Judgment :- 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for damages for the alleged wrongful dismissal from service of the plaintiff who was employed as a teacher in the Chaldean Syrian High School at Trichur. This School is owned and managed by the Chaldean Syrian Church at Trichur. It is a public school recognised as such by the State Government and receiving grant-in-aid from the State. The management of the school has been and is also being regulated by such of the provisions of the Cochin Education Code as are applicable to similar grant-in-aid schools under private management. The 1st defendant in the case is the Manager of the School and is also the Administrator of the Chaldean Syrian Church. The Church itself has been impleaded as the 2nd defendant in the suit and is represented by its trustees who are defendants 2 to 5. The plaintiff who is a B.A. & B.T., was appointed as a permanent teacher in the Chaldean Syrian High School in the year 1103. Ext. B dated 29th Edavam 1103 is the order of appointment given to him by the manager of the school. He served the institution as a teacher till 19th Makaram 1118 (1st February 1943) on which date his services were dispensed with by the order Ext. E served on him by the Manager. This abrupt termination of his services is challenged by the plaintiff as a wrongful dismissal. The plaintiff's case is that as per the contract entered into between himself and the authorities of the school and also as per the custom and practice governing similar institutions, he was entitled to be in service till the completion of his 55th year of age and also to get the usual increments in the scale of his pay as well as his due promotions from time to time. It is also contended by him that even after the completion of 55 years of age, he could be retained in service on proof of continued good health and competency till he attains the age of 60. At the time of the termination of the plaintiff's services, his salary was in the grade of Rs. 60-70. He has stated that if he had been in service, he would have reached the grade of Rs. 90-5-110 by the time of the present suit. At the time of the termination of the plaintiff's services, his salary was in the grade of Rs. 60-70. He has stated that if he had been in service, he would have reached the grade of Rs. 90-5-110 by the time of the present suit. On the basis of such a calculation of the loss of pay sustained by the plaintiff from the date of the termination of his services upto the superannuation limit has been estimated by him at about Rs. 25,000. According to him he is entitled to get this amount by way of compensation from the school and the Church for the wrongful termination of his services. All the same he limited his claim in the suit to a sum of Rs. 10,000. 2. In the joint written statement filed by the defendants the plaintiffs claim for damages was resisted by them on several grounds. The more important of these grounds are the following. The plaintiff's appointment as a teacher in the Chaldean Syrian High School was not governed by any contract or any particular custom or practice entitling him to serve as a matter of right till he attains the age of 55 or 60. The school itself was started as an adjunct to the Church with the policy of giving preference to the members of the Chaldean Syrian Christian community in the matter of admission of students and appointment of teachers "with the correlative condition of continued adherence to the faith of the Church and obedience to the religious overload, as a condition for continuance either as students or as teachers at the option of the local religious overload, the Bishop". The plaintiff was appointed as a teacher as a member of the Chaldean Syrian Christian community and on the express understanding that he would faithfully abide by the rules of theChurch and the Community. The plaintiff's idea to marry his deceased wife's sister was opposed to the rules of the Chaldean Syrian Church and community and the perpetration of any such act "would amount to a culpable deed." The plaintiff was therefore warned by the Church authorities to desist from the proposed marriage. He not only disregarded such advice and warnings, but also severed his connection with the Chaldean Syrian community and went over to the Roman Catholic Church. He not only disregarded such advice and warnings, but also severed his connection with the Chaldean Syrian community and went over to the Roman Catholic Church. The plaintiff "having abjured his faith in the faith of the Church and become an apostate, automatically ceased to have any claim to continue in office" as a teacher in the Chaldean Syrian High School. His services were at the pleasure of the management of the school and no special reasons need exist to terminate his services. Even otherwise his conduct in having acted in defiance of the advices and warning given by the authorities concerned and of having deserted the Church, constituted sufficient reason to justify the termination of his services as a teacher in the Chaldean Syrian High School. The plaintiff's complaint that before the termination of his services no charges were framed against him nor was an opportunity given to him to explain his position, is baseless. It was not necessary to frame any such charge or to give him an opportunity to explain his conduct. The warnings and advice which had already been given to the plaintiff were by themselves sufficient to justify the action taken against him and as such it cannot be said that the defendants had acted in violation of the principles of natural justice or had committed a breach of contract of service. The plaintiff's claim for damages is totally unsustainable. The amount of compensation as estimated by him is highly exaggerated and unsustainable in law. If the plaintiff was aggrieved by the order of dismissal his remedy was to seek redress by way of appeal to the Director of Public Instruction as provided in the Education Code. Such a special tribunal having been constituted under the Education Code for finally deciding such matters, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's suit for damages. In any view of the matter, the plaintiff is not entitled to get a decree as against the Church. 3. The lower court repelled all these contentions and found that the plaintiff's claim in the present suit was sustainable and accordingly passed a decree in his favour. The 5th defendant, who is one of the trustees of the 2nd defendant Church, has preferred this appeal challenging the correctness of the lower court's decision. 4. 3. The lower court repelled all these contentions and found that the plaintiff's claim in the present suit was sustainable and accordingly passed a decree in his favour. The 5th defendant, who is one of the trustees of the 2nd defendant Church, has preferred this appeal challenging the correctness of the lower court's decision. 