Gangadharan Pillai v. Nagendra Prabhu — 1952 DIGILAW 105 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. The plaintiffs who are two in number are the appellants. The suit is for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from entering upon the plaint schedule property. The property belongs to the defendants. It 19 Punja land, about 33 acres in extent. The plaintiffs' case is that they were cultivating the properties as lessees from 1123 onwards. The harvest of the year 1126 was taken in the month of Kumbhom that year. After that the plaintiffs did the preliminary agricultural operations for the crop of 1127 and spent Rs. 750/- and 500 paras of paddy for that purpose. The defendants attempted to take forcible possession of the property from the plaintiffs and therefore they filed the suit for the relief mentioned above, It was also alleged in the plaint that the plaintiffs had effected improvements in the property of the value of Rs. 2500 and that the defendants had agreed to pay that amount at the time of eviction. It was further alleged that the defendants had received some amount as advanced pattern for the year 1127. The amount was, however, not mentioned in the plaint. 2. In the written statement filed by the defendants they contended that the property was leased to the plaintiffs only for the cultivation of 1126, that after the harvest of 1126 was taken the property was surrendered to the defendants and that they conducted agricultural operations for the crop of 1127. They denied the allegation that the plaintiffs had effected improvements in the property and that the defendants had agreed to give the value thereof. The allegation that some amount has been paid to the defendants as advance pattom for 1127 was also denied. They contended that they were in possession of the property and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief claimed in the plaint. In the replication filed by the plaintiffs they reiterated the allegations in the plaint and denied that they surrendered the property to the defendants after the harvest of 1126. 3. With regard to the allegation in the plaint that the plaintiffs had effected improvements in the property the learned Munsiff did not record a definite finding. In the replication filed by the plaintiffs they reiterated the allegations in the plaint and denied that they surrendered the property to the defendants after the harvest of 1126. 3. With regard to the allegation in the plaint that the plaintiffs had effected improvements in the property the learned Munsiff did not record a definite finding. He observed that "there is no evidence worth the name to prove that the plaintiffs did effect some improvements," But since the first defendant admitted in his deposition that when the property was in the possession of a prior lessee some improvements have been effected in the property by the defendants at the cost of about Rs- 1000/- the learned Munsiff disposed of the question in the following manner: "I am forced to draw a presumption in favour of the plaintiffs. Apart from this presumption I leave this issue open." No issue was raised relating to the allegation in the plaint that the plaintiffs had paid some amount to the defendants as advance pattom for the year 1127. The plaintiffs did not choose to adduce any independent evidence relating to this matter and they do not seem to have pressed it at the time of hearing, 4. The important issues tried by the learned Munsiff are issues 2, 3 and 5 which relate to the following questions, i. e., whether the plaintiffs surrendered the property to the defendants after the harvest of 1126, who conducted the agricultural operations for the crop of 1127 and who was in possession of the property on the date of suit. With regard to the question whether the plaintiffs surrendered the property to the defendants the finding of the learned Munsiff was that there was no reliable evidence to prove the surrender. The learned Munsiff was of the opinion that the plaintiffs intended to continue in possession even after the harvest of 1126. With regard to possession of the property on the date of suit the finding of the learned Munsiff is not very clear. According to him even if the defendants entered into possession of the property the entry would not be legal and it would be only an act of trespass (vide paragraph 16 of the judgment). In paragraph 17 the learned Munsiff observes thus: "Possession on the date of suit has not been properly established in this case one way or the other. In paragraph 17 the learned Munsiff observes thus: "Possession on the date of suit has not been properly established in this case one way or the other. But as prior possession is admittedly with the plaintiffs and since I have already held that the surrender has not been proved the plaintiff has discharged his primary burden to prove possession by examining himself and some of the neighbouring cultivators, Pws.1, 2 and 4". The learned Munsiff did not, however, discuss the evidence of these witnesses. As for the witnesses examined by the defendants to prove their possession of the property the learned Munsiff did not choose to act on their evidence. The main reason given by the Munsiff for not accepting the evidence of the defence witnessess is that the second defendant and one Madhavan Pillai who, according to the first defendant, have been supervising the agricultural operations in the property, have not been examined in the case. The documents produced on both sides were also not relied on by the learned Munsiff for the reason that they were produced late: An additional reason for not relying on some of the documents produced by the defendants