Judgment :- 1. Plaintiffs 1 to 4 are the appellants. At the time of the institution of the suit, plaintiffs 1 to 3 were minors represented by their mother the 4th plaintiff. The 1st defendant is the father of plaintiffs 1 to 3 and the husband of the 4th plaintiff. They are governed by the Hindu Mitakshara Law. They are members of an undivided Hindu family of which the 1st defendant was the manager. The properties described in A schedule were said to belong to the family. The B schedule consists of properties said to have been acquired by the 1st defendant with the income from the ancestral properties. The 1st defendant was stated to have assumed the management of the family affairs in 1089 when the family had immovable properties to the value of Rs. 20,000/- moveables and ornaments estimated to the value of Rs.10,000/-, besides a ready cash of Rs.2000/-. The net income from the family properties then was Rs. 2000 a year. The 1st defendant had also surrendered a mortgage right of the family on 3-10-1094 and received 14,000 fanams. The 1st defendant's father was alive in 1089 and, since the 1st defendant's management proved injurious to the family, there was an arrangement between the father and the son in 1094, as evidenced by Ex. A, by which some properties were given to the 1st defendant for management. After the death of the father, the 1st defendant secured possession of all the family properties, and by his reckless alienations, without consideration and family necessity, disposed of most of the plaint properties. Whatever considerations he had received were misused by him. The alienations effected by him are given in detail in the plaint, and they are evidenced by the documents Ex. E or XLVI to the 3rd defendant, Ex. R or X to the 19th defendant, Ex. B or II to the 2nd defendant, Ex. F or IV to the 4th defendant, Ex. I, and J or XXV to the 6th defendant, Ex. L or XXXIV to the 9th defendant, Ex K to the 7th defendant, Ex. P to the 16th defendant and Ex. Q to the 18th defendant. He had also executed Ex. VI hypothecation bond to defendants 11 and 12 for the future subscriptions of a chitty, and on his default to pay the same, they had obtained a decree in O.S.. P to the 16th defendant and Ex. Q to the 18th defendant. He had also executed Ex. VI hypothecation bond to defendants 11 and 12 for the future subscriptions of a chitty, and on his default to pay the same, they had obtained a decree in O.S.. 1432 of 1107 of the Addl. Munsiff's Court, Padmanabhapuram, and in execution, got several of the items sold and purchased by them and by a stranger the 17th defendant. The sale sannad to the 17th defendant is Ex. VIII, and the sale sannad to defendants 11 and 12 are Exts. XXVI and XXVII. Item 1 in B schedule was a mortgage acquisition with family funds, and this, the 1st defendant had released without receiving consideration by executing Ex. XVI. None of these alienations was supported by consideration and necessity binding on the family. The prayer of the plaintiffs was therefore to have all these documents set aside and to recover possession of such of the properties obtained possession of by the defendants. If all the properties could not be thus delivered over to them, they had also made a prayer that their shares in the family properties might be divided by metes and bounds and that they might be put in possession of the same with past and future mesne profits. The suit itself was filed in forma pauperis. 2. Defendants 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 21 to 27, 28, to 30, 37, 38 to 40 and 45 had entered appearance and contested the suit. Of the defendants, the 2nd defendant died and his legal representatives are defendants 21 to 27. The 3rd defendant became an insolvent and he is represented by defendants 35 and 36. The 7th defendant died and his legal representatives are defendants 31 to 38. Defendants 4 and 27 also died and they are represented by defendants 28 to 30. Defendants 37 to 45 were impleaded as they come in under the Official Receiver. The common contention of all these defendants was that the alienations were supported by consideration and family necessity; that the 1st defendant, by himself, was competent to effect these alienations, that the same were binding on the family, including the shares of the 1st defendant's sons, and that they were not liable to be set aside. The common contention of all these defendants was that the alienations were supported by consideration and family necessity; that the 1st defendant, by himself, was competent to effect these alienations, that the same were binding on the family, including the shares of the 1st defendant's sons, and that they were not liable to be set aside. The detailed contentions of each of these defendants will be considered when the alienations in respect of which they are interested are dealt with in the following paragraphs. 3. The court below found that A schedule items 1 to 29 and 32 to 35 were alone proved to be the ancestral properties, that items 1 to 5 in B schedule were acquired with the funds belonging to the family, that items 6 and 7 in B schedule which stand in the name of the 9th defendant, a brother-in-law of the 1st defendant, were not shown to have been acquired by the 1st defendant with his funds, that none of the alienations except Exts. K, P and Q is liable to be set aside, that since the properties covered by Exts. K, P and B schedule item 5 in Ex. Q were included in the sale sannad Exts. VIII and XXVI, the plaintiffs can get no relief regarding those properties, that by an order dated 11-6-1114 the suit had been dismissed as regards defendants 8,15 and 20 so that the plaintiffs can get no relief relating to A schedule items 13, and 21 to which they were entitled and that they can get delivery of possession of only A schedule items 3 included in Ex. Q sale deed. 4. It is seen that subsequent to the passing of the first decree by the lower court on 17-10-1118 (31st May 1943) the 18th defendant who had taken Ex. Q sale deed got the suit restored to file, so far as he was concerned, and another decree dismissing the suit as regards Ex. Q also was passed on 29-3-1122 corresponding to 15th November 1946. No appeal has been preferred against this latter decree, so that in effect, the plaintiffs' entire suit now stands dismissed. Q sale deed got the suit restored to file, so far as he was concerned, and another decree dismissing the suit as regards Ex. Q also was passed on 29-3-1122 corresponding to 15th November 1946. No appeal has been preferred against this latter decree, so that in effect, the plaintiffs' entire suit now stands dismissed. The plaintiffs were directed to pay the costs of the contesting defendants, (Advocate's fee one set) and the State had been allowed to realise the institution fee from the plaintiffs as a first charge on whatever rights they had over the plaint schedule properties. 