JUDGMENT DAS GUPTA, J. - This appeal is against the judgment of Bose, J., sitting singly by which he held that the respondent No. 1 Messrs. Shree Ganesh Jute Mills Ltd., was not liable to pay sales tax in respect of certain sales of hessian, cancelled the notification dated the 8th of November, 1950, which had been served on it by the Commercial Tax Officer demanding an amount of Rs. 9,401-10-6 on account of sales tax and directed the Commercial Tax Officer and the State of West Bengal to forbear from giving effect to the said notification. This judgment was given on an application by the respondent No. 1 Messrs. Shree Ganesh Jute Mills Ltd. This respondent had in execution of the contract supplied to the Government of India hessian goods valued at Rs. 2,40,000 between the 1st of August, 1948, and the 1st of November, 1948. The Commercial Tax Officer who had jurisdiction to demand payment of sales tax on this, if any sales tax was payable, issued a notice of demand on the 8th of November, 1950, demanding payment of Rs. 9,401-10-6. It was upon this that Messrs Shree Ganesh Jute Mills Ltd. made its application praying for (1) a writ of mandamus or in the nature of mandamus on the respondents to cancel and/or recall and/or forbear from acting or giving effect to the demand of Rs. 9,401-10-6; (2) a writ of prohibition or in the nature of prohibition prohibiting the respondent from taking any steps in connection with levying or demanding any sales tax in respect of these goods; (3) a writ of certiorari or in the nature of certiorari calling upon the respondents to produce the records and proceedings in the alleged demand and quashing the same. Sinha, J., granted Rule nisi on the respondent to show cause why an order in the nature of prohibition, as asked for, should not be issued. The case of Messrs Shree Ganesh Jute Mills Ltd. was that under the provisions of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act the sale of these goods must be excluded in calculating the taxable turnover. If this contention be correct, it is clear that the Commercial Tax Officer acted illegally in making the demand for the sales tax. The case of Messrs Shree Ganesh Jute Mills Ltd. was that under the provisions of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act the sale of these goods must be excluded in calculating the taxable turnover. If this contention be correct, it is clear that the Commercial Tax Officer acted illegally in making the demand for the sales tax. Bose, J., who heard the Rule came to the conclusion that the contention of Messrs Shree Ganesh Jute Mills Ltd. was correct and gave judgment in favour of the applicant as mentioned earlier. The contention of the appellants, the Commercial Tax Officer and the State of West Bengal, is that in law the sale in question cannot be excluded in calculating the taxable turnover. Before we can consider this contention, it is necessary to consider the preliminary objection that was raised on behalf of the respondents, the Union of India and Messrs Shree Ganesh Jute Mills Ltd., namely, that no appeal lies to the High Court against the judgment of Bose, J. The judgment was given in exercise of the jurisdiction that Article 226 of the Constitution vests in the High Court. Bose, J., exercised this jurisdiction on the strength of a Rule framed by this Court under Article 225 of the Constitution. The Constitution does not in terms provide for any appeal from the decision given by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226. It is not disputed, however, that the principles laid down in the National Telephone Co.'s case ([1913] A.C. 546) which have been reaffirmed on several occasions and were last reaffirmed by the Privy Council in the case of Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar ((1948) L.R. 74 I.A. 264), have full application here; and that an appeal will lie from the judgment of a single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of the High Court if the judgment is within the provisions of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The substantial question therefore is whether the provisions of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent apply to this case. The substantial question therefore is whether the provisions of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent apply to this case. Clause 15 of the Letter Patent is in these words :- "And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act made (on or after the first day of February 1929) in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judge of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our Heirs or Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided." Admittedly, there is in this case a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15. It has recently been held in Belait v. The State of West Bengal (F.M.A. 87 of 1952) that the exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is the exercise of Original Jurisdiction. If, therefore the words "pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act" had not been there, there would clearly be not difficulty in deciding that an appeal lay from the judgment passed by Bose, J., in this case to High Court. If, therefore the words "pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act" had not been there, there would clearly be not difficulty in deciding that an appeal lay from the judgment passed by Bose, J., in this case to High Court. It is necessary to consider the effect of these words. It may be mentioned that the words in the clause, as they originally stood, were "pursuant to Section 13 of the said recited Act", the recited Act being the Indian High Court Act, 1861, commonly known as the Charter Act. Some time after the Government of India Act, 1915, came into force, the clause was amended by substituting for these words the words "pursuant to Section 108 of the said Act". There has been no amendment of this provision in spite of the fact that the Government of India Act, 1915, was repealed by the Government of India Act, 1935, and that again has been repealed by the Constitution of India. I have no hesitation in holding that the rule that if any Act is repealed, its provision as incorporated in some other Statute will continue to be effective, has the effect of continuing the provision of Section 108 as incorporated in spite of the Government of India Act being repealed. It was observed by the Judicial Committee in the case of Secretary of State for India v. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society ((1931) L.R. 58 I.A. 259), as follows :- "In this country it is accepted that where a Statute is incorporated by reference into a second Statute, the repeal of the first Statute does not affect the second; see the cases collected in Craies on Statute Law, 3rd Edn., pp. 349, 350..........; despite the death of the parent Act its offspring survives in the incorporating Act. Though no such saving clause appears in the General Clauses Act their Lordships think that the principle involved is as applicable in India as it is in this country." There can be no doubt, therefore, that in spite of the repeal of the Government of India Act, 1915, the words "pursuant to Section 108" as incorporated in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent continue to be operative. In law the words "pursuant to Section 108" must be held to be equivalent to the words "pursuant to the provision that, (1) Each High Court may by its own rules provided as it thinks fit for the exercise by one or more Judges, or by Division Courts, constituted by two or more Judges of the High Court of the Original and Appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court; and (2) The Chief Justice of each High Court shall determine what Judge in each case is to sit alone and what Judges of the Court, whether with or without the Chief Justice, are to constitute the several Division Courts." On the principle laid down in the case of Secretary of State for India v. Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society ((1931) L.R. 58 I.A. 259), these words must be held to continue in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent even though the Government of India Act has been repealed. If, therefore, a single Judge is exercising jurisdiction vested in the High Court on the strength of some rule made in accordance with the provision (1) above and according to the determination by the Chief Justice of the High Court under the terms of the provision (2) mentioned above, an appeal will lie from his judgment to the High Court. The rule and the determination under which Bose, J., exercised jurisdiction in this case purports to have been made, as already mentioned, under Article 225 of the Constitution of India. It is important to remember that the powers under Section 108 of the Government of India Act as regards the making of rules and the determination of the Chief Justice as to what Judge shall sit alone and what Judges are to constitute the several Division Courts were admittedly continued by Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and have been preserved in Article 225 of the Constitution. The fact that the rule and the determination purport to have been made under Article 225 will not alter the position that what was done was done in exercise of powers that had originally been given by Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915. It is contended however that that will not make the exercise of jurisdiction by Bose, J., "pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act". It is contended however that that will not make the exercise of jurisdiction by Bose, J., "pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act". It is contended on the authority of certain observations in the case of India Electric Works Ltd. v. Registrar, Trade Marks ((1947) 51 C.W.N. 42), that to be "pursuant to Section 108" the judgment must be in the exercise of jurisdiction that was vested in the High Court at the time Section 108 was put on the Statute Book. The question their Lordships had to decide in that case was whether an appeal lay to the High Court from the judgment of a single Judge deciding an appeal from the decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks. Their Lordships held that no such appeal lay. At page 51 of the report appear the following reasons given by Gentle, J., for his decision :- "The hearing of an appeal under Section 76(1) is pursuant to rules made under Section 77 of the Trade Marks Act and is not a disposal in accordance with a rule made under Section 108 of the 1915 Statute and a judgment in such appeal is not a judgment pursuant to Section 108. Since it is not such a judgment it follows that there is no right of appeal from a single Judge to a Division Bench with respect to a Trade Marks Act appeal." At page 70 appear the reasons given by Das, J., for his final conclusion :- "In dealing with the company's appeal under Section 76 of the Indian Trade Marks Act, 1940, McNair, J., was not sitting singly under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent in pursuance of any rule made under Section 108 and was not exercising jurisdiction assigned to a single Judge under rules framed by the High Court under Section 108 of the 1915 Act. The appeal came up before him pursuant to the rules made by the High Court under Section 77 of the Indian Trade Marks Act. The judgment passed by him on that appeal cannot, therefore, be said to be a judgment 'pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The appeal came up before him pursuant to the rules made by the High Court under Section 77 of the Indian Trade Marks Act. The judgment passed by him on that appeal cannot, therefore, be said to be a judgment 'pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In this view of the matter, although the judgment of McNair, J., was passed in exercise of jurisdiction vested in the High Court.........it.........does not come within the purview of Clause 15 and no right of appeal against the same can be claimed under that clause." It is abundantly clear thus that both Gentle and Das, JJ., based their decision that no appeal lay to the High Court on the fact that the rules under which a single Judge sat to exercise jurisdiction vested in the High Court were admittedly under Rule 77 of the Trade Marks Act. It was not really necessary for them to decide whether exercise of such jurisdiction as did not exist when Section 108 was enacted can be said to be "pursuant to Section 108." What their Lordships have said on this latter question must therefore be considered to be obiter dicta and though entitled to very great respect as indicating the views of such eminent Judges are not binding on us. The view of Gentle, J., on this question appears at page 50 in the following passage :- "The authority given by Section 108(1) of the 1951 Statute to make rules for the exercise by one or more Judges of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, is limited to the jurisdiction then vested in the Court, that is to say, the jurisdiction conferred by Section 106(1). Such rules therefore cannot relate to jurisdiction conferred by an Act passed after the commencement of the 1915 Statute not to an appeal heard by the Court pursuant to such an Act since the jurisdiction to hear such appeal is conferred by the particular Act giving the right to such appeal and was not conferred upon or vested in the Court by Section 106(1)..... The power and authority under Sections 106(1) and 108(1) of the 1915 Statute cannot be exercised with regard to an Act passed after the commencement of the Statute." Similar views have been expressed by Das, J., at page 60 :- "The position at the commencement of the 1915 Act was therefore that under Section 106(1) this High Court had such jurisdiction, powers and authority as (i) it got under the Letters Patent; (ii) it inherited from the Supreme Court, in so far as they had not been taken away by Indian Legislative enactments; (iii) it derived from Indian Legislative enactments up to that date. It was with regard to these jurisdictions, original and appellate, that the High Court was empowered by Section 108 to make rules." Though the observations were made in connection with the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, they were undoubtedly applicable to the exercise of original jurisdiction. If the view that the authority given by Section 108(1) of the Government of India Act to make rules is limited to the jurisdiction then vested in the Court be right, a conclusion that the exercise of jurisdiction that did not exist when Section 108(1) came on the Statute Book is not "pursuant to Section 108", appears to be justified. With great respect, I am however unable to accept as correct this view that the authority given by Section 108(1) to frame rules is limited to the jurisdiction then vested in the Court. The words of Section 108(1) which have already been set out above provide for the making of rules for the exercise by one or more Judges, or by Division Courts of two or more Judges, of the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court. There is no word "now" before the word "vested" nor are there the words "now and hereafter". In the absence of any of these words, it seems to me clear on a plain reading of the section that the right to make rules was not limited to the exercise of the jurisdiction which existed at the commencement of the Act. It is interesting to note that though the words "at the commencement of the Act" had been used in Section 106(1) of the Government of India Act, these words are conspicuous by their absence in Section 108. It is interesting to note that though the words "at the commencement of the Act" had been used in Section 106(1) of the Government of India Act, these words are conspicuous by their absence in Section 108. This fact itself justifies the conclusion that in enacting Section 108 the Parliament had the intention that the rule-making power in Section 108 is not to be limited to the exercise of jurisdiction that existed at the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1935. It is unreasonable to think that the Parliament would make no provision for making rules as regards the exercise by some of the Judges of the High Court of the jurisdiction vested in the High Court after the commencement of the Act. The Parliament could not be unaware that new jurisdiction could be vested after 1915 Act. Could it be their intention