JUDGMENT : DIXIT, J. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a decision of a Division Bench of this Court, whereby the decree of the Additional District Judge, Indore, was set aside and the plaintiff's claim for the specific performance of a contract for sale of a house was dismissed with costs throughout. The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted on 2-7-1948 by the plaintiff in the Court of Additional District Judge, Indore. A decree in favour of the plaintiff was made by the trial Court on 28-2-1950. The defendant, then, filed an appeal to this Court on 29-8-1950 from the decree of the Additional District Judge Indore. The appeal was heard by a Division Bench and allowed on 12-7-1951 and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The present appeal is directed against the decision dated 12-7-1951 of the Division Bench and was filed on 2-11-1951. 2. The preliminary question that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to the competence of the appeal. Prima facie under the Madhya Bharat High Court Act, 1949 (Act 8 of 1949), as amended by Ordinance No.1 of 1950, no appeal lies from any judgment, decree, order or sentence passed or made by any Division Bench of this Court after 25-1-1950. Mr. Bharucha learned counsel for the appellant admits that the present appeal is not under the old S.25 of the High Court Act which provided for appeals under certain conditions from decisions of any Division Bench and which was repealed on 25-1-50 by Ordinance No.1 of 1950. He, however, claims that the appeal is under S.21(c), Indore High Court Act 1948 (Act 4 of 1948 of Indore State). He, however, claims that the appeal is under S.21(c), Indore High Court Act 1948 (Act 4 of 1948 of Indore State). The argument is that on the date of the institution of the suit in the Court of the Additional District Judge, the Indore High Court Act, 1948 existed; that under S.21 of the Act an appeal lay to the Indore High Court from a decree passed by the District Judge in the exercise of his original civil jurisdiction and a further appeal lay within the High Court itself from the decision of the Court in a first appeal from decree of the District Judge, that this right of two appeals which according to the Pull Bench decisions of this Court in - 'Gulab Chand v. Kudi Lal', AIR 1951 Madh-B 1 (A) and in - 'The Rajkumar Mills v. Pratap Singh and the Hukam Chand Mills Ltd.', (Indore Bench) Second Appeal No.24 of 1950 (Madh-B) (B), is a right which yested in the appellant at the time of the filing of the suit; that this right of further appeal in the High Court has not been taken away by express provisions or necessary intendment of any piece of legislature; and that on the other hand the provision contained in Madhya Bharat High Court Ordinance, 1948 (Ordinance 2 of 1948) and Madhya Bharat High Court Act (Act 8 of 1949) by which this Court was established and then continued and the Indore High Court ceased to exist, that the High Court is to "apply the laws and usages prevailing in any State forming part of the United State to Civil, Criminal and other proceedings in that State till such time as a duly constituted authority modifies them" (S.6 of Act 8 of 1949) and that all appeals, petitions for revision, etc., which lay to the High Court of any Covenanting State according to the laws in force in that State, shall lie to the High Court (See S.37(1) of Act 8 of 1949) distinctly show that so far as appeals to this Court, arising out of suits instituted in the quondam Indore State are concerned, the Indore High Court Act, 1948 is still operative. On this reasoning, it is maintained that the right of the appeal within the High Court itself which the appellant had with respect to the Indore High Court, enures also in regard to this Court and that, therefore, this appeal is competent. 3. The reply of Mr. Samvatsar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent is that the Madhya Bharat High Court being a new Court, its powers and jurisdiction must be determined with reference to Ordinance 2 of 1948 and Act 8 of 1949 constituting it and not with reference to the Indore High Court Act 1948; that under Act 8 of 1949 as amended on 25-1-50 this appeal is clearly incompetent. Mr. Samvatsar relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in - 'State of Serai Kella v. Union of India', AIR 1951 SC 253 (C), to support this proposition. It is further urged that as on the establishment of this Court, the Indore High Court ceased to exist, the Act under which High Court was established, namely the Indore High Court Act, 1948 also ceased to be operative and that Act cannot be said to be an existing law which this Court is enjoined to apply under S. 6 of the High Court Act to Civil, Criminal and other proceedings; nor can it be said to be a law at present in force in the territories of Madhya Bharat comprising of the former Indore State under which the appellant can claim to file this appeal by virtue of the provision of S.37(1), Madhya Bharat High Court Act. Mr. Samvatsar proceeded to point out that even under the Indore High Court Act, 1948, the appellant had no right of appeal from a decision of a Division Bench; that S.21(c) of the Act only provided for an appeal within the High Court from a decision of a single Judge passed in the exercise of his appellate jurisdiction; and that on the other hand S.23 of the Act stated in express words that "no appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by the High Court in the exercise of its civil or criminal jurisdiction except as provided in the enactment." 