Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff, mortgagee, in this case had obtained a decree for money due under the mortgage. The mortgagor wanted to discharge the debt under sections 8, 9 and 15 of the Debt Relief Act. He was making the deposits and, while doing so, he put in an application for delivery of possession of the property to him. It is seen that the fourth defendant was given delivery of possession on 30-7-1117. The debtor, however, continued to deposit the instalments without making the three consecutive defaults. The plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for re-delivery of possession, as he was entitled to retain possession of the same till the last pie due under the Debt Relief Act was paid to him. That he was entitled to retain possession of the property till the entire amount due to him was paid is beyond any controversy; and that was the trend of the decisions reported in Parvathi Pilla v. Govindan (XXXII T. L. J. 931), Krishna Iyer v. Chockalingom Pillai (XXXIII T. L. J. 583) and Yovan Nadan v. Swamiatha Nadan (XVII T. L. T. 22). Thus, the order allowing the fourth defendant to get possession in 1117 was wrong. A petition to review the order for giving delivery was dismissed; and against that, C. R. P. No. 1219 of 1121 was filed in this Court. The debtor agreed in this Court to pay the entire debt within fifteen days; and so the order of the lower court was set aside and that court was directed to reconsider the whole matter. The debt was not, however, paid within fifteen days; but the plaintiffs petition remained pending in the lower court till it passed the present order, on 23-5-1124. 2. The lower court ordered that the fourth defendant was a defaulter as the first two deposits made by him was short by 4 Fs. each, since the amount due for each instalment had been fixed at 574 Fs. in the order dated 29-3-1117. Since this deficiency was not made out, it was held that the debtor had forfeited his rights under the Debt Relief Acts. But it was seen that, while determining the amount which the debtor was to pay under the provisions of Section 9, no time limit, within which the deficiency was to be made up was fixed. Since this deficiency was not made out, it was held that the debtor had forfeited his rights under the Debt Relief Acts. But it was seen that, while determining the amount which the debtor was to pay under the provisions of Section 9, no time limit, within which the deficiency was to be made up was fixed. This was a fatal mistake; and so even if the deficiency was not made up by the debtor, he would not lose the benefits under the Debt Relief Acts. The plaintiff's learned Advocate had also conceded that this portion of the order of the court below was wrong. So that finding is set aside.