that if and when such jurisdiction is vested by a later Act, the entire High Court should have to sit to exercise such jurisdiction unless the Legislature made some special provision ? It is absurd to think that this could be their intention. It is helpful to compare at this stage the language of the corresponding provision of the 1861 Act in Section 13. It is in these words :- "Subject to any laws or regulations which may be made by the Governor-General in Council, the High Court established in any Presidency under this Act may, by its own rules, provide for the exercise, by one or more Judges, or by Division Court constituted by two or more Judges of the said High Court, of the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in such Court, in such manner as may appear to such Court to be convenient for the due administration of justice." There also, nothing was said expressly about the exercise of jurisdiction that may later come to be vested in the High Court; and this in spite of the fact that Section 9 of the same Act clearly contemplated such vesting of additional jurisdiction by later legislation. In my judgment, as in Section 13 of the 1861 Act so in Section 108 of the 1915 Act, the Parliament clearly intended that rules may be made by the High Court as regards the exercise of jurisdiction vested in it at the time of the Act and also jurisdiction that would be vested in it later on. In my judgment, as in Section 13 of the 1861 Act so in Section 108 of the 1915 Act, the Parliament clearly intended that rules may be made by the High Court as regards the exercise of jurisdiction vested in it at the time of the Act and also jurisdiction that would be vested in it later on. My conclusion therefore is that the exercise of jurisdiction vested in the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution under the rules that have been framed by the Court must be held to be exercise of jurisdiction "pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act" and that consequently an appeal lies to the High Court from the judgment of a single Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution. Coming now to the merits of the appeal, the question for decision is whether the supplies made by Messrs Shree Ganesh Jute Mills Ltd., as mentioned above, were sales to the Indian Supply Department within the meaning of Section 5(2)(a)(iii) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (Bengal Act VI of 1941). The first sub-section of Section 5 provides that "the tax payable by a dealer under this Act shall be levied at the rate of three-quarters of an anna in the rupee on his taxable turnover." The second sub-section provides that the expression "taxable turnover" means that part of a dealer's gross turnover during any period which remains after deducting therefrom his turnover on the different sales mentioned in the five different clauses and such other sales as may be prescribed. Clause (iii) of these clauses is in these words :- "Sales to the Indian Stores Department, the Supply Department of the Government of India and any railway or water transport administration." The effect of this is that sales to the Indian Supply Department of the Government of India will be deducted from a dealer's turnover for determining the taxable turnover on which tax has to be paid. Admittedly, there was in existence at the time this Act came into force a department of the Government of India with the designation "Supply Department". This department continued its separate existence up to the 6th January, 1946. Admittedly, there was in existence at the time this Act came into force a department of the Government of India with the designation "Supply Department". This department continued its separate existence up to the 6th January, 1946. By a resolution which was published in the Gazette of India on the 5th of January, 1946, the Governor-General in Council created a new department in place of the former Department of Supply and the former Department of Industries and Civil Supplies. The resolution is in these words :- "1. The Governor-General in Council is pleased to announce the creation with effect from the 7th January, 1946, of the Department of Industries and Supplies in place of the existing Departments of Supply and of Industries and Civil Supplies. 2. The Indian Stores Department and the Contracts Directorate, which during the war were bought under the Supply Department, will be incorporated in the new Department. This Department will also direct the work of the India Stores Department in the United Kingdom and the India Supply Mission in the United States of America. 3. This Department will deal with the following items of business : Development of Industries in accordance with approved Industrial Plans; Administration of Government Factories not allocated to Specialised Department; Procurement of Stores for Government; Disposals of Surpluses and Civil Supplies." On the 2nd September, 1947, a further resolution was adopted by the Government which was published in the Gazette of India on the 6th of September, 1947. By this resolution the Industries and Supplies Department was re-designation "Ministry of Industry and Supply". This re-designation does not effect any real change and in my judgment a sale to the Ministry of Industry and Supply will have the same effect in law as a sale to the Industries and Supplies Department. Creation of a new department is however something essentially different from re-designation. What happened in January, 1946, was that the old "Department of Supply" ceased to exist and in its place a new department combining some of the functions of that department and some functions of another department was created. The fact that the newly created department took over some of the functions of the old "Supply Department" including, for example, the procurement of stores for Government, cannot, in my judgment, make the newly created department even in part the same as the old Supply Department. The fact that the newly created department took over some of the functions of the old "Supply Department" including, for example, the procurement of stores for Government, cannot, in my judgment, make the newly created department even in part the same as the old Supply Department. Suppose, for example, the old Supply Department had three duties to perform, - procurement of supplies for the Federal Court, procurement of supplies to the Railways and procurement of supplies to the Delhi University. If the Supply Department is abolished and the above three functions are taken over by the Federal Court, the Railway Board and the Delhi University, could it still be said that the supply of stores to, say, the Federal Court will be equivalent in law to the supply of stores to the Supply Department ? In my judgment, there is no justification for such a view. The learned counsel for the respondents has invoked the principle that taxation statutes should be construed strictly and that if there is any ambiguity or scope for doubt, the benefit of that doubt would go to the subject. In interpreting provisions for exemptions from the general rules, it is well to remember what was pointed out by Lord Halsbury in Inland Revenue v. Forrest ((1890) 15 App. Cas. 334; 3 Tax Cas. 117) that all exemptions from taxation increase the burden on other members of the community. The argument for strict interpretation in favour of the subject is not as forcible in the case of provisions for exemptions as in the case of provisions imposing burdens. Besides, we have to remember always the important principle that the Court cannot in interpreting Statutes import its own views as to what would have been fair. It might perhaps seem unfair that though a sale to the Government of India was entitled to certain privilege so long as it was to one department of the Government of India, an exactly similar sale to another department would not be so entitled. But that is a question of legislative policy with which the court has nothing to do. It might perhaps seem unfair that though a sale to the Government of India was entitled to certain privilege so long as it was to one department of the Government of India, an exactly similar sale to another department would not be so entitled. But