule IV (i) (c) are "an electoral college", but I can find nothing in these words which would make it incumbent upon the Rajpramukh to constitute a body of electors which may not consist of two divisions. All that was necessary was that these members should be elected. The body or bodies which were to elect them depended upon the choice of the Raj Pramukh which could be exercised only in consultation with the Government of India. I am unable to find any warrant in the language of Schedule IV for the conclusion that an electoral college consisting of two divisions each of whom was to elect a certain number of members, could not be formed by the Rajpramukh. To my mind only three things were essential : (1) That the electoral college should be constituted by the Raj Pramukh. (2) That he should do so in consultation with the Government of India; and (3) that the members should be chosen by election. If these three conditions were fulfilled and 20 members were elected for the Interim Legislative Assembly I am of opinion that the requirements of the Schedule should be deemed to have been substantially met with. 18. It may also be a matter for consideration that the Covenant makes no provision for the consequences of the failure or inability of the Raj Pramukh to comply literally with any of its provisions. 19. The object in view was to secure the representation of the group of smaller states. This it was indicated should be done by constituting an electoral college. It was further provided that the election by this college should be by proportionate representation by means of the single transferable vote. 19. The object in view was to secure the representation of the group of smaller states. This it was indicated should be done by constituting an electoral college. It was further provided that the election by this college should be by proportionate representation by means of the single transferable vote. The power of Raj Pramukh to constitute an electoral college was left unfettered by any restrictions. If with a view to achieve the objects and purposes of the Covenant the Rajpramukh gave effect to any of its provisions in a manner which constituted substantial, though not literal compliance with the words used, but no objection is taken to such a course by the parties to the Covenant, it may, in these circumstances be legitimate to infer that what was done by the Raj Pramukh was within the scope of the general authority which the signatories to the Covenant must be deemed to have conferred upon him. The covenant was creating an Executive Head of a new State. He was entrusted with unfettered powers to issue Ordinances for the peace and good government of the new State which was brought into existence. We cannot in these circumstances impute to the signatories to the Covenant an intention to insist upon literal compliance with every provision contained therein by the Rajpramukh. An authority like the Rajpramukh could not in the discharge of the multifarious functions which his office naturally imposed upon him, be expected to sacrifice the objects and purposes of the Covenant by an attempt to comply literally with any supposed interpretation of a provision of the Covenant. Such, I am clear could not have been the intention of the signatories to the Covenant. They must be taken to be aware that in the task which they set to the Rajpramukh there might crop up many unforeseen contingencies. How was he to deal with a situation, like this? There was no provision in the Covenant for the Rajpramukh to consult the signatories to the Covenant on such occasions. It would be wrong to suppose that he was merely their agent. To my mind it is not only a legitimate but in fact the only proper interpretation of such a Covenant to construe it as conferring upon the Rajpramukh authority to give effect to its provisions in the manner which in his opinion was best calculated to achieve its objects and purposes. To my mind it is not only a legitimate but in fact the only proper interpretation of such a Covenant to construe it as conferring upon the Rajpramukh authority to give effect to its provisions in the manner which in his opinion was best calculated to achieve its objects and purposes. So long as he did not disregard any positive direction laid down for his guidance, anything done by him could not be challenged on the ground of his failure to comply literally with the words of any provisions of the Covenant. 20. It was the Government of India which had not only concurred in but guaranteed the provisions of the Covenant. There is no suggestion that whatever was done by the Rajpramukh in regard to the election of 20 members to secure the representation of the smaller group of States did not have the approval of the Government of India. Ever since its formation in 1948 the Interim Legislative Assembly thus constituted had been functioning as a Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat till the 25th of January 1950 when the Constitution of India came into force. The Constitution toy providing in Art. 385 that the body or the authority functioning immediately before it came into force, as the Legislature of an Indian State shall exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred by the provisions of the Constitution on the house or houses of the Legislature of that State, indirectly set its seal of approval on the constitutional validity of the Interim Legislative Assembly constituted by the Rajpramukh in Madhya Bharat as a body. When I say so I do not imply that the validity of election of one or more members of this Assembly could not be challenged. But I am of opinion that it is not open to one to challenge the constitutionality of the Madhya Bharat Assembly as a body and to contend that any enactment passed by it was unconstitutional on the ground that it was not a validly constituted Assembly. 21. Another argument advanced by the learned Advocate General in reply to Mr. Somayya's contention was that the impugned Act was passed in 1951 by a Legislative Assembly which derived its authority under Art. 385 of the Constitution. 21. Another argument advanced by the learned Advocate General in reply to Mr. Somayya's contention was that the impugned Act was passed in 1951 by a Legislative Assembly which derived its authority under Art. 385 of the Constitution. That Article provides that the body or authority functioning immediately before the commencement of the Constitution as the Legislature of an Indian State was to exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred by the provisions of the Constitution on the house or houses of the Legislature of that State. The Advocate General contended that under this provision the only test which could be applied in examining the constitutionality of the body which was functioning as the Legislature in Madhya Bharat when the Zamindari Abolition Act was passed must be a factual one. All that could be considered was whether this Assembly was immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, a body functioning as the legislature in Madhya Bharat, The framers of the Constitution could not have been oblivious of the possibility of the constitutionality of any of the existing Legislatures in any of the Part B States being open to challenge on the 25th of January 1950. All they required of a body which was under Art. 385 to be invested with the authority of a House or Houses of the Legislature of the State was, that it should on the 25th of January 1950 be functioning as the Legislature in the Indian State concerned. The argument so advanced does not imply that the provisions of Art. 385 of the Constitution were a bar to the validity of election of any member of that Assembly being challenged as invalid. What he stressed however was that the constitutionality of the Legislative Assembly as a body could not in view of the provisions of Art. 385 be challenged. The argument is not without force. Art. 385 of the Constitution requires the application of only a factual test. It cannot be disputed, and in fact it was not disputed, that the Legislative Assembly which passed the Zamindari Abolition Act was on the 25th of January 1950 functioning as the Legislature in Madhya Bharat. The argument is not without force. Art. 385 of the Constitution requires the application of only a factual test. It cannot be disputed, and in fact it was not disputed, that the Legislative Assembly which passed the Zamindari Abolition Act was on the 25th of January 1950 functioning as the Legislature in Madhya Bharat. Reference may in this connection be made to Section 9 (2) of the Interim Legislative Assembly Ordinance No. 18 of 1948 (Madhya Bharat) which provides that : "The Assembly shall have power to act notwithstanding any vacancy in the membership thereof, and any proceeding in the Assembly shall be valid notwithstanding that it is discovered subsequently that some person who was not entitled to do so sat or voted or otherwise took part in the proceedings." The same provision was re-enacted as S. 9 (2)1 of the Interim Legislative Assembly Act No. 23 of 1949 by which Ordinance No. 18 of 1949 was repealed. The constitutionality as a body of the Legislative Assembly which passed the Zamindari Abolition Act cannot be challenged as it fulfilled the factual test laid down by Art.385 of the Constitution. Accordingly even if it be assumed that some members of that body who were not entitled to sit, vote or otherwise take part in the proceedings of the Assembly did so, the validity of any enactment passed by it cannot be challenged in view of the provisions of Sec. 9(2) of the Interim Legislative Assembly Act. For the reasons above stated the point raised by Mr. Somayya must be rejected. 22. The third point raised by Mr. Somayya was that : "Under Article X Paragraph (2) of the Covenant the Rajpramukh was required to constitute an Interim Legislative Assembly not later than the first day of August 1948. This was not done and any Legislative Assembly constituted subsequently could not be in accordance with the terms of the Covenant and therefore not a validly constituted body." 23. For obvious reasons the principle that 'time is of essence' which is often discussed in Law Courts in cases arising out of breach of contracts cannot be applied to interpretation of Article X of the Covenant. It is significant that there is no provision in the Covenant as to the consequences which would follow on the inability of the Rajpramukh to constitute an Interim Legislative Assembly before the 1st of August 1948. It is significant that there is no provision in the Covenant as to the consequences which would follow on the inability of the Rajpramukh to constitute an Interim Legislative Assembly before the 1st of August 1948. The circumstances which caused the delay have been stated in the affidavit filed by Shri Chaturvedi. If we accept Mr. Somayya's contention that time was of essence we would be creating an impossible position. The Rajpramukh either could not or did not constitute the Interim Legislative Assembly before the 1st day of August 1948. He constituted the Interim Legislative Assembly some time later. If it be held that he had no authority to do so, we will find ourselves in a position that the entire fabric of the edifice conceived of by the Covenant would fall. There would be no Legislative Assembly and no authority to frame Laws for the newly created State. The fact that no provision is made in the Covenant for such a contingency is a strong ground for the inference that time was not intended to be 'of essence'. I am confirmed in this view by the circumstance that neither any of the signatories to the Covenant nor the Government of India who had concurred in the Covenant and guaranteed its provisions ever raised any objection to the constitution of the Interim Legislative Assembly at a period subsequent to that indicated in Article X (2) of the Covenant. The only purpose of fixing a date was in my opinion to emphasise the need for expeditiousness in the constitution of the Interim Legislative Assembly. I am unable to accept Mr. Somayya's argument which if given effect to would lead to an impossible position. 24. The fourth point taken by Mr. Somayya is already covered by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in 'Anand Bihari Mishra v. Ram Sahay,' Civil Misc. Appln. No. 3 of 1950, which was decided on the 12th of October 1951. I do not think I can usefully add anything to what was said there on this point and accept the view of Law expressed in that decision. 25. The impugned Act as we know from its preamble is an Act for acquisition of the rights of the proprietors in villages, Muhals, Chaks or blocks settled on Zamindari system in Madhya Bharat. 25. The impugned Act as we know from its preamble is an Act for acquisition of the rights of the proprietors in villages, Muhals, Chaks or blocks settled on Zamindari system in Madhya Bharat. In view of the recent amendment of the Constitution and addition of Art. 31A in Part III thereof it would ordinarily appear to be futile to challenge the validity of any such Act on the grounds mentioned in the application before us. Mr. Somayya was of course alive to this difficulty. 26. Article 31A reads thus : "Saving of Law providing for acquisition of Estate etc. 1. