JUDGMENT : DIXIT, J. 1. This is an appeal from an order of the District Judge, Gwalior refusing to set aside an 'ex parte' decree passed against the appellant on 19-10-1950. The appellant sought to have the decree set aside on the ground that the summons of the suit had not been duly served on him and that the report of the process-server that the appellant refused to accept service on 27-9-50 and that he, therefore, affixed a copy of the summons on the outer-door of a house in a garden in Morar was not correct and further that as a matter of fact on the date on which the process-server is alleged to have gone to the garden for effecting service, the appellant was not residing in the garden and that he ordinarily resides and carries on business in a house in Lashkar. 2. In support of the application for setting aside the 'ex parte' decree, the appellant filed two affidavits. The respondent also filed a counter-affidavit. The deponents were cross-examined by the opposite party on the affidavits made by them. The parties desired to produce certain witnesses also but the learned District Judge prohibited them from doing so. On the basis of the evidence of these affidavits, the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the defendant-appellant had failed to show that the summons had not been duly served on him. He, therefore, rejected the application for setting aside the 'ex parte' decree. 3. In my opinion, the order of the lower Court cannot be sustained. In his affidavit, the appellant denied the fact that he was in the garden on the day on which the process-server came there for effecting service. He also denied the fact that he declined to accept service and that the process-server then affixed the summons on the outer-door of a house in the garden. In fact he denied the existence of any house in the garden. In his cross-examination he stated that he was ordinarily living in a house in Lashkar with his brother-in-law as his tenant and that at times he used to be away from Lashkar for several months and that some times he used to live in his own house in Sadar. Bazar, Morar. In his cross-examination he stated that he was ordinarily living in a house in Lashkar with his brother-in-law as his tenant and that at times he used to be away from Lashkar for several months and that some times he used to live in his own house in Sadar. Bazar, Morar. On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, his Mukhtyar Kanhiyalal filed an affidavit saying that he accompanied the process-server on 27-9-50 and that the appellant who was present in the garden refused to accept the service and that thereupon, the process-server affixed the summons to the outer-door of a house in the garden where the appellant resides. In his cross-examination Kanhaiya Lal said that the appellant's wife lives in Sadar Bazar, Morar and that when he had first accompanied the process-server for effecting service at this place, he was informed that the appellant did not reside there. From these affidavits and the cross-examination of the appellant and Kanhaiya Lal, I do not find the essential material on the basis of which the learned District Judge preferred to accept the affidavit of Kanhaiya Lal. The District Judge has not, in fact, given in his order any indication of the criterion he has applied in preferring the affidavit of the respondent to the affidavit of the appellant. Again the learned District Judge overlooked the fact that the presumption under S.114, illustration (e), Evidence Act, which arises in respect of the due service of the summons, could be satisfactorily strengthened or displaced by the evidence of the process-server and of the witnesses who attested the report made by the process-server. The process-server and the attesting witnesses Shahkar Lal, Prabhu Dayal, and Madan Mohan were the material witnesses who could have deposed about the service of summons on the appellant. In the absence of their evidence, it is clearly not possible to determine whether the affidavit of the appellant or of the respondent is true. The learned District Judge was, therefore, not justified in refusing permission to the parties to supplement their affidavits by the evidence of these and other witnesses. It appears to me that in following the procedure of disposing of the defendant's application for setting aside the ex parte decree on the affidavits filed in this case, the learned District Judge has not properly understood the circumstances in which affidavit-evidence is permitted and can be acted upon by the Court. It appears to me that in following the procedure of disposing of the defendant's application for setting aside the ex parte decree on the affidavits filed in this case, the learned District Judge has not properly understood the circumstances in which affidavit-evidence is permitted and can be acted upon by the Court. Affidavit evidence is not permitted except where there is an agreement between the parties that evidence may be taken by affidavit or where under O.19, R.1, Civil P.C. there is an order of the Court that particular facts may be proved by affidavits or that an affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing. See - 'Marneedi Satyam v. Ven-kata Swami', AIR 1949 Mad 689. Here, there was no agreement between parties that their evidence would be by affidavits only. Under O.19, R.1 the Court is authorised to order for sufficient reasons that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavits. I do not find in the record before me any such order of the Court. The learned District Judge while rejecting an application filed by the respondent for being allowed to tender the process-server, the attesting witnesses and other persons as witnesses on his behalf, no doubt, stated that the parties in the case had been ordered before that their evidence would be by affidavits. It is not clear from this whether the order directing the parties to tender evidence by affidavits was an oral order or one in writing. As it is, there is on the record, no order of the Court directing the parties to prove by affidavits any particular fact or facts and containing the reasons which in the opinion of the District Judge were sufficient to give such a direction to the parties. It must be noted that even when the parties agree to take evidence by affidavits, they are not precluded from giving oral evidence to supplement the affidavit unless the agreement specifies that their evidence would be by affidavits alone -'Glossop v. Heston and Isleworth Local Board', (1878) 47 LJ Ch 536. In the present case the affidavits filed were not even in accordance with the provisions of O.19, R.3. In the present case the affidavits filed were not even in accordance with the provisions of O.19, R.3. This rule says: "Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove, except on interlocutory application son which statements of his belief may be admitted provided that the grounds thereof are stated." 4. But the affidavits filed by the parties in the present case bear only the verifications that they were sworn on oath and the contents of the affidavits were read out to the deponents and were admitted by them to be correct. These verifications make the affidavits meaningless and valueless, as they do not state how much of the affidavit is a statement of the deponent's knowledge and how much is a statement of his belief. It has been observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J., in - 'Padmabati v. Rasik', 37 Cal 259, that the provisions of O.19, R.3 must be strictly observed and every affidavit should clearly express how much is the statement of the deponent's knowledge and how much is a statement of his belief and the ground of belief must be stated with sufficient particularity to enable the Court to judge whether it would be safe to act on the deponent's belief As the affidavits filed in present case are not in conformity with O.19, R.3, it must be held that the affidavits required by O.19, R.1 simply do not exist in the case. I am, therefore, of the view that the learned District Judge was not justified in holding on the basis of the affidavits without any more that the appellant had failed to show that the summons of the case was not duly served on him. This was not a case in which an affidavit filed by one party had been challenged by the opposite party merely by verbal denial without any attempt to contradict it by a counter affidavit or without asking about the attendance of the deponent for the purpose of cross-examination. 5. I would, therefore, set aside the order of the lower Court refusing to set aside the ex parte decree and send back the case with the direction that the learned District Judge should dispose of the application for setting aside the ex parte decree after recording the evidence of such witnesses as the parties may desire to tender on their behalf. In the circumstances of the case, the parties should bear their own costs of this application. 6. CHATURVEDI, J. :- I agree.