JUDGMENT : The facts of this appeal are that in execution of a decree held by the respondent Pratap Singh against Bag Mal, Raj Mal and Phool Mal, the judgment-debtor Phool Mal was arrested on 13-5-46. He was released on 14-5-43 when the appellant Phool Mal executed a bond promising to produce the judgment-debtor on 30-5-46 or to pay the decretal amount in default. On 30-5-46, the judgment-debtor Phool Mal raised various objections to the execution petition and to his arrest. On this very date the appellant Phool Chand again executed a fresh bond promising to produce the judgment-debtor at any time till and also after his objections to the execution petition were disposed of. On the dismissal of the objections he further promised to produce the judgment-debtor at any time on a notice being given to him to that effect and failing he promised to pay the decretal amount. The judgment-debtor's objections were disposed of by the District Judge of Gwalior on 30-9-48. The learned District Judge holding that the arrest of the judgment-debtor was illegal, dismissed the execution petition and discharged the appellant who stood surety for the appearance of the judgment-debtor. The decree-holder then appealed to this Court from the said order of the District Judge. In the appeal (Civil Misc. Appeal No.16 of 2005) a Division Bench of this Court held that the arrest of Phool Mal was proper and that he was "wrongly released from prison". In the appeal this Court directed the executing Court to proceed according to law in the light of the observations made in that appeal. When the matter went back to the lower Court, the appellant was served with a notice on 30-3-51 to produce the judgment-debtor on 2nd April 1951. The appellant failed to produce the judgment-debtor on this date, and contended that his liability ended with the dismissal of the execution petition by the lower Court on 30-9-48; that he was not bound by any proceedings taken thereafter in this Court by the decree-holder; and that it was not possible for him to produce the judgment-debtor in the Court on a short notice of two days. The lower Court rejecting these objections directed the appellant to deposit in the Court on or before 15-5-1951 the decretal amount. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed. 2. Mr. The lower Court rejecting these objections directed the appellant to deposit in the Court on or before 15-5-1951 the decretal amount. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed. 2. Mr. Bhagwandas Gupta learned counsel for the appellant firstly contends that as the appellant was not made a party in the appeal Civil Misc. No.16 of 2005 preferred by the decree-holder, he is not bound by the decision in that appeal holding the arrest of the judgment-debtor proper and directing the execution proceedings to be continued. This objection is, in my opinion, without any substance. The liability of the appellant as a surety in this case arises quite independently of the decree which is sought to be executed. He is not a party to the execution proceedings of the decree. He has, therefore, no 'locus standi' to object to the execution of the decree or the validity of the arrest of the judgment-debtor for whom he stood surety. The bond that was required from the appellant for the appearance of the judgment-debtor was irrespective of the fact whether the arrest of the judgment-debtor was or was not proper. The appellant having executed the surety bond in the form he had done, could not raise the objection that the arrest of the judgment-debtor was not legal or that the execution of the decree by the arrest of the judgment-debtor was not legal. That being so, the liability of the appellant to produce the judghient-debtor is in no way affected by the fact that in the appeal in which this Court held that the arrest of the judgment-debtor was proper, the appellant was not made a party. 3. It is next urged that the bond which the appellant gave for producing the judgment-debtor was only with respect to the proceedings then pending in the lower Court and that he was not liable to produce the judgment-debtor in execution proceedings taken in pursuance of the order made by this Court. To support this contention, learned Counsel for the appellant relies on a decision of the Madras High Court in - 'Balaraju Chettiar v. Masilamani Pillai', AIR 1930 Mad 514 (FB) in which it was held that upon the dismissal of a suit, the attachment before judgment ceases and if the dismissal is set aside and the suit is decreed in appeal, then the attachment is not revived. There are a number of cases in which various High Courts have taken a contrary view. There are also cases in which various High Courts have held that when execution proceedings are dismissed for default, any subsequent proceedings ace entirely distinct from the proceedings in respect of the prior execution proceedings that were dismissed and the surety could only have contemplated becoming so for the appearance of the judgment-debtor during the proceedings that were then pending and not for proceedings that had not then even been contemplated. Again, there are also cases in which it has been held that if a suit previously dismissed for default is restored on an application by the plaintiff, then with the restoration of the suit all the ancillary proceedings must be deemed to be restored also and that a surety bond given in the suit is also deemed to have been restored. In my opinion, none of these cases are of any guide in the matter before us. There is no uniformity in these decisions. It seems to me that the question whether the surety bond passed by the appellant was meant only for