4. As Mr. As Mr. Chitale had addressed us arguments on an allied question in 'Udaybhan v. Firm Sankarlal', AIR 1953 Madh-B 209 (FB) (D), appearing as amicus curiae, we thought it desirable to hear him in that capacity in this case also. Mr. Chitale supported the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent and added that even accepting as correct the proposition that as the hearing of an appeal by a Single Judge or a Division Bench of the High Court is merely a matter of procedure, the appellant would have been entitled under S.21, Indore High Court Act to a further appeal within the Indore High Court if his appeal from the decree of the Additional District Judge had been heard by a Division Bench, the appellant cannot claim that right in relation to this Court for the reason that the opening words of S.21, Indore High Court Act, namely "Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force" clearly show that, that right would now be subject to the provisions of the Madhya Bharat High Court Act, 1949. It is contended that whatever might have been the law prior to 25-1-50 with regard to appeals from decisions of a Division Bench of this Court, on 25-1-50 this Court was deprived by Ordinance No.1 of 1950 of any jurisdiction to hear and determine any, appeal from the decisions of any Division Bench given after 25-1-50 and that as under Art.225 of the Constitution of India the jurisdiction of this Court is the same as that vested immediately before the commencement of the Constitution and as on that date this Court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine any appeal against the decisions of any Division Bench given after 25-1-50, it follows that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain, hear and determine this appeal. In support of this contention Mr. Chitale has cited a Pull Bench decision of this Court in - 'Baldeo Singh v. The State', AIR 1951 Madh B 149 (FB) (E) relying on - 'James Chad-wick and Bros. Ltd. v. National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd.', AIR 1951 Bom 147 (F); - Vaman Ravji v. Nagesh Vishnu', AIR 1940 Bom 216 (G) and - 'Hanuman Chamber of Commerce Ltd.', Delhi v. Jassa Ram Hira Nand', AIR 1948 Lah 64 (H). Mr. Ltd. v. National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd.', AIR 1951 Bom 147 (F); - Vaman Ravji v. Nagesh Vishnu', AIR 1940 Bom 216 (G) and - 'Hanuman Chamber of Commerce Ltd.', Delhi v. Jassa Ram Hira Nand', AIR 1948 Lah 64 (H). Mr. Chitale further argued that this appeal is really what is commonly described as "inter Court-Appeal" that appeals within the High Court itself are the peculiarities of the Constitution and the rules of practice and procedure of the specific High Court; and that if the Court is abolished its Constitution and rules cannot survive and therefore, even if this appeal could have been entertained by the Indore High Court under its own Constitution, if the Constitution and rules of practice and procedure of this Court do not provide for an appeal from a decision of a Division Bench, then the appeal cannot be entertained. 5. It will be seen from the arguments summarised above that the appellant stand upon the provisions of the Indore High Court Act, 1948 and his contention is twofold: (1) that in relation to appeals arising out of suits instituted in the territories of Madhya Bharat comprising of the former Indore State, the Indore High Court Act, 1948 is still operative and that the power and jurisdiction of this Court must in the matter of these appeals be determined with respect to the Indore High Court Act; (2) and that the appellant had in any case acquired under that Act while it was in force a vested right of appeal within the High Court from a decision of a Division Bench and this right is available to him in this Court also. In my opinion, both these contentions are unsound and must be rejected. 