that is a question of legislative policy with which the court has nothing to do. The Legislature might have, if it thought fit, used in the relevant clause the words "sales to the Government of India" instead of mentioning only "sales to the Indian Stores Department and Supply Department of the Government of India." We have to interpret the language actually used and have no power to extend it. I have therefore come to the conclusion that the sales in question by Messrs Shree Ganesh Jute Mill Ltd. cannot be said to be sales to the Supply Department of the Government of India and consequently, these sales cannot be excluded in calculating the taxable turnover. In this view, I would set aside the order passed by Bose, J., and order that the application of Messrs Shree Ganesh Jute Mills Ltd. be dismissed, and that the appeal be allowed with costs. P. N. MOOKERJEE, J. - I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother. A preliminary objection has been raised to the maintainability of this appeal but, having given the matter my best consideration, I am unable to uphold the same. On the merits, too, I am satisfied that the learned trial Judge was not right in his interpretation of the relevant statutory provision and I agree, therefore, that this appeal should be allowed. The appeal is directed against a judgment of our learned brother Bose, J., cancelling imposition of sales tax to the tune of Rs. 9,401-10-6 upon the respondent company on account of certain sales made by them to the other respondent, the Union of India, and forbidding the appellants, the Commercial Tax Officer and the State of West Bengal from realising the same. 9,401-10-6 upon the respondent company on account of certain sales made by them to the other respondent, the Union of India, and forbidding the appellants, the Commercial Tax Officer and the State of West Bengal from realising the same. The "judgment" was pronounced upon an application of the respondent company under Article 226 of the Constitution for, inter alia, appropriate writs of certiorari and prohibition or in the nature of certiorari and prohibition, and Bose, J., allowed the application holding inter alia that the sales in question were not liable to sales tax under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act by reason of Section 5(2)(a)(iii) thereof, as it stood at the material time, namely, August to November, 1948, when, admittedly, the said sales were made. The propriety of this decision has been assailed before us by the appellants and their learned counsel have argued that the view of Bose, J., applying Section 5(2)(a)(iii) of the Act to the present case and exempting the respondent company from liability to pay sales tax in respect of the disputed sales is wrong and his order, cancelling the Notification, whereby the tax was demanded, and forbidding the appellants from giving effect to the same, should be set aside. There are two respondents in this appeal, namely, the seller company, Messrs Shree Ganesh Jute Mills Ltd. and the purchaser, the Union of India, to whom the sales in question were made and who, under the terms of the relevant contract of sale, would be liable to pay the sales tax, if any be ultimately found payable in law. The two respondents jointly resist the appellants' claim and they question the maintainability of the present appeal by raising a preliminary objection and they support also the decision of Bose, J., on the merits. I shall first consider the preliminary objection and then I shall advert to the merits of the case. It is well settled that "the right of appeal is a creature of Statute" and that "an appeal does not exist in the nature of things" : (Vide Sandback Charity Trustees v. Northstraffordshire Ry. Co. ((1877) L.R. 3 Q.B.D. 1), Meenakshi Naidoo v. Subramania Sastri ((1887) L.R. 14 I.A. 160) and Rangoon Botatoung Co., Ltd. v. The Collector, Rangoon ((1916) L.R. 39 I.A. 197)). Co. ((1877) L.R. 3 Q.B.D. 1), Meenakshi Naidoo v. Subramania Sastri ((1887) L.R. 14 I.A. 160) and Rangoon Botatoung Co., Ltd. v. The Collector, Rangoon ((1916) L.R. 39 I.A. 197)). It is not also disputed that the present appeal cannot be maintained except under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court, the relevant part whereof runs as follows :- "..........an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature.......from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.........and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act.......", there being no other statutory provision, not even the Code of Civil Procedure (vide Debendra v. Bibhudendra ((1916) I.L.R. 43 Cal. 90 at pp. 93-94)), available for the purpose. The preliminary objection, as urged by the respondents' learned counsel, is founded exclusively upon the words "pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act", quoted and underlined above, and Mr. Meyer's arguments in this behalf may be shortly stated thus :- Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, so far as it is relevant here, permits an appeal to the High Court from the "judgment" of one Judge thereof "pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act." To be appealable, therefore, under this clause the decision of Bose, J., must be shown to be a "judgment pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act" which obviously refers to the Act of 1915. In other words, argues learned counsel, the present appeal would be maintainable only if (a) the decision of Bose, J., is a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, and (b) that "judgment" is "pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915." Requirement (a), concedes the learned Counsel, is satisfied in the present case but he strongly urges that requirement (b) is not present and submits that Section 108, referred to above, having been replaced by the Government of India Act, 1935, and this latter Act having been replaced by the Constitution long before the present proceedings, the judgment of Bose, J., cannot be said to be a "judgment" pursuant to the said Section 108 and, there having been no amendment of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent despite the above constitutional changes, that "judgment" cannot be held to be appealable under the said clause. To decide the preliminary objection, therefore, we have to determine only the true construction and the scope and effect of the words "pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act", as used in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, in the present context of things, keeping in mind that there has been no amendment made in the said clause following the constitutional changes, referred to above. Some aspects of the matter have been fully dealt with by my learned brother in his judgment, just pronounced, and, as repetition is unnecessary, I shall endeavour to confine myself as far as possible, to the other aspects from which the question of maintainability of the present appeal may be considered and to these aspects I at once advert. The Government of India Act, referred to in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was, as stated above, obviously the Act of 1915 which was replaced by the Government of India Act, 1935, so far as it is relevant for our present purposes, with effect from 1st April, 1937. Section 223 of this latter Act replaced the old Section 108 of the repealed Statute of the year 1915 and preserved and continued its provisions. The Act of 1935 was, in its turn, repealed by the Constitution which came into force on and from 26th January, 1950, and Article 225 of this repealing enactment replaced Section 223 of the earlier Act and similarly preserved and continued the provisions of the repealed section. The Act of 1935 was, in its turn, repealed by the Constitution which came into force on and from 26th January, 1950, and Article 225 of this repealing enactment replaced Section 223 of the earlier Act and similarly preserved and continued the provisions of the repealed section. The net position, therefore, was that Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, was repealed by the 1935 Act and re-enacted in it as Section 223 and this latter section was, in its turn, similarly repealed by the Constitution