Judgment Ramaswami, J. 1. These appeals are presented on behalf of the plaintiff against the order of the Subordinate Judge of Gaya dated 31-5-1952, rejecting two applications, one for the appointment of a receiver with respect to the properties involved in the suit and the other for the issue of an ad interim injunction against defendants 1 and 2 restraining them from taking delivery of possession of the properties mentioned in Schedules B and C of the plaint from the Court of Wards of Uttar Pradesh. 2. The dispute relates to the Tamkohi Raj which is an ancient impartible Raj, succession to which is governed according to the rule of lineal primogeniture. The Raj consists of movable and immovable properties located in the districts of Deoria, Gorakhpur and Basti in the Province of Uttar Pradesh and in the districts of Saran and Gaya in the Province of Bihar. Raja Indarjit Pratap Bahadur Sahi who was the last male holder of the Raj executed a registered will on 15-12-1939, whereby he conferred a Hindu womans estate on Rani Jagdishwari Kuer in respect of all the properties comprised in the Tamkohi Raj. The Rani was given authority to adopt and it appears from the will that the testator intended that she should adopt one or the other of a number of persons who were mentioned in it. Raja Indarjit died on 12-6-1947. The Rani did not take probate of the will after the death of the Raja nor did she make any adoption in pursuance of the authority contained in the will. On 14-10-1950, Rani Jagdishwari died. It appears that after the death of the Raja the Court of Wards of. Uttar Pradesh had taken possession of so much of his estate as was situated in Uttar Pradesh. In April, 1951, Rani Padam Kueri, the mother of the Raja, applied to the High Court for letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed. In para. 10 of her petition Rani Padam Kueri stated that she had surrendered her right of inheritance in respect of the entire Raj in favour of Bhagwati Prasad Sahi, sisters son of Raja Indarjit. Rani Padam Kuer, therefore, asked that letters of administration may be granted either in her favour or in favour of Bhagwati Prasad Sahi. In para. 10 of her petition Rani Padam Kueri stated that she had surrendered her right of inheritance in respect of the entire Raj in favour of Bhagwati Prasad Sahi, sisters son of Raja Indarjit. Rani Padam Kuer, therefore, asked that letters of administration may be granted either in her favour or in favour of Bhagwati Prasad Sahi. On 18-3-1952, the High Court granted letters of administration to Rani Padam Kueri holding that under the terms of the will she was entitled to certain legacies and other benefits. As regards the alleged surrender made by Rani Padam Kuer in favour of Bhagwati Prasad, the High Court did not express any opinion. Meanwhile Jitendra Pratap Bahadur Sahi instituted the present suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Gaya claiming that Tamkohi Raj was an ancestral impartible estate, that succession to it was governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture, that Raja Indarjit had died on 12-6-1947, in a state of jointness with the other family members, that according to the admitted pedigree plaintiff was the eldest and sole surviving male member in the eldest line of the family and that he had succeeded to the Tamkohi Raj according to rule of survivorship. On 2-1-1952, the plaintiff applied to the subordinate Judge for appointing a receiver for all the properties comprised in the Tamkohi Raj and also for the issue of an injunction restraining defendants 1 and 2 from taking possession from the Court of Wards of the properties located in Uttar Pradesh. The plaintiff alleged that there was apprehension that the defendants would squander valuable assets and that they would commit misappropriation and waste. The application was contested by the defendants Rani Padam Kueri and Bhagwati Prasad Sahi who denied that there was any waste or misappropriation. They further asserted that Tamkohi Raj had ceased to be coparcenary property for the purpose of succession and that it was the separate property of Raja Indarjit at the time he executed the registered will. The defendants, therefore, contended that the rule of lineal primogeniture was not applicable in order to find out the lawful successor to the impartible estate. Defendant 1 Padam Kueri added that she had been appointed as administrator of the properties by virtue of the order of the High Court in the testamentary case, that she had taken charge of the estate of the testator. Defendant 1 Padam Kueri added that she had been appointed as administrator of the properties by virtue of the order of the High Court in the testamentary case, that she had taken charge of the estate of the testator. After examining the respective claims of the parties the learned Subordinate Judge held that in the circumstances of the case neither a receiver should be appointed for taking possession of the properties nor should a temporary injunction be granted in favour of the plaintiff. 