6. The contention that the powers and jurisdiction of this Court in respect of appeals of the type referred to above must be determined with reference to the Indore High Court Act, 1948 must be repelled for the reasons which I have already given in - 'AIR 1953 Madh B 209 (FB) (D)' which raised very much the same consideration as the present. In that case relying on the Supreme Court decision in - ' AIR 1951 SC 253 (C) and on a Full Bench decision of this Court in - 'Bharosi Lal v. Dwarika Das', 1949 Madh B LR 8 (I), I, have held that this Court is not a successor Court of the High Courts of the Covenanting States but that it is a new Court and the powers and jurisdiction of this Court are those conferred under the Madhya Bharat High Court Ordinance No.2 of 1948 and the Madhya Bharat High Court Act (8 of 1949) under which it has been established and it is continuing. It seems to me a truism to say that the Indore High Court having ceased to exist, the Indore High Court Act, 1948 cannot be said to have survived. If the Indore High Court Act cannot be regarded operative today, it follows that it is not an existing or current law which this Court is required to apply under S.6, Madhya Bharat High Court Act to civil, criminal and other proceedings and which would 'proprlo vigore' entitle the appellant to prefer this appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant strongly relied on the Full Bench decision of this Court in - 'Second Appeal No.24 of 1950 (Madh B) (B)' and also drew our attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in - 'Dajisaheb v. Shankarrao Vithairao', AIR 1952 Bom 303 (J) and pressed on us to hold that the powers and jurisdiction of this Court in regard to appeals arising out of suits instituted in the former Indore State must be determined with reference to the provisions of the Indore High Court Act 1948. These cases, in my view, have no application here. I have already considered the decision in - 'Second Appeal No.24 of 1950 (Madh B) (B)', in the opinion which I have just delivered in - 'AIR 1953 Madh-B 209 (PB) (D)' and pointed out that the decision is not an authority for the contention that in determining the powers and jurisdiction of this Court, the Constitution of the Indore High Court or of any other High Court of a Covenanting State ought to be taken into consideration. The Full Bench decision did not, and of course could not, reject the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of - 'State of Serai Kelia v. the Union of India', (C) that when a new Court is established, its jurisdiction and powers are those as defined by the statute constituting it. In the 'case of Raj Kumar Mills (B)' also this principle was recognised and the learned Judges constituting the Full Bench examined the provisions of the Madhya Bharat High Court Act, 1949 and then came to the conclusion that there was nothing in S.25, Madhya Bharat High Court Act or any other provision of that Act to show that the right of appeal conferred by S.25 was available to a party who did not possess such a right at the time of the institution of the suit. Now, it must be remembered that it is one thing to say that in the matter of appeals the power and jurisdiction of this Court are regulated by the Indore High Court Act 1948 and that as under that Act a party had no right of appeal, he cannot claim the right in this Court; but it is quite different to say that under the powers and jurisdiction of this Court as defined in the Madhya Bharat High Court of Judicature Act, 1949, a right of appeal, which had not vested in a party at the time of the suit, was not available to him in this Court or that a right which had so vested in him has been preserved or taken away. It is essential to bear in mind the ratio deciendi of the Supreme Court decision in the case of 'the State of Serai Kella (C)', The 'ratio decidendi' is, that the Supreme Court being a new Court established under the Constitution of India, its power and jurisdiction are those as defined in the Constitution itself and that if the Constitution expressly bars the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with regard to any matter, then notwithstanding the fact that the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain the matter or that it was pending before the Federal Court at the time of the establishment of the Supreme Court and was. removed to the Supreme Court for disposal, the Supreme Court would not have jurisdiction to entertain the matter. 7. removed to the Supreme Court for disposal, the Supreme Court would not have jurisdiction to entertain the matter. 7. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court in - ' AIR 1952 Bom 303 (J)' simply applied to the case before them the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of 'the State of Serai Kella (C)'. The decision in - ' AIR 1952 Bom 303 (J)' is of no assistance to the appellant. In 'the Bombay case (J)' the question under consideration was whether in respect of appeal to the Supreme Court arising out of suits filed prior to the coming into force of the Constitution, the limitation as to value or amount prescribed in Art.133 of the Constitution of India applied. Their Lordships held that although under sub-Cls.