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, no Law providing for the acquisition by the State of any Estate or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part : Provided that where such Law is a law made by the Legislature of the State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such Law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent. 2. In this article :- (a) the expression 'estate' shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing Law relating to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any Jagir, Inam or Muafi or other similar grant; (b) the expression 'rights' in relation to an estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of the land revenue." 27. Mr. Somayya contended that the present Legislation was not saved by Art. 31A. Under the proviso to Art. 31A (1) where any such Law as is referred to in Clause (1) of the Article is a Law made by the Legislature of a State the provisions of Art. 31A shall not apply to it unless such Law having been reserved for the consideration of the President has received his assent. Under the proviso to Art. 31A (1) where any such Law as is referred to in Clause (1) of the Article is a Law made by the Legislature of a State the provisions of Art. 31A shall not apply to it unless such Law having been reserved for the consideration of the President has received his assent. He pointed out that in as much as the Bill for abolition of Zamindari in Madhya Bharat after it was passed by the Legislative Assembly did not receive the assent of the Rajpramukh as required under Art 200 of the Constitution to make it a Law the provisions of the proviso just referred to were not complied with. What was reserved by the Raj Pramukh for the assent of the President in the present case was a Bill passed by the State, Therefore any such Legislation would not attract itself the provisions of Art. 31 A. 28. Another argument advanced by Mr. Somayya was that Art. 31A barred a challenge to the validity of a Law providing for the acquisition of any estate which was based on the ground "that it was inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred" by any provisions of Part III of the Constitution. But a challenge based on other grounds was outside the scope of Art. 31A. According to him the rights of his client which are infringed by the present Act were not rights "conferred" by Part III of the Constitution. They were natural rights which were merely recognised by the Constitution. He sought to draw a distinction between the rights "conferred" and rights "recognised" by Part III of the Constitution. 29. The first of his argument is the same which was advanced before a Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Misc. Petn. No. 29 of 1951 in connection with the corresponding Act passed by the Central Provinces and Berar Legislative Assembly for abolition of Zamindari in that State. This judgment has not yet been published in any of the legal journals but a copy of the same was made available to us by the Advocate General and we find from Paras. 24 to 26 of the judgment that the argument was rejected by that Court. Their Lordships observed at paragraph 26 of the Judgment :- "The matter can also be put in a different way. 24 to 26 of the judgment that the argument was rejected by that Court. Their Lordships observed at paragraph 26 of the Judgment :- "The matter can also be put in a different way. After a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly the Governor has three courses open to him - either give his assent to the Bill or to withhold his assent therefrom or reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President. A discretion is conferred upon him by the Constitution to follow one of these three courses (except in a case where, as here, another specific provision of the Constitution makes it obligatory upon him to pursue a particular course. What is important to note is that by following one of the three courses permitted to him by Art. 200 he exhausts his function and there is nothing more that he is expected to do, even though he is a part of the Legislature. It is not the Law that a Bill can never pass into an Act except with the assent of the Governor. It may further be added that when the Governor does not withhold his assent to a Bill and reserves the same for the consideration of the President, he must be deemed to have given his assent to that Bill, as an essential part of the Legislature of the State." I respectfully agree with this view. 30. It will further be noticed that Part VI of the Constitution makes provision for Legislative Procedure. Though it provides for reservation of a Bill, passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State by the Rajpramukh for the consideration of the President there is no provision made in that part for reservation of 'Law' for the President's consideration. Article 201 also speaks only of the assent of the Bill, reserved for his consideration or withholding of assent therefrom. There is no provision for reserving of 'the Law' for the assent of the President in any of the Articles in that Part. This inclines me to take the view that the word 'Law' as used in Art. 31A means more than a Bill passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State or in the case of a State having the Legislative Council a Bill passed by both Houses of Legislature of the State. An argument analogous to that advanced by Mr. This inclines me to take the view that the word 'Law' as used in Art. 31A means more than a Bill passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State or in the case of a State having the Legislative Council a Bill passed by both Houses of Legislature of the State. An argument analogous to that advanced by Mr. Somayya was put forward before a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in 'Raja Suryapal Singh v. The U.P. Government', AIR (38) 1951 All 674 by Mr. P.R. Das and was not upheld (See Paragraph 24 of the judgment) For the reasons given above I am of opinion that the contention put forward by Mr. Somayya is without force. 31. As regards the other argument advanced by Mr. Somayya concerning the inapplicability of Art. 31A to the present Act I may say at once, that it is too late in the day to base an argument in an Indian Court on the theory of the natural rights of man, particularly in relation to property. Without entering into any detailed discussion of this now trite proposition, I may say that the very concept of property pertains to a stage in the evolution of this history of man when he had passed beyond the "state of nature." I do not mean to suggest that the expression "natural right" has no meaning. It may well have a meaning in other contexts but has none in a discussion relating to the validity of a Legislative enactment which is challenged in an Indian Court of Law on the ground that it infringes a natural right. We are aware of the time and energy which have been spent in English and American Courts over discussion of arguments based on 'natural rights' and "natural justice". Recently however when a kindred question was raised in connection with the meaning of the words "procedure established by the law" in Art. 21 of the Constitution in our own Supreme Court in 'A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras', AIR (37) 1950 SC 27, there was a consensus of opinion on the point. Recently however when a kindred question was raised in connection with the meaning of the words "procedure established by the law" in Art. 21 of the Constitution in our own Supreme Court in 'A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras', AIR (37) 1950 SC 27, there was a consensus of opinion on the point. This may well be stated in the words of Mahajan, J., that : "A Court cannot declare a Statute unconstitutional and void on the ground of unjust and oppressive provisions and because it is supposed to violate natural, social or political rights of citizens unless it can be shown that such injustice is prohibited by or such rights are guaranteed by, the Constitution." 32. I will now consider whether the distinction sought to be drawn by the learned counsel between rights "conferred" by Part III (3) and rights that were only 'recognised' by that Part is sound. Article 31(1) lays down that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of Law. Can we say that this provision of the Constitution only recognises some right which existed previous to the commencement of the Constitution? In this connection it is well to remind ourselves that whatever rights can now be claimed by any citizen in India must be on the basis of the Constitution. If relief is sought in respect of any infringement of an alleged right, the persons asking for such relief must base his claim on some provision of the Constitution either express or implied. It is true that legal rights existed and were recognised even before the 26th of January 1950, and even that what are now called Fundamental Rights are some of those rights which were recognised by the Law Courts even before the commencement of the Constitution of India. There is however a real distinction between the rights as they existed previously and the Fundamental Rights as they are now called. The Fundamental Rights derive their sanctity not from anything which existed previously but from the Constitution and in this sense they are conferred by the Constitution. And I may add that they are rightly called as "conferred" by the constitution in as much as for enforcement of such rights new remedies are made available to the citizens of India. 33. Entries 18 and 36 of List II (2) of the Seventh Schedule run as follows : "18. And I may add that they are rightly called as "conferred" by the constitution in as much as for enforcement of such rights new remedies are made available to the citizens of India. 33. Entries 18 and 36 of List II (2) of the Seventh Schedule run as follows : "18. Land that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenure including the relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization. 36. Acquisition or requisitioning of property except for the purposes of the Union, subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III (3)." 34. Entry 42 of List III (3) is as follows : "Principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given." 34a. Mr. Somayya's client may have had a right to hold his Zamindari property even before the commencement of the present Constitution. The Legislature of the State was however given the authority to acquire it subject to the provisions of Entry 42 of List III (3). Article 31 (2) however confers upon him a new right in as much as it provides that no Law for acquisition of immoveable property shall be valid unless it provides for compensation for such acquisition and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principle on which and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given. In the absence of this provision Mr. Somayya could not challenge the validity of any enactment passed" by the Madhya Bharat Legislature for acquisition of his client's Zamindari. Even if Mr. Somayya's contention about the distinction between a right "conferred" and a right "recognised" by the Constitution were sound which I do not concede the present application is not a proceeding in relation to a right which has been merely recognised, but is in regard to a right which has been conferred by the Constitution. The argument that Art. 31A does not apply to the present case must therefore fail. 35. The argument that Art. 31A does not apply to the present case must therefore fail. 35. The learned Advocate General contended on behalf of the State that even apart from Art. 31A the impugned Act could not be successfully challenged as it was saved by Article 31 (4) of the Constitution, That clause provides that : "If any Bill pending at the commencement of this Constitution in the Legislature of a State has, after it has been passed by such Legislature, been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, then, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the Law so assented to shall not be called in question in any Court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of Cl. (2)." It was argued that this was a Bill pending at the commencement of the Constitution in the Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat. After it was passed by the Legislative Assembly it was reserved by the Raj Pramukh for consideration of the President and receiving his assent. Accordingly 'notwithstanding anything in the Constitution' this Act cannot be challenged on the ground that it is of discriminatory or confiscatory character and does not provide for compensation or fails to specify the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation has to be determined. In reply to this Mr. Somayya argued that the Bill after it emerged from the Select Committee was so altered that it could not be called the same Bill as introduced. A similar argument was advanced in the Nagpur case to which reference has already been made and it was summarily rejected with the observation that : "We cannot accept the contention. In our judgment the requirement of the clause is that a Bill must be pending on. the date of the commencement of the Constitution and not that the Act ultimately passed must be in every respect follow the Bill." To me the argument seems to be wholly without substance and if I may say so without disrespect was rightly rejected. 