is that the 2nd defendant in whose favour those documents were executed and Madhavan Pillai in whose handwriting they were written were not examined in the case. The learned Munsiff ultimately found that the plaintiffs' possession of the property had not been disturbed (vide paragraph 19). In paragraph 23 the learned Munsiff further observed thus: "I may be permitted to add that even if it be true that the defendants' men entered the land and conducted some of the agricultural operations it does not amount to complete ouster of the plaintiffs. It can only be isolated acts of trespass and the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction restraining them from committing further acts of trespass." In the result, the defendants were restrained by an injunction from disturbing the possession of the plaintiffs till they were evicted in due course of law. Both parties were ordered to suffer their costs. 5. In the appeal filed by the defendants from this decision the learned District Judge reversed the finding of the Munsiff relating to the possession of the property on the date of suit The learned judge held that the defendants were in possession of the property on the date of the suit. Both parties were ordered to suffer their costs. 5. In the appeal filed by the defendants from this decision the learned District Judge reversed the finding of the Munsiff relating to the possession of the property on the date of suit The learned judge held that the defendants were in possession of the property on the date of the suit. The oral and documentary evidence adduced by the defendants relating to the possession of the property was believed by the learned Judge He, therefore, held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction restraining the defendants from entering into possession of the property and dismissed the suit with costs. 6. The main question to be decided in this second appeal is- who was in possession of the plaint property on the date of suit? The only prayer in the plaint is for an injunction restraining the defendants from entering into possession of the plaint property. If on the date of suit the defendants were in possession of the property, whether rightly or wrongly, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to the relief claimed in the suit Apart from the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs relating to the possession of the property on the date of suit learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied on certain circumstances which, according to him go to show that the plaintiffs were in possession of the property. One such circumstance is that the plaintiffs were allowed to be in possession of the paddy necessary for the seed and cultivation expenses for the crop of 1127. Another circumstance is that the first defendant himself admits that the plaintiffs wanted to continue the lease arrangement for the year 1127 also. It is, therefore, argued that it is not likely that the plaintiffs would have voluntarily surrendered possession of the plaint property after the harvest of 1226. The third circumstance is that in view of the fact that under Act VIII of 1950 the defendants could not evict the plaintiffs from the property it is not likely that the plaintiffs would have surrendered possession of the property. Before dealing with the evidence relating to the possession of the property on the date of suit it is necessary to consider the force of the argument based on the above circumstances. 7. Before dealing with the evidence relating to the possession of the property on the date of suit it is necessary to consider the force of the argument based on the above circumstances. 7. With regard to the possession of paddy for the seed and cultivation expenses for the crop of 1127, the evidence is to the effect that as soon as the harvest of 1126 was over the plaintiffs removed from the threshing floor all the paddy except 850 paras to be paid to the defendants as pattam and 362 paras to be sold to Government. Ext. XVIII is the statement filed by the first plaintiff before the Grain Purchasing Officer on 25-1-1951 before the harvest was taken. Ex. XVIII (a) dated 6-3-1951 is the report of the Grain Purchasing Parvathicar on that statement. The report is to the effect that 450 paras of paddy more had to be sold to Government, that the lessees removed paddy from the threshing floor without the permission of the Parvathicar and that steps should be taken for recovering the paddy from the lessees. The Parvathicar was examined as Dw. 5 in the case. He swears that the paddy was unauthorisedly removed from the threshing floor by the plaintiffs. It is true that it is stated in Ex. XVIII (a), report that 750 paras of paddy would be required for agricultural purposes But there was no occasion for the plaintiffs or for the defendants to demand this paddy from the Parvathicar. As stated above, the paddy had been already removed from the threshing floor without the permission of Dw. 5 as is clear from Ex, XVIII (a) report. It has to be noted that the report, Ex. XVIII (a) was submitted by Dw. 5 soon after the harvest was taken. It is true that Dw. 5 swears that the paddy necessary for seed and cultivation expenses for the crop of 1127 was given to the plaintiffs. He also swears that if the defendants had asked him for the paddy he would not have given the same to the plaintiffs. But this has to be read along with his report, Ex. XVIII (a) and his deposition that the paddy had been removed by the plaintiffs from the threshing floor without his permission. He also swears that if the defendants had asked him for the paddy he would not have given the same to the