(a) and (b) of Art.133 no appeal lay to the Supreme Court where the subject-matter in dispute was less than Rs.20,000, the Supreme Court has been given under Art.135 the same jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter to. which the provisions of Art.133 or 134 did not apply, if the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain the matter. They also held that S.27 of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 expressly preserves the right already accrued to a party to appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the amount or value of the subject matter in dispute was Rs.10000 or more. The Bombay case was decided on the basis that the Constitution itself gives to the Supreme Court the jurisdiction to deal with appeals where the amount or value of the subject matter in dispute is less than Rs.20000/- if the appeal is one arising out of a suit filed before the coming into force of the Constitution. As the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court pointed out whereas in the case of 'the State of Serai Kella (C)' the question was of absence of jurisdiction under the Constitution in the Supreme Court, in the case before them there was no such absence of jurisdiction. The Bombay case, therefore, does not support the contention of the appellant, which in my opinion, is untenable. 8. The Bombay case, therefore, does not support the contention of the appellant, which in my opinion, is untenable. 8. The contention that the appellant had acquired, under the Indore High Court Act, a vested right of appeal within the High Court from a decision of a Division Bench is not supported by the wording of Ss.21(c) and 23, Indore High Court Act. Section 21(c) is as follows: "Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from (c) a decree or an order appealable under the Indore Code of Civil Procedure or any other law for the time being in force, passed either by a Judge of the High Court or a District Judge in the exercise of his appellate jurisdiction." Section 23 says: "No appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by the High Court in the exercise of its Civil or Criminal jurisdiction except as provided in this enactment." 9. It is clear from these provisions that the appellant had under the Indore High Court Act no right of further appeal in the High Court from a decision of a Division Bench, on the contrary such an appeal was expressly prohibited by S.23 of that Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that S.21(c) did confer on the appellant such a right, it is further clear from the opening words of S.21(c) namely, "save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force" that if any other statute prohibits an appeal within the High Court from a decision of a Division Bench, then S.21(c) would give way and the provisions of the other statute would prevail. If, therefore, the Madhya Bharat High Court Act, 1949 negatives the existence of any such right of appeal, the appellant cannot clearly exercise the right said to have accrued to him under S.2(c), Indore High Court Act. That this Court has under the Madhya Bharat High Court Act, 1949, as it stands today no jurisdiction to hear and determine any appeal from a decision of a Division Bench, is clear enough. The Madhya Bharat High Court Ordinance No.2 of 1948 did not confer on this Court any such jurisdiction. That this Court has under the Madhya Bharat High Court Act, 1949, as it stands today no jurisdiction to hear and determine any appeal from a decision of a Division Bench, is clear enough. The Madhya Bharat High Court Ordinance No.2 of 1948 did not confer on this Court any such jurisdiction. Section 25 of the High Court Act, 1949 which replaced the Ordinance, no doubt, provided for appeals to a Full Bench in certain cases from decisions of a Division Bench. But on 25-1-50 by Ordinance No.1 of 1950, a new section, namely S.25(A) was inserted in the Act and this new section took away the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine any appeal from a decision of a Division Bench given after 25-1-50. Section 25(A) was in these terms: "Notwithstanding anything contained in S.25, the High Court shall have no jurisdiction to hear and determine any appeal from any judgment, decree, order, and sentence passed or made after the promulgation of this Ordinance by any Divisional Court of the High Court on its original or appellate side." It must be noted that the words "Notwithstanding anything contained in S.25" which occur in S.25(A) only override the provisions of S.25. They do not limit the deprivation of jurisdiction only to appeals falling under S.25. The words only mean that S.25 shall be no impediment to the nonexistence of the jurisdiction. If the intention had been to limit the taking away the jurisdiction of this Court only to appeals under S.25, then one would have found the qualifying words "under S.25" after the words "any appeal" and before the word "from" in S.25(A). But as it is S.25(A) uses the unqualified words "any appeal" which in my opinion, mean that any appeal whether under S.25 or under any other provisions of law. The word "any" is a word which as used in S.25(A) excludes limitation or qualification. But as it is S.25(A) uses the unqualified words "any appeal" which in my opinion, mean that any appeal whether under S.25 or under any other provisions of law. The word "any" is a word which as used in S.25(A) excludes limitation or qualification. It follows from this that whatever might have been the law prior to 25-1-50, this Court has now no jurisdiction at all to