36. The Bill passed through the usual Legislative Procedure and any argument that the Act as passed by the Legislative Assembly and assented to by the President, could not be called to be the same Legislation as was envisaged by the original Bill must fail. 36. The Bill passed through the usual Legislative Procedure and any argument that the Act as passed by the Legislative Assembly and assented to by the President, could not be called to be the same Legislation as was envisaged by the original Bill must fail. There is no warrant for the proposition that if a Bill as originally introduced in a Legislative Assembly, is during its passage through the House, so materially altered as to become unrecognisable as the same Bill, the resulting Act can be impugned on this ground. 37. Under Art. 208 of the Constitution a House of the Legislature of a State is empowered to make rules for regulating its procedure and the conduct of its business subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Article 212 provides that the validity of any proceeding in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity in the procedure. It would appear therefore that an objection like that raised by Mr. Somayya cannot be considered or enquired into by a Court of Law. 38. It was next contended that the Act was bad in as much as it was confiscatory and discriminatory in character. This argument was obviously based on the provisions of Arts. 14 and 31 of the Constitution. For a full appreciation of this contention it is desirable to give a brief resume of the contents of the impugned Act. It consists of 8 Chapters and has 3 Schedules attached to it. Chapter I entitled "preliminaries" deals with the title, extent and commencement of the enactment and gives certain definitions. Chapter II relates to the vesting of proprietary rights in the State. The most important provision of this chapter is contained in S. 3 which has been reproduced at page 2 of this judgment. Chapter III (3) : This chapter provides for assessment of compensation. Under S. 8 which forms part of this Chapter it is made obligatory upon the Government to pay compensation to every proprietor who is divested of his proprietary rights. The compensation is to be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in Sch. I annexed to the Act. Paragraph 4 of the Schedule provides that the compensation payable to the proprietor under S. 8 (1) shall be eight times the net income determined in accordance with the provisions contained in that Schedule. The compensation is to be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in Sch. I annexed to the Act. Paragraph 4 of the Schedule provides that the compensation payable to the proprietor under S. 8 (1) shall be eight times the net income determined in accordance with the provisions contained in that Schedule. There is a proviso to this paragraph which runs as follows : "Provided that the Chakdar or blockdar who has completely fulfilled the conditions of his. lease shall be entitled to the refund of the deposit money together with interest thereon deposited by him at the time of taking the lease." Chapter IV is devoted to determination of debts secured on Zamindari rights. Chapter V deals with payment of compensation. Chapter VI relates to the management of tenure of lands after Zamindari rights have been acquired by the State. Chapter VII : Provisions relating to the rehabilitation grant form the subject-matter of this Chapter. In addition to compensation which the proprietors are to get such of them as pay annual land revenue not exceeding Rs. 3500/- are to be paid rehabilitation grants on a graduated scale. The scale on which rehabilitation grant is to be given is more favourable to smaller Zamindars than to those holding big Zamindaries. Chapter VIII deals with certain miscellaneous provisions. Schedule I as already stated gives the method of assessing compensation and its measure. Schedule II contains the rehabilitation grant Rules; and Schedule III mentions the points which were to be considered in determination of the amount of compensation with regard to wells. 39. I will now deal with two contentions that were raised by the applicant's learned counsel. He contended that : (1) The Act was confiscatory in as much as it did not provide for any compensation being given to Chakdars and blockdars; and (2) that certain items of property were not evaluated in assessment of the compensation. 40. The first of these arguments appears to be based on a misapprehension. As already stated under S. 8 a duty has been cast upon the Government to pay compensation to every proprietor who is divested of proprietary rights. "Proprietor" is defined in S. 2 (a) of the Act. 40. The first of these arguments appears to be based on a misapprehension. As already stated under S. 8 a duty has been cast upon the Government to pay compensation to every proprietor who is divested of proprietary rights. "Proprietor" is defined in S. 2 (a) of the Act. It means in respect of a village, Muhal or land settled on Zamindari system, a person owing whether in trust or for his own benefit such village, Muhal or land and includes a Chakdar or Blockdar whose lease granted to him by the Government under any Act, Rules or Circular relating to the Chaks and blocks, includes also amongst other conditions, a condition that he shall acquire proprietary rights in respect of that Chak or block when the conditions of the lease are fulfilled. A reference to S. 7 of the Act will also show that in the Chapter dealing with the assessment of compensation it is only Mustaja Supurdgidar, mortgagee and the ex-Zamindar whose rights to acquire Zamindari have ceased are not included within the term "Proprietor". Section 7 makes no reference to Chakdars or blockdars. A complete answer to this argument will be found in paragraph (4) of Sch. I which lays down that : "The compensation payable to the proprietor under S. 8 (1) shall be eight times the net income determined in accordance with the provisions hereinafter contained : Provided that the Chakdar or blockdar who has completely fulfilled the conditions of his lease shall be entitled to the refund of the deposit money together with interest thereon deposited by him at the time of taking the lease." 41. The next ground for the objection that the Act is confiscatory was based on the absence of any provision therein under which compensation could be awarded for forest lands pastures, stray trees and similar other items pertaining to Zamindari. According to Para. (2) of Sch. I, the gross income of a village, Muhal, Chak or Block shall include the following : (a)..................... (b)..................... (c) The Sivai Jama income which shall be an amount equal to 1/5 of such total income during the five agricultural years from Samvat 2000 to 2004 as recorded in the Siyaha of the village, Muhal, Chak or block. 42. There are two notes appended at the foot of this Paragraph. (b)..................... (c) The Sivai Jama income which shall be an amount equal to 1/5 of such total income during the five agricultural years from Samvat 2000 to 2004 as recorded in the Siyaha of the village, Muhal, Chak or block. 42. There are two notes appended at the foot of this Paragraph. The first of which runs as follows : "Only the income for those items will be taken which were included in the assessment at the time of the current settlement." Sivai Jama as is well known is a term applied to income arising in a Zamindari from sources other than rent received by letting out agricultural land for cultivation. Thus it would appear that the income from sources to which reference was made by Mr. Somayya has not been ignored by the Act in assessment of compensation. The same contention was urged before a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in 'Suryapalsingh v. The U.P. Government', AIR (38) 1951 All 674, and was rejected. The learned Chief Justice observed in Para. 76 of the judgment : "The argument rests on the assumption that the compensation is being paid on the basis of the income of the property, and that, therefore, no compensation is payable for non-income yielding property. We think this argument to be fallacious. In the first place compensation is based on the assets of the intermediary, those assets being measured by the value of the net income. Secondly, what is being acquired under the Act are the estates of the intermediaries, and each of such estates must be regarded as a whole. It would not in our opinion be correct to regard the acquisition of an estate as an aggregate of the acquisition of separate parts of or interest in the estate considered independently of each other." I respectfully agree with the view expressed in this case. The usual method of evaluating Zamindari property when it is sold is to take the annual rental plus the Sivai Jama of the property in question and to calculate the price at a figure which is 20,25,30 times or any other similar multiple of the annual income thus ascertained minus the land revenue. I am clear that there is no substance in this contention. 43. I am clear that there is no substance in this contention. 43. Another argument advanced by the learned counsel was that the Act is discriminatory in character and thus contravenes the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Reference was in this connection made to the method prescribed for calculation and award of the rehabilitation grant. The rehabilitation grant was it is contended a part of compensation and inasmuch as the Statute discriminates between bigger and smaller Zamindars in giving rehabilitation grants the provisions of the Act pertaining to the subject of compensation must be held to be void. In as much as I have taken the view that the impugned Act is saved by the provisions of Art. 31A it is unnecessary to go into this matter. Were it however necessary to do so I would hold that the provisions relating to the award of rehabilitation grants though discriminatory are not void. 44. The argument advanced before us was also advanced in the case of 'Suryapalsingh v. The U.P. Government', AIR (38) 1951 All 674, and was rejected. It is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in the 'State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara', AIR (38) 1951 SC 318, that where different Laws are enacted for different classes of persons and the classification is not arbitrary or capricious but rests on some reasonable basis there is no room for application of Art. 14. Section 39 of the Bombay Prohibition Act of 1949 provided that the Provincial Government may, on such conditions as may be specified in the notification published in the Official Gazette, permit the use or consumption of foreign liquor on cargo boats, warships and troopships and in military and naval messes and canteens. It was contended that this exemption in favour of certain classes of persons being discriminatory was against the provisions of Art. 14 and hence the impugned Act was bad. In considering this argument Fazl Ali, J., observed (See Paragraph 21 of the Judgment) : "The question is whether in relaxing the rule in favour of Warships, troopships and military and naval messes and canteens the Legislature has acted arbitrarily and capriciously or it has proceeded here also on the basis of reasonable classification." The distinction between the bigger and the smaller Zamindars cannot be said to be arbitrary or capricious. A distinction based on the economic condition of the different classes cannot be said to be unreasonable. 45. Before bringing this judgment to a close I should like to say a few words about a matter which attracted our attention during the course of argument. There are certain sections in the Act which bar the jurisdiction of Court and other authorities to interfere with the decisions taken by the persons appointed under the Act. The question arose whether any of those sections were in conflict with the provisions of Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Reference was made to Ss. 14 (5), 15, 20, 31 and 32 in this connection. 46. Section 14 (5) runs thus : "Except as provided in sub-ss. (1), (2), (3) and (4) the decision and the record made by the Deputy Compensation Officer shall be final and conclusive in respect of the quantum of the compensation payable and other entries made in the statement of the Deputy Compensation Officer." I am clear that the phrase "final and conclusive" means nothing more than it would not be open to challenge by an appeal or other proceeding. It should not be however interpreted to mean that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution was thereby excluded. The ordinary rule of construction is that provisions in any enactment if it is possible to put upon them such a construction without doing violence to the language used should be so interpreted as not to make them inconsistent with other Statutes. 