3. In support of these appeals Mr. B. C. De argued in limine that the plaintiff has established a strong prima facie case of title and that the Subordinate Judge was erroneous in not considering the case from this angle. Learned counsel pointed out that according to the admitted pedigree the plaintiff was the nearest male agnate to Raja Indarjit. Learned counsel referred to -- Sarabjit Pratan V/s. Indarjit Pratap, 27 All 203 (A), in which it was held by the High Court that the Tamkohi Raj was an ancestral impartible estate governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture. As regards the contention of the defendants that the estate had become the separate property of Raja Indarjit. Mr. De pointed out that by executing the registered will dated 15-12-1939, Raja Indarjit merely gave a life estate to Rani Jagdishwari conferring upon her authority to adopt a son from certain persons described in the will. Relying upon the authority of -- Shyam Pratap V/s. Collector of Etawah, AIR 1946 PC 103 (B), learned counsel argued that by granting life estate the Raja did not break the line of succession. Learned counsel maintained that there was no complete disposal of the proprietary interest and the character of the estate was [lot given any new direction but continued to be coparcenary property as before. Learned counsel further referred to the Ekrarnama of 1895, compromise decree of 1916 in -- First Appeal No. 138 of 1916 and also to two letters dated 25-2-1909, and 16-5-1910, addressed by Sarabjit Pratap Bahadur to the Collector of Gorakhpore. It was argued by Mr. De that the documents were not sufficient in law to establish separation in the case of an ancestral impartible estate. It was argued by Mr. De that the documents were not sufficient in law to establish separation in the case of an ancestral impartible estate. It was contended that in order to establish that an impartible estate had ceased to be joint family property for the purpose of succession it was necessary to prove an intention, express or implied, on behalf of the junior members of the family to renounce their right of succession to the estate. The argument was based upon the authority of two cases: -- Shiba Prasad V/s. Prayag Kumari, AIR 1932 PC 216 (C), and -- Collector of Gorakhpur V/s. Ramsundar Mal, AIR 1934 PC 157 (D). 4. On the contrary, the respondents contend that by the provisions of the will Raja Indarjit granted not merely a life estate but a widows estate in favour of Rani Jagdishwari. Mr. Lalnarain Sinha referred in detail to the various clauses of the registered will and argued that the effect of the will was to vest in Rani Jagdishwari Kueri the entire proprietary interest in the Tamkohi Raj. Learned counsel argued that by execution of the registered will Raja Indarjit had broken the line of succession. Learned counsel maintained that the case fell within the principle enunciated by the Judicial Committee in -- Peermal Sethurayar V/s. Subbulakshmi Nachiar, AIR 1939 PC 95 (E). As regards separation, Mr. Lalnarain Sinha pointed out that in 1805 there was an Ekrarnama between Raja Satrujit, father of Raja Indarjit, and Sarabjit, wherein it was provided that Raja Satrujit would be registered in respect of the entire Tamkohi Raj and Sarabjit would be maintained out of the estate and in case Sarabjit or any of his lineal male descendant desires, he might claim separation to one-eighth share of the estate. In 1899 Sarabjit instituted a civil suit against Raja Indarjit asking for partition of 8 annas share in the Tamkohi Raj. The suit was dismissed on 13-8-1900, by the Subordinate Judge of Gorakhpore. On 5-8-1910, Sarabjit applied to the Court of Wards formally expressing his intention to separate. He wrote two letters dated 25-2-1909, and 16-5-1910, in this respect to the Collector of Gorakhpore. The suit was dismissed on 13-8-1900, by the Subordinate Judge of Gorakhpore. On 5-8-1910, Sarabjit applied to the Court of Wards formally expressing his intention to separate. He wrote two letters dated 25-2-1909, and 16-5-1910, in this respect to the Collector of Gorakhpore. Again Sarabjit instituted Partition Suit No. 184 of 1913 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Chapra against Raja Indarjit for two annas share in Tamkohi Raj according to the Ekrarnama of 1895 and in terms of compromise petition filed in the Privy Council Appeal. The suit was dismissed. Sarabjit preferred appeal to the High Court but on 7-3-1919, the parties entered into a compromise whereby in consideration of certain benefits Sarabjit and Chatarpati gave up all claims of any share in the Tamkohi Raj. It was contended by Mr. Lalnarain Sinha that there was partition of the joint family and that Raja Indarjit held the Tamkohi Raj as separate property at the time of his death. 5. On the question of the plaintiffs title the arguments of the learned counsel, therefore, ranged over a wide field. But it is not necessary or desirable in this case to express any opinion on these important arguments. Even if the question of prima facie title is answered in favour of the plaintiff the more important question to be determined is whether a receiver can be appointed against an administrator who has qualified in the probate Court and to whom that Court has granted letters of administration. 