entertain any appeal from a decision of a Division Bench given after 25-1-1950.The effect of S.25A of the High Court Act and Ordinance No.1 of 1950 has already been considered by a Full Bench of this Court in - 'AIR 1951 Madh B 149 (E)'and it has been held in that case that as at the commencement of the Constitution of India, this Court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine any appeal against the decisions of any Division Bench given after 25-1-50, the inference follows from Art.225 of the Constitution of India that it has none today. For these reasons the contention of the appellant that he had at the institution of the suit a vested right of appeal within the High Court or that if he had such a right he is entitled to exercise it in this Court also must be rejected. 10. In this view of the matter, it is hot necessary to consider the further argument of Mr. Chitale about the nature of appeals within the High Court itself i.e. of "inter-Court" appeals. Such appeals are, in my view, no doubt, something quite special being peculiar to the Constitution, and the rules of practice and the procedure of the particular Court. It, however, appears to me that the real question raised by this argument is whether the principle of the right of appeal being a vested right applies to appeals within the High Court, and that so far as this question is concerned, it is for the present, concluded by the Full Bench decision of this Court in - 'Second Appeal No.24 of 1950 (Madh B) (B)'. As I have held that this Court has no jurisdiction at all to entertain any appeal from a decision of a Division Bench, the question whether the appellant can take advantage of an inter-Court appeal, when at the time of the institution of the suit, there was no such appeal provided, does not arise. As I have held that this Court has no jurisdiction at all to entertain any appeal from a decision of a Division Bench, the question whether the appellant can take advantage of an inter-Court appeal, when at the time of the institution of the suit, there was no such appeal provided, does not arise. It would not, therefore, be proper to examine the correctness of the decision in - 'Second Appeal No.24 of 1950 (Madh B) (B)' in this case, where the point covered by that decision does not arise. 11. In the result, I have come to the conclusion that this appeal is incompetent and must be dismissed directing the appellant to pay to the respondent half his costs here. 12. SHINDE, C.J.:- I agree and have nothing to add. 13. A. H. KHAN, J.:- This appeal arises out of suit No.53 of 1948 for specific performance, which was instituted on 2-7-1948 and in which a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff by the Additional District Judge of Indore on 28-2-1950. The defendant filed an appeal No.19 of 1950 before the Madhya Bharat High Court, which was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court on 12-7-1951, and the plaintiff was non-suited. Aggrieved by the decision of the Division Bench, the plaintiff has filed this second appeal. 14. A preliminary objection has been raised that the appeal is incompetent. It is said that the High Court of Judicature Act, Madhya Bharat (Act No.8/1949) as it stands today does not provide for an appeal from the decree of a Division Bench to a larger Bench of this Court. No doubt that under S.25, High Court of Judicature Act, such an appeal was possible, but first by Ordinance 1 of 1950, and later on by Act 3 of 1952, S.25 was done away with. In the circumstances, it is contended that the plaintiff is not entitled to prefer this appeal. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Bharucha contends that this appeal is not brought under the repealed S.25. High Court of Judicature Act, but that it is preferred in accordance with S.21(C), Indore High Court Act (4 of 1948). In the circumstances, it is contended that the plaintiff is not entitled to prefer this appeal. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Bharucha contends that this appeal is not brought under the repealed S.25. High Court of Judicature Act, but that it is preferred in accordance with S.21(C), Indore High Court Act (4 of 1948). It is contended that the Indore High Court Act provided for two appeals in the High Court, and, by virtue of S.6 read with S.37, Madhya Bharat High Court of Judicature Act (8 of 1949), this High Court has to apply the law that prevailed in the High Court of the former Holkar State, and, as such this appeal is competent. It is further argued that the right of appeal is a vested right and according to the well established principle of law as affirmed in the decision of this High Court 'Daulat Singh v. State'. AIR 1950 Madh B 112 (FB) (K) this right inheres in a party at the commencement of the proceedings, and, because at the time of filing the suit, the Indore High Court Act was in force, which provided for two appeals in the High Court, this appeal is competent. 16. Learned and lengthy arguments have been addressed to us by the counsel of both the parties and we had also the benefit of hearing Mr. Chitale, the learned Advocate General, who has appeared as amicus curiae. 