Judgment :- 1. This revision comes before a Division Bench having been referred by one of us on account of the practice prevalent in the Travancore area of permitting, what is called, anticipatory resistance or obstruction which was given effect to as cursus curiae in 1951 (6) D.L.R. Travancore-Cochin 434 which decision reserved the question of the applicability of that practice to proceedings started after the Indian Code of Civil Procedure was extended to this State on 1st April 1952. 2. The suit out of which these proceedings arise was between two Christian brothers. Recovery of a slice of immovable property with the building thereon was the relief sought for and granted. The basis of the action was trespass by the defendant. The case was fought in three courts and ultimately the plaintiff succeeded. Before execution was applied for, the defendant's son approached the trial court with a petition stating that a part of the site and a building thereon were given to him by his father under an arrangement some years after the litigation started and that bit of property and building are not liable to be surrendered in execution of the decree. The decree-holder opposed this application. The court below found against the petitioner and held that he was not in possession as alleged. It also held that in law the application was not maintainable. Hence this revision. 3. The question of fact cannot be and has not been canvassed before us. The question of law alone was presented before us. We say "presented before us" with a purpose because learned counsel for the petitioner did not canvass the correctness of the opinion of the court below. Indeed he was supporting that view as it suited his purpose because, if the court below had jurisdiction to entertain the application and determine it, the finding recorded by it on the question of fact would affect him. Learned counsel for the respondent also supports the opinion held by the court below. Thus an interesting situation of counsel, on both sides agreeing that particular view is the correct view to be taken has arisen and the court called upon not to choose between conflicting views urged by the contending parties but to consider whether the view that they conjointly contend for is correct. 4. Thus an interesting situation of counsel, on both sides agreeing that particular view is the correct view to be taken has arisen and the court called upon not to choose between conflicting views urged by the contending parties but to consider whether the view that they conjointly contend for is correct. 4. S.74 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that: "Where the court is satisfied that the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or that the purchaser of immovable property sold in execution of a decree has been resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession of the property by the judgment-debtor or some person on his behalf and that such resistance or obstruction was without any just cause, the court may, at the instance of the decree-holder or purchaser, order the judgement-debtor or such other person to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days and may further direct that the decree-holder or purchaser be put into possession of the property." In O. XXI, under the heading "sale of immovable property", the last two rules are Rr. 95 and 96. 95 and 96. R. 95 provides that: "Where the immovable property sold is in the occupancy of the judgment-debtor or of some person claiming under a title created by the judgment-debtor subsequently to the attachment of such property and a certificate in respect thereof has been granted under R. 94, the court shall, on the application of the purchaser, order delivery to be made by putting such purchaser or any person whom he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf in possession of the property, and, if need be, by removing any person who refuses to vacate the same." R. 96 enacts that: "Where the property sold is in the occupancy of a tenant or other person entitled to occupy the same and a certificate in respect thereof has been granted under R. 94, the court shall on the application of the purchaser, order delivery to be made by affixing a copy of the certificate of sale in some conspicuous place on the property, and proclaiming to the occupant by beat of drum or other customary mode, at some convenient place, that the interest of the judgment-debtor has been transferred to the purchaser." The next heading in O. XXI is "Resistance to delivery of possession to decree-holder or purchaser" and consists of Rr. 97 to 105. R. 97 provides that: "97 [1]. Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. [2]. The court shall fix a day for investigating the matter and shall summon the party against whom the application is made to appear and answer the same." R. 98 is as follows: "Where the court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession the court may also, at the instance of the applicant order the judgment-debtor or any person acting at his instigation to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days". The next R. 99 provides that: "Where the court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned by any person (other than those mentioned in R. 98) claiming in good faith to be in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor, the court shall make an order dismissing the application". Rr. 100 and 101 refer to applications by persons dispossessed and provide as follows: "100. (1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the court complaining of such dispossession. (2) The court shall fix a day for investigating the matter and shall summon the party against whom the application is made to appear and answer the same". "101. Where the court is satisfied that the applicant was in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property." R. 102 is to the effect that: "Nothing in Rr. 99 and 101 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person". R. 103 provides for a suit by a party not being a judgment-debtor against whom an order is made under R. 98, R. 99 or R. 101 to establish the right which he claims to the present possession of the property, or to cancel the order if any, for compensation, but subject to the result of such suit (if any), the order shall be conclusive. Art. 11-A of the Limitation Act fixes a period of one year from the date of the order as the period of limitation for such a suit and Art. 167 prescribes thirty days from the date of resistance or obstruction for an application complaining of resistance or obstruction to delivery of immovable property decreed or sold in execution of a decree. 5. 5. The aforesaid provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, are intended to invest the court with jurisdiction to enquire into particular matters at the instance of particular persons to ensure speedy disposal of the questions arising in execution. The proceedings contemplated in the said rules must, as the rules themselves provide, be initiated by specified persons, that is to say the decree-holder, the purchaser in court auction, or the stranger who is dispossessed. This is the view taken from very early times. (See XIV Allahabad 1417, XII C.W.N. 115 and A.I.R. 1923 Lahore 145). In A.I.R. 1924 Allahabad 495 F.B., a note of dissent was struck by Mukerji, J., dessenting from the majority (Sulaiman and Kanhaiya Lal, JJ.,) who took the view that avoidance of tautology which is a recognised principle in construing statutes justified if it did not necessitate the interpretation of the word "resistance" differently from "obstruction". The meaning given for the word "resistance" in Murray's dictionary, renders it possible to construe that expression as meaning "an opposition other than physical"; obstruction is the appropriate expression to physical opposition. In that case there was an application by the decree-holder alleging apprehension of resistance to delivery of the properties decreed, by the sons of the judgment-debtors who were made parties to the application. They appeared and set up their own rights to title and possession which were claimed to be free from the operation of the decree to which they were not parties. They succeeded. The decree-holder filed a suit for possession against them but that was beyond an year from the date of the order. The question was whether Art. 11-A of the Limitation Act was a bar to the entertainment of the action. They succeeded. The decree-holder filed a suit for possession against them but that was beyond an year from the date of the order. The question was whether Art. 11-A of the Limitation Act was a bar to the entertainment of the action. The majority view was that the application made by the decree-holder was one under R. 95 which did not contemplate an investigation, the order one which would attract the application of the one year's period provided in Art. 11-A. The dissenting judge was of the view that the enquiry that was made must be taken to have been made under the rule that permitted it which is R. 97 and as under that rule a decree-holder is entitled to complain of resistance or obstruction, an application by him apprehending resistance or obstruction which proves to be true as the sons of the judgment-debtors appeared and set up their claim for title and possession against the decree, Art. 11-A applied. This dissenting judgment was relied upon by the erstwhile Travancore High Court in Kesavan Kesavan Namboori v. Avira Skaria (XXI T.L.J. 173) and applied to facts materially different from those of the one in which the said dissenting judgment was given. In Kesavan Namboori's case there was an application for delivery of the property purchased by the decree-holder in court auction. Orders were passed for delivery of possession and a warrant for delivery was issued. Before the time fixed for return of the warrant, the judgment-debtor's