plaintiffs. But this has to be read along with his report, Ex. XVIII (a) and his deposition that the paddy had been removed by the plaintiffs from the threshing floor without his permission. He definitely swears that the paddy necessary for the seed and cultivation expenses for the crop of 1127 was not in the threshing floor when 362 paras of paddy was measured out to him by the plaintiffs. There was, therefore, no occasion for Dw. 5 to give the plaintiffs the 750 paras of paddy required for the cultivation for the next year's crop. What really happened seems to be this: The plaintiffs removed from the threshing floor all the paddy except 362 paras which according to them was the quota to be sold to Government and 850 paras to be paid to the defendants as pattern. The Grain Purchasing Proverthicar was not concerned with the question as to who should retain the paddy for the next year's cultivation, so long as no complaint was made to him about the matter. He only wanted to get some more paddy from the plaintiffs as the quota due to Government. The defendants had no occasion to demand from him the paddy required for the cultivation since the paddy had already been removed from the threshing floor by the plaintiffs. According to the defendants they began the agricultural operations soon after the harvest was taken and when they were in need of paddy for paying the workmen they petitioned the Grain Purchasing Officer for recovering from the plaintiffs the paddy which they had unauthorisedly removed from the threshing floor. Ext. XVII is the petition presented by them on 15-4-1951. In that it was stated that after the harvest of 1126 was taken the plaintiffs surrendered the property, that the defendants were doing the agricultural operations and that the ploughmen were demanding paddy for their work. It was also stated that 300 paras of paddy which was necessary for seed and 450 paras necessary for the agricultural expenses which was with the lessees was not in the threshing floor when the pattom was measured out and that the lessees had removed the same previously. It was also stated that 300 paras of paddy which was necessary for seed and 450 paras necessary for the agricultural expenses which was with the lessees was not in the threshing floor when the pattom was measured out and that the lessees had removed the same previously. It was, therefore, prayed that 750 paras of paddy should be recovered from the plaintiffs and sold to the defendants. This petition was sent for the report of Dw. 5 who reported that the agricultural operations in the property were being conducted by the defendants and that the 750 paras of paddy kept with the plaintiffs for seed and cultivation expenses should be recovered from them and sold to the defendants. Accordingly the Grain Purchasing Tahsildar directed the Proverthicar to purchase the paddy from the plaintiffs and, if they refused to measure out the paddy, to keep the granary under seal. Since the plaintiffs refused to give the paddy their granary was kept under seal. The first plaintiff presented a petition to the Grain Purchasing Tahsildar on 25-5-1951 for release of the paddy. He subsequently agreed to sell to Government some more paddy as Government's quota. According to the second plaintiff {Pw.1) 150 paras more was sold to Government. According to the Grain Purchasing Proverthicar, Dw. 5,100 paras more was sold to Government. The first plaintiff also executed a kychit undertaking to sell to Government 282 paras of paddy in case he was not cultivating the property for the 1127 crop. Ext. XX is the kychit executed by him. In the circumstances it cannot be said that 750 paras of paddy was kept with the plaintiffs with the consent of the defendants and the Grain Purchasing Proverthicar for the cultivation of the property for the 1127 crop. It may be that the plaintiffs wanted to make use of this paddy in case they were allowed to cultivate the property for the year 1127 also. But the mere fact that they were in possession of the paddy does not go to show that the understanding between the parties was that the plaintiffs should cultivate the property for that year's crop. The defendant's case is that it was because the plaintiffs' granary was sealed as a result of the petition presented by the defendants that this suit was filed. The granary was sealed on 24-5-1951 and the suit was filed on 29-5-1951. 8. The defendant's case is that it was because the plaintiffs' granary was sealed as a result of the petition presented by the defendants that this suit was filed. The granary was sealed on 24-5-1951 and the suit was filed on 29-5-1951. 8. With regard to the second circumstance relied on by learned counsel for the plaintiffs, namely, that it is admitted by the first defendant that the plaintiffs wanted to continue the lease arrangement for the year 1127 also, what the first defendant swears as Dw.1 is that after the harvest of 1126 was over he told the plaintiffs that the defendants themselves wanted to cultivate the property for the year 1127 and asked the plaintiffs not to plough the field. The plaintiffs said that they wanted to cultivate the property for one year more. The defendants did not agree to this and they themselves conducted the agricultural operations as soon as the harvest was taken. Dw. 7 swears that when the defendants were conducting the agricultural operations the second plaintiff requested him to persuade the defendants to agree to the plaintiffs cultivating the property for one year more. When he replied that the defendants were not likely to agree to this since he knew that they themselves wanted to cultivate the property the 2nd plaintiff requested him