Judgment Jamuar, J. 1. These three applications have been heard together, as a common point arises in them. The petitioners have been convicted under Section 9(4), Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, and variously sentenced. It appears that permission had been obtained from the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi to hold a meeting of the Adibasi Mahasabha. In Criminal Revision 600, the meeting was to be held on 12-11-1949, in the afternoon, at village Sonpurgarh, in Criminal Revision 601, the meeting was to be held on 15-11-1949 at village Raniya; and, in Criminal Revision 602, the meeting was to be held on 14-11-1949, at village Tapkara. The three villages are within the jurisdiction of Torpa Police Station in the district of Ranchi. The permission granted by the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi to hold the various meetings made it a condition that no firearms, bows, arrows or other lethal weapons would be carried in the meetings. 2. The petitioners in the three applications were prosecuted on two charges, firstly, for having committed a breach of the condition mentioned in the permit to hold the meeting by carrying bows and arrows, and, secondly, for having contravened a notification No. 17716-C., dated 25-6-1949, published in the Bihar Gazette of the same date. This notification was made in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Sec. 6, Bihar Maintenance of Public Order (No. 2) Ordinance, 1949, and directed that no public meeting or procession shall be held without the permission of the District Magistrate or the Additional District Magistrate of the district. The prosecution alleged in all the three cases that, in contravention of this notification, the petitioners had led a procession to the meeting ground. 3. The petitioners in the three applications were tried at separate trials. The petitioners have been acquitted of the charge that they had broken the condition of the permit by carrying bows and arrows, on the ground that there was no evidence that these petitioners had carried bows or arrows. They have, however, been convicted for having led a procession to the meeting ground in breach of the notification mentioned above. 4. Mr. They have, however, been convicted for having led a procession to the meeting ground in breach of the notification mentioned above. 4. Mr. Basanta Chandra Ghosh, who has appeared in support of all these three applications, has raised a common point that in none of the three cases there was any evidence before the Magistrate to conic to the conclusion that there had been held any procession at all on those dates. The evidence given at the trial of the three cases was that the petitioners had led a "procession" and nothing more. This evidence in Criminal Revision 600 was given by a constable and a Sub-Inspector, in Criminal Revision 601 by a Sub-Inspector, a constable and a chaukidar, and in Criminal Revision 602 by a Sub-Deputy Magistrate, a Sub-Inspector and a constable. Mr. Ghosh contended that there should be some material on the record to enable a Court to come to a finding that there was, in fact, a procession, and that the Magistrate ought not to have accepted the mere ipse dixit of the witnesses that there was a procession. In order to find that there was a procession, it is necessary to find the ingredients of a procession. The term "procession" has not received any statutory definition. Guidance, therefore, has to be taken from the dictionary meaning of the term as also from the observations made in decided cases. The Court of appeal below has itself quoted the definition of the word "procession" as found in dictionaries. It has noticed that, in the Chambers Dictionary, the word "procession" has been defined as "a train of persons in a formal march", and, in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, the term has been defined as "a proceeding of body of persons in orderly succession." None of these elements constituting a procession was deposed to at the trial as having been present; but the Court of appeal below was of the opinion that, in view of the definitions which it has cited, it was easy for the witnesses to have distinguished between "a procession and a group of persons going together to attend a meeting". It was argued that the Court of appeal below has, by so doing, surrendered its own judgment to the judgment of the witnesses, and has acted merely upon an opinion expressed by the witness at the trial. In my opinion, there is force in this argument. It was argued that the Court of appeal below has, by so doing, surrendered its own judgment to the judgment of the witnesses, and has acted merely upon an opinion expressed by the witness at the trial. In my opinion, there is force in this argument. The petitioners had examined defence witnesses on their behalf, and, according to the evidence of these witnesses, what happened was that a number of persons had collected for the meeting, and, when the petitioners in each case arrived at the meeting place, people went up to the gate to welcome the petitioners, and then they, along with the petitioners, returned to the place where the meeting was to be held. In view of this evidence adduced by the petitioners and in the absence of any element constituting a procession in the evidence led by the prosecution, I do not think that any definite conclusion can be arrived at that there had been held a procession in any of the three cases. 