4. The objection raised by the 5th defendant-appellant as to the maintainability of the plaintiffs suit may be examined at the outset. Admittedly the plaintiff was employed as a teacher in the English High School owned and managed by the 2nd defendant Church. Even though the school is a public school, recognised as such and receiving grant-in-aid from the State, it is not a Government Institution under the management of the State, but is only a private institution. It follows therefore that the plaintiff's service as a teacher in this particular school could in no sense be deemed to be public service under the Crown. Naturally therefore the law governing the tenure of service of such public servants as well as their rights incidental to and arising out of such service, cannot be made applicable to the tenure of service under private institutions. The ordinary law of Master and Servant, as modified by particular customs or terms of the contract or agreement, if any, has to govern the rights and liabilities arising out of the latter class of services. The plaintiff has based his claim in the present suit under a contract as pleaded by him. He has also contended that as per the custom and practice prevailing in the Chaldean Syrian High School and in other similar institutions, he had certain well recognised rights as a teacher in the Chaldean Syrian High School. If there has been a breach of the agreement governing the plaintiff's tenure of appointment as a teacher and if he has been wrongfully dismissed from service, he has the undoubted right to sustain an action for damages against those responsible for such wrongful acts. This right has been statutorily recognized by S. 73 of the Contract Act. Even if the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's appointment as a teacher was not governed by any contract or custom has to prevail, it cannot be denied that the relationship of Master and Servant existed as between the management of the school and the plaintiff. This right has been statutorily recognized by S. 73 of the Contract Act. Even if the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's appointment as a teacher was not governed by any contract or custom has to prevail, it cannot be denied that the relationship of Master and Servant existed as between the management of the school and the plaintiff. Certain limited rights and liabilities arose out of such relationship also. Under common law a servant wrongfully dismissed from service can maintain an action for damages against the master. 5. On behalf of the appellant, it is argued that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain such an action has been taken away by S. 57 of the Cochin Education Code. The Section lays down that no licensed teacher shall be suspended or dismissed from an aided school, except for good cause. It is further stated that against the suspension or dismissal, an appeal shall lie to the Director of Public Instruction, provided that such an appeal is preferred within 30 days of the order of dismissal and that the decision of the Director shall be final. The Cochin Education Code is not a legislative enactment. It has not the force of a statute. It merely contains certain administrative rules and directions issued by the Executive Government to control and regulate the conduct and management of recognised educational institutions in the State. The authority created under such a Code of administrative rules has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the civil rights of the citizens of the State. The decisions by such authority on disciplinary and other departmental matters, cannot be deemed to preclude the aggrieved party from seeking redress in the ordinary civil courts of the land in respect of any infringement of their civil rights. The Code itself being not a statute, there can be no force in the contention that under S. 57 of the Code, the Director of Public Instruction has been constituted as a special tribunal having exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the civil rights of teachers wrongfully dismissed from service. The civil court's jurisdiction in respect of that matter is in no way affected by the provisions of the Education Code. The civil court's jurisdiction in respect of that matter is in no way affected by the provisions of the Education Code. Our attention has not been drawn to any instance where, under similar circumstances, the Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain an action for damages on account of wrongful dismissal from service in a recognised educational institution has been doubted or held to be ousted by the administrative orders or rules. On the other hand, precedents to the contrary are numerous. Nirod Chandra Roy v. Kirtya Nanda Singh, AIR 1922 Patna 24; Lekshinarasimhacharyulu v. Mc Lawrin High School Cocanada, AIR 1941 Mad. 788; Govinda Pillai v. Kuriakko,1950 DLR Travancore Cochin 228; Venkata Sitapathi v. Krishna Chandra, AIR 1942 Patna 176 and Wittenbaker G.H. v. J.C. Golstaun, 43 I.C. 11, are a few of such precedents. In these cases the position that civil courts have jurisdiction to entertain an action for damages by a teacher wrongfully dismissed from service was accepted as unassailable. So far as the present case is concerned, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the plaintiff's suit for damages for his alleged wrongful dismissal from service has been ousted by any provision contained in the Cochin Education Code. The lower court was therefore right in overruling the objection on that score raised by the contesting defendants. 6. The next point urged on behalf of the appellant is that the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant Church. The argument is that it was the 1st defendant, the Manager of the School, who dismissed the plaintiff from service, and hence, the plaintiff could, if at all, sustain an action only against the 1st defendant. We see no force or substance in this contention also. The school is admittedly owned by the Church and it is only by virtue of the authority derived from the Church that the 1st defendant has been managing the affairs of the school. Clearly, therefore, the 1st defendant was acting merely as the agent of the Church. So far as the dismissal from service of the plaintiff is concerned, all that was done by the 1st defendant was merely to implement the decision and the mandate to that effect by the Church authorities. Ext. Clearly, therefore, the 1st defendant was acting merely as the agent of the Church. So far as the dismissal from service of the plaintiff is concerned, all that was done by the 1st defendant was merely to implement the decision and the mandate to that effect by the Church authorities. Ext. C, the first letter of warning issued to the plaintiff, and Ext.E, the subsequent dismissal order served on him, are by themselves sufficient to prove beyond any room for doubt that the 1st defendant has done nothing beyond carrying out the decision of the Church to dismiss the plaintiff from service. Ext. C, runs as follows: "As commanded by His Grace Mar Thimotheus Metropolitan, Patron of the Chaldean Syrian Church Schools, Mr. N.T. Francis, B.A., B.T., Teacher, C.S. H.S., is hereby given to understand that His Grace has ascertained from reliable sources that in spite of timely advises and warnings, Mr. Francis is about to perpetrate a culpable deed in connection with his intended marriage and that as it brings disgrace not only on himself but also on the whole of the Chaldean Syrian Community, the Church injustice to its self respect shall have to resort to the painful duty of dismissing him from its service." Similarly the order contained in Ext. E concludes with the following sentence:- "As such and as ordered by His Grace Mar Thimotheus Metropolitan, the Patron of the School, you are hereby informed that your services in the C.S.H.School, Trichur, are dispensed with from today onwards". The contentions put forward in the written statement jointly filed by the 1st defendant and the trustees of the 2nd defendant Church are also consistent with the position disclosed by Exts. C and E. Under these circumstances, the Church cannot disown all responsibility for the act complained of by the plaintiff. If he succeeds in making out that his dismissal from service as teacher in the Chaldean Syrian High School was wrongful, he has undoubtedly a cause of action against the Church for a claim for damages arising out of such wrongful dismissal. 7. This leads on to the question whether the plaintiff's dismissal from service was wrongful or not. The terms and conditions regulating the plaintiff's service as a teacher in the defendant's school have an important bearing on this question. 