to ask the defendants to give the plaintiffs at least a panku. Dw. 7 spoke to the first defendant about the matter and the latter replied that it was not possible either to allow the plaintiffs to cultivate the property or to give them a panku. From this it is argued that, in view of the fact that even according to the defendants the plaintiffs insisted on cultivating the property for the year 1127 also, it is not likely that they would have voluntarily surrendered possession of the property. In this connection it is necessary to consider the nature of the lease arrangement entered into by the plaintiffs and the defendants. Ext. I to III are the lease deeds executed by the plaintiffs in favour of defendants 1 to 3 respectively. In this connection it is necessary to consider the nature of the lease arrangement entered into by the plaintiffs and the defendants. Ext. I to III are the lease deeds executed by the plaintiffs in favour of defendants 1 to 3 respectively. It is expressly stated in those documents that the lease was only for the Medom crop of 1126, The following is the relevant term: With regard to the nature of lease arrangements for the cultivation of Punja lands this is what was observed by this Court in Chacko Kuncheria v. Government of T. C. and others (1950 KLT 689 at p. 695): "The right to cultivate these paddy lands would not come strictly under the category of 'leases' as defined in the Transfer of Property Act. These lands were leased out for the specific purpose of cultivating paddy. He could not use that land for any other purpose so that he could not get exclusive right to enjoy the so-called leasehold. Though this arrangement was called a lease-hold right, the mere use of such loose terms would not by itself confer on him all the rights of a lessee as is ordinarily understood" According to the custom relating to the cultivation of these lands no special formality is required for the surrender of the property after the harvest is taken. When the harvest it taken and the pattom is paid to the lessor the lease arrangement comes to an end. The expression used is "WOtU kMgMpOW". The lessee has no further stake in the property. Unless he does the agricultural operations for the next year also there is nothing to show that he continues to be in possession of the property or that he intends to continue in possession. The evidence of the second plaintiff himself will make this clear. This is what he says: What the first defendant swears as Dw.1 is that after the pattom was paid by the plaintiffs they were asked not to plough the land since the defendants themselves wanted to cultivate the property. He was asked in cross examination whether he did anything for taking possession of the property besides asking the plaintiffs not to plough the field: It has to be noted that it was after the first defendant was examined that the 2nd plaintiff was examined. He was asked in cross examination whether he did anything for taking possession of the property besides asking the plaintiffs not to plough the field: It has to be noted that it was after the first defendant was examined that the 2nd plaintiff was examined. It will thus be seen that even if the plaintiffs desired to cultivate the property for the 1127 crop also so long as the defendants were not agreeable to that there was nothing to prevent the defendants from entering upon the property after the harvest of 1126 was taken and preparing the field for the next cultivation. Although the transaction may not be of the nature of a mere licence it comes to an end as soon as the harvest is taken and pattom is paid to the lessor. If the lessee wants to cultivate the property for the next crop also a fresh arrangement will have to be entered into for the purpose. In the absence of any such arrangement the lessee is not entitled to do the agricultural operations for the next crop. Even if it is necessary that the lessor should ask the lessee not to plough the field, as sworn to by the second plaintiff; the first defendant swears that he so asked the plaintiffs after the harvest was over. Therefore, from the mere fact that the plaintiffs wanted to cultivate the property for the 1127 crop also it cannot be held that they continued to be in possession of the property after the 1126 harvest was taken. It must be established by evidence in the case that they were in actual possession of the property even after the harvest was taken. 9. With regard to the third circumstance relied on by learned counsel for the applicants, namely, in view of Act VIII of 1950 it is not likely that the plaintiffs would have surrendered possession of the property, the question depends upon the fact whether the plaintiffs had reason to believe that they were entitled to the benefit under Act VIII of 1950. The lease was only for the cultivation of a particular crop, and as stated above, the custom relating to Punja cultivation is such that such lease arrangements come to an end when the harvest is taken and pattom is paid to the landlord. The lease was only for the cultivation of a particular crop, and as stated above, the custom relating to Punja cultivation is such that such lease arrangements come to an end when the harvest is taken and pattom is paid to the landlord. It cannot, therefore, be said that the lessee would continue in possession of the property even after the harvest is taken. In the circumstances it is doubtful whether the plaintiffs would have believed that they were entitled to the benefit under Act VIII of 1950. The terms of the lease deeds, Exts. I to III and the custom relating to the termination of lease arrangements in respect of Punja cultivation are such that