47. Section 15 provides as-follows : "Except an authority before whom an appeal under this Chapter is pending against an order of the Compensation Officer, no Court or authority shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any Law for the time being in force, issue any injunction against any person in respect of any proceedings pending before the Compensation Officer under this Chapter which has the effect of staying the proceedings." The principle of construction which I have applied to S. 14 (5) cannot however be applied to this section. In view of the words "anything contained in any Law for the time being in force" it is not possible to hold that the section does not trench upon the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In view of the words "anything contained in any Law for the time being in force" it is not possible to hold that the section does not trench upon the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. I hold therefore that the section in so far as it excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court exercisable under these two Articles is ultra vires of the powers of State Legislature. 48. Section 20 (5) purports to exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. This section prescribes the procedure for preliminary proceedings for determination of debts, and lays down that if no objection is made under sub-s. (2) of the Section or if an objection is made and decided, the jurisdiction of the Claims Officer to proceed in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter shall not be questioned in any civil Court. Applying the principle of construction which I did on the interpretation of S. 14 (5) I hold that it was not intended by this provision of the Act to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 49. The same reasoning applies to Ss. 31 and 32. I hold that inasmuch as they are not intended to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution they are in view of Entry No. 65 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution intra vires of the State Legislature. 50. For the reasons given above I hold that the impugned Act is a good and valid Law except for S. 15 of the Act which in so far as it purports to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court exercisable under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution is ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature. 51. The application shall stand dismissed. 52. In view of the fact that the questions raised as to the proper constitution of the State Legislative were not altogether free from difficulty I make no order as to costs. 53. 226 and 227 of the Constitution is ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature. 51. The application shall stand dismissed. 52. In view of the fact that the questions raised as to the proper constitution of the State Legislative were not altogether free from difficulty I make no order as to costs. 53. DIXIT, J. :- In this application under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner, who is the owner of certain Zamindari lands in Madhya Bharat challenges the constitutionality of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 (Act XIII (13) of 1951) and prays for the issue of a direction or an order against the State of Madhya Bharat prohibiting them from giving effect to the said Act or proceeding in any manner under the Act. A number of similar applications by persons describing themselves as Zamindars, Chakdars, Malguzars and Blockdars have been filed in this Court challenging the same Act. In all these petitions, the objections raised to the validity of the Act are the same. 54. Out of the several grounds taken in the petition, Mr. Somayya, the learned counsel for the petitioner has excluded the grounds relating to the validity of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which have now been concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in the petition of 'Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India', Petitions Nos. 382, 371 and 166 of 1951. He confined his arguments to the following grounds : (1) that the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act is not protected by Art. 31A of the Constitution from being challenged on the ground that the Act violates the provisions of Arts. 14 and 31 (2) as these Articles merely recognise the Natural Rights of the petitioners and do not confer any new rights; (2) that the Act is discriminatory, expropriatory and does not give adequate compensation; that no compensation is given to Chakdars and Blockdars and for forests and grass lands and thus the Act infringes Arts. 14 and 31 (2) as these Articles merely recognise the Natural Rights of the petitioners and do not confer any new rights; (2) that the Act is discriminatory, expropriatory and does not give adequate compensation; that no compensation is given to Chakdars and Blockdars and for forests and grass lands and thus the Act infringes Arts. 14 and 31 (2) of the Constitution and is, therefore, 'ultra vires' and unconstitutional; (3) that the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Bill did not receive the assent of the Raj Pramukh and has therefore not passed into law; (4) that the Bill as passed by the State Legislature and assented to by the President was not identical with the Bill pending at the commencement of the Constitution, in that the Select Committee enlarged the scope of the Bill by extending it to chakdars and blockdars; (5) that the Madhya Bharat Legislative Assembly acted beyond its powers in adopting the Bill as altered by the Select Committee; (6) that the Assembly when it passed the Bill was not a valid Legislative Body under the Constitution for the reason firstly that the members of the body had not taken oath as required by Article 188 and secondly that it was presided over by a person who had not taken an oath under Article 188 and who was not entitled to continue in the office of Speaker of the Assembly after the coming into force of the Constitution; (7) that the Madhya Bharat Legislative Assembly which passed the Bill was not a properly constituted and a valid Legislative body under the Covenant entered into by the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and other Central Indian States for the formation of Madhya Bharat. 55. The title of the Act in question, namely, the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act describes it as "An Act to provide for the Public purposes of the improvement of agriculturists and financial condition of agriculturists by abolition and acquisition of the rights of proprietors in villages, muhals, chaks or blocks settled on Zamindari system, which is only a system of keeping an intermediary between the State and the tenants injurious to the betterment of agriculture as well as the agriculturists in Madhya Bharat and for other matters connected therewith." 56. Section 1 of the Act provides that it shall extend to the whole of Madhya Bharat and directs that it shall come into force on and from such date as the Government may notify. The Bill as passed by the Legislature was reserved by the Raj Pramukh for the consideration of the President. It received the assent of the President on 5-6-51. Thereafter, a notification was issued bringing the Act into force from 25-6-51. 57. Section 2 is the definition section and by Section 2 (a) it is provided that the term "proprietor" means : "as respects a village, muhal or land settled on Zamindari system a person owning whether in trust or for his own benefit such village, muhal or land" and includes : "1. a Malguzar as defined in sub-clause (12) of Section 2 of Qanoon Mal, Gwalior State, Samvat 1983; and 2. as respects a chak or block a chakdar or blockdar whose lease granted to him by the Government under any Act, Rules or Circular relating to chaks and blocks, includes also amongst other conditions, a condition that he shall acquire the proprietary rights in respect of that chak or block when the conditions of the lease are fulfilled; 3. the heirs and successor-in-interest of a proprietor." 58. Chapter II (2) deals with the vesting of proprietary rights in the State and the consequences of the vesting. 59. Chapter III provides for the assessment of compensation and the procedure for determination of the amount of compensation and also contains provisions for appeals, revisions, reviews against the decisions of officers determining compensation. A proprietor, on the acquisition of his proprietary rights by the State which term does not for the purposes of compensation include "mustajer, Supurdgidar, mortgagee and the ex-Zamindars whose rights to acquire Zamindari have ceased", becomes entitled to receive compensation eight times the net income determined in accordance with Schedule I to the Act. 60. Chapter IV contains provisions for the determination of debts of the proprietors. 61. Chapter V deals with the actual payment of compensation. 62. Chapter VI provides for the management and tenure of land and includes incidental provisions dealing with the consequential changes of the vesting of proprietary rights in the State. 63. 60. Chapter IV contains provisions for the determination of debts of the proprietors. 61. Chapter V deals with the actual payment of compensation. 62. Chapter VI provides for the management and tenure of land and includes incidental provisions dealing with the consequential changes of the vesting of proprietary rights in the State. 63. Chapter VII contains provisions for the payment of rehabilitation grants on a graduated scale as laid down in Schedule II to every proprietor, other than a Supurgidar, Mustajar, Sabiq Zamindar and Tehekedar, "who has been divested of his proprietary rights under the Act and who earns his livelihood wholly or mainly from agriculture" and who pays Rs. 3,500/- or less as land revenue. 64. Chapter VIII contains provisions for miscellaneous matters and empowers the Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. 65. Before dealing with the contentions of the petitioner, it is necessary to set out the provisions of Clause 1 of Art. 31A, inserted in Part III of the Constitution by the Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951. 1 "Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part." "Provided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this Article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent." 66. It is obvious that the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act is a law providing for the acquisition by the State of estate and of the rights therein as defined in clause 2 of Art. 31 A. The Bill passed by the State Legislature having been reserved for the consideration of the President, received his assent. It follows, therefore, from the provisions of Art. 31A that the Act cannot be called in question and declared void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, if I had not heard the plausible arguments of Mr. It follows, therefore, from the provisions of Art. 31A that the Act cannot be called in question and declared void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, if I had not heard the plausible arguments of Mr. Somayya the learned counsel for the petitioner, I should have thought that the petition in so far as it attacked the validity of the Act on the ground that it offends against Arts. 14 and 31(2) was unarguable. 67. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the protection afforded by Art. 31A is strictly confined to one ground, namely, that "it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of Part III, that the measure can be attacked on other grounds, that as any provision of Part III does not confer any right, the Act can be attacked on the ground that it is repugnant to that provision, that the right or personal liberty, of private property, and of equity before the law are the Natural Rights of Man, which the petitioner possessed even before the Constitution and possesses today independent of the Constitution, that as these Rights already existed, they cannot be said to have been conferred by Part III of the Constitution by their recognition and incorporation in that Part and that, therefore, if the Act infringes these Natural rights of the petitioner, it must be held to be void." 68. In reply, the learned Advocate-General contended that the petitioner possesses no Natural Rights as such. The recognition by the Constitution of the rights of equality and property as fundamental rights is a conferment of the rights by the Constitution and that therefore, Art. 31A completely shuts out the petitioner from contending that the Act is void on the ground that it violates the provisions of Arts. 14 and 31(2). 