7. This leads on to the question whether the plaintiff's dismissal from service was wrongful or not. The terms and conditions regulating the plaintiff's service as a teacher in the defendant's school have an important bearing on this question. Even though the plaintiff has put forward his case on the basis of a contract, he has not been able to produce any document containing the terms of the alleged agreement regulating his tenure of office as a teacher. Ext. B is the order by which he was appointed as teacher. This order is signed by the Manager of the School and it simply states thus: "This is to inform you that you are appointed as permanent teacher". According to the plaintiff, the order appointing him as a permanent teacher must be construed as embodying in it an agreement by necessary implication that he is entitled to such of the rights and privileges as are available to persons in the service of Government and which have been made applicable to the teachers in service in recognised private schools also as per the custom and practice followed in such schools. It is on this basis that he has contended that he is entitled as a matter of right to continue in service till his 55th year of age and the consequent enhancement in salary from time to time and also to all the privileges of the Provident Fund instituted in the school. Ext. B order of appointment by itself cannot be construed as implying all these terms and conditions. The appointment as a permanent teacher does not mean that the tenure of office is guaranteed for any definite period. The word 'permanent' in the appointment order is used as a descriptive of the nature of the appointment so as to distinguish it from a mere acting or temporary appointment. If the appointment is merely an acting appointment, the appointee has to give place to the permanent incumbent on the return of the latter to take charge of the post. Similarly if the appointment is specified to be merely temporary, the incumbent is liable to be relieved on the termination of the period of the temporary post. A permanent appointment is not so precarious as an acting or a temporary appointment. On the other hand, it has a fixity of tenure though not for any fixed period. Similarly if the appointment is specified to be merely temporary, the incumbent is liable to be relieved on the termination of the period of the temporary post. A permanent appointment is not so precarious as an acting or a temporary appointment. On the other hand, it has a fixity of tenure though not for any fixed period. The duration of such a service will depend on the rules and conditions governing such service. In Bimalacharan v. Trustees, Indian Museum, AIR 1930 Calcutta 404 it was pointed out that the phrase 'substantive and permanent' as applying to an appointment is more descriptive of the nature and character of the appointment than indicative of the duration of that appointment. The implications arising out of the expression "permanent appointment" came up for consideration in Venkatasitapathi v. Krishna Chandra, AIR 1942 Patna 176 also. In that case it was explained that the word "permanent" in relation to an employment means no more than that the employment is of a permanent as opposed to a purely temporary character and that the employee is the incumbent of his appointment and not merely 'acting' and is entitled to the emoluments of it in such a way that in the ordinary course, if his employment continued, he would be entitled to and subject to all the rights and liabilities incidental to the service in accordance with the rules governing the same. Construing the order of appointment Ext. B in the present case in the light of these principles, it has to be taken that the plaintiff's service in the defendants' school was meant to be more stable and secure than acting or temporary appointment. It has to be mentioned in this connection that his appointment was in a school which is being managed in accordance with the provisions of the Cochin Education Code. Even though the Code contains only administrative orders and rules, the management of the school is bound to comply with and adhere to such rules and orders and any failure on their part to comply with the provisions of the Code is likely to result in the Government withdrawing the recognition of the school and also stopping the grant-in-aid given to school. Some of the rules contained in the Code are obviously intended to afford the necessary protection and security of service to the teachers employed in such recognised educational institutions. Some of the rules contained in the Code are obviously intended to afford the necessary protection and security of service to the teachers employed in such recognised educational institutions. The tenure of office of the permanent teachers in such schools must therefore be deemed to be controlled and limited by the provisions of the Education Code. When a teacher is thus appointed, there is an implied agreement on the part of the management of the school that his service will be subject to the conditions specified in the Code. Similarly the teacher accepting the appointment has to be deemed to have impliedly agreed to serve as a teacher subject to the conditions specified in the Code. The reciprocal obligations thus created have the force of a contract between the management and the teacher. Failure to discharge such obligations would amount to a breach of contract giving rise to a claim for damages under S. 73 of the Contract Act. The latter part of that Section states that: "When an obligation resembling those created by contract has been incurred and has not been discharged, any person injured by the failure to discharge is entitled to receive the same compensation from the party in default, as if such person had contracted to discharge it and had broken his contract". 8. It is not disputed that the plaintiff was duly qualified for the post of a teacher when he was appointed in the defendant's school. His appointment was as a permanent teacher. Necessarily, therefore, he was entitled to the security of service as contemplated by the Education Code. S. 57 of the Code states that, "No licensed teacher shall be suspended or dismissed from an aided school except for good causes". S. 58 of the Code enumerates as many as 15 causes which would render a teacher unfit or disqualified from continuing in service and on the basis of which the Director of Public Instruction may suspend or cancel his teaching license. If the dismissal of the plaintiff from service was not for any of these causes, and not for any other good cause as contemplated by S. 57, the dismissal has to be held to be wrongful. The Code that was in force at the time of the plaintiff's dismissal did not contain a provision specifying the period during which a permanent teacher could continue in service. The Code that was in force at the time of the plaintiff's dismissal did not contain a provision specifying the period during which a permanent teacher could continue in service. According to the plaintiff, the custom and practice followed in such aided schools were to retain the teacher till his 55th year of age and thereafter to extend his service till the 60th year of age, in case he is found to be physically and mentally fit to discharge his duties efficiently. The plaintiff as PW. 2 has deposed to such a custom. He has also examined PW.1 who also swears to such a custom and practice followed in the aided schools in the State. At the time of giving evidence, this witness was the Principal of a Training Institution. He has also been the President of the Cochin Teachers' Association. He is therefore competent to give evidence on the custom and practice followed by aided schools in the matter of the duration of service of the teachers. The evidence given by him regarding such custom and practice has also not been successfully challenged in his cross-examination. The provision contained in S. 60 of the Education Code is also in favour of the version given by this witness that the normal superannuation limit for teachers in these aided schools is the completion of the 55th year, just as in the case of officers in Government service. It is provided in S. 60 that teachers in aided schools shall be eligible for pension and Provident Fund as may be instituted by Government. The plaintiff has deposed that Provident Fund had been instituted in his name and that the Government as well as the management of the school had been contributing towards that fund. He has also stated that after his dismissal from service in the school, the Provident Fund Account was closed and the amount due to him has been paid. Since S. 60 of the Code contemplates the institution of Provident