6. It was not seriously disputed by learned counsel for respondents that the Subordinate Judge has jurisdiction under Order 40, Rule 1 to appoint a receiver of property in the possession of an executor or administrator appointed by the Court of probate. It cannot be doubted that the Subordinate Judge has jurisdiction to entertain a suit not with respect to the genuineness of the will but as regards title to the properties which the testator has purported to bequeath by the will. On such a case there is nothing in the Indian Succession Act which expressly or by necessary implication bars the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge to appoint a receiver under the provisions of p. 40 Rule 1 for protecting the properties. On such a case there is nothing in the Indian Succession Act which expressly or by necessary implication bars the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge to appoint a receiver under the provisions of p. 40 Rule 1 for protecting the properties. The jurisdiction is well-established, but it should be exercised with great caution, and as was stated by Sir Asutosh Mukherjea, a strong case must be made out to induce a Court to dispossess a trustee or executor who is willing to act -- Surendra Kumar V/s. Sushil Kumar, AIR 1928 Cal 256 (F). The question in this case is not, therefore, whether the Subordinate Judge has jurisdiction, but whether having jurisdiction, he should exercise it by appointing a receiver to perform the same duties which the administrator appointed by the probate Court can perform without the intervention of the Subordinate Judge. In asking for the appointment of a receiver for the properties in dispute the plaintiff is in effect asking that defendant 1, Rani Padam Kueri, who is the administrator acting under the probate should be removed from the management of the estate. The case, therefore, presents an apparent conflict of jurisdiction between two equally competent tribunals and the problem is on what principle should the conflict be resolved. In a case where there is concurrent jurisdiction it is necessary for the proper administration of justice that there should be comity between the two jurisdictions, so that complications and difficulties and conflicting orders regarding the same subject matter may be prevented. In -- Jopson V/s. James, (1908) 77 LJ Ch 824 (G). Farwell L. J. states: "Two points appear to me to be usual on considering whether the Court should have regard and defer to a jurisdiction with which it may come in conflict, or whether the Court can fairly expect that other jurisdiction to defer to it. One is the priority in time, and the other is the extent of the relief asked for or obtainable in the other jurisdiction." In the present case it is manifest that the comity between the two conflicting jurisdictions should be exercised in favour of the Probate Court. Rani Padam Kueri, defendant 1, had applied for letters of administration in April, 1951, long before the plaintiff had instituted the title suit. Rani Padam Kueri, defendant 1, had applied for letters of administration in April, 1951, long before the plaintiff had instituted the title suit. On 18-3-1952, the High Court granted letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed in favour of Rani Padam Kueri. The application for the appointment of a receiver was argued before the Subordinate Judge on 31-5-1952. The order of the Probate Court has, therefore, the advantage of priority of time. As regards the nature and quantum of relief, the jurisdiction of the Probate Court is co-extensive and equally effective. Sections 301 and 302, Succession Act confer extensive authority on the High Court to take proper action for the preservation of the testators estate. Sec.302 empowers the High Court to give to the executor or administrator any general or special direction in regard to the estate or in regard to the administration thereof. Sec.301 confers power on the High Court to suspend or remove or discharge an executor or administrator and provide for the succession of another person to the office and invest in such successor of any property belonging to the estate. If there is waste or misappropriation or neglect on the part of the administrator, it is open to the appellant to move the Probate Court under Sec.301 or Sec.302 and obtain suitable relief. Under Sec.211, Succession Act the administrator is legal representative of the deceased Raja Indarjit and all the property of Raja Indarjit vests in the administrator as such. Sec.307, Sub-section (2) (ii) provides that the administrator may not without the previous permission of the Probate Court mortgage, charge or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise any immovable property nor shall the administrator lease any such property for a term exceeding five years. Sec.307, Sub-section (2) (iii) enacts that the disposal of the property by an administrator in contravention of Clauses (i) or (ii) is voidable at the instance of any other person interested. Under Sec.317 the administrator is required within six months of the grant of probate to exhibit in the Court an inventory of all the properties in her possession and an account of the estate showing the assets which had come into her hands and the manner in which they were applied or disposed of. Sec.368 makes the administrator liable in devastavit. Sec.368 makes the administrator liable in devastavit. Sec.369 similarly makes the administrator liable for any loss to the estate on account of neglect on her part. On this resume of the relevant statutory provisions, it is manifest that the powers and duties of an administrator are in practice analogous to those of a receiver appointed under Order 40, Rule 1. There is of course the legal representative of the deceased testator and the title to the whole estate vests in him while the receiver appointed in the suit does not represent the estate but only holds the estate for the benefit of the successful litigant. 