and re-enacted in it as Article 225. To the Government of India Acts, 1915 and 1935, the English Interpretation Act, 1899, was applicable, - they being Acts of the British Parliament and thus "Acts" under the English Interpretation Act, and they also come within the expressions "Act of Parliament" and "enactment", as used in Section 8(2) of our General Clauses Act, 1897, and to the Constitution the General Clauses Act, 1897, applies. [Vide Article 367(1)]. The consequence thus follows that when the Government of India Act, 1935, or the Constitution "repeals and re-enacts with or without modification any provision or provisions of a former Act or enactment, then reference or references in any other Act or enactment or in any instrument to the provision or provisions so repealed shall, unless the contrary or a different intention appears, be construed as reference or references to the provision or provisions so repealed." (Vide Section 38(1) of the English Interpretation Act and Section 8 of the General Clauses Act). It is clear, therefore, that, on and from 1st April, 1937, reference to Section 108 of the Government of India Act in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent which appears to me to be an "instrument" within the meaning of the above statutory quotation - the Bombay case reported in Emperor v. Rayangouda Lingangouda Patil ((1944) A.I.R. 1944 Bom. 259) being, in my opinion, entirely different - fell to be construed as reference to Section 223 of the new Act of 1935 and, on and from 26th January, 1950, such reference by a similar process of reasoning became, in law, reference to Article 225 of the Constitution. 259) being, in my opinion, entirely different - fell to be construed as reference to Section 223 of the new Act of 1935 and, on and from 26th January, 1950, such reference by a similar process of reasoning became, in law, reference to Article 225 of the Constitution. The same conclusion also follows from the relevant rule or rules of statutory construction deducible from judicial decisions (Vide Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. ((1931) L.R. 58 I.A. 259 at p. 267), and India Electric Works Ltd. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks ((1947) 51 C.W.N. 42 at p. 60), per Das, J., as he then was), which lay down that "where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute the repeal of the first statute does not affect the second" and that "despite the death of the parent Act its offspring survives in the Incorporation Act" and, further, that "when a statute is repealed and re-enacted the reference to a section of the repealed Act is to be read as a reference to the section of the new Act which reproduces it." The real question, therefore, is whether the "judgment" of Bose, J., is a "judgment" pursuant to Article 225 of the Constitution and the true answer to this question will decide the fate of the respondents' preliminary objection. Article 225 of the Constitution in its relevant part runs as follows :- "Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution." Immediately before the commencement of the Constitution these powers were to be found in Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which enacted as follows :- "Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act, to the provisions of any Order in Council made under this or any other Act and to the provisions of any Act of the appropriate Legislature enacted by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Act, the jurisdiction of and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act." The powers, just above referred to, were, immediately before the commencement of Part III of the Act of 1935, contained in Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, which, alike its predecessor, Section 13 and Section 14 of the Charter Act, 1861, conferred, in express terms, upon each High Court, that is, upon the Judges thereof, and upon its Chief Justice the powers respectively "to make rules for the exercise by one or more Judges or by Division Courts, constituted by two or more Judges of that Court, of the Original and Appellate Jurisdiction vested in the Court" and "to determine what Judge in each case is to sit alone and what Judges, whether with or without the Chief Justice, are to constitute the several Division Courts." The position thus emerges that Article 225 of the Constitution has conferred on the Judges of this Court (including the Chief Justice) the powers "to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts" on the same terms as the old Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and to the language of this latter section, therefore, one must turn for ascertainment of the scope and extent of such powers. Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, was in two parts which read as follows :- "(1) Each High Court may by its own rules provide as it thinks fit for the exercise, by one or more Judges, or by Division Courts constituted by two or more Judges of the High Court, of the Original and Appellate Jurisdiction vested in the Court" and "(2) The Chief Justice of each High Court shall determine what Judge in each case is to sit alone and what Judges of the Court, whether with or without the Chief Justice, are to constitute the several Division Courts." The language used is quite general. It is wide enough to embrace the exercise of all various jurisdiction vested in the High Court. The terms "Original" and "Appellate", occurring in sub-section (1), appear to have been used in contradistinction to each other but comprehending between themselves all the different jurisdictions possessed by the High Court (See in this connection the observations of Das, J., as he then was, in the case of India Electric Works Ltd. v. The Register of Trade Marks ((1947) 51 C.W.N. 42, at p. 65)). There is also nothing in the words employed to restrict them to the exercise of these jurisdictions over particular subjects or subject-matters or to restrict them to the extents of these jurisdictions, as obtaining at any particular point of time. Whatever the jurisdiction - "Original" or "Appellate" in their above comprehensive senses - for its exercise the High Court, that is, the Judges thereof, had power to make rules and the Chief Justice had power to determine or constitute "Courts" or "Benches" under Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and, after its repeal, under Section 223 of the Act of 1935, and now they have respectively these powers under the appropriate parts of Article 225 of the Constitution. The Rules of this Court under Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, with alterations and additions made from time to time, continued as its Rules under Section 223 of the Act of 1935 and are now in force under Article 225 of the Constitution as the current Rules, and the Chief Justice's power of "determination" or constitution of "Courts" or "Benches" which, during the currency of the 1915 Statute, used to be exercised under Section 108 thereof, continued to be so done under the new Section 223, when the Act of 1935 was in operation, and is being exercised, since the Constitution, under Article 225 thereof. In the year 1951, therefore, when Bose, J., heard and decided the respondent's application he must have acted pursuant to the Rules of this Court and the "determination" on the Chief Justice under Article 225 of the Constitution and the "judgment" under appeal must, therefore, be held to be "pursuant to Article 225 of the Constitution", that is, "pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, according to the rules of construction of statutes - statutory or otherwise - indicated by me in an earlier part of this judgment. The only point, urged by the respondents' learned counsel, against the maintainability of the present appeal must, therefore, fail and the preliminary objection must be overruled. In pressing his preliminary objection Mr. Meyer relied strongly upon the decision of this Court in India Electric Co.'s case ((1947) 51 C.W.N. 42, at p. 65) already cited, where the learned Judges (Gentle and Das, JJ.) had occasion to consider the meaning of the phrase "pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act" in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Learned