69. I am unable to accede to this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Somayya did not point out how and when Natural Rights originated or were recognised or enforced before the Constitution came into force. He apparently relied on the old political doctrine of the Natural Rights of Man as primordial Rights inherent in their personality as individuals. Mr. Somayya did not point out how and when Natural Rights originated or were recognised or enforced before the Constitution came into force. He apparently relied on the old political doctrine of the Natural Rights of Man as primordial Rights inherent in their personality as individuals. I do not propose to enter into a discussion on the so called Fundamental Natural Rights of Man. But it seems to me necessary to state that the formulation of the Natural Rights of Man is an idea of no great antiquity. It is not more ancient than the eighteenth century. The writings of Locke, Hume, Voltaire, Rousseau, Payne, and Blackstone in that century contributed to the development of the concept of the Rights of Man. Locke justified the English Revolution of 1688 by it and the commentaries of Blackstone furnished the philosophical basis for the American Declaration of Independence. Political Thinkers have differed in their views as to the nature and concept of these Rights. According to Burke, there are no such things as Natural Rights, all rights are socially created; convention creates society, and the society thus created -in its turn creates rights and it is free to limit and modify rights which it creates. Bentham dismissed Natural Rights of man as a fiction. Blackstone's view of the Natural Rights of Man as those "which need not the aid of human laws to be more effectually in every man than they are which no human Legislature has power to abridge or destroy", is, as pointed out by Professor Barker, an eminent English Political theorist in "Essays on Government" " (published in 1945) contradicted not only by the general doctrine of sovereignty but also by the rules and practice of English law". With the exception of very old cases such as 'Bonham's case, (1610) 8 Co. Rep. 118 and Day v. Savidge', (1614) Hob 97' decided in the seventeenth century and noted in many books on Constitutional law, one can find no recent English case holding that an Act of Parliament against natural equity or reason is void. 70. In our country, the ancient Ideal of Polity did not speak of the Rights of Man, but expatiated at length on the duties of Kings, as a guarantee of the Rights of their subjects. 70. In our country, the ancient Ideal of Polity did not speak of the Rights of Man, but expatiated at length on the duties of Kings, as a guarantee of the Rights of their subjects. It was only during the last twenty five years preceding the present Constitution that the idea regarding the Fundamental Natural Rights of Man found consistent expression and finally culminated in the incorporation of some of the rights in the Constitution. 71. The position today is that the rights of Liberty, Equality and of Property by their incorporation and recognition in Part III of the Constitution derive their validity from the Constitution. By giving validity to these Rights, the Constitution confers them on the citizens of the Republic. It is plain that the Natural Rights of Liberty, Property and of Equality before law is a meaningless phrase unless the Constitution which is the superior objective legal system, recognises the validity of the rights and provides for their maintenance and enforcement. The act of conferring a right is an act of authority and consists in the grant of recognition and validity by the authority to that right. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that Arts. 14 and 31(2) do not confer any rights on the citizens. They are not machinery provisions. They recognise the validity of the Right of Equality before the law, and of the Right to Property and thus confer the two rights on the citizens. 72. The flaw in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner lies in its premise that the Right of Equality and of Property is a part of some sacred law which is superior to the Constitution and is binding on the Legislature; whereas the truth is that these rights got their validity from the Constitution itself. 73. A somewhat similar argument was addressed before the Supreme Court in Gopalan's case, AIR (37) 1950 SC 27. The argument was rejected by the Supreme Court. Kania, C.J., observed : "It is difficult upon any general principles to limit the omnipotence of the soverein Legislative power by judicial interposition, except in so far as the express words of a written Constitution give that authority......... The argument was rejected by the Supreme Court. Kania, C.J., observed : "It is difficult upon any general principles to limit the omnipotence of the soverein Legislative power by judicial interposition, except in so far as the express words of a written Constitution give that authority......... It is only in express constitutional provisions limiting legislative power and controlling the will of a majority by a permanent and paramount law settled by the deliberate wisdom of the Nation that one can find a safe and solid ground for the authority of Courts of Justice to declare void any Legislative enactment." 74. His Lordship Mahajan, J., was even more emphatic on the subpect. He said (Para 132). "It is quite obvious that the Court cannot declare a statute unconstitutional and void on the ground of unjust and oppressive provisions and because it is supposed to violate natural, social or political rights of citizens unless it can be shown that such injustice is prohibited or such rights are guaranteed by the Constitution. It may also be observed that an Act cannot be declared void, because in the opinion of the Court it is opposed to the spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution but not so expressed in words. It is difficult on any general principles to limit the omnipotence of the sovereign Legislative power by judical interposition except in so far as the express words of a written Constitution give that authority." 75. These observations, in my judgment, govern the present case and following them, any attack on the validity of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act as contrary to the Natural Rights of the petitioner cannot be entertained. As observed by the Supreme Court in the petitions upholding the validity of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1951, Article 31A : "aims at saving laws providing for the compulsory acquisition by the State of a certain kind of property from the operation of Art. 13 read with other relevant articles in Part III." Articles 14 and 31 (2) are, in my opinion, articles which confer rights on the citizens and by virtue of Art. 31A, it is not open to the petitioner to challenge the Act on the ground that it violates the provisions of Arts. 14 and 31 (2). 76. 14 and 31 (2). 76. If the view, which I have expressed, is not correct I am further of the opinion that the Act is protected under Art. 31 (4) from challenge on the ground that the compensation provided by the Act is inadequate or that it gives no compensation for forest and grass-lands or that it discriminates against chakdars and blockdars by denying them any compensation. Clause 4 of Art. 31 says : "If any Bill pending at the commencement of the Constitution in the Legislature of a State has, after it has been passed by such Legislature, been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, then, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2)." 77. It is clear from this clause that if a Bill fulfils the two conditions laid down therein, then, the Act cannot be called in question on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause 2. That is to say, it cannot be challenged on the ground that it does not provide for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired or that it does not fix the amount of compensation or specify the principles on which the compensation is to be determined. It would, again, appear from the words "Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution" which occur in clause 4 that it is also not permissible to object to the Act on the ground that the compensation fixed or to be determined is no compensation in law as being contrary to other provisions of the Constitution, it is invalid. For, to question, on the basis of any article of the Constitution, the validity of the compensation fixed or the principles on which it is to be determined, is to say that the compensation or the principles on which it is to be determined are not the compensation or the principles contemplated by the provisions of clause 2 and that, therefore, the Act contravenes the provisions of clause 2. 78. A similar view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in 'Suryapal Singh v. U.P. Government', AIR (38) "1951 All 674 FB and by the Nagpur High Court in Misc. Petn. No. 29 of 1951 and other petitions decided on 6. 4. 51. 78. A similar view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in 'Suryapal Singh v. U.P. Government', AIR (38) "1951 All 674 FB and by the Nagpur High Court in Misc. Petn. No. 29 of 1951 and other petitions decided on 6. 4. 51. The Nagpur decision has not been reported so far, but a copy of the decision has been made available to us by the learned Advocate-General. The purpose, scope, the transitory nature of clause 4 of Art. 31 and the significance of the words "Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution" occurring therein, have been so fully dealt with in the aforesaid decisions of the Allahabad and Nagpur High Courts that I feel there is very little left to add to the reasons given therein to support the view that Art. 31 (4) bars any attack founded on the contravention of any article of the Constitution, if it is directed against the compensation fixed by the Act or the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined. In 'Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar', AIR (38) 1951 Pat 91, the Patna High Court, however, held that the protection given by Clause 4 is strictly confined to one ground only, namely, the ground arising out of the provisions of clause 2 of Art. 31 and that the words "Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution" do not enlarge the effect of the operative portion of the clause. On a careful perusal of the opinions expressed by the learned Judges constituting the Full Bench of the Patna High Court I am disposed to say with all respect to the learned Judges, that in forming this view, they have not given due weight to the words ''Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution". I agree with the observations of the learned Judges of the Nagpur High Court that the words "Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution" used in clause 4 are crucial and that, the Patna High Court has not given full effect to the amplitude of these words. 79. Leaving out of account for the moment the objection as to the alteration of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Bill during its progress in the Legislature, the impugned Act is clearly one to which Art. 31 (4) applies. The Bill leading to the Act was pending at the commencement of the Constitution in the State Legislature. 79. Leaving out of account for the moment the objection as to the alteration of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Bill during its progress in the Legislature, the impugned Act is clearly one to which Art. 31 (4) applies. The Bill leading to the Act was pending at the commencement of the Constitution in the State Legislature. It was reserved for the consideration of the President after it had been passed by the Legislature. Thereafter, it received the assent of the President. The petitioner cannot, therefore, in my view, question the validity of the Act on the ground that the compensation provided by the Statute is inadequate or unjust compensation or that the principles laid down for determining the compensation are inequitable on the ground of inequality. In fact the arguments addressed to us by the learned counsel for the petitioner to show that this Act contravened the provisions of Clause 2 of Art. 31, were only in relation to the matter of compensation for chakdars, blockdars and for forests and pasture lands. 80. It was said that land belonging to chakdars and blockdars is being acquired without compensation being paid for it; that the Act does not provide for any compensation for forests and pasture lands. There is no substance in this grievance. A chakdar or a blockdar is included in the definition of the word "proprietor" given in S. 2 (a) of the Act. He is also treated as a proprietor for the purposes of compensation. Under S. 8, every proprietor whose proprietary right is acquired is entitled to receive and to be paid eight times the net income determined in accordance with the provisions of Sch 1. The net income is arrived at after deducting certain items from the gross income. Section 2 of Schedule 1 makes a specific mention of the gross income of a chakdar or a blockdar. Thus, for the purposes of compensation a chakdar or a blockdar is placed on the same footing as other proprietors. Again, as I read the proviso to Section 4 of Schedule 1, it appears to me that in addition to compensation a chakdar or a blockdar is also entitled to receive back with interest the money deposited by him at the time of taking the lease enabling him to acquire proprietary rights on the fulfilment of its terms. Again, as I read the proviso to Section 4 of Schedule 1, it appears to me that in addition to compensation a chakdar or a blockdar is also entitled to receive back with interest the money deposited by him at the time of taking the lease enabling him to acquire proprietary rights on the fulfilment of its terms. There is, therefore, no force in the contention that the impugned Act discriminates against chakdars and blockdars by denying them compensation. 