it is not likely that the plaintiffs would have believed that they could claim the benefit under Act VIII of 1950. It has also to be noted that the lease transaction in question came into existence after the date of Act VIII of 1950. The lease for the year 1123 was in favour of the second plaintiff only as admitted by him as Pw.1. According to the first defendant, the lease for the year 1124 also was in favour of the second plaintiff alone. In any case the lease for the year 1126 was a fresh lease. This, however may not be a material circumstance so far as the applicability of Act VIII of 1950 is concerned. The more important question is whether the plaintiffs could claim the benefit of the Act if their possession of the property terminated with the taking of the harvest raised by them. Even if the plaintiffs could claim the benefit under the Act and were not bound to surrender possession of the property to the defendants after the harvest was taken, if as a matter of fact the defendants entered upon the property and reduced it into their possession before the date of the suit the plaintiffs cannot succeed in this suit which is merely one for an injunction restraining the defendants from entering into possession of the property and not one for recovery of possession of property on the basis of section 9 of the Specific Relief Act So far as this case is concerned the only question for consideration is- who were in possession of the property on the date of suit, whether the plaintiffs or the defendants. 10. 10. Before dealing with the evidence relating to the possession of the property it is necessary to refer to another argument advanced on behalf of the appellants. It is this: The first defendant admits as Dw.1 that while the defendants were conducting agricultural operations in the paddy field the plaintiffs obstructed them and that the defendants complained to the Police about this. From this it is argued that even if the defendants entered upon the property and did some agricultural operations it cannot be said that the plaintiffs acquiesced in that and that the defendants reduced the property into their possession. What Dw. 1 swears is this: Before the sowing the paddy field has to be ploughed thrice. The first ploughing is called the second and the third"' The property is about 33 acres in extent. If the whole property is ploughed by the defendants twice it certainly amounts to reducing the properly into their possession. If the plaintiffs acquiesced in this and subsequently obstructed the defendants when the third ploughing was done by them it cannot be said that the plaintiffs were in possession of the property at the time of the obstruction. The first defendant's evidence is that even after this obstruction the defendants did the third ploughing and other agricultural operations. Therefore, the mere fact that the plaintiffs obstructed the defendants at the third ploughing of the field and that the latter complained to the Police about this does not go to show that the defendants had not reduced the property into their possession before the date of suit 11. It was next argued for the appellants that even in cases in which a tenant holds over after the termination of the lease without the consent of the land-lord the latter cannot take the law into his own hands and eject the tenant by force and that his only remedy is to obtain possession of the property in due course of law. If the tenant is ejected otherwise than in due course of law he is entitled under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act to recover possession of the property from the landlord. If the tenant is ejected otherwise than in due course of law he is entitled under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act to recover possession of the property from the landlord. Reference was made to the decisions in Sofool Khan v. Woopean Khan (9 Weekly Reporter 123) Janardhan Achari v. Aradhun Achari (9 Weekly reporter 613), Rudrappa v. Narrsingha Rao (I.L.R. 29 Bombay 213), Emperor v. Haji Ghulam Muhammed (I.L.R. 43 Bombay 631), Secretary of State for India v. Dinshaw Navroji (AIR 1925 Sind 275) Velayudhan v. Padmanabha Pillai !4 D.L.R. 1949, Travancore 53; I do not think that these rulings apply to the facts of this case. If the plaintiffs in this case can be said to have been holding over after the termination of the lease and to have continued in possession of the property it is true that the defendants would not be entitled to evict them by force and that the remedy of the defendants would be to recover possession of the property in due course of law. But, as stated above, the plaintiffs in this case cannot be said to have continued in possession of the property after the 1126 crop was taken. There was, therefore, no question of ejecting them and recovering possession of the property from them. The basis of the defendants' case is that the plaintiffs ceased to be is possession of the property after the harvest was taken and that the defendants entered into possession of the property for the cultivation of the next crop. The real question therefore for consideration in the case is whether the plaintiffs continued to be in possession of the property after the 1126 harvest was taken. This again depends on the question whether it was the plaintiffs or the defendants who did the agricultural operations in the property after the taking of the harvest and before the filing of the suit. 12. The harvest was taken in Kumbhom 1126 and it is the case of both parties that ploughing of the field began soon after the harvest was taken. The suit was filed on 29-3-1951 i.e., in Edavam 1126. Evidence was adduced by both sides with