7. The history of the English Court of Chancery also illustrates the proposition that the Court would refuse to exercise its power of appointing a receiver if there was a likelihood of conflict of jurisdiction with the Probate Court. According to the English practice the Court of Chancery used to appoint receivers pending a litigation in the Ecclesiastical Court over the probate of a will or the right to administer an estate (see -- Watkins V/s. Brent, (1835) My & Cr 97 at p. 102 (H) and -- Rendall V/s. Rendall, (1841) 1 Hare 152 (I) ). The relief was granted in this class of cases, because there was no conflict of jurisdiction. The relief was granted because there was no person to receive the assets or to preserve the estate pending litigation in the Ecclesiastical Court. It is important in this context to remember that the Ecclesiastical Court had at no time in the history of its existence any jurisdiction or control over real property. The Ecclesiastical Court could exercise jurisdiction only over the personal estate of the testator. It was, therefore, necessary for the Court of Chancery to intervene during the litigation in the Ecclesiastical Court to lend its aid for the preservation of the real estate. In 1857 the legal position was changed when the Probate Act was enacted. The testamentary jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Court was abolished and a Court of Probate was established as a result of the enactment. Section 70 provided for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite of the personal estate of the deceased person whose will is being contested, such administrator to, have all the powers of a general administrator other than the right of distributing the residue of personal estate. Section 70 provided for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite of the personal estate of the deceased person whose will is being contested, such administrator to, have all the powers of a general administrator other than the right of distributing the residue of personal estate. Section 71 of the Act empowered the Court of Probate to appoint a receiver of the real estate. After the year 1857 the Court of Probate could appoint an administrator pendente lite who could in such a case do everything that was necessary for the protection of the property. There was nothing, however, in the Probate Act which ousted the original jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. But if the Probate Court had appointed an administrator pendente lite the Court of Chancery would refuse to exercise its power so that a conflict between the Courts might be avoided (-- See Veret V/s. Dupred, (1868) 6 Eq 329 (J). If an administrator pendente lite had not been appointed in a Probate Court, the Court of Chancery would appoint a receiver as a matter of course. But there are cases which demonstrate that after the Probate Court appoints an administrator pendente lite, the Court of Chancery would discharge the receiver it had appointed. In -- Tichborne V/s. Tichborne, (1865) LR 1 P 730 (K), there was an administration suit in which the plaintiff and defendant were contesting the right to a grant of administration of the personal estate of Lady Tichborne, deceased. A suit between the same parties raising similar questions was pending in the Court of Chancery. Stuart, V/s.C., made an order in the suit appointing Mr. Humphreys receiver of the personal estate of the deceased. The creditor of the deceased moved for an order in the Probate Court for appointing an administrator pendente lite. The Probate Court appointed Mr. Humphreys as administrator pendente lite. At p. 733, Lord Penzance states: "I was told that a receiver had been appointed by the Court of Chancery, who had got in the estate, and it occurred to me that the appointment of an administrator might lead to a conflict of jurisdiction. The Probate Court appointed Mr. Humphreys as administrator pendente lite. At p. 733, Lord Penzance states: "I was told that a receiver had been appointed by the Court of Chancery, who had got in the estate, and it occurred to me that the appointment of an administrator might lead to a conflict of jurisdiction. The remarks of the Vice-Chancellor have satisfied me on that head, and I gather that as soon as the Court of Chancery finds any one clothed by this Court with the character of an administrator, even although he is only appointed pendente lite, it will discharge the order for a receiver, and will allow the administrator to receive the estate, but that it will then hold its hand over his dealings with it and make such orders upon him as it may think proper." 