81. As regards forests and grass-lands, it is not correct to say that they are being acquired without compensation being paid for them. Under Section 4 of Schedule 1 of the Act, compensation has been fixed eight times the net income. According to S. 3 of the Schedule, the net income is calculated by deducting certain items from the gross income of a village, muhal, a chak or a block as the case may be. The gross income is determined in the manner laid down in S. 3 of the Schedule and inter alia comprises of 1/5 of the total Sivai Jama income of the village, muhal, chak or block for the five agricultural years from Samvat 2000 to 2004 as recorded in the Siyaba of the village, muhal, chak or block. The expression "Sivai Jama income" has not been defined in the Act. But under S. 2(o) of the impugned Act, it has the same meaning which is attached to it under the Qanoon Mal Gwalior State of Samvat 1983 and means income from various sources such as village forests, grass lands etc. It follows, therefore, that the income from pasture lands and forests is taken into account in determining the gross income which after the deduction of land revenue for the basic year and costs of management leads to the net income forming the basis of compensation. It cannot, therefore, be said that forests and grass lands are not being valued at all for the purposes of compensation. 82. Learned counsel for the petitioner faintly raised the point that the impugned Act is not for a public purpose. He did not, however, press the contention in this Court but reserved his right to raise the point elsewhere if need be. 82. Learned counsel for the petitioner faintly raised the point that the impugned Act is not for a public purpose. He did not, however, press the contention in this Court but reserved his right to raise the point elsewhere if need be. It is, therefore, not necessary to enter into a discussion of the indeterminate concept of a public purpose which varies according to the practical needs and political philosophy of the time. It is sufficient to say that the Constitution itself contemplates acquisition of land for the purpose of the State as a public purpose and it empowers the State Legislature under item 36 of List II (2) to legislate with respect to "acquisition or requisitioning of property, except for the purposes of the Union, subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III (3)." Entry 42 of List III (3) is in the following terms, namely : "principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given". The words "for other public purpose" which follow the preceding words "for the purposes of the Union or of a State " indicate that purposes of the State or purposes of the Union are public purposes. Taking into consideration S. 3 of the Act which vests proprietary rights in the State and other provisions of the Act, I do not think it can be seriously disputed that the impugned Act is for the purposes of the State. On this point, there is no conflict in the views expressed by the Patna High Court and the Nagpur High Court in their decisions referred to above. They have held that acquisition for the purposes of the State is acquisition for public purpose. 83. The next point taken on behalf of the petitioner is that a law, such as is referred to in Cl. 2 of Art. 31, requires under the Constitution the assent of both the Raj Pramukh or the Governor, as the case may be, and of the President, and that as in the present case the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Bill received the assent only of the President, it is not a valid law. 2 of Art. 31, requires under the Constitution the assent of both the Raj Pramukh or the Governor, as the case may be, and of the President, and that as in the present case the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Bill received the assent only of the President, it is not a valid law. Learned Counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to the words "shall have effect" which occur in Cl. 3 of Art. 31 and argued that these words indicated that the law reserved for the consideration of the President must be one which having been passed by the Legislature has become effective by the assent thereto of the Raj Pramukh. This argument has, in my judgment, no weight. To my mind, the words "No such law............... shall have effect" far from making the assent of the. Governor or Raj Pramukh essential to a Legislation of the type in question here, emphasise the fact that even if such legislation is assented to by the Raj Pramukh after it has been passed by the Legislature, it shall not become effectual unless it is reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent. In other words Cl. 3 of Art. 31 as it is worded makes the President's assent the sine qua non. The necessity for the use of the words "No such law............shall have effect" in Cl. 3 of Art. 31 is obvious from the provisions of Art. 200. Under this Article when a Bill passed by the Legislature is presented to the Raj Pramukh, he has three options. He may assent to the Bill, or withhold assent therefrom, or reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President. There is nothing in Art. 200 to require the Raj Pramukh to assent to a Bill before reserving it for the consideration of the President. The article again does not make it obligatory for the Raj Pramukh to reserve the Bill for a law such as is referred to in Cl. 2 of Art. 31 for the consideration of the President. Where such a Bill is, however, reserved for the consideration of the President, as was done in the present case, the question of the assent of the Raj Pramukh to the Bill does not arise, and the Bill becomes law when President assents to it under Art. 201. 2 of Art. 31 for the consideration of the President. Where such a Bill is, however, reserved for the consideration of the President, as was done in the present case, the question of the assent of the Raj Pramukh to the Bill does not arise, and the Bill becomes law when President assents to it under Art. 201. But the Raj Pramukh may give his assent to such a Bill and not reserve it for the consideration of the President. In such a case Cl. 3 of Art. 31 prohibits the law assented to by the Raj Pramukh becoming effective - which otherwise would be until it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent. The impugned Act cannot, therefore be held to be invalid by reason of the Raj Pramukh's failure to assent to the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Bill before reserving it for the consideration of the President. 84. It was next urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Act is invalid because the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Bill, as introduced in the Legislative Assembly, was not intended to apply to chakdars and blockdars, but that the Select Committee extended the scope of the Bill making it applicable to chakdars and blockdars. It was said that in as much as under the Madhya Bharat Legislative Assembly Rules (published in the Gazette dated 7-10-50) the scope of the Bill could be enlarged by the Assembly alone, it was not competent for the Assembly to pass the Bill as altered by the Select Committee. There is no force in this contention. Quite apart from the fact that the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Bill as introduced in the Assembly itself intended that it should apply to chakdars and blockdars, it appears to me that the form content or subject-matter of a Bill at the time of its introduction into or of its consideration by the Assembly on the report of the Select Committee, is not a matter with which a Court of law is concerned. The question, whether the Assembly should have passed the Bill as reported by the Select Committee or recommitted it to the Select Committee or dropped the Bill, is a domestic matter relating to the procedure followed by the Assembly in the course of legislation. The question, whether the Assembly should have passed the Bill as reported by the Select Committee or recommitted it to the Select Committee or dropped the Bill, is a domestic matter relating to the procedure followed by the Assembly in the course of legislation. It is a matter regulated by the "Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Assembly as adapted by the Speaker under Art. 208 (2) of the Constitution" and as interpreted by him. In view of the provisions of Art. 212 (1) it is not a matter with which a Court can interfere, or indeed one on which it is entitled to express any opinion. If there was any irregularity in the procedure followed by the Assembly in passing the Bill it does not make the culminating Act invalid or ultra vires. 85. A further point taken by the petitioner is that as the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Bill as passed by the Assembly was not the same as the one pending at the commencement of the Constitution, the President's assent to the altered Bill passed by the Legislature cannot exempt the law under Art. 31 (4) from being challenged on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of Cl. 2 of Art. 31. On the language of Art. 31 (4), I find it impossible to entertain the view that the protection afforded by Cl. 4 is not available unless the Bill as passed by the Legislature and assented to by the President is in every respect identical with the Bill pending at the commencement of the Constitution. 86. The contention that the Madhya Bharat Legislative Assembly which passed the Bill was not a valid Legislative body under the Constitution, because the members of the body did not comply with the requirements of Art. 188 about oath and it was presided over by a person who had not taken an oath and was not entitled to continue in the office of Speaker of the Assembly after the coming into force of the Constitution, is concluded, so far as this Court is concerned, by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in 'Anand Bihari v. Ram Sahay', Civil Misc. Appln. No. 3 of 1950. I was a party to that decision. Appln. No. 3 of 1950. I was a party to that decision. In that case the validity of the continuance of Shri Ram Sahay as the Speaker of the Assembly after 6-1-50 was challenged on these very grounds. It was held that Shri Ram Sahay's continuance in the office of Speaker after 26-1-50 was valid. It was pointed out in that case that the members of the Assembly had substantially complied with Art. 188 by taking oath in the form they did. Learned counsel for the petitioner did not advance any arguments to persuade me to revise the opinion expressed in that case. 87. The last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and one on which he laid considerable stress is, that the Madhya Bharat Legislative Assembly which passed the impugned law was at its inception not a validly constituted body under the Covenant. In order to appreciate the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Advocate General on this head, it is necessary to refer to certain material provisions of the Covenant entered into by the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in Central India for the formation of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat). The Covenant was signed by the Rulers of the Covenanting States on 22-4-48. Article III (3) of the Covenant made the present Ruler of Gwalior the Raj Pramukh of the United State during his life time and provided that he should enter upon the duties of his office on the 11th day of May 1948. Clause (1), (a), of Art. VI (6) of the Covenant laid down that when the Ruler of a covenanting State makes over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh, then all the rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler which appertain, or are incidental, to the Government of his State shall vest in the United State and shall thereafter be exercisable only as provided by the Covenant. The administration of the Gwalior and Indore States was made over to the Raj Pramukh on 16-6-48. 88. The administration of the Gwalior and Indore States was made over to the Raj Pramukh on 16-6-48. 88. By clause 2 of Article X (10) it was provided that : "the Raj Pramukh shall constitute not later than the first day of August, 1948 an Interim Legislative Assembly for the United State in the manner indicated in Schedule IV (4)." According to this Schedule the Legislative Assembly was to consist of : "(a) forty members elected by the members of the Gwalior Legislative Assembly. (b) fifteen members elected by the members of the Indore Legislative Assembly; and (c) twenty members elected by an electoral college to be constituted by the Raj Pramukh in consultation with the Government of India to represent the Covenanting States other than Gwalior and Indore." 89. Clause 2 of the Schedule stated that the election should be by proportional representation by means of single transferable vote. 90. Clause 3 of the Schedule empowered the Raj Pramukh to make rules for carrying into effect the provisions of the Schedule and securing the due constitution of the Legislative Assembly. 91. On 19-10-48 a body consisting of forty members elected on 8-5-48 by the Gwalior Legislative Assembly, fifteen members elected on 9-5-48 by the Indore Legislative Assembly, fourteen members elected by the Regional Council of the Central India States Peoples Conference, and six persons chosen by the Madhya Bharat Provincial Congress Committee was formed and notified by the Raj Pramukh as the Interim Assembly for Madhya Bharat. 