17. I would uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss the appeal on the short ground that as contended by the learned counsel of the appellant, no appeal is provided against the decision of a Division Bench in the Indore High Court Act, 1948 (Act 4 of 1948). All that S.21(C), Indore High Court Act intends to provide is that in the event of an appeal being heard by a Judge of the High Court (Single Bench), an appeal would lie to the High Court. In other words it provides that on a case being decided by a single Bench another appeal before a larger Bench could be filed. But the Act nowhere says that if an appeal was initially heard by a Division Bench, the aggrieved party had a further right of appeal to a larger Bench. In the course of the arguments, I asked Mr. But the Act nowhere says that if an appeal was initially heard by a Division Bench, the aggrieved party had a further right of appeal to a larger Bench. In the course of the arguments, I asked Mr. Bharucha whether he could cite any authority or for the matter of that refer to the practice of the Indore High Court, to substantiate the point that under Indore High Court Act, it was possible to appeal against the decree of a Division Bench. His reply was not satisfactory. I am, however, quite clear in my mind that it was not possible and the reasons are two: First, there is no provision express or implied in the Indore High Court Act for such an appeal, secondly, the Indore High Court consisted of a Chief Justice and two puisne Judges vide S.2(1), Indore High Court Act (Act 4 of 1948). Now if an appeal was initially heard by a Division Bench it was not physically possible for the High Court to constitute a larger Bench to hear an appeal from it. Furthermore, S.23, Indore High Court Act says: "No appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by the High Court in the exercise of its Civil or Criminal jurisdiction except as provided in this enactment......" 18. There being no provision for an appeal from the decision of a Division Bench in the Act, a second appeal was barred by S.23 of the Act itself. 19. For the reasons stated above, I have no hesitation in holding that under the Indore High Court Act, no appeal could be heard by a larger Bench against the decision of a Division Bench, and, as such this appeal is not competent. In the view I take of the preliminary objection, regarding the competence of this appeal, it is, in fact, unnecessary to examine and discuss any further arguments, but en passant, one or two arguments advanced with great vehemence may be noticed. 20. Mr. In the view I take of the preliminary objection, regarding the competence of this appeal, it is, in fact, unnecessary to examine and discuss any further arguments, but en passant, one or two arguments advanced with great vehemence may be noticed. 20. Mr. Chitale, the learned Advocate General, has specially referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of - ' AIR 1951 SC 253 (C)' to establish the proposition that when a new Court is established, its jurisdiction and powers are those as defined by the Statute constituting it, and that in considering the competence of this appeal, the Indore High Court Act of 1948 should be brushed aside altogether, and, that we should determine the question only by reference to the Madhya Bharat High Court Act (Act 8 of 1949) under which this Court is constituted. But what if the Madhya Bharat High Court Act itself enjoins on us to take the Indore High Court Act into consideration? I refer to Ss.6 and 37, Madhya Bharat High Court Act, the material portions of which run as follows : "Section 6: The High Court shall apply the laws and the usages prevailing in any State forming part of the United State to Civil, Criminal and other proceedings in that State till such time as a duly constituted authority modifies them. Section 37........and all cases pending before the said High Court, Tribunal or Authority, shall be transferred to the High Court of the United State for disposal, and all appeals, petitions for revision etc., which lay or lie to the said High Court, Tribunal or Authority, according to the laws in force in that State, shall lie to the High Court of the United State." On reading the 'State of Seraikella case (C)', I find that what their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed, is thus: "that the Supreme Court was a new Court established by the Constitution of India and the jurisdiction of the Court has, therefore, to be ascertained 'by considering all the relevant articles of the Constitution'. It is in that light, the provisions of Art.363 have to be read and interpreted." 21. It is in that light, the provisions of Art.363 have to be read and interpreted." 