5. In Criminal Revns. Nos. 1044 and 1051 of 1950, decided by a Bench of this Court on 6-12-1950 (A), the definition of the word "procession" was quoted from the Oxford Dictionary as "a proceeding of body of persons in orderly succession", and it was observed as follows: "The petitioners and their companions may have had a flag or placard with them and some of them may have been shouting slogans, but it does not appear at all clearly from the evidence that they were drawn up in any kind of formation and could properly be described as a procession". It seems to me that some element of an organised march according to a system is necessary in order to constitute a procession. In the case of -- Flockhart V/s. Robertson, (1950) 1 All ER 1091 (B), Lord Goddard C.J. pointed out the difference between a body of men going in loose formation and not in ranks which his Lordship described, though he did not want to be uncomplimentary, as being in the form of a rabble, and not in a compact body and a body of men forming themselves into ranks and thus getting themselves into what is commonly called a procession. Whereas the body of men in the former case would not constitute themselves into a procession, they may in the latter case do so. Mr. Whereas the body of men in the former case would not constitute themselves into a procession, they may in the latter case do so. Mr. Chakravarty, who appeared for the State, cited the case of -- Emperor V/s. Nana Shahu, AIR 1943 Bom 209 (C). But I do not think that this case supports him on the point which arises for consideration in these three applications. It would appear from the judgments of the 2 learned Judges who decided that case that the prosecution case there was that the accused were "marching along" on a public road, one of them carrying a Congress flag and both of them shouting slogans. Divatia J. said: "Any number of persons moving forward in the same direction would not be necessarily described as a procession. A certain degree of order and formality in marching together is an essential element in its connotation. Although a body of persons may not move in regular form, some degree of orderliness is necessary to demonstrate its object. Without such common purpose and intention to demonstrate it, there can be no procession however large the number of persons may be and in whatever manner they might proceed forward." At places more than one, his Lordship has indicated that there must be an orderly march or a formal march or a demonstrated march, and in an organised way. Lokur J., the other learned Judge, has attempted a definition of the term "procession" as "a formal and organized march of two or more persons, formal implying a kind of solemnity or something spectacular, so as to attract attention, and organized implying a common intention or unity of purpose." In the present cases before us, not one of these elements has been stated to be present by any of the witnesses. 6 Every case has to be decided on its own facts. Mr. Chakravarty contended that there are circumstances present from which an inference can be drawn that there had been held a procession in each of the three cases before us. 6 Every case has to be decided on its own facts. Mr. Chakravarty contended that there are circumstances present from which an inference can be drawn that there had been held a procession in each of the three cases before us. The common features in these cases are that a number of villagers came to attend the meeting from a village, and they were shouting slogans and carrying musical instruments, and in Criminal Revision 602 the distance from which the villagers came was given as about 400 yards, and it was also there deposed to that the petitioner was heading the procession. Now, the circumstances are that a meeting was permitted to be held in the village, and it was being lawfully held. If a number of villagers came to the meeting, though shouting slogans and carrying musical instruments, that will not be a circumstance leading to the inference that they came in a procession. The villagers may well have started from the village to attend the meeting on their own account. They may have all met along the route, and proceeded to the meeting ground. This conclusion is not excluded. In my judgment, in none of the three cases before us it has been established that there had been held a procession in contravention of the notification dated 25-6-1949. 7. In the result, I would allow these applications, and set aside the convictions of the petitioners and the sentences imposed upon them. The petitioners will be discharged from their bail bonds. If the petitioner Musammat Dulari in Criminal Revision 600 has paid the fine, it will be refunded. Ahmad, J. 8 I agree.