92. On 30-10-48, the Raj Pramukh made and promulgated the Interim Legislative Assembly Ordinance (Ordinance No. 18 of 1948) containing provisions about the constitution of the Assembly, its dissolution and other matters. This Ordinance was subsequently replaced by an Act (Act No. 23 of 1949) of the Assembly embodying the provisions of the replaced Ordinance. 93. It is also relevant to note that the Covenant dated 22-4-48 contemplated under Cl. 1 of Art. X (10) the establishment of a Constituent Assembly for framing a Constitution for the State. This provision was subsequently deleted by a supplementary Covenant entered into by the Rulers of covenanting States in 1949. Article II (2) of the Supplementary Covenant substituted for the provisions of the original Covenant relating to the formation of the Constituent Assembly, the following paragraph with the direction that "it shall be deemed always to have been substituted". This provision was subsequently deleted by a supplementary Covenant entered into by the Rulers of covenanting States in 1949. Article II (2) of the Supplementary Covenant substituted for the provisions of the original Covenant relating to the formation of the Constituent Assembly, the following paragraph with the direction that "it shall be deemed always to have been substituted". The substituted paragraph is as follows : "(1) There shall be a Legislature for the United State consisting of the Raj Pramukh and a Legislative Assembly." 94. Article 1 of the Supplementary Covenant enjoined that the Constitution of India adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India shall be the constitution for the United State of Madhya Bharat. 95. The Assembly which was formed and notified by the Raj Pramukh on 19-10-48 was functioning immediately before the commencement of the Constitution of India as the Legislature for the United State of Madhya Bharat and is the body which to-day, by virtue of Art. 385 of the Constitution, exercises the powers and performs the duties conferred by the provisions of the Constitution or the House of the Legislature of Madhya Bharat. It is this body which passed the law challenged by the petitioner. 96. Learned counsel for the petitioner put his argument as to the validity of the Constitution of the Assembly on three grounds. Firstly, it is contended that the election on 8th and 9th May, of the prescribed number of members by the Legislative Assemblies of Gwalior and Indore was not valid inasmuch as it was not held after the Maharaja of Gwalior had entered upon the duties of the office of Raj Pramukh, and directed the Assemblies to elect their representatives to the Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat in accordance with rules framed by him. Secondly, that the Assembly was not constituted before 1-8-48, that is, before the date prescribed in Cl. 2 of Art. X (10) of the Covenant. Thirdly, the twenty members chosen to represent States other than Gwalior and Indore were not elected by an electoral college constituted for the purpose by the Raj Pramukh in consultation with the Government of India in accordance with Cl. (c) of Schedule IV (4) to the Covenant. 97. 2 of Art. X (10) of the Covenant. Thirdly, the twenty members chosen to represent States other than Gwalior and Indore were not elected by an electoral college constituted for the purpose by the Raj Pramukh in consultation with the Government of India in accordance with Cl. (c) of Schedule IV (4) to the Covenant. 97. In the return filed on behalf of the State the averment as to the constitution of the Assembly is as follows : "It is denied that the Act is unconstitutional on the ground that the Legislative Assembly of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat) was not validly constituted under the Covenant entered into between the Rulers of the integrating States. The Respondents humbly submit that the Legislative Assembly was validly constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant, from amongst the then existing Legislatures of the Gwalior State, the Holkar State and an electoral college for securing popular representation from the remaining covenanting States, as ad hoc electoral college was constituted in accordance with a formula evolved with the object of securing a popular representation in the existing conditions and consented to by the Government of India." 98. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the State, it is admitted that the election of representives from Gwalior and Indore States was held on 8th and 9th May respectively in accordance with rules framed for the purpose by the Speakers of these Assemblies after securing the approval before 11th May, 1948 of the Maharaja of Gwalior as the person who was to be the Raj Pramukh. It is also not disputed that of the twenty members representing States other than Gwalior and Indore, fourteen were elected by the Regional Council of the Central Indian States Peoples Conference and six were chosen by the Madhya Bharat Provincial Congress Committee and that the Assembly was fully constituted after 1st August, 1948. The learned Advocate General, however, argues that as the Covenant is a constitutional document creating a new State in place of the Several Covenanting States and providing for the peace, order and good Government of the new United State, it should be given a large and liberal construction so as to accomplish the objects for which the Covenant was entered into by the Rulers of the Covenanting States, that Cl. 2 of Art. X (10) which provided for the constitution of a Legislative Assembly before 1-8-1948 without declaring the consequences of the failure to constitute the Assembly by this date, should be construed as having a directory and not a mandatory effect, that the delay in constituting the Interim Legislative Assembly was caused by the practical difficulties in setting up an electoral college and the constitution of the Assembly is not vitiated by the alleged delayed action of the Rajpramukh; that as the Covenant did not exclude the possibility of the date of making over the administration of the Gwalior and Indore States to the Rajpramukh synchronising with the date of the assumption of the duties of the Raj Pramukh by the Maharaja of Gwalior, Cl. 3 of Sch. IV to the Covenant should be construed as empowering the person who was to be Rajpramukh to make rules for carrying into effect the provisions of the Schedule; and that in any event as the Rajpramukh ratified the election of the members by the Gwalior and Indore Assemblies by issuing a notification on 19-10-1948, that is, after he entered upon the duties of the office of Rajpramukh, the election of the members is not rendered invalid by the alleged irregularity. As to the members representing States other than Gwalior and Indore, it was submitted by the learned Advocate General that these members were, no doubt, to be elected by an electoral college constituted by the Rajpramukh in consultation with the Government of India, but on an exploration of the field, the Rajpramukh was unable to discover any public bodies from which an electoral college could be readily constituted. A workable formula was, therefore, evolved for setting up an ad hoc electoral college in consultation with the Government of India. In accordance with that formula, the Regional Council of the Central Indian States People's Conference was asked to elect and thus elected fourteen members. To afford representation to other sections of public opinion, the Rajpramukh was also authorised by the Government of India to ask the Madhya Bharat Provincial Congress Committee to elect six persons. According to the learned Advocate General, the scheme constituted in terms an ad hoc electoral college as the only practical solution of a political problem and the only workable hypothesis. It is, therefore, urged that the representatives of States other than Gwalior and Indore were validly elected. According to the learned Advocate General, the scheme constituted in terms an ad hoc electoral college as the only practical solution of a political problem and the only workable hypothesis. It is, therefore, urged that the representatives of States other than Gwalior and Indore were validly elected. 99. It was further said by the learned Advocate General that under Art. 385 of the Constitution, it is the body which was actually functioning before the commencement of the Constitution as the Legislature, irrespective of the fact whether it was, or was not, validly constituted, that is, competent to exercise after 26th January, 1950 the powers and duties conferred by the Constitution on the House of Legislature of Madhya Bharat and that an inquiry into the validity of the constitution of the Assembly is thus barred by Art. 385. Learned Advocate General also relied on the provisions of S. 9 (2) of the Interim Legislative Assembly Act to show that the validity of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act cannot be questioned on the ground that the Assembly which passed the law was composed of persons who being not validly elected, were not entitled to sit in the Assembly. Section 9 (2) of the Interim Legislative Assembly Act is as follows : "The Assembly shall have power to act notwithstanding any vacancy in the membership thereof and any proceedings in the Assembly shall be valid notwithstanding that it is discovered subsequently that some person who was not entitled so to do sat or voted or otherwise took part in the proceedings." 100. On a prolonged and careful consideration of the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, I am driven to the conclusion that they must be rejected. The foundation of Mr. Somayya's arguments in connection with the question as to the validity of the constitution of the Assembly rests on the assumption that the Covenant entered into by the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in Central India is a Statute and the provisions under consideration of the Covenant are mandatory and immutable, and must be construed and interpreted applying strictly the same rules to which a statute is subject. This assumption is, in my opinion, not correct. The Covenant is not a Statute. This assumption is, in my opinion, not correct. The Covenant is not a Statute. It is as its name implies a compact between the signatories to the Covenant, the object of which is to secure the welfare of the people of the region by the establishment of a new State comprising the territories of the Covenanting States with a common Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. It is true that the Covenant is not a treaty in the strict sense accorded to the term 'treaty' in International Law. But it is more than an instrument between private parties and its validity as distinct from its scope, and interpretation could not be questioned in any Court. The Covenant represents indeed, some things sui generis alike in Constitutional law and in International law. I think the nearest approach to it is the treaty of the Union of 1707 between England and Scotland, although the analogy cannot be pressed too far. It seems to me, therefore, that in the interpretation of the Covenant, the same rules as apply to treaties in International law ought to be followed, in so far as they can be made applicable. It is unnecessary to enumerate here all the recognised principles of the interpretation of treaties. For our purpose, it is sufficient to note that in the interpretation of treaties and interstatal agreements the important point is, to use the words of Westlake. "to get at the real intention of the parties and that inquiry is not to be shackled by any rule of interpretation which may exist in a particular national jurisprudence." Such documents must be interpreted according to their reasonable in contradistinction to their literal sense. In doing so it is permissible to take account not only of the historical development, the terminology, the grammatical and logical meaning of the words used in the treaty of the Covenant, but also of the functions which the signatories to it intended to fulfil and consequently of the preamble also defining the objects and the functions of the treaty or the Covenant. Another important principle in regard to the interpretation of treaties and interstatal agreement must also be noticed. Another important principle in regard to the interpretation of treaties and interstatal agreement must also be noticed. The principle as enunciated by Oppenheim, Schwarzenberger and other writers on International law is that if the parties to a treaty agree even informally upon the interpretation of any of its provisions and execute it accordingly, then the interpretation given by the parties themselves is authoritative even though it overrides general rules of interpretation. The agreement between the parties as to the interpretation of the provision of the treaty may be expressed or tacit. It is stated in Schwarzenberger's International Law, Volume I (1949 edition) at page 222 that the permanent Court of International Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the 'Faworzina Boundary