Fund or the making of a provision for payment of pension to teachers serving in aided schools, it can be safely and legitimately inferred that the intention of all the parties concerned was that the teachers' service should normally go upto 55th year. The custom and practice followed by the aided schools regarding this matter as spoken to by PW.1 can therefore be accepted as true. The custom and practice followed by the aided schools regarding this matter as spoken to by PW.1 can therefore be accepted as true. But it cannot be put on the level of an agreement that the management of the school was bound to retain the plaintiff in service until he completes his 55th year of age. 9. The question whether the plaintiff's dismissal from service as per the order Ext. E was wrongful or not may now be considered. Sometime after the death of his wife in the year 1113 leaving behind four children to tender age, he appears to have been advised by his friends and relatives to marry his deceased wife's sister, suggesting that such an alliance will be in the best interests of the minor children also. The plaintiff approved of his suggestion and made up his mind to marry his deceased wife's sister. The Chaldean Syrian Church took exception to such a marriage and characterised it as a'culpable deed' bound to bring disgrace on the Chaldean Syrian Community. The letter Ext. C issued by the Manager of the School to the plaintiff, sufficiently demonstrates the uncompromising attitude on the part of the Church authorities to the plaintiff's idea of marrying his deceased wife's sister. In this letter the plaintiff was advised to desist from such a marriage which was characterised as a culpable deed and he was also warned that in the event of his contracting such a marriage alliance, "the Church in justice to its self-respect shall have to resort to the painful duty of dismissing him from its service". Apart from the question as to whether, the proposed marriage would amount to a culpable deed as viewed by the Church authorities, the evidence in the case shows that the plaintiff did not want to wound their moral and religious susceptibilities. The plaintiff thereupon made up his mind to secede his connection with the Chaldean Syrian Church and to go over to the Catholic faith. After intimating that fact to the 1st defendant by way of reply to Ex. C letter, the plaintiff addressed Ext. D letter to the Director of Public Instruction reporting about the threat of dismissal from service as held out to him by the Chaldean Syrian Church in the letter Ext. C and also the fact of the plaintiff having seceded all connections with the Chaldean Syrian Church. In Ext. C letter, the plaintiff addressed Ext. D letter to the Director of Public Instruction reporting about the threat of dismissal from service as held out to him by the Chaldean Syrian Church in the letter Ext. C and also the fact of the plaintiff having seceded all connections with the Chaldean Syrian Church. In Ext. D the plaintiff had also requested to be intimated whether his change of faith and the conduct of the proposed marriage would in any way violate departmental rules or orders so as to adversely affect his position as a teacher of that school. The plaintiff having gone over to the Catholic faith, appears to have very much offended the authorities of the Chaldean Syrian Church and the provocation thus caused resulted in the dismissal of the plaintiff from their school. This is clear from the reasons for the dismissal as stated in the order Ext. E served on the plaintiff. The grounds for the dismissal as stated in Ext. E are the following: "You were appointed a teacher in the Chaldean Syrian High School as a member of the Chaldean Syrian Community. A trust, as such was reposed in you. You intended violating this trust by contracting a marriage in contravention to the accepted rules and principles of the Church and you are warned of his serious consequences; whereupon you threatened us that you would leave the Church altogether. It has now come to our knowledge that you have carried out your threat and have deserted the Church. We are running the school to look after the special interests of our congregation and you who act in defiance to our advises and warnings have rendered yourself unfit to fulfil the purposes for which the school is conducted and you were appointed as a teacher therein. Under these circumstances we cannot retain you in our school. As such and as ordered by His Grace Mar Thimotheus Metropolitan, the Patron of the School, you are hereby informed that your services in the C.S.H. School, Trichur, are dispensed with from today onwards." In the written statement also filed on behalf of the Church the position taken up is that the above mentioned grounds are sufficient to justify the action taken against the plaintiff in dismissing him from service in the school. 10. 10. The authorities of the Church seem to have been too much obsessed with the idea that the plaintiff as a teacher in their school was absolutely at their mercy and that they had the right to control even his social and religious activities. The acceptance of the teacher's post by the plaintiff did not and could not amount to a surrender by him of his freedom of faith or the freedom of his normal social activities. The contention put forward on behalf of the Church that the appointment of teachers in their school was subject to the condition of continued adherence to the faith of the Church and obedience to the religious overlord, the Metropolitan of the Church, has no basis to support it. Ext. B, the order by which the plaintiff was appointed as teacher, does not even remotely suggest or indicate that his appointment was subject to any such condition. The evidence adduced on behalf of the Church does not also make out that the plaintiff's appointment as teacher was subject to any such express or implied condition as now pleaded by the defendants. It has to be remembered in this connection that even though the school is owned and managed by the Church, it is not a denominational school intended solely for the benefit of the Chaldean Syrian Christian Community where the Church could enforce its own precepts and rules. On the other hand, it is a public school having been recognised as such by Government and is being conducted strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Education Code in force for the time being. It follows therefore that the school cannot be used as the venue for enforcing any particular faith on the pupils and staff of the school. The exercise of the freedom of faith by the teachers and students is a matter beyond the control and jurisdiction of the management and the due exercise of such freedom cannot in any way prejudice the position of these persons as teachers or students in the school. 11. The conditions under which the services of a teacher could be properly terminated have been specified in Ss. 57 and 58 of the Cochin Education Code. The two charges leveled against the plaintiff by the Church authorities do not come under any of the reasons and conditions contemplated by these sections. 11. The conditions under which the services of a teacher could be properly terminated have been specified in Ss. 57 and 58 of the Cochin Education Code. The two charges leveled against the plaintiff by the Church authorities do not come under any of the reasons and conditions contemplated by these sections. The first charge was that the plaintiff was contemplating to marry his deceased wife's sister. It may be that such a marriage is not approved of and sanctioned by the Chaldean Syrian Church. All the same it cannot be said that such a marriage alliance is an immoral or illegal act or that it involves any moral turpitude so that it may be treated as a good cause justifying the dismissal of the teacher under S. 57 of the Education Code. It has also come out in the evidence that such marriages are approved of and sanctioned by other denominations in the Christian Community, particularly by the Catholic Church. It is also seen that out of deference to the sentiments of the Chaldean Syrian Church authorities, the plaintiff refrained from contracting the proposed marriage so long as he remained a member of that community. The evidence is that the marriage was conducted by him only after he had gone over to the Catholic Church. The order of dismissal Ext. E was served on the plaintiff even before such marriage as is evident from Ext. L, the petition submitted by him to the Director of Public Instruction, and hence it cannot be said that the marriage was treated as a'culpable deed' and made the basis of the action taken against him. Ext. E order does not also make any reference to the marriage as a reason for the action taken against the plaintiff. On the other hand it is clear from Ext. E that the plaintiff's action in having gone over to the Catholic Church was really the reason which provoked the authorities of the Chaldean Syrian Church to take the drastic action of dismissing the plaintiff from service in their school. 