counsel laid considerable stress on the lines of approach, there indicated, and pressed for acceptance of the construction, there suggested. Learned counsel laid considerable stress on the lines of approach, there indicated, and pressed for acceptance of the construction, there suggested. I say "suggested", because it appears to me that the observations made in the case cited, on the question, now before us, were obiter dicta, as its ultimate decision, in the judgments of both the learned Judges, turned upon the Trade Marks Act and the Rules made thereunder, under which, according to both the learned Judges, the other learned Judge (McNair, J.) who heard the "appeal" under Section 76(1) of the Act, exercised in that case the jurisdiction of this Court. With the utmost respect, however, to the learned Judges (Gentle and Das, JJ.) who decided the India Electric Co.'s case ((1947) 51 C.W.N. 42), I would say that, for reasons sufficiently indicated above, I am unable to agree with them in their construction of the relevant phrase in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, quoted above, and the Bombay view, expressed on this point by Chagla, C.J., and Bhagwati, J., in the recent case of James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd. v. The National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. ((1951) A.I.R. 1951 Bom. 147), seems to me to be preferable. I should not, however, be understood to express any opinion as to which of the above two cases is correct so far as the actual decision, namely, on the question of an "inter High Court appeal", as it was put in the Calcutta case in a trade mark action - or "appeal", to quote the language of the statute under Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, when the same is dealt with by the High Court under Rules, framed under Section 77 of the Act, is concerned. For the purposes of this case I would only point out further that it is significant to note that their Lordships in the Calcutta case reserved consideration of the question, namely, the question of an "inter High Court appeal", so far as the original proceedings in this Court under Sections 10, 38, 39, 45 and 59 of the Trade Marks Act were concerned and it appears also that one of the learned Judges (Das, J., as he then was), was inclined to accept the rules of statutory construction, adopted by me, although he reached in the end a different conclusion in spite thereof. I have found above against the respondents on the point, urged on their behalf in support of the preliminary objection, but there are three other matters to which some reference ought to be made in connection with the same. These matters I shall now briefly discuss. It was conceded before us, as already stated, that the decision of Bose, J., was a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. There is little doubt that this concession was rightly made. Bose, J., cancelled the Notification on a finding that the respondent company was not liable to pay sales tax in respect of the disputed sales. His decision was, therefore, "a decision which affected the merits of the question between the parties by determining their rights and liabilities" under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act and, as such, it was a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent (Vide the leading cases of The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Co. Ltd. ((1872) 8 B.L.R. 43) and Hadjee Ismail v. Hadjee Mohammed ((1874) 13 B.L.R. 91)). It also appears to me that Article 225 of the Constitution involves the exercise of original jurisdiction of this Court. The high prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition etc. have always been treated in England as matters of original jurisdiction (Vide in this connection Halsbury' Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Vol. IX, p. 874) and in this country too the three Chartered High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, which had, before the Constitution undeniable powers - though limited - to issue these writs (Vide Annie Besant v. Advocate-General of Madras ((1919) L.R. 46 I.A. 176) and the other two Privy Council cases reported in Ryots of Garabandha v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi ((1943) 70 I.A. 129) and Moulvi Hamid Hassan Nomani v. Banwarilal Roy ((1947) 51 C.W.N. 716 (P.C.))) always acted in such matters as Courts of Original Jurisdiction : (See in this connection the two Madras and the two Bombay cases reported respectively in Chief Commissioner of Income-tax v. North Anantapur Gold Mines Ltd. ((1921) 44 Mad. 718 at p. 725) and Pinugonda Venkataratnam v. Secretary of State for India in Council ((1930) 53 Mad. 979 at pp. 999 and 1017-19) and Dinshaw Darabshaw Shroff v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central ((1943) A.I.R. 1943 Bom. 718 at p. 725) and Pinugonda Venkataratnam v. Secretary of State for India in Council ((1930) 53 Mad. 979 at pp. 999 and 1017-19) and Dinshaw Darabshaw Shroff v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central ((1943) A.I.R. 1943 Bom. 77 at p. 78; 11 I.T.R. 172) and Raghunath Keshaw Khadhikar v. Poona-Municipality ((1945) A.I.R. 1945 Bom. 7 at p. 10)). In the two recent cases on these writs which went up to the Privy Council the judgments of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee contain ample indication that these writs are original writs and the issue of such writs is a matter of original jurisdiction : (Vide Ryots of Garabandha v. The Zamindar of Parlakimedi ((1943) 70 I.A. 129) and Maulvi Hamid Hassan Nomani v. Banwarilal Roy ((1947) 51 C.W.N. 716 (P.C.))) and in the latter of these two cases the Board further held that in issuing the high prerogative writs the High Court exercises original civil jurisdiction (Vide page 722 of the Report). That these are original proceedings is also confirmed by their nature. They are instituted or initiated in the High Court in the first instance and originate there and, even where they are sought in connection with proceedings, pending before any authority, such authority is invariably made a party and the matter, that is, the dispute between the applicant and the authority is tried out as an original action. In the proceedings for the issue of the writ some alleged right of the authority concerned is disputed by the applicant and this comes up for decision for the first time in these proceedings. Of this dispute there would be no previous decision by any tribunal and the proceedings for the writ would not be, strictly speaking, against any previous decision. There is thus little doubt that these proceedings are original proceedings with regard to the parties concerned as also with regard to the dispute involved. In the matter of these writs, therefore, the jurisdiction that is exercised is original jurisdiction. There is thus little doubt that these proceedings are original proceedings with regard to the parties concerned as also with regard to the dispute involved. In the matter of these writs, therefore, the jurisdiction that is exercised is original jurisdiction. Article 226 of the Constitution, so far as it is relevant for our present purpose, enacts that "every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of......mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them ...." The power thus conferred is, in its nature, essentially similar to the power of issuing the high prerogative writs. Indeed, in describing the power, so conferred, the Article expressly mentions writs in the nature of the high prerogative writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus etc. as part of its subject-matter. Clearly, therefore, proceedings under this Article, so far at least as writs in the nature of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus etc., are concerned, would involve exercise of the original civil jurisdiction of this Court as in the case of the corresponding high prerogative writs and Bose, J., in dealing with the respondents' application was exercising such original civil jurisdiction. It may be that the jurisdiction, so exercised, would not be "Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction" within the