regard to agricultural operations conducted after the date of suit. 12. The harvest was taken in Kumbhom 1126 and it is the case of both parties that ploughing of the field began soon after the harvest was taken. The suit was filed on 29-3-1951 i.e., in Edavam 1126. Evidence was adduced by both sides with regard to agricultural operations conducted after the date of suit. I do not think that evidence is of much value so far as this case is concerned especially in view of the fact that there has been an interim injunction in this case restraining the defendants from entering into possession of the property and also an order prohibiting the plaintiffs from entering into possession. Agricultural operations conducted by either party under the protection of orders passed by the court after the institution of the suit cannot be regarded as evidence of possession of the property on the date of suit. The plaintiffs' oral evidence relating to possession of the property consists of that of Pw. 1, Pw. 3 and Pw. 4. Pw.1 is the second plaintiff himself. I agree with the learned judge in his view that no reliance can be placed on his evidence. His case that the plaintiffs had effected improvements in the property of the value of rs. 2500/- and that the defendants had agreed to give this amount at the time of eviction is clearly false as observed by the learned District Judge. The terms of the lease deeds, Exts. I to III, make it clear that the plaintiffs had not effected any improvements in the property. His case with regard to the payment of advance pattam is also clearly false. No amount was mentioned in the plaint. In the chief examination he said that 170 paras of paddy has been paid while in the cross examination he said that it was 175 paras of paddy that was paid. Both the courts below did not act on the account book, Ext. B, produced by him. The accounts start from 16-7-1126. According to the second plaintiff, the agricultural operations began on the 3rd Kumbhom 1126. Ext. H is an Uzhavukarar chit relating to the ploughing of the property. It is dated 15-7-1126. It is stated in it that 84 paras of paddy was received by the executants of the document on that day as advance wages for ploughing. This, however, does not find a place in the account book, Ext. B Ext. Ext. H is an Uzhavukarar chit relating to the ploughing of the property. It is dated 15-7-1126. It is stated in it that 84 paras of paddy was received by the executants of the document on that day as advance wages for ploughing. This, however, does not find a place in the account book, Ext. B Ext. G also is an Uzhavukarar chit executed in favour of the second plaintiff. The plaintiffs did not care to examine the executants of Ext. G and H. The second plaintiff alone swears to the genuineness of these documents. In the circumstances I do not thick that any reliance can be placed on Exts. B, G and H. Ext. F is the copy of the proceedings of the Punja Special Officer relating to the dewatering of the Block of Punja land including the plaint paddy field. That shows that the second plaintiff was one of the members of the committee appointed for the purpose. But this is dated 1st August 1951, long after the suit was filed and when the interim injunction was in force. It has, therefore no evidentiary value so far as the question of possession of the property on the date of the suit is concerned. Pw. 3 who is the Manager of an oil mill situated near the plaint property swears that it was the plaintiffs who did the agricultural operations in the property for the year 1127. He does not, however, say that the agricultural operations referred to by him were done before the date of suit. The temporary injunction issued by the trial court was in force from 29-5-1951 to 8-11-1951. It is, therefore, possible that the plaintiffs did some agricultural operations during that period. Even if Pw. 3 is believed his evidence does not go to show that the plaintiffs did agricultural operations in the property before the Hate of suit. So far as Pw. 4 is concerned, what he swears in chief examination is that it was the 2nd plaintiff who raised the crop for the year 1127. In cross examination he says that it was in Vrischikam 1127 that the crop was raised. This is long after the filing of the suit. This is all the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs to prove their possession of the property before the date of suit. In cross examination he says that it was in Vrischikam 1127 that the crop was raised. This is long after the filing of the suit. This is all the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs to prove their possession of the property before the date of suit. The evidence is not at all sufficient to prove that the plaintiffs were in possession of the property on the date of suit. The question of burden of proof is not very material in this case since both sides have adduced evidence relating to the possession of the property 13. The defendants have examined Dws.1 to 9 and have produced various documents to prove their possession of the property. Ext. V is a receipt dated 3-4-1981 executed by Dw. 3 for Rs. 252-12-0 price of lime shell purchased by the defendants fur putting in the plaint property at the time of ploughing. Ext. VI is a receipt given by Dw. 2 on 24-5-1951 for 100 paras of paddy and Rs. 186-3-6 towards wages for ploughing the plaint paddy field. Ex. VI (a) is a similar receipt executed on the same day by Dw. 4 for 40 paras of paddy and Rs. 73-12-0. Ext. VII is a receipt dated 28-4-1951 for Rs. 197-7-0 executed by Dw. 8 towards wages for levelling up portions of the property and repairing bunds, Ext. VIII is a receipt dated 25-5-1951 