12. Finding that even this may not be a ground for justifying the action taken against the plaintiff, another ground of misbehaviour has been attempted to be made out against him. The allegation is that the plaintiff was carrying on a propaganda against the Chaldean Syrian Church and against its Metropolitan. 12. Finding that even this may not be a ground for justifying the action taken against the plaintiff, another ground of misbehaviour has been attempted to be made out against him. The allegation is that the plaintiff was carrying on a propaganda against the Chaldean Syrian Church and against its Metropolitan. The truth of this allegation is sought to be made out by the evidence of DW1 and also by the correspondence which the Metropolitan and the Manager of the school had conducted with the then Diwan of the State and also with the Director of Public Instruction. The letters of such correspondence are contained in Ext. F series. Ext. F(1) dated 19th November 1942 is copy of a letter addressed by the Metropolitan to the Diwan. The remarks offered by the Director of Public Instruction to whom that letter was forwarded by Government are also contained in Ext. F(1). The only accusation against the present plaintiff in that letter was that the plaintiff's proposal to marry his deceased wife's sister was a gross violation of the rules of the Church. It was also stated that in case the plaintiff commits such an act in violation of the rules of the Church and in contravention of the instructions of the Metropolitan, the latter will be compelled to send the plaintiff out of the Church and also to dispense with his services in the school. It is significant to note that there was absolutely no mention or even suggestion in that letter that the plaintiff was carrying on any propaganda against the Metropolitan or the Church. It is seen that the Metropolitan was conscious that the ground urged against the plaintiff may not be accepted as sufficient for his dismissal from service and therefore the Metropolitan sought the advice of the Diwan in the matter. In the remarks offered by the Director of Public Instruction he is seen to have pointed out that the ground urged against the teacher would not come under any of the fifteen causes enumerated in S. 58 of the Education Code, as grounds justifying the taking of drastic action against the teacher. Ext. In the remarks offered by the Director of Public Instruction he is seen to have pointed out that the ground urged against the teacher would not come under any of the fifteen causes enumerated in S. 58 of the Education Code, as grounds justifying the taking of drastic action against the teacher. Ext. F(2) contains copy of another letter sent to the Diwan by the Metropolitan and therein the accusation against the plaintiff was that he had disregarded the warning given by the Metropolitan and has changed his faith by going over to the Catholic Church and also that he has begun a regular propaganda against the Metropolitan and the Church. It may be mentioned in this connection that this latter accusation was made behind the back of the plaintiff and that the charge was not directly put to him nor was he afforded an opportunity to meet the same and explain his position. It is not known on what basis such an accusation had been made against the plaintiff by the Metropolitan. Ext. F(4) is copy of a report sent by the Manager of the Chaldean Syrian High School on 1st February 1943 to the Director of Public Instruction stating that as per the order of the Metropolitan and in anticipation of Government approval, the plaintiff's services as a teacher had been dispensed with. In this report as also in the order Ext. E served on the plaintiff, the only ground stated in support of the action taken against the plaintiff by the management is that the plaintiff having acted in defiance of the advices and warnings given by the Church authorities and having deserted the Church, has rendered himself unfit to continue in service as a teacher. There is no mention in this report that the plaintiff had been indulging in any propaganda against the Metropolitan or the Church. In the remarks offered on this report by the Inspector of Schools, it was pointed out as follows:- "The Manager's action in having dismissed the teacher without previous departmental sanction is irregular. If such high-handed action of the Managers are not checked, the security of teachers in private schools will be greatly affected in an adverse manner". On 2nd February 1943 the Metropolitan appears to have sent another communication to the Director of Public Instruction copy of which is contained in Ext. F(5). If such high-handed action of the Managers are not checked, the security of teachers in private schools will be greatly affected in an adverse manner". On 2nd February 1943 the Metropolitan appears to have sent another communication to the Director of Public Instruction copy of which is contained in Ext. F(5). In that communication it was stated that as a consequence of the conversation which the Metropolitan had with the Diwan and as per his verbal instructions, the plaintiff's services had been dispensed with. In the note made by the Director of Public Instruction on this letter, he had pointed out that in the order dispensing with the services of the plaintiff he has not been accused of having conducted any propaganda against the Metropolitan and the Church. It was also pointed out that it seemed doubtful whether the charge of having changed his faith could be taken as a sufficient ground justifying the action against the teacher. However, the Director felt that he was helpless in the matter, as is evident from his order on Ext. F. That order was passed on a complaint petition put in by the plaintiff through an Advocate. The order was to the effect that, "The advocate may be told that the teacher was releived by the Manager with the sanction of Government and as such if he wishes to appeal it must be to Government". Accordingly Ext. K letter was issued by the Director of Public Instruction intimating the purport of the order already adverted to. The plaintiff appealed to Government praying for his reinstatement in service. By Ext. P order he was intimated that his request could not be granted. To another petition put in by the plaintiff, he got the reply Ext. O that he may apply to the Staff Selection Board for appointment and take his chance. 13. From the series of correspondence referred to above, it is clear that the charge of the plaintiff having indulged in propaganda against the Metropolitan and the Church, was not investigated at all and that such a charge was not established by any evidence. Even in the present suit the defendants have not adduced any evidence to prove that there was any real basis for such a charge. Even in the present suit the defendants have not adduced any evidence to prove that there was any real basis for such a charge. DW.1 the only witness examined on behalf of the defendants, has not deposed to the fact of the plaintiff having been engaged in carrying on any propaganda against the Metropolitan or the Church. The belated attempt to develop such a charge against the plaintiff was made with the obvious idea of justifying the action taken against the plaintiff by bringing it under any of the causes contemplated by Ss. 57 and 58 of the Education Code. