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1952 DIGILAW 115 (MP)

Mohammad Yakub v. Poonam Chand

1952-10-23

SATHEY

body1952
ORDER : 1. The non-applicants-plaintiffs obtained a decree for Rs.283 with costs against the applicant-defendant for arrears of rent of a house at Rs.22-8-0 per month in the Court of the Small Causes, Bhopal. The latter, challenges it. 2. The applicant had contended that in fact the plaintiffs were his mortgagees in possession of the house and the rent-note was executed to cover the interest on the mortgage debt and under the law as then applicable, the plaintiffs could not be entitled to more than 12 per cent. per month as interest on the amount of the mortgage (i.e. at Rs.11-4-0 per month only). The Court overruled the contention and the defendant-applicant seeks to revise the decree on this ground. 3. In the original revision application only one plaintiff, Pooranchand was joined as the non-applicant and Chunnilal non-applicant 2 was joined only on 9-4-1952 and was allowed to do so subject to the question of limitation. 4. It is now contended that the Court failed to exercise the jurisdiction it had to reduce the rent under S.49, Bhopal Civil P.C., while the non-applicants contend that the whole revision petition is barred by time as non-applicant 2 was joined after the expiry of the period of limitation and secondly that S.49, Bhopal Civil P.C., was repealed and could not be applied. 5. The first question, therefore, for decision is whether the revision should be deemed to have been filed on the date when non-applicant 2 was joined and as such is barred by time. There is no doubt that non-applicant 2 was a necessary party to the revision petition not only because he was a plaintiff in the suit but also because he was admittedly a joint mortgagee-landlord and as such a joint decree-holder with non-applicant 1. This is conceded by the learned counsel for the applicant. As such, as the principle under the provisions of S.22, Limitation Act, is applicable to revisions, the revision petition must be deemed to have been barred by time. It is, however, contended that the name of non-applicant 2 was not stated in the copy of the judgment and hence it was omitted as the counsel who prepared the petition was not aware of his being a party and therefore, the delay be condoned. It is, however, contended that the name of non-applicant 2 was not stated in the copy of the judgment and hence it was omitted as the counsel who prepared the petition was not aware of his being a party and therefore, the delay be condoned. Though S.5, Limitation Act, is not applicable to revision applications still under proviso (1) under S.34, Bhopal and Vindhya Pradesh (Courts) Act, the delay may be condoned if this Court is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of 90 days. Under the old copying rules which prevailed when the copy was applied for, the names and descriptions of all parties to an order or decree did not appear to be required to be shown in the copy and thus it was not unlikely that such omissions were made in the subsequent proceedings. The contention is supported by the copy of the judgment filed on record and in the circumstances I am inclined to hold that there was sufficient cause for the oversight and omission to join non-applicant 2 in the revision petition within the period prescribed. In the circumstances, the delay must be condoned and the revision petition cannot be thrown out on that ground. 6. The next question is whether the provisions of S.49, Bhopal Civil P.C were applicable to the case of the defendant and the rent under the note was liable to be reduced accordingly. It is obvious that the learned Small Cause Court Judge has altogether overlooked this provision and it must be conceded that this has been the result of the vague pleading of the defendant-applicant in which this contention was not definite. Examining the pleadings and the evidence it is obvious that the defendant executed a usufructuary mortgage of the house for Rs.1,500 in favour of the plaintiffs-non-applicants but continued in possession by executing a rent-note the same day i.e. on 9-8-49 agreeing to pay Rs.22/8 per month which works out interest at Rs.1/8 per cent. per month on the loan advanced. The transaction therefore appears to be nothing but a mortgage falling within the purview of S.49, Bhopal Civil P.C. This is made clear in the recitals of the rent-note itself filed by the plaintiffs. 7. per month on the loan advanced. The transaction therefore appears to be nothing but a mortgage falling within the purview of S.49, Bhopal Civil P.C. This is made clear in the recitals of the rent-note itself filed by the plaintiffs. 7. On 9-8-49 when the two documents were executed the Bhopal Civil Procedure Code was applicable to the suits an3 transactions of this nature and the rights and liabilities of the parties as obtained then continued to be available to them even if that Code was repealed by the Merged States Laws Act which came into force on 1-1-1950 introducing with it the Indian Civil Procedure Code in Bhopal State by the date the suit was instituted on 15-5-1951. 8. Amendment or repeal of the law cannot affect the operation of the then existing law as is held in several decisions amongst which the following may he cited. It is alas clear that a statute is not retrospective in its operation. It is held in - 'Mst. Bana Bai v. Mt. Chandrabhaga', AIR 1931 Nag 60 that: "Ordinarily a siatute is not retrospective and it can never be so when the amending statute itself lays down that the amendments would not affect transactions before a certain date." In - 'Harlal v. Lala Prasad', AIR 1931 Nag 138 it is held that: "Unless an intention to the contrary is clear, an Act is to be construed as operating only on cases or facts which come into existence after the Act." In - 'Haidar Hussain v. Puran Mal', AIR 1935 All 706 (FB) the rule of law is more strongly stated that: "No rule of construction is more firmly established than this, that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards a matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing -violence to the language of the enactment." The decisions in - Peoples Bank of Northern India Ltd. v. Wahid Bux', AIR 1943 Lah 170 (FB) and - 'Abdul Razak v. Kuldip Narain', AIR 1944 Pat 147, at p.162 lay down the same rule of law. 9. 9. It is clear that it is not merely the procedural rights and liabilities that were affected by the repeal of the Bhopal Civil Procedure Code but a substantive right, as available under S.49 of that Code, was affected and as such the decision in - 'L. Laiq Ram v. Har Prasad', AIR 1934 All 253 is not applicable to the case on hand. 10. Examining the question further it is held in - 'Sundrabai Sitaram v. Manohar Dhondu', AIR 1933 Bom 262 that: "Where an Act is in force on the date of a transaction, subsequent repealment of Act does not affect the merits, rights or liabilities of the parties as on the date of the transaction" Section 6, Merged States Laws Act, lays down the same principle as pointed out above and therefore, in my opinion, the provisions of S.49, Bhopal Civil P.C., must be held to be applicable to the rate of interest covered as rent of the house and as such it is Sable to be reduced. 11. Calculating the rent due therefore, according to the rate of interest permissible under the above section, the total amount due works out to a sum of Rs.180 at Rs.11/4 per month. Out of this, a sum of Rs.77 is admittedly paid out leaving a balance of a sum of only Rs.103 as due from the defendant for the sixteen months for which the rent was not paid in due time. The non-applicants were, therefore, entitled to a decree of only Rs.103. 12. The result is that the revision petition is allowed with costs against the non-applicants who shall bear their own costs. The decree of the lower Court is modified and it is ordered that the plaintiffs' claim for Rs.103 only is decreed with proportionate costs against the defendant who shall bear his own costs in the suit. Counsel's fees would be up to the maximum, if certified in time. Revision allowed.