8. The principle is different when a party asks for appointing a receiver after will has been duly admitted to probate. The principle is that where there is legal title conferred upon the administrator the Court ought not to interfere unless where the legal title is abused or there is proof that it is in danger of being so. For instance, the Court of Chancery interferes where a fair prima facie case of fraud is made out or where the executor has become insolvent (-- Newton V/s. Rickets, (1847) 10 Beav 525 (L) ). The principle is clearly stated in -- Haines V/s. Carpenter, 1 Woods 202 (M). "The party in possession of the property for which a receiver is asked is the executor named in the will of the testatrix, who has qualified in the Probate Court and given bond for the faithful discharge of his trust. Under these circumstances, the Court should not displace him upon light grounds. And though a suit be instituted by a party having an interest in the estate it does not follow that the trust created by the testator is to be set aside. A strong case must be made out to induce the Court to dispossess a trustee or executor who is willing to act." (quoted in para. 707 of High on Receivers). On behalf of the appellant Mr. B.C. De relied upon -- Ball V/s. Oliver, (1813) 35 ER 255 (N), in which a receiver was appointed by a Court of Equity pending a disputed Administration in the Ecclesiastical Court. 707 of High on Receivers). On behalf of the appellant Mr. B.C. De relied upon -- Ball V/s. Oliver, (1813) 35 ER 255 (N), in which a receiver was appointed by a Court of Equity pending a disputed Administration in the Ecclesiastical Court. But that case illustrates the exception to the principle. It was alleged that the Administrator Oliver had become insolvent and that she had "fraudulently represented that she was legitimate daughter of the intestate. On these special facts the Court of Equity appointed a receiver for the protection of the estate pending the proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Court. 9 I turn next to the allegations of waste and mismanagement levelled against the administrator. It is alleged in the first place that on 28-3-1951, Rani Padam Kueri surrendered the entire estate orally in favour of Bhagwati Prasad Sahi, nephew of Raja Indarjit. It was argued for the appellant that this was an act of effacement or breach of trust on the part of the administrator. But Mr. Lal Narain Sinha points out that this alleged surrender was on 28-3-1951, long before Rani Padam Kueri applied for letters of administration. Indeed it appears from the judgment of the High Court in the Probate case that Rani Padam Kueri expressly stated that she had surrendered the estate in favour of Bhagwati Prasad Sahi and that letters of administration may be granted jointly in their favour. In spite of the allegation the Probate Court granted letters of administration to Rani Padam Kueri. It is, therefore, impossible to accept the argument that the alleged surrender on the part of Rani Padam Kueri would in any way disqualify her from acting as administrator for the estate of Raja Indarjit. Mr. B.C. De then pointed out that Bhagwati Prasad Sahi has sold a house in Gaya for Rs. 20,000.00 though the house was worth over Rs. 70,000/-. It was also alleged that on 15-5-1951, Bhagwati Prasad Sahi executed a lease in respect of 131 acres of land in the district of Deoria at a nominal rental of. Rs. 750.00 per year. But it was pointed out by Mr. Lal Narain Sinha that Rani Padam Kueri was not a party to these transactions and Bhagwati Prasad was not in any case competent to confer any title to the transferees in the absence of any assent on the part of the administrator. Rs. 750.00 per year. But it was pointed out by Mr. Lal Narain Sinha that Rani Padam Kueri was not a party to these transactions and Bhagwati Prasad was not in any case competent to confer any title to the transferees in the absence of any assent on the part of the administrator. It was alleged for the appellant that Rani Padam Kueri had permitted Bhagwati Prasad to be mutated in respect of several touzis of Gaya district in the land registration office. It was said that Rani Padam Kueri had at first applied for registration of her name in the Collectors Court but later on withdrew the application and allowed the name of Bhagwati Prasad Sahi to be recorded in respect of the touzis. The mutation was apparently made on 25-4-1952. But Mr. Lal Narain Sinha points out that there was no negligence or mismanagement on the part of the Rani Padam Kueri since the estate had been notified in 16-11-1951, under the Bihar Land Reforms Act. It was stated by the learned counsel that the title to Gaya properties had not only vested in the Government but the Collector of Gaya had taken possession of the properties. It was argued that mutation of the name of Bhagwati Prasad Sahi in the land registration Court was of no consequence. It is, therefore, not prima facie established on behalf of the appellant that there is any danger to the estate or that there is fraud or misconduct on the part of the administrator. In any event, the right procedure for the plaintiff is not to apply for receivership in the title suit but to go to the Probate Court and to ask for direction or for removal of the administrator if he could make out a proper case. 10. For the reasons I have expressed I think that the learned Subordinate Judge rightly re-fused to appoint a receiver or to grant an in-junction in favour of the plaintiff and these appeals must be dismissed with costs. Das, J. 11 I agree, and have nothing useful to add.