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the case made out against the plaintiff would come under clauses 10 and 14 of S. 58 of the Education Code. It is admitted and is also obvious that the accusations against the plaintiff would not come under any of the other clauses of this section. The reasons stated in clauses 10 and 14 are as follows:- "Behaves in any manner unbecoming a teacher and a gentleman" and "takes any part whatsoever in any agitation directed against the authority of Government, or any movement or agitation of any kind, which may be accompanied by or result in ill-feeling between different sections of any community or gives expression in any way to opinions that may excite feelings of disloyalty or disaffection". If it had been established by convincing evidence that the plaintiff had been indulging in carrying on propaganda against the Chaldean Syrian Church, it could be argued that he was engaged in an agitation bound to result in ill-feeling between different sections of the Christian Community and in that manner the defendants could have invoked the aid of clause 14 of S. 58. But, as already stated, that accusation has not been made out to be true. There is not even an allegation that the plaintiff was engaged in any of the other acts contemplated by clause 14 of S. 58 of the Code. Coming to Clause 10 also it cannot be said that the plaintiff had behaved in a manner unbecoming a teacher and a gentleman. There is not even an allegation that the plaintiff was engaged in any of the other acts contemplated by clause 14 of S. 58 of the Code. Coming to Clause 10 also it cannot be said that the plaintiff had behaved in a manner unbecoming a teacher and a gentleman. It cannot be said that his having changed the religious faith and having gone over to the Catholic Church or of his having contracted a marriage alliance with his deceased wife's sister, which marriage was approved and sanctioned by the Catholic Church, is a behaviour unbecoming a teacher and a gentleman. Thus it is seen that none of the grounds urged against the plaintiff can be accepted as a good and proper cause justifying the action taken by the Church against him. 14. There is yet another serious defect in the procedure adopted by the management of the school in the matter of terminating the plaintiff's services as a teacher in their school. Before he was condemned and sent out of the school, he was entitled in law and justice to be told about the nature of the charges against him so that he could answer those charges and offer his own explanations regarding the same. The only notice given to the plaintiff is that contained in Ext. C. The charge mentioned in that communication was that the marriage contemplated by the plaintiff could not be tolerated by the Chaldean Syrian Church and that the perpetration of such act was likely to result in a dismissal of the plaintiff from service in the school. Even though the plaintiff maintained that there was nothing objectionable about the proposed marriage, he was prepared to respect the sentiments of the church authorities. After brooding over the matter, he came to the conclusion that the Chaldean Syrian Church was unsuited to his own religious conviction and thereupon made up his mind to change over to the Catholic faith. After thus changing the faith, he intimated that fact to the management and also addressed the letter Ext. D to the Director of Public Instruction enquiring as to whether his proposed marriage in accordance with the rites of the Catholic Church would adversely affect his position as a teacher. It was at such a stage that the management served Ext. E order of summary dismissal from service, on the plaintiff. D to the Director of Public Instruction enquiring as to whether his proposed marriage in accordance with the rites of the Catholic Church would adversely affect his position as a teacher. It was at such a stage that the management served Ext. E order of summary dismissal from service, on the plaintiff. Since the marriage objected to by the Chaldean Syrian Church as per the warning given to the plaintiff in Ext. C letter had not been conducted by this time, it is obvious that it could not have been the ground for the dismissal of the plaintiff. The order Ext. E also did not mention this as the ground for his dismissal. Thus Ext. C notice cannot be treated as notice of the charge on which the action under Ext. E was taken against the plaintiff. The charge mentioned in Ext. C is that the plaintiff had carried out his threat of deserting the Chaldean Syrian Church and had thus violated the trust imposed on him at the time of his appointment as a teacher in the school belonging to the Church. It was also stated that the plaintiff had thus become unfit to be a teacher in that school. No notice of this charge was ever given to the plaintiff and as such he had no chance of explaining his position. He had no chance to know of the nature of the correspondence carried on behind his back by the management with the Diwan and the authorities of the Education Department. It is also clear from such correspondence that even those authorities had not cared to apprise the plaintiff of the nature of the charges made against him by the management and to get his explanation before giving their sanction to his dismissal from service in the school as proposed by the management. The result was that he was condemned without being heard and was summarily dismissed from service. There was thus a flagrant violation of all principles of natural justice. The position taken up by the defendants that it was not necessary to frame any charges against the plaintiff or to give him an opportunity to explain his position in the matter, is clearly unsustainable. Viewed from any stand-point, the plaintiff's dismissal from service as per the order Ext. E has undoubtedly been wrongful. The lower court's finding to that effect is therefore upheld. 15. Viewed from any stand-point, the plaintiff's dismissal from service as per the order Ext. E has undoubtedly been wrongful. The lower court's finding to that effect is therefore upheld. 15. The next aspect to be considered is as to the quantum of damages to be awarded in this case. In the statement Ext. M filed by the plaintiff he has estimated the damages sustained by him on account of his wrongful dismissal from service at Rs. 32,875. The basis of this estimate is that as per the contract of service he was entitled to be in service till his sixtieth year of age ie., for a further period of 25 years from the date of his dismissal when he was only 35 years old. He has assumed that he would have got the regular increments in his salary from time to time and striking an average of such expected increase in salary, he has taken Rs. 100 per month as his average salary for the purpose of the calculation made in the statement Ext. M. Even if he were to retire on the completion of his 55th year, he would have had 20 years' service more to his credit and on that basis the salary which he would have got has been estimated at Rs. 25,000. After making such an estimate, he has limited his claim in the suit to Rs. 10,000. The lower court has taken the view that the basis of the calculation adopted by the plaintiff is proper and acceptable and that therefore the full amount claimed by him has to be decreed. 