the proceedings in the lower Court which were then pending or whether it was passed also for any proceedings taken by the lower Court in pursuance of the order made by this Court, has to be decided solely with reference to the terms of the bond. It was by giving security that the judgment-debtor Phool Mal was set at liberty and the present appellant stood surety for the appearance of the judgment-debtor. The bond which was executed by the appellant in favour of the Court on 30-5-46 in these terms. "In this case the judgment-debtor Phool Mal has been set free on my security. I continue the security until the disposal of his objections and promise to produce the judgment-debtor if his objections are dismissed and an order is passed for his arrest. If I fail in this, I promise to pay the decretal amount from my person and property. After the disposal of the objections, I shall be bound to produce the judgment-debtor on a notice being given to me to produce him on a date fixed." 4. If I fail in this, I promise to pay the decretal amount from my person and property. After the disposal of the objections, I shall be bound to produce the judgment-debtor on a notice being given to me to produce him on a date fixed." 4. It is clear from these terms of the bond that they in no way limit the operation of the bond to the order which the lower Court would make on the objections of the judgment-debtor. By the bond, the appellant gave an undertaking in general terms that on the rejection of the objections of the judgment-debtor and on the order being passed for his arrest he would produce the judgment-debtor in the Court and in the event of his failing to produce the judgment-debtor, he would pay the decretal amount. There is nothing to show in the bond that the surety would not be liable under it if the judgment-debtor's objections are rejected by the Court of appeal and if an order is ultimately made by that Court for the arrest of the judgment-debtor. It was, no doubt, open to the surety to limit his liability by using proper language to that effect. But when he has not used such language, it is fair to hold that the appellant stood surety for the appearance of the judgment-debtor, whether the lower Court in requiring the appellant to produce the judgment-debtor was acting on its own decision or was acting in pursuance of an order made by this Court. On the terms of the bond, it makes no difference to the liability of the surety whether the objections of the judgment-debtor were dismissed and his arrest was ordered consequently by the lower Court or by this Court in appeal. That in a case such as this, the liability of the surety must be determined on the terms of the bond passed by him is supported by the decision of the Bombay High Court in - 'I.S. Patil v. Irbasappa', 51 Bom 31 and of the Privy Council in - 'Raghubar Singh v. Jai Indra Bahadur Singh', 46 Ind App 228 (PC). On the reading of the bond in the present case it is clear to me that it has reference to the ultimate issue of the objections-of the judgment-debtor. On the reading of the bond in the present case it is clear to me that it has reference to the ultimate issue of the objections-of the judgment-debtor. As the judgment-debtor's objections were ultimately rejected by this Court and his arrest was ordered, the-appellant is liable under the bond to produce the judgment-debtor in the lower Court. 5. The appellant further urges that he was not given a reasonable time to produce the judgment-debtor. It is said that he was served with a notice on 30-3-51 to produce the judgment-debtor on 2-4-51 and that in this short time, he could not produce the judgment-debtor who was a resident of Bara Kota. This complaint is well-founded. The question of sufficiency of notice in such cases has to be determined according to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience and in all cases where the period of notice required to be given is not specified, the Courts have always held that a notice to be given must be a reasonable notice. The learned District Judge has not seriously considered the question whether notice given to the appellant to produce the judgment-debtor was a reasonable one. He dismissed the contention of the surety as to the sufficiency of the notice by simply saying that there was no substance and that if the appellant had really intended to produce the judgment-debtor, he could have done so even at the time of the hearing of the arguments before him on the question of the default of the judgment-debtor. In adopting this reasoning, the learned District Judge has missed the real point which he should have considered. The question is not whether the surety could have voluntarily produced the judgment-debtor at any time he liked. But it is whether when under the bond the appellant undertook to produce the judgment-debtor on a notice being given to him and the notice which was actually given to him was a reasonable notice. I have no hesitation in holding that the time of two days given to the appellant to produce the judgment-debtor from Bara Kota was clearly not a reasonable notice. I have no hesitation in holding that the time of two days given to the appellant to produce the judgment-debtor from Bara Kota was clearly not a reasonable notice. On this ground I would accept this, appeal and setting aside the order of the lower Court directing the appellant to deposit the decretal amount, order that the lower Court should now give a reasonable notice to the appellant to produce the judgment-debtor and dispose of the execution proceedings in accordance with law. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs of this appeal.