21. I would like to point out that their Lordships have laid particular emphasis on the fact that 'all the relevant Articles have to be considered in ascertaining the jurisdiction' of the Court, and this being so, in ascertaining the juris diction of the Madhya Bharat High Court, it is not only Ss.23 and 24, Madhya Bharat High Court of Judicature Act (which define its civil and criminal and appellate jurisdiction that are to be looked at, but all the relevant sections of the Act have also to be considered). Thus Ss.6 and 37 of the Act cannot be left out of account. 22. It was also held in 'the State of Seraikella case (C)' that Art.363 controlled Art.374(2) of the Constitution in determining the question of jurisdiction. In other words Art.363 put an embargo on the operation of Art.374(2) of the Constitution. But in our case the jurisdiction to hear appeals, as contained in Ss.23 and 24, Madhya Bharat High Court of Judicature Act, suffers from no such restraint as is placed on Art.374 by Art.363 of the Constitution. On the contrary, the scope of our jurisdiction is widened by Ss.6 and 37 of the Act, in so far as these sections enioin on this High Court to apply the laws of the Covenanting States also (including the right of appeal which may exist under some law of any of the covenanting State) till such time as they were modified. Thus on analysing the Supreme Court case, I find that it does not exclude the consideration of the Indore High Court Act of 1948: on the contrary it directs us to consider all the provisions of the Statute which created the Madhya Bharat High Court. In this view of the matter if the Indore High Court Act of 1948 had reaily provided for an appeal from the decision of a Division Bench (and I have held above that it did not so provide), then having regard to Ss.6 and 37, Madhya Bharat High Court of Judicature Act, this appeal was competent. 23. It has been contended that in the abolition of the Indore High Court, the Indore High Court Act came to an end. This statement is only partially true. 23. It has been contended that in the abolition of the Indore High Court, the Indore High Court Act came to an end. This statement is only partially true. In so far as the Indore High Court Act created the Indore High Court and contained provisions of an administrative and procedural nature, it must be held to be inoperative, but so much of the Indore High Court Act which relates to the right of appeal in the Indore High Court, must be deemed to have survived because the right of appeal is a vested right and it inheres in a party at the commencement of proceedings. And S.8 read with S.37 referred to above, is responsible for keeping that right alive. 24. It has been argued that the opening words of S.21, Indore High Court Act, "save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force" imply that if any other law bars the jurisdiction of the Indore High Court to hear an appeal from the decision of a Division Bench, then that law would supersede the direction contained in S.21(C). Now it is contended that Madhya Bharat High Court of Judicature Act as it stands today, negatives the existence of any such right and therefore, it must prevail over the Indore High Court Act of 1948. But this argument ignores the existence of Ss.6 and 37, Madhya Bharat High Court of Judicature Act, whereby the laws of the Covenanting States are made applicable in cases that lay or may lie till such laws are modified. However queer the position may appear to be, yet it is a fact that on one hand the Madhya Bharat High Court of Judicature Act (Act 8 of 1949) lays down its own constitution for the hearing of appeals filed before it in Ss.23 and 24 of the Act, and on the other it enjoins on us that the laws of the Covenanting States shall be applied as well. At the first blush, it may appear to be somewhat non-plusing and even incongruous, but when one considers the circumstances and conditions under which the State of Madhya Bharat came into being one can well appreciate the nature of such a Statute. At the first blush, it may appear to be somewhat non-plusing and even incongruous, but when one considers the circumstances and conditions under which the State of Madhya Bharat came into being one can well appreciate the nature of such a Statute. Although the High Court of Madhya Bharat is a new Court and it cannot be regarded as a successor Court of the various High Courts (small and big) that existed in the covenanting States, yet the proposition cannot be gainsaid that in many respects the HighCourt was intended to take the place of the covenanting High Courts that were abolished as a consequence of the merger and the emergence of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat). The Legislature had not a clean slate to write upon and a good deal was already there. It is in this context that the Madhya Bharat High Court of Judicature Act should be construed and interpreted. 25. In result I agree with the conclusion of my learned brother Dixit J., that the appeal is not competent and that it should be dismissed with half the costs. 26. BY THE COURT: The decision of the Full Bench being ready, it is pronounced by me today. The appeal stands dismissed as the same is not competent. The appellant shall pay half of the costs of the respondent in this Court and bear his own.