meaning of the Letters Patent (Vide Hamid Hassan's case ((1947) 51 C.W.N. 716 (P.C.) at p. 722)) but it may safely be said that it is original civil jurisdiction of this Court : (Vide in this connection Ramayya v. The State of Madras ((1952) A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 300 at p. 303)). Once this conclusion is reached, it is clear that the "judgment" of Bose, J., does not fall within any of the excepted or excluded categories of jurisdictions, mentioned in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, and would thus be appealable thereunder if the other conditions are satisfied. One of the writs, invoked and granted in this case, is a writ in the nature of certiorari and the Notification demanding sales tax from the respondent company has been cancelled in exercise of the power to issue such writ. One of the writs, invoked and granted in this case, is a writ in the nature of certiorari and the Notification demanding sales tax from the respondent company has been cancelled in exercise of the power to issue such writ. It may be said, therefore, that Bose, J., exercised in reality or in substance, a power of revision and thus acted in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court so that his judgment would fall within the exceptions mentioned in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and would not thus be appealable. To this possible contention there is a two-fold answer. In the first place, from what I have said above, it is quite clear that the exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution, alike the power to issue the high prerogative writs, would be exercise of original jurisdiction, and I do not feel impressed or convinced that the nature of this jurisdiction would be altered by the fact that the ultimate result of the exercise of that power would be of a revisional character. Original suits or proceedings as a result of which awards, orders or decrees are set aside or modified, are not unknown in law and, merely because the effect is revision or quashing of some order or proceeding of or before some inferior tribunal, the proceedings in this Court for appropriate writs do not lose their "original" nature or character. In my opinion, therefore, proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution remain original proceedings despite the fact that, in some instances, they may result in revision of orders or proceedings of or before some other authorities. The second answer to the above contention is to be found in the recent Madras case of Ramayya v. The State of Madras ((1952) A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 300), and in the earlier Bombay case reported in Raghunath Keshav Khadikar v. Poona Municipality ((1945) A.I.R. 1945 Bom. 7), which point out respectively at page 303 and pages 9 - 10 of their respective reports that the exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution or of issuing the high prerogative writs does not involve exercise of revisional jurisdiction within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 7), which point out respectively at page 303 and pages 9 - 10 of their respective reports that the exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution or of issuing the high prerogative writs does not involve exercise of revisional jurisdiction within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Those cases lay down inter alia that the separate mention of the power of superintendence in that clause well indicates that the revisional jurisdiction, there contemplated, is revisional jurisdiction, strictly so called, that is, under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, if I may add, revisional jurisdiction, expressly conferred as such, by other statutes or enactments. Viewed either way the judgment of Bose, J., would remain outside the excluded categories in Clause 15 and would thus be appealable thereunder if the other conditions are satisfied, and this view is well supported by the decisions, cited above. The remaining matter under this head involves consideration of the larger question as to whether in exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court acts as a Special Court or Tribunal or as a Court or Tribunal of special jurisdiction to whose decisions the ordinary incidents of the rules and procedure of the High Court, including the general right of appeal from its decisions, would not attach. The question involved is undoubtedly one of extreme difficulty but it seems to me that, on principle and authority, it should be answered in the negative. A matter comes to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution when a legal right is in dispute and the High Court becomes seised of such dispute as one of the ordinary courts of this country. Clearly, therefore, from its decision an appeal would lie in the ordinary way : (Vide Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar ((1943) L.R. 74 I.A. 264; 52 C.W.N. 275 (P.C.)). It is true that there is no express provision conferring specifically a right of appeal from decisions under Article 226 of the Constitution but it is also equally true that, if what I have stated in the preceding part of this paragraph be correct, there would attach to such decisions the right of appeal provided in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, and from them an appeal would lie if the conditions of appealability, therein contained, be satisfied. It seems to me, further, upon an analysis of the real position, that the exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution so far at least as writs in the nature of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus etc. are concerned, does not involve exercise of any special jurisdiction. It is in essence an enlargement of the original jurisdiction - or to be more precise the ordinary original jurisdiction or, still more precisely the ordinary original civil jurisdiction - of this Court - and here it must be remembered that ever since its establishment this Court possessed as part of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction the power to issue some at least of the high prerogative writs : (Vide the decision of the Judicial Committee in Hamid Hassan Nomani's case ((1947) 51 C.W.N. 716 (P.C.)) cited above) - either by addition of new subjects and/or subject-matters and/or by extension of its territorial limits. Such enlargement of the original jurisdiction of this Court is permissible under the Letters Patent (Vide Clause 44) and no legitimate objection can possibly be raised when it is done by the Constitution as the Letters Patent continue after the Constitution by reason of Articles 225 and 372 thereof and these two Articles expressly make such continuance subject to the provisions of the Constitution. The case is thus sufficiently brought well within the protective ambit of the decisions in the cases of National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. His Majesty's Post Master General ([1913] A.C. 546) and Hem Singh v. Besant Das ((1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 180), and the recent case, reported in Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekara Thevar ((1943) L.R. 74 I.A. 264; 52 C.W.N. 275 (P.C.)), and cited above - to name only a few of the numerous decisions holding the same view - and the incident of appealability under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is attracted to it as one of the ordinary incidents of proceedings in this Court. The two cases of this Court, reported in Dhirendra Kumar Mozumdar v. A. Latif ((1941) 45 C.W.N. 181) and Nur Mohammed v. S. M. Solaiman ((1945) 49 C.W.N. 10) are distinguishable from the present case and cases under Article 226 of the Constitution, as they arose under a different enactment viz., the Calcutta Municipal Act, and involved different considerations. The two cases of this Court, reported in Dhirendra Kumar Mozumdar v. A. Latif ((1941) 45 C.W.N. 181) and Nur Mohammed v. S. M. Solaiman ((1945) 49 C.W.N. 10) are distinguishable from the present case and cases under Article 226 of the Constitution, as they arose under a different enactment viz., the Calcutta Municipal Act, and involved different considerations. If, however, the above distinction be not sufficient, I would, with respect, differ from the said decisions in view of the later pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in the case of Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar ((1943) L.R. 74 I.A. 264) on this branch of the law. In the result, therefore, I agree in overruling the respondents' preliminary objection to the maintainability of the present appeal. Proceeding now to the merits of the appeal it seems to me that this appeal ought to succeed. I give below my reasons for the view. The respondents claim that the sales in question are exempt from sales tax by reason of Section 5(2)(a)(iii) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (Bengal Act VI of 1941). The material portion of this section runs as follows :- ".......