JUDGMENT : 1. This is an appeal under S. 30, Workmen's Compensation Act by Bhagwandas Sureshchandra Ginning Factory Sendhwa against the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, by which the appellant was directed to pay to the respondent a sum of Rs. 735/-. The facts of the case are briefly as follows : 2. On 10-2-1949 Radhelal Jaiswal, General Secretary Majdoor Congress Indore, wrote to the commissioner for Workmen's Compensation that one Pyarelal of Anjad lost his right thumb in an accident while working in Bhagwandas Ginning Factory, at Sendhwa; hence compensation be awarded to Pyarelal. After several notices the defendant appeared and the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation awarded Pyarelal compensation of Rs. 735/-. Being aggrieved by this, order the defendant has filed this appeal. 3. A preliminary objection has been raised by the respondent that as no substantial question of law is involved in the appeal, this appeal cannot be entertained. Section 30, Workmen's Compensation Act contains a proviso which reads thus : "Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and,.............." It is clear, therefore, that the legislature has provided for an appeal against the order of Commissioner only when there is a substantial question of law involved in it. In this appeal although several points have been raised there is no point which can be said to amount to a substantial question of law. A Division Bench of this court in Cri. Misc. Case No. 17 of 1951 (A) held that, a question of law can be said be a substantial question of law when by reason of the question being unsettled or by reason of there being a conflict of existing authority as to the principle of law involved requires an authoritative decision from the highest court in the land. The same view was taken by Chagla, C.J. in - 'Kaikhushroo Ghiara v. C. P. Syndicate Ltd., AIR 1949 Bom 134 (B). His Lordship observed as follows : "The only guidance that we have had from the Privy Council is that substantial question is not necessarily a question which is of public importance. It must be a substantial question of law as between the parties in the case involved. His Lordship observed as follows : "The only guidance that we have had from the Privy Council is that substantial question is not necessarily a question which is of public importance. It must be a substantial question of law as between the parties in the case involved. But here again it must not be forgotten that what is contemplated is not a question of law alone; it must be a substantial question. One can define it negatively. For instance, if there is a well established principle of law and that principle of law is applied to a given set of facts, that would certainly not be a substantial question of law. Where the question of law is not well settled or where there is some doubt as to the principle of law involved, it certainly would raise a substantial question of law which would require a final adjudication by the highest court." The same view was taken in - 'Abdur Rahman v. Kaghbir Singh', AIR 1951 Punj 313 (CandD). Harnamsingh, J. held chat questions of law which have been definitely settled by the Privy Council or the High Courts in India are not substantial questions of law within cl. 3 of S. 110, Civil P.C. or Art. 133, Constitution of India. From these authorities it is clear that a question of law can be said to be a substantial question of law only when there may be some doubt or difference of opinion. No such question of law has been raised in this appeal. This appeal, therefore, cannot be entertained. 4. This appeal can be rejected only on the ground that it does not involve a substantial question of law. But even on merits this appeal cannot succeed. The counsel for the appellant has raised several points. His first contention is that as no notice was given under S. 10, Workmen's Compensation Act, the claim cannot be entertained. This contention has no force. Section 10, Proviso (b) clearly states that if the employer for any one of the several employers or any person responsible to the employer for the management of any branch of the trade or business in which the injured workman was employed had knowledge of the accident from any other source at or about the time when it occurred, want of a notice shall not be a bar to the entertainment of a claim. That the appellant had knowledge of this accident is clear from his own written statement. He states clearly in his written statement I that he felt grieved at the less of respondent's thumb and that he incurred sufficient expenditure on that account. This contention therefore, has no substance. 5. His second contention is that a claim can be entertained only if no agreement is reached between the parties. That the appellant was not willing to pay any compensation to the respondent is clear from his own conduct. The Commissioner had to issue several notices before the appellant appeared before him. The accident took place on 30-11-1948. On 17-2-1949 a notice was issued from the Department of Industries asking the appellant to let the department know, how he proposes to decide the claim of the injured for compensation. The appellant gave no reply. In these circumstances this contention has no force. 6. The third contention is that R. 20, Workmen's Compensation Rules was not followed. This contention also has no force. The application was sent by the Secretary, Majdoor Congress, Indore which is permitted by S. 24, Workmen's Compensation Act. Besides if there be any irregularity in the form of the application it is not fatal to the entertainment of the claim. In - 'T.S. Alagappa v. Veerappan', AIR 1942 Mad 116 (E), Horwill, J. held that the Legislature did not intend that a claim should not be entertained or enquired into, or that no compensation should be granted, unless the application were in strict form. If therefore there be any irregularity in the form of the application the claim for compensation cannot be rejected. Consequently this contention cannot be upheld. 7. The next contention of the appellant is that no preliminary inquiry was held. Rule 25, Workmen's Compensation Rules gives a discretion to the Commissioner to hold a preliminary inquiry. The rule does not make it obligatory to hold a preliminary inquiry in every case. Consequently this contention also has no substance. 8. The next contention of the appellant is that a copy of the application was not sent to the appellant. This contention appears to be an after-thought. In his written statement the appellant has raised no objection with regard to this point. Besides the written statement gives replies w all points raised in the application. This shows that the appellant did receive a copy of the application. This contention appears to be an after-thought. In his written statement the appellant has raised no objection with regard to this point. Besides the written statement gives replies w all points raised in the application. This shows that the appellant did receive a copy of the application. In any case such an irregularity cannot defeat the claim of the respondent as already stated. 9. The next contention raised by the appellant is that no issues were framed in the case. It appears from the proceedings that the appellant was asked to appear on 20-2-1950 on that date the appellant filed his written statement. That written statement does not raise any contentious points for determination. Besides the appellant was asked to deposit the sum of Rs. 700/- on 13-3-1950. On that date the appellant prayed for two days' time from the court stating that an agreement had been reached between him and the respondent and that within two days he would either submit the compromise or deposit the sum. The court granted two days' time. On the appointed date the applicant neither submitted the compromise nor deposited the amount, but appointed Shree Thakkar as his Vakil and through him submitted an application stating that the factory was not responsible for the accident caused to Pyarelal. Even in the application submitted by Mr. Thakkar no mention has been made that the appellant wanted to adduce any evidence. Pyarelal's statement was recorded on 21-1-1950. The appellant did not cross-examine Pyarelal. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the court acted in a manner contrary to the procedure laid down. Rule 31 states that if the Commissioner finds it impossible to dispose of an application at one hearing he shall record the reasons which necessitate a postponement. This rule clearly indicates that the claim is to be decided as far as possible in one hearing. The appellant was asked to be present on 26-2-1D50 and although he was given two adjournments he still wanted a further adjournment. It is clear from the conduct of the appellant that he wanted to prolong the case and delay the decision. In these circumstances there is no justification to interfere with the decision of the lower court although it has not followed the procedure laid down by R. 28, Workmen's Compensation Rules. 10. It is clear from the conduct of the appellant that he wanted to prolong the case and delay the decision. In these circumstances there is no justification to interfere with the decision of the lower court although it has not followed the procedure laid down by R. 28, Workmen's Compensation Rules. 10. The last contention raised by the appellant is that the application is not properly submitted in so far as it has not been signed by the person injured. Section 24, Workmen's Compensation Act permits a registered trade Union to submit an application on behalf of the injured person. The application in this case was submitted by the Secretary Majdoor Congress Indore. Consequently this contention also has no force. 11. The result is that this appeal has no force and is therefore, dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.