Case' laid down that "the right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal rule belongs solely to the person or the body who has power to modify or suppress it and that in the case of a treaty such power rests jointly with the contracting parties." We have, therefore, to construe the Covenant bearing in mind the above rules of construction as also the important fact that the object of the Covenant was to create a United State and inter alia to establish for it a Legislature and a Council of Ministers responsible to the Legislature. It is upon a correct appreciation of the scope and object of the Covenant itself and of the application to it of what has been characterised as the "functional interpretation" that the decision of the question as regards the validity of the constitution of the Madhya Bharat Legislative Assembly turns. Clause 2 of Article X of the Covenant, which provided for the constitution of an Interim Legislative Assembly, said "the Raj Pramukh shall constitute not later than 1-8-48 an Interim Legislative Assembly for the United States in the manner indicated in Schedule IV." The language used in this clause is, no doubt, imperative. But it does not necessarily follow from this language that a Legislature constituted after 1-8-48 is invalid. This clause spoke both of the constitution of the Legislative Assembly and of the date by which it was to be constituted. The Covenant, nowhere, declared the consequences of non-adherence to the date fixed for the establishment of the Legislative Assembly. The provision in clause 2 of Art. X is affirmative. This clause spoke both of the constitution of the Legislative Assembly and of the date by which it was to be constituted. The Covenant, nowhere, declared the consequences of non-adherence to the date fixed for the establishment of the Legislative Assembly. The provision in clause 2 of Art. X is affirmative. It is not a negative one prohibiting the constitution of the Assembly after 1-8-48. Can it, therefore, be contended that the action of the Raj Pramukh in constituting the Legislature after 1-8-48 was void and the present Madhya Bharat Legislative Assembly is invalid? The answer is clearly in the negative. The function of clause 2 of Article X is to establish a Legislature for the United State. It is the constitution of the Legislative Assembly which is of vital importance and not the date by which it is to be constituted. It is fair to assume that if the parties to the Covenant intended to make the time factor as the essence of the constitution of the Assembly, they would have expressed their intention in more absolute and emphatic language so as to prohibit the establishment of any Legislature after the date fixed by them. The object of the Covenant being to establish a Legislature for the United State, construction of Article X clause 2 denying to the Raj Pramukh the power to constitute the Assembly after 1-8-48 being destructive of that object must be rejected. Learned counsel for the petitioner suggested that inasmuch as clause 3 of Article X gave to the Raj Pramukh the power to make and promulgate the Ordinances for the peace and good Government of the United State, it could not be said that the Covenant did not indicate the consequences of the failure to constitute a Legislature before 1st August, 1948. The suggestion ignores altogether the object of the Covenant namely, to establish a Government responsible to the Legislature and the nature of the power of the Raj Pramukh to make and promulgate Ordinances. In my judgment, the provision in clause 2 of Article X about the date of the constitution of the Interim Legislative Assembly cannot be held to be mandatory having the effect contended by the petitioner. 101. In my judgment, the provision in clause 2 of Article X about the date of the constitution of the Interim Legislative Assembly cannot be held to be mandatory having the effect contended by the petitioner. 101. Proceeding to consider the different clauses of Schedule IV of the Covenant, in connection with the contention of the petitioner that the election of the members of the Assembly from the States of Gwalior and Indore was not valid, we find that they unmistakably show that what was essential to the constitution of the Assembly, was the election of the prescribed number of members by the Gwalior and Indore Legislative Assemblies by means of the single transferable vote and not the date of the election or the making of the rules by the Raj Pramukh for holding the election. The words "may make the rules" in clause 3 of Schedule IV denote that the provision about making rules was not mandatory. The principle and method of election having been specified in Schedule IV, it is clear that any rules framed by the Raj Pramukh could have only dealt with matters of minor importance. Considering the scope and object of the Covenant, it would, I think, be unreasonable to hold that the Raj Pramukh was precluded from constituting the Assembly otherwise than by rules made by him under clause 3 of the Schedule. In my view, there was no duty imposed on the Raj Pramukh to make rules. He had an unfettered discretion in the matter. After entering upon the duties of his office, the Raj Pramukh could have either made rules for holding an election of the members to the United State Legislature by the Gwalior and Indore Legislative Assemblies or he could have recognised the members already elected by these Assemblies in accordance with Schedule IV and in accordance with the constitution rules framed by the Speakers thereof, as validly elected for the constitution of the Assembly. Indeed, in the event, which was possible under the Covenant, of the Legislative Assemblies of Gwalior and Indore States ceasing to exist on the administration of these States being handed over to the Raj Pramukh immediately after the assumption of duties of Raj Pramukh by the Maharaja of Gwalior, the Raj Pramukh could not have called upon these non-existing bodies to hold an election of the members to be the Legislature of the United State. He could have only followed the course of recognising the election already held by these bodies in accordance with Schedule IV as valid for the constitution of the Legislature. If, therefore, in the present case the prescribed number of members were in fact elected by the members of Gwalior and Indore Legislative Assemblies by means of the single transferable vote and the election was recognised by the Raj Pramukh - and this fact is not disputed by the petitioner - the election of the members cannot be declared invalid merely because the election was not held by these bodies in accordance with any rules framed by the Raj Pramukh and later being called upon by the Raj Pramukh to hold the election. The fact that the Maharaja of Gwalior before he entered upon the duties of his office approved the rules under which the Gwalior and Indore Legislative Assemblies held the elections only justifies the course adopted by him of recognising the elections after he became the Raj Pramukh. In my opinion the words "the Raj Pramukh shall constitute" used in clause 2 of Article X cannot be construed as implying that the Maharaja of Gwalior after entering upon the duties of the Raj Pramukh should have called upon the Legislative Assemblies of Gwalior and Indore to elect the members of the new Legislature in accordance with the rules framed by him for the purpose and that it is only an election so held that is valid for the constitution of the Assembly. To my mind, the words "the Raj Pramukh shall constitute" in Clause 2 of Article X (10) mean nothing more than that the Raj Pramukh should give a legal form to the Assembly of the persons chosen in the manner indicated in Schedule IV. This was done in the present case firstly, by the issue of a notification of 19-10-48 by the Raj Pramukh declaring the names of the persons elected from the three groups mentioned in Schedule IV and secondly by the promulgation on 30-10-49 of an Ordinance, namely, the Interim Legislative Assembly Ordinance (Ordinance No. 18 of 1948). For the above reasons I am unable to take the view that the election of the members by Gwalior and Indore Legislative Assemblies was not valid. 102. For the above reasons I am unable to take the view that the election of the members by Gwalior and Indore Legislative Assemblies was not valid. 102. The contention, that the election of twenty members to represent covenanting States other than Gwalior and Indore was invalid, seems to me equally untenable. It seems to me from the wording of clause 1, (c) of Schedule IV of the Covenant that these members were to be elected by a single body of persons themselves chosen on some representative basis. But this could not be achieved as on an exploration of this field, the Raj Pramukh was unable to discover any public bodies from which an electoral college could readily be constituted. In consultation with the Government of India the Raj Pramukh therefore asked the Regional Council of the Central India States People's Conference to elect fourteen members and likewise asked the Madhya Bharat Provincial Congress Committee to choose six persons. The twenty persons were accordingly elected by these two bodies. The election of these twenty members of two bodies instead of one was clearly not in accordance with the literal meaning of clause 1, (c) of Schedule IV. But I do not think that this or any other deviation from the provisions of clause 1, (c) or even of Clause 2 of Schedule IV in regard to the election of these twenty members affects the validity of their election or gives the petitioner any right to complain of the deviation. The petitioner was not a party to the Covenant. He had not acquired, under the Covenant any right in the matter of the constitution of the Assembly. The Rulers of the States who were parties to the Covenant were free to vary, or agree as to the interpretation and application of any provision of the Covenant to suit the circumstances then existing in order to carry out the objection of the Covenant. In the present case, there is no contest between any of the parties to the Covenant regarding the manner in which these twenty persons were elected. In the present case, there is no contest between any of the parties to the Covenant regarding the manner in which these twenty persons were elected. On this question, there being complete harmony between the parties to the Covenant and the Government of India with whose concurrence and guarantee, the Covenant was entered into by the signatories, it must be held that in order to fulfil the function which the parties had intended, they agreed to so interpret clause 1, (c) and 2 of Schedule IV as to permit the election of the twenty members in the manner in which it was held. In other words on the principles of interpretation already indicated above such a practical construction put by the parties themselves must be regarded as authoritative of the scope and meaning of clause 1, (c) and of the applicability of clause 2 of Schedule IV. On this reasoning, I am inclined to think that the election of the twenty members chosen to represent States other than Gwalior and Indore was valid. 103. Having reached this conclusion, it is not necessary for me to consider at length the contentions of the learned Advocate General resting on Art. 385 of the Constitution and Section 9 (2) of the Interim Legislative Assembly Act. It is enough to say that I am unable to accept them. As I read Art. 385, it seems to me that the Article does not protect from challenge the validity of the Constitution of a body which though functioning immediately before the commencement of the Constitution as the Legislature of the State was not legally entitled to do so under the law of the State. As regards Section 9 (2) of the Interim Legislative Assembly Act, I cannot see any justification for suggesting its applicability in the present case where the initial constitution of the Legislature itself is being questioned. 104. Before concluding, it must be stated that we drew the attention of the learned Advocate General to Sections 14 (5), 15, 20, 31 and 32 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to question the decisions of the various authorities under the Act, and asked him whether these sections as they are worded, affect the jurisdiction of this Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The learned Advocate General stated that these sections do not take away the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 in respect of proceedings under the impugned Act. In these circumstances I would only say that if these sections purport to take away the right of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution as regards proceedings under the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, then clearly, they are to that extent ultra vires the Constitution. 105. For the reasons which I have given, I am satisfied that the applicant is not entitled to the relief claimed and his application should be dismissed. In view of the special circumstances of the case there should be no order as regards costs. 106. SHINDE, J :- I agree with judgment proposed by my learned brother Dixit, J. 107. BY THE COURT : The application is dismissed. No order as to costs. Application dismissed.