son appeared with a petition and objected to the delivery, whereupon the warrant for delivery was recalled. The decree-holder purchaser preferred objections to the "blocking petition presented by the defendant's son". These proceedings were treated as coming under S. 40 of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure (corresponding to S. 47 of the Indian Code). At the end of the enquiry wherein a mass of evidence was adduced by the parties the learned Munsiff found that the petition was not maintainable as the applicant was not a party to the decree and dismissed the application on that ground. An appeal was preferred before the erstwhile Travancore High Court against that decision. In that Court the maintainability of the appeal was questioned. The objection was upheld by the court and the appeal was converted into a revision at the request of the appellant and in that revision the sustainability of the order was canvassed. An appeal was preferred before the erstwhile Travancore High Court against that decision. In that Court the maintainability of the appeal was questioned. The objection was upheld by the court and the appeal was converted into a revision at the request of the appellant and in that revision the sustainability of the order was canvassed. After referring to the aforesaid decision of the Allahabad High Court, the learned judges say: "No doubt the enquiry under 0. 21, R. 94 has to start on the complaint of the auction-purchaser. In the present case there is such a complaint. For, the objection petition by the purchaser to the ante-delivery petition of the appellant is such a complaint. Viewing the dispute in that light, we are of opinion that the dismissal of the applicant's petition without any decision is unsustainable". This decision which was rendered in 1931 was the origin of the practice in the Travancore area of presenting what the learned judges termed "ante-delivery petitions" by strangers to proceedings. The practice having persisted, had to be and was given effect to by this court in 1951 (6) D.L.R. Travancore-Cochin 434 as already stated. 6. Except the dissenting judgment of Mukerji, J., and the decision of a single judge in A.I.R. 1925 Rangoon 374, there is no support for the view that a stranger is entitled to approach the court for adjudication of his title to or possession of property before the property is either attempted to be taken out of him and on his obstruction the person entitled to possession seeks to obtain delivery after removal of the obstruction, or before he is dispossessed and he complains of dispossession and seeks restoration. The question has arisen in almost all the courts in India and they are uniform in their view against the maintainability of an application by a stranger before his dispossession. Reference may be made to: 1. Sobha Ram v. Tursi Ram (I.L.R. 46 Allahabad 693); 2. Kiron Shoshi Dassee v. The Official Assignee of Calcutta (I.L.R. 60 Calcutta 8); 3. Hargolal v. Chendu Lal (A.I.R.1923 Lahore 145); 4. M.T. Talia Bibi v. Nur Din (A.I.R.1928 Lahore 672); 5. Milkhi Ram v. Basant Singh (A.I.R.1931 Lahore 686); 6. Daroga Prasad v. Bhagwati Prasad (A.I.R.1935 Patna 253); 7. Lonan v. Lekshmi (V Cochin Law Journal 432); and 8. Nityananda v. Pala Dei (A.I.R.1952 Orissa 120 F.B.). Hargolal v. Chendu Lal (A.I.R.1923 Lahore 145); 4. M.T. Talia Bibi v. Nur Din (A.I.R.1928 Lahore 672); 5. Milkhi Ram v. Basant Singh (A.I.R.1931 Lahore 686); 6. Daroga Prasad v. Bhagwati Prasad (A.I.R.1935 Patna 253); 7. Lonan v. Lekshmi (V Cochin Law Journal 432); and 8. Nityananda v. Pala Dei (A.I.R.1952 Orissa 120 F.B.). In the Cochin case the obstructor who succeeded at the enquiry conducted upon his "ante-delivery petition" by the court below contended that the opposite party having acquiesced in the enquiry conducted by that court is estopped from questioning its competency. In repelling this contention the learned judges say at page 435: "A plea of estoppel cannot be allowed to defeat the provision of a statutory enactment which affects the jurisdiction of a court, as a party cannot by his admission or his conduct, confer jurisdiction where none exists. Where no jurisdiction exists neither the consent not the acquiescence of parties can invest the court with any authority so as to convert the proceedings before it into a proper judicial process. If the court has no authority in law to hear and decide a matter, its decision is one made without jurisdiction and the judgment of a court without jurisdiction is a nullity." 7. In our judgment, therefore, the court below had no jurisdiction to entertain the application presented by the petitioner before he was dispossessed and the view taken by that court is correct. The decision in Kesavan Namboodiri's case is not sound being contrary to the positive provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and cannot, therefore, be followed. 8. The revision petition should, therefore, be dismissed with costs.