(the) expression 'taxable turnover' means that part of a dealer's gross turnover during any period which remains after deducting therefrom.................................. (iii) Sales to the Indian Stores Department, the Supply Department of the Government of India, and any railway or water transport administration", thus virtually exempting the sales, therein mentioned, from sales tax which, under the Act, is payable on the dealer's "taxable turnover" [Vide Section 4(1), 4(5) and 5(1)]. Clearly, therefore, to avail the benefit of this provision the respondents must establish that the sales in question were made to the Supply Department of the Government of India. The sales were made between August and November, 1948, and at that time there was admittedly no Supply Department of the Government of India. But, contends the respondent's learned counsel, the sales were made to the Ministry of Industry and Supply which had taken over the powers and functions of the old Supply Department of the Government of India and made the disputed purchases from the respondent company in the exercise of such powers and in the discharge of such functions. It has, accordingly, been submitted that the said sales are protected under the statutory provision, quoted above, and so exempt from sales tax. It has, accordingly, been submitted that the said sales are protected under the statutory provision, quoted above, and so exempt from sales tax. The argument is no doubt attractive but is hardly bears scrutiny. On the materials before us it is quite clear that the Supply Department of the Government of India came into existence in September, 1939, and continued to function as such till 6th January, 1946. There was also, at or about the same time, another department of the Government of India, known as the Department of Industries and Civil Supplies. On and from 7th January, 1946, a new department under the comprehensive designation of Department of Industries and Supplies was created in place of the above two departments and in this new department was also incorporated the pre-war Indian Stores Department which, during the war, had been brought under the Supply Department, or, as it was also called, the Department of Supply, of the Government of India. This new department took over inter alia some of the powers and functions of the old Supply Department, e.g., its powers and functions in the matter of procurement of stores, and this state of things continued till about the end of August, 1947, when there was a redistribution of the "existing Secretariat Departments" under which the Department of Industries and Supplies came to be known as the "Ministry of Industry and Supply" and continued to exercise the powers and perform or discharge the functions of the old Department of Industries and Supplies, including, inter alia, some of the powers and functions of the pre-existing Supply Department, as stated above. At the relevant time, therefore, namely, between August and November, 1948, when the sales, with which we are concerned, took place, the position was that there was no Supply Department of the Government of India but there was the bigger department known as the "Ministry of Industry and Supply," which was performing, amongst others, some of the functions of the old Supply Department and the question arises whether this new department, namely, "Ministry of Industry and Supply" was entitled, on the dates of the respective sales, namely, between August and November, 1948, to get the benefit to Section 5(2)(a)(iii) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act. In my opinion, the question posed has to be answered in the negative. In my opinion, the question posed has to be answered in the negative. If we examine the language used in the statute, it becomes pretty clear that the exemption was available to "sales to the Indian Stores Department, the Supply Department of the Government of India and any railway or water transport administration." The difference in the description of the intended beneficiaries is striking and sufficiently suggestive and the contrast in the expressions used is marked and its significance can hardly be ignored or overlooked. This view receives ample corroboration when we turn to the next clause, viz., Section 5(2)(a)(iv) of the Act where again the intended beneficiary is described in general terms, namely, "any undertaking supplying electrical energy to the public under a licence or sanction" etc., and, therefore, in interpreting Section 5(2)(a)(iii) of the Act this aspect will have to be carefully borne in mind. In the case of sales to the Indian Stores Department or the Supply Department of the Government of India the exemption is, on the words of the statute, limited to sales to the said two departments of the Government or India, specifically named, that is, to the said two departments qua such departments, and does not extend to all sales to the Government of India or, for the matter of that, to sales to its other departments. In the case of railway and water transport administrations the exemption extends to all sales to the respective administrations whichever department thereof makes the purchases. It seems to me, therefore that under the Statute in question, a sale to the Supply Department of the Government of India quo such department would be protected and similarly also a sale to the Indian Stores Department of the Government of India qua such department, but not a sale to any other department of the Government of India, even though such sale be for purposes of the said Supply Department or Indian Stores Department or for purposes for which these latter departments were authorised or intended to make purchases. It may be that a mere re-designation of the department would not be sufficient to cause deprivation of the benefit of the statutory exemption but when the department is abolished and its functions or, as in the present case, some of its functions, along with functions of other departments, are taken over by a bigger department or when the particular department is amalgamated with other departments and formed into a bigger department or when it merges into another department, it would not, in my opinion, be a case of mere re-designation or change of name, and so the exemption would no longer remain available. The disputed sales in the present case were not sales to the Supply Department of the Government of India to which the exemption attached under the statute but were sales to the "Ministry of Industry of Supply" which as a re-designation of the former Department of Industries and Supplies was really the bigger department, formed on amalgamation of the pre-existing Supply Department and Industries and Civil Supplies Department etc. of the Government of India, and, thus, in the light of what I have said above, the disputed sales would not be entitled to protection. This appeal, therefore, ought to succeed on the merits too. It is true the statute in question, being a taxing or fiscal statute, should be strictly construed against the taxing authority but it seems to me that the construction which I have put above on the relevant statutory provision is the only possible and reasonable construction in the true context of things and does not offend against that rule of strict construction. In the circumstances, the appellants' claim ought to prevail. I agree, therefore, that this appeal should be allowed with costs. Appeal allowed.