Judgment :- 1. The sole question in the this second appeal preferred by the defendant is whether the lower appellate court went wrong in passing a decree for redemption when the suit was only to recover possession of the property after avoiding two mortgages thereon. The suit giving rise to the Second Appeal was brought by a Malayalee Brahmin to declare as invalid and inoperative two mortgages executed by his deceased father on the ground they were not supported by consideration or family necessity. Recovery of possession of the property was also sought for. Though the trial court originally allowed the suit that decision was reversed in appeal by the District Court and the case remitted for fresh trial. The revised judgment of the trial court was completely in favour of the defendant. An alternative claim for redemption put forward at the final hearing was negatived by the learned Munsiff. In the appeal preferred against the revised judgment and decree the learned District Judge allowed redemption as prayed for orally in the primary court. The present second appeal is against the District Court's judgment and decree. 2. As stated the only point raised before us was that no redemption decree should have been passed when the plaintiff had not made such an alternative claim in the plaint or sought to introduce such an alternative prayer by way of amendment. We are afraid we cannot accept the contention. The two decisions which the Respondent's learned counsel brought to our notice, namely, Parshotam Bhaishankar v. Rumal Zunjar (1869) ILR 20 Bom.196 and Palu v. Rasilu AIR 1923 Lah. 675 are clear authorities for the position that a court can in its discretion pass a decree for redemption in a case in which the plaintiff has sued in ejectment. The Lahore decision refers to the decision in Parshotam Bhaishankar v. Rumal Zunjar (1869) I.L.R. 20 Bom.196 and after referring to the rule enunciated there the judgment proceeds to state as follows: "The plaintiffs came into Court alleging that they were entitled to possession on the ground that the alienation was made by a widow without necessity. The Lahore decision refers to the decision in Parshotam Bhaishankar v. Rumal Zunjar (1869) I.L.R. 20 Bom.196 and after referring to the rule enunciated there the judgment proceeds to state as follows: "The plaintiffs came into Court alleging that they were entitled to possession on the ground that the alienation was made by a widow without necessity. Cases of this nature are common and decrees constantly have been given for possession on payment of money which has been found to have been a charge on the property as being for necessity." We may add that our experience also is that in proper cases courts allow redemption even though the plaintiff had only asked for recovery of possession after setting aside an alienation. 3. In this connection it is interesting to notice the observations made in a very early Cochin case reported in Raghurma Patta v. Sankunny Menon (4 Select Decisions 144). What Locke, C.J. and Narayana Marar, J. said in paragraphs 9 and 10 of their judgment may with advantage be quoted here. "Paragraph 9. There are innumerable decisions of the Bombay High Court in which suits in ejectment have been allowed to be converted into suits for redemption, even without an amendment. I.L.R. 7 B. 146 and the numerous previous decisions collected together in the judgment of Kembell, J. at P. 148; 8 B. 168; 20 B. 196; 27 B. 292. In Calcutta too, the judges of the High Court were inclined to give a decree for redemption, if only the plaintiff desired it, in a suit which had originally been brought to have it declared that the mortgage was not binding upon and could not be enforced against the joint properties mentioned in the mortgage bond. See I.L.R. 28 Cal. 517. "It seems to me" says the Chief Justice in whose judgment the other two judges agreed, "that now the only right of the minor is to redeem, and that, as we now have all the parties before the Court, we can give him that right, if he asks for it." page 531. See I.L.R. 28 Cal. 517. "It seems to me" says the Chief Justice in whose judgment the other two judges agreed, "that now the only right of the minor is to redeem, and that, as we now have all the parties before the Court, we can give him that right, if he asks for it." page 531. "Paragraph 10: In a case from Australia where the plaintiff sought to recover possession as if the properties were unencumbered, and the defendant resisted the action not as mortgagees in possession, but as absolute owners, having become such though originally mortgagees, the Privy Council held that though the suit was only in ejectment a decree for redemption could be made in the circumstance of the case. See Ghose on the law of Mortgage, 3rd Edition, page 725." The concluding portion of the succeeding paragraph also contains some relevant observations and they are in these terms:- "Paragraph 11. x x x x x 4. The question therefore is whether the suit in ejectment in the present case is so inconsistent with redemption that it would be improper to allow it to be converted into one to redeem. It is not denied that on the allegations contained in the plaint, it is competent for the plaintiff to add an alternative relief for redemption should the Court be of opinion that there is any mortgage in favour of the defendant. It is therefore difficult to see how in such a case the purposes of the suit can be said to be inconsistent with redemption. It is in fact in such cases that Courts have held that conversion can be allowed. The facts of the case in ILR 20 Bom.196 are exactly similar to the present." This case was followed by Varghese, C.J. and Krishna Menon, J. in the case reported in Kuhunni Elayath v. Sankaran Nair (16 Cochin Law Reports 285.) The learned Chief Judge observed that so far as Cochin Court was concerned the law was that a suit in ejectment may be converted into one for redemption, if the justice of the case demands it. Though the observation was confined to the Cochin Law the authority relied on, namely, 4 Select Decisions 144 clearly shows that the rule is one accepted in other jurisdictions as well. Though the observation was confined to the Cochin Law the authority relied on, namely, 4 Select Decisions 144 clearly shows that the rule is one accepted in other jurisdictions as well. In the light of the foregoing authorities we have no hesitation to hold that the learned judge in the court below has not exercised the discretion vested in him improperly in allowing the conversion prayed for before him. We have carefully examined the cases brought to our notice by the appellant's learned counsel namely, Mahmuda Khatun Chowdhurani v. Mahomed Elahadad Khan Pani (23 Indian Cases 332 (P.C.), Bishen Singh v. Prem Singh (AIR 1929 Lah.126) and Seetha Beharani v. A Jagannath (A.I.R. 1944 Pat. 312.) These cases are clearly distinguishable and hence not very relevant. We think it unnecessary to go into their facts. 5. In the suit the appellant had contended that in case the mortgages of which he had become owner were set aside he should be allowed the value of his improvements as a condition precedent to the plaintiff obtaining possession. Accordingly a commission was taken out to value the improvements and that was done so late as Kanni 1122. On the strength of the commissioner's report and account and in the light of the oral evidence defendant led in support of his contention the trial court had recorded a finding regarding their value. Even if a fresh suit were to be brought for redemption the appellant could not get anything more than the mortgage money and value of improvements. There is no substance in the complaint that he had not adduced all the evidence to substantiate his claim regarding value of improvements. No objection was raised in the appellate court with respect to the Munsiff's finding on the question. We would therefore affirm the lower appellate court's decision granting redemption and dismiss the second appeal, subject to the modification mentioned below. 6. The lower appellate court directed the parties to bear their costs before that court. It is settled rule that in a suit for redemption, pure and simple, the mortgagee should ordinarily get his costs. In a case where the plaintiff wanted to dispossess the mortgagee without paying him a pie and when the former ultimately obtains a decree in redemption we cannot find any justification for following a different rule. It is settled rule that in a suit for redemption, pure and simple, the mortgagee should ordinarily get his costs. In a case where the plaintiff wanted to dispossess the mortgagee without paying him a pie and when the former ultimately obtains a decree in redemption we cannot find any justification for following a different rule. Accordingly we hold that the plaintiff should pay the appellant all the costs incurred by him before the lower appellate court as well. In the circumstances of the case we make no order for costs in this court. Decree accordingly.