16. The basis of the calculation adopted in Ext. M statement is clearly unsupportable in law. As already stated, there is no written agreement between the parties stipulating that the plaintiff shall be retained in service till he completes 55 or 60 years of age and that in the event of the termination of his service at an earlier period the total amount of salary that he would have got for the remaining period would be paid to him by way of liquidated damages. All that can be said is that as per the custom and practice proved to govern the service of teachers in recognised private schools conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cochin Education Code, the plaintiff could expect to be in service till the completion of his 55th year of age. At best an implied agreement could be inferred on the part of the management to retain him in service under normal circumstances until he completes his 55th year of age. But a wrongful dismissal from service resulting in a breach of that agreement will not entitle the plaintiff to get the total amount of salary which he would have got had he continued in service for the whole of the expected period by way of damages. The possibility of continuance in service for the whole of such period cannot be asserted with certainty. The possibility of the termination of service at any time during that period, on account of death or of physical or mental disability or on account of other justifiable causes, cannot be ruled out. The assumption that there would have been a progressive increase in the salary of the plaintiff by regular increments and higher scales of pay on account of promotions, is equally bad for uncertainty. Promotions and the consequent increase in salary cannot be taken to be automatic, but can be expected to follow only from the acceptance of the service as satisfactory and creditable. The damages claimed on the basis of an anticipation or assumption of all these factors in favour of the plaintiff can only be termed as too remote, and such a claim will not be countenanced by a court of law. 17. A servant complaining of wrongful dismissal from service cannot rest content by merely putting forward a claim for recovery in a lump and in advance the entire amount of anticipated salary covering the whole period for which he expected to continue in service so as to utilise such amount for safe investment and thus to convert the very injury complained of into a blessing in disguise. The common law which recognises his right to recover damages for wrongful dismissal imposes a corresponding duty on him to do all that is possible to mitigate such damages. The common law which recognises his right to recover damages for wrongful dismissal imposes a corresponding duty on him to do all that is possible to mitigate such damages. He is bound to act in that direction not only in his own interests but also in the interests of the opposite party against whom he has to sustain an action for damages. He has to use due diligence in endeavouring to obtain suitable employment with wages approximating that which he was getting in the service from which he was dismissed, even though he is not expected to accept a fresh engagement in a lower status. The possible chance of obtaining a suitable employment elsewhere has to be taken into account in assessing the measure of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff. In the judgment of the House of Lords in Beckham v. Drake (1848) 2 HLC 579 the principles to govern a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal in violation of an agreement for service, have been stated thus: "The measure of damages for the breach of promise now in question is obtained by considering what is the usual rate of wages for the employment here contracted for, and what time would be lost before a similar employment could be obtained. The law considers that employment in any ordinary branch of industry can be obtained by a person competent for the place, and that the usual rate of wages for such employment can be proved, and that when a promise for continuing employment is broken, it is the duty of the servant to use diligence to find another employment." Even where the service is not covered by a contract, the rule is that the service can be terminated only after reasonable notice except in cases where the dismissal is for proved misconduct or for other justifiable causes. The period of such notice will ordinarily be fixed as the time during which a fresh employment may reasonably be expected to be obtained. Thus in either case the anticipated salary or wages for an unreasonably long period subsequent to the date of the dismissal cannot be fixed as the measure of damages arising out of the wrongful dismissal. These principles have been embodied in S. 73 of the Contract Act also. Thus in either case the anticipated salary or wages for an unreasonably long period subsequent to the date of the dismissal cannot be fixed as the measure of damages arising out of the wrongful dismissal. These principles have been embodied in S. 73 of the Contract Act also. It is stated in that section that "Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach". The Explanation to the Section states as follows: "In estimating the loss or damage arising from a breach of contract, the means which existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by the a nonperformance of the contract must be taken into account." The quantum of damages to be awarded in favour of the plaintiff in the present case have to be fixed in the light of these principles. 18. The plaintiff was dismissed from service as per the order Ext. E on 1st February 1943. The present suit was instituted by him on 25th Edavam 1121/8th June 1946. The memos Exts. O and P issued to him by the State Government show that the plaintiff's attempt to get reinstated in service proved futile. Ext. O which is the last memo received by him is dated 12th October 1943. At the time of arguing the appeal it was stated on behalf of the appellant that the plaintiff has already secured an employment under the contractor in charge of the Peechi Irrigation Works and that he has been getting a monthly income of Rs. 250 during the last three years. In a counter-affidavit filed by the respondent-plaintiff, this averment has been denied. All the same it is admitted by him in that affidavit that he was for some time helping the aforesaid contractor, but it is stated that it was not on any salary basis. We do not propose to direct any investigation into this matter at this stage. The real point for consideration is whether the plaintiff has made all diligent attempts to get an employment similar to the one he had in the defendant's school. 19. The plaintiff is a trained graduate teacher with 15 years of service to his credit in a recognised school. His dismissal from service was not for any misconduct or for other causes which would preclude him from being entertained as a teacher in any other school. 19. The plaintiff is a trained graduate teacher with 15 years of service to his credit in a recognised school. His dismissal from service was not for any misconduct or for other causes which would preclude him from being entertained as a teacher in any other school. Under such circumstances, it is only reasonable to suppose that he could have secured a teacher's post without much difficulty if he had made an earnest attempt in that direction. In this deposition he has admitted that the only attempt made by him was to approach the authorities of two schools for securing a job. One school was prepared to engage him, but he did not accept the engagement because the salary offered was considered to be too low. In the other school there was no vacancy. Admittedly the plaintiff did not pursue his attempts to get a teacher's post. He has stated in so many words that he has not even sent a written application to any school for appointment as a teacher. Even the above mentioned half-hearted attempts were made only after the expiry of two years from the date of his dismissal from the defendant's school. He has stated that during this period he has engaged in a partnership trade. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the plaintiff had been diligent enough in endeavouring to obtain a post elsewhere similar to the one he was holding in the defendant's school and thus to minimise the damages arising out of the injury complained of by him. We feel that if he had made an earnest attempt in that direction it would have been possible for him to secure a suitable job within a reasonable period. 