executed by the same witness for Rs. 30 received by him as advance wages for keeping watch in the paddy field. These documents are proved by their executants. The first defendant as Dw.1 swears that they were executed in his house although they were taken in the name of the second defendant alone who was supervising the agricultural operations. The learned Munsiff did not discuss the evidence of these witnesses or the genuineness of these documents but discharged them mainly on the ground that the second defendant and Madhavan Pillai, the writer of some of these documents, were not examined in the case. In view of the fact that the executants of the documents have sworn to their genuineness and of the further fact that the first defendant swears that the documents were executed in his house I do not think that it is a material circumstance that the second defendant and Madhavan Pillai were not examined in the case. Ex. In view of the fact that the executants of the documents have sworn to their genuineness and of the further fact that the first defendant swears that the documents were executed in his house I do not think that it is a material circumstance that the second defendant and Madhavan Pillai were not examined in the case. Ex. IX is the account book relating to the expenses incurred by the defendants for the cultivation of the plaint property. That by itself may not be a strong piece of evidence. It is a book that can be written up at any time. Exts. XXII to XXIX relate to agricultural operations conducted after the date of the suit and they came into existence after that date. It is, therefore, not necessary to refer to those documents or to the oral evidence relating to them, Dw. 5 is, as stated above, the Grain Purchasing Proverthicar whose evidence has already bean dealt with. The evidence of Dw. 6 relates to agricultural operations conducted after the date of suit. Dw. 7 whose evidence has been already referred to swears to the fact that it was the defendants who did the agricultural operations in the property for the year 1127 and that he gave the first defendant 210 paras of seed paddy in Thulam 1127 for sowing in the plaint property. He swears that he is cultivating about 6000 paras of paddy land and that he pays nearly Rs. 1000 as land tax. He, however, admits that an insolvency petition was filed against him by a creditor and that he has been adjudicated insolvent. He explains the circumstances in which the petition happened to be filed. The learned District Judge has not referred to the evidence of this witness. He appears to be an intimate friend of the defendants and I do not attach much importance to his evidence. The evidence of Dw. 9 relates to agricultural operations that took place after the date of suit. The learned District Judge has discussed the evidence of Dws.1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8 and has believed them. I find no reason to disagree with him. I therefore hold that the agricultural operations in the property after the date of the harvest in Kumbhom 1126 and before the date of suit were done by the defendants and not by the plaintiffs. I find no reason to disagree with him. I therefore hold that the agricultural operations in the property after the date of the harvest in Kumbhom 1126 and before the date of suit were done by the defendants and not by the plaintiffs. It follows from this finding that the defendants were in possession of the plaint property on the date of suit. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that even if it is found that the plaintiffs remained in possession of the property after the 1126 harvest was taken, their possession would be that of trespassers if they remained in possession against the consent of the defendants. Reference was made to the decision of this court in Abraham v. Madhavan (AIR 1952 T.C. 359). In that case it was held that the possession of the lessee after the termination of the tenancy by the efflux of time against the consent of the landlord is not even that of a tenant at sufferance but is that of a trespasser. It was, therefore, argued that the plaintiffs would not in any case be entitled to an injunction restraining the rightful owner from entering into possession of the property. Learned counsel contended that a person in wrongful possession of a property is not entitled to the assistance of the court by way of injunction for maintaining his wrongful possession against the rightful owner and that he can ask for an injunction only for maintaining his possession as against persons other than the rightful owner, although he may be entitled under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act to recover possession of the property even from the rightful owner if the latter evicts him by force. Reference was made to the decisions in Narayana Rao V. Dharmachan (I.L.R. 26 Madras 614) and Periyaswami Muthiriyan v. Anandayi (AI R. 1924 Madras 722). This question did not directly arise for consideration in those cases although there are some observations in those cases which can be construed as supporting the position taken up by learned counsel for the respondents. In view of the fact that I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the plaint property on the date of suit I do not think it necessary to express any opinion on this aspect of the case. 15. In view of the fact that I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the plaint property on the date of suit I do not think it necessary to express any opinion on this aspect of the case. 15. I, therefore, confirm the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and dismiss the second appeal with costs. Dismissed.