20. What would be the reasonable period to be fixed for that purpose is the next aspect to be considered. In fixing such a period the nature of the appointment held by the plaintiff is an important factor to be taken into account. Normally the work of a teacher is to commence at the beginning of the academic year and has to continue at least to the end of that year. Fresh engagements could therefore be expected to be obtained under ordinary circumstances only at the beginning of each year. Normally the work of a teacher is to commence at the beginning of the academic year and has to continue at least to the end of that year. Fresh engagements could therefore be expected to be obtained under ordinary circumstances only at the beginning of each year. Such being the nature of the teacher's post held by the plaintiff the duration of the service has to be taken to be one continued from year to year. Such a service cannot be put on a par with the service of domestic servants or of other menials which could be terminated at a month's notice. In Beeston v. Collyer 4 Bing 309 the Court of Common Pleas had occasion to consider the nature of the service of a clerk who had been summarily dismissed after he had been in service for several years. In the course of the judgment in that case Best, C.J., observed as follows: "I entertain no doubt on the law or justice of this case. The defendant has not suggested any reason for ending the service of the plaintiff; and it would be, indeed, extraordinary, if a party, in his station of life, could be turned off at a month's notice like a cook or scullion. If a master hire a servant, without mention of time, that is a general hiring for a year, and if the parties go on four, five or six years, a jury would be warranted in presuming a contract for a year in the first instance, and so on for each succeeding year, as long as it should please the parties; such a contract being implied from the circumstances, and not expressed, a writing is not necessary to authenticate it". The above observations apply with greater force to the case of the plaintiff who had been in service as a teacher continuously for a period of 15 years and was abruptly dismissed from service without any just or justifiable cause and without any notice at all. These and other circumstances already adverted to lead us to the conclusion that the reasonable period within which the plaintiff could have normally obtained a similar job elsewhere, would be one year and that the salary he would have got for this period, had he continued in the service of the defendants, would be the proper amount to be awarded as damages in this case. Reference may also be made in this connection to the decision in Nirod Chandra v. Kirtyananda Singh, AIR 1922 Pat. 24 where it was held: "The rule of one month's notice which applies to menials, will not apply to the case of a school master. The rule as to yearly hiring extents to domestic and other servants such as clerks and others, but it is not an inflexible rule and each case must be considered by itself, and in each case it must be decided what notice would be reasonable". The claim by a qualified Engineer whose service had been wrongfully terminated by the management of the Mills which had engaged him, was considered in Minakshi Mills Ltd. v. Anantharama Ayyar, AIR 1930 Mad. 654 and there it was held that it is reasonable to fix the amount of damages on the basis of the emoluments which he would have got in the service of the defendant for a period of one year. A claim for damages by a dismissed school master against the management of the institution came up for consideration by the Madras High Court in a still later case in Lekshminarasimacharyulu v. Mc. Laurin High School, Cocanda, AIR 1941 Mad. 788. In the present case the lower court has cited this decision as an authority in support of its conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to claim by way of damages an amount equal to the total salary that he would have got, had he continued in service till he completed his 55th year of age. That case cannot be taken to have laid down as a general proposition of law that the assessment of damages in the case of wrongful dismissal from service should be on the basis of the salary for the period yet to run to reach the superannuation limit. There was a written agreement governing the terms of service of the plaintiff in that case. It is also seen that the plaintiff in that case was 53 years old at the time when his services were dispensed with. In another two years he would have had to retire from service even under normal circumstances. It was on a consideration of all these aspects that a lump amount of Rs. 3,000 was fixed as reasonable compensation in that case. In another two years he would have had to retire from service even under normal circumstances. It was on a consideration of all these aspects that a lump amount of Rs. 3,000 was fixed as reasonable compensation in that case. The method adopted in that case in the matter of assessing damages can only be taken to be justified by the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. So far as the present case is concerned, we are definitely of opinion that the quantum of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff has to be fixed on the basis of one year's salary. Since his salary was in the grade of Rs. 60-70 at the time of his dismissal from service, it may be taken that he was getting a normally salary of Rs. 70 per mensem. The possibility or otherwise of his getting promotions or increments in the scale of pay, in case he had continued in service, cannot be taken into account in fixing the monthly salary for the purpose of calculating the amount of damages. Mental suffering and loss of reputation have also been urged by the plaintiff in support of his claim for damages. Since the suit is essentially one for damages arising out of the wrongful dismissal from service, such damages have to be fixed on the basis of the emoluments which can be deemed to have been lost by him for no fault of his, but soley due to the fault of the employer. Mental feelings or such other considerations have no place in assessing the quantum of damages. In Addis v. Gramaphone Company Ltd. (1909) AC 488 it was ruled by the House of Lords that "Where a servant is wrongfully dismissed from his employment, the damages for the dismissal cannot include compensation for the manner of the dismissal, for his injured feelings or for the loss he may sustain from the fact that the dismissal of itself makes it more difficult for him to obtain fresh employment." Thus we hold that the amount that can be awarded to the plaintiff by way of damages in this case for his wrongful dismissal from the defendants' school is 12 months' salary at the rate of Rs. 70 per month, which he would have got, had he continued in service, ie., Rs. 840. The amount decreed by the lower court will therefore be reduced accordingly. 70 per month, which he would have got, had he continued in service, ie., Rs. 840. The amount decreed by the lower court will therefore be reduced accordingly. 21. Even though the appellant-defendant has succeeded to a large extent in this suit, we do not think that in the nature and circumstances of this case it would be proper or equitable to direct the plaintiff to pay cost to the appellant. The suit itself was necessitated on account of the wrongful act of the defendant in the abrupt and unjustifiable termination of the plaintiff's services in the school. His claim for compensation was also stoutly opposed by putting forward a series of untenable contentions. Even for getting the partial relief that is now allowed to the plaintiff, he had to fight out his claim in two courts. Under such circumstances we think that the proper direction regarding costs will be that the defendants will suffer their costs throughout and will similarly pay the plaintiffs costs to the extent of his success in the suit. 22. The result is that this appeal is allowed to the extent as stated above and the decree of the lower court is modified by fixing the amount of damages at Rs.840. This amount will carry future interest at 6 per cent per annum. The decree for costs will be as per the direction given above. Appeal partly allowed.