5. The plaintiffs had in clause J (1) of paragraph 6 of the plaint stated that item 11 of A schedule had also been sold in court auction in execution of the decree in O.S. 1432 of 1107 obtained by defendants 11 and 12. They had also mentioned that the whole of A schedule item 25 whose extent is 23 cents had been sold in execution of the said decree. Defendants 11 and 12, in paragraph 11 of their written statement, had disclaimed any interest over item 11 of A schedule. They had also stated that they had obtained possession of only 10 cents out of the property within the boundaries given for A schedule item 25, This had not been noticed either by the learned Advocate appearing in the case or by the court below. The plaintiffs could therefore get a declaration of their right to A schedule item 11 and A schedule item 26 excluding the 10 cents claimed by defendants 11 and 12. Similarly, A schedule item 26 is not mentioned to be the subject of any alienation, and though the plaintiffs' learned Advocate had not referred to this in his argument, or the learned judge of the Court below did not notice this, it has to be mentioned that the plaintiffs are entitled to a similar declaration as regards A schedule item 26 also. 6. Before considering the several alienations in detail, it is only proper that the principle that would govern the alienations made by the manager of a Hindu family, particularly when he is the father, are to be briefly indicated. 6. Before considering the several alienations in detail, it is only proper that the principle that would govern the alienations made by the manager of a Hindu family, particularly when he is the father, are to be briefly indicated. The leading case on the subject of alienation by a manager of a Hindu family is Brij Narain Bai v. Mangala Prasad (51 I.A. 129 = A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 50) It considered the previous decisions on the subject and laid down the following principles: "[1] The managing member of a joint undivided estate cannot alienate or burden the estate qua manager except for purposes of necessity. [2] If he is the father, and the other members are the sons he may, by incurring debt, so long as it is not for an immoral purpose, lay the estate open to be taken in execution proceedings upon a decree for payment of that debt. [3] If he purports to burden the estate by mortgage, then unless that mortgage is to discharge an antecedent debt, it would not bind the estate. [4] Antecedent debt means antecedent in fact as well as in time, that is to say, that the debt must be truly independent of, and not part of, the transaction impeached. [5] There is no rule that this result is affected by the question whether the father who contracted the debt or burdened the estate, is alive or dead." (Vide principles of Hindu Law by D. F. Mulla, Eleventh Edn. p. 386). 7. In Sahu Narain v. Sri Kishen Das (63 I.A. 384 = A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 277) the right of the father to sell or mortgage the joint family property therein to discharge a debt contracted by him for his own personal benefit was stressed, and such alienation binds the sons provided (a) the debt was antecedent to the alienation and (b) it was not incurred for an immoral purpose. In order that the debt must be antecedent, it is not necessary that the prior and subsequent creditors should be different persons. All that is necessary is that the two transactions must be dissociated in time as well as in fact. (Vide Ramkaran Thakur v. Baldev Thakur A.I.R. 1938 Patna 44 and Bharatpur State v. Srikishen Das I.L.R. 58 All. 804 - F.B.) 8. All that is necessary is that the two transactions must be dissociated in time as well as in fact. (Vide Ramkaran Thakur v. Baldev Thakur A.I.R. 1938 Patna 44 and Bharatpur State v. Srikishen Das I.L.R. 58 All. 804 - F.B.) 8. Where the sons are joint with their father and debts have been contracted by the father for his own personal benefit, the sons are liable to pay the debts provided they were not incurred for an illegal or immoral purpose. This liability of the sons arises from an obligation of religion and piety which is placed upon the sons under the Mithakshara Law to discharge the father's debts when the debts are not tainted with immorality. (Vide page 359 of Principles of Hindu Law by Mulla-11th Edn.). The learned author, after analysing the decided cases, has stated at page 360, that this liability of the sons exists whether the father be alive or dead. Thus, in the application of the doctrine of pious obligation, the question of raising money to discharge an antecedent debt does not at all arise for consideration. That was the view expressed by a Bench of five judges of the Travancore High Court in Neelakanda Nadar v. Peerumuhammad (1945 T.L.R. 1). It was laid down there that the Sanskrit term "Rina" which lays down the pious obligation rule ought not to be understood as confined in its meaning to the word "debt" according to its English common law acceptation, that it includes every conceivable form of liability of the father, provided it is not tainted with immorality, that a mortgage executed by the father 13 binding upon the sons as a secured debt of the joint family property by virtue of the doctrine of pious obligation even though the mortgage is for a cash consideration and not for an antecedent debt and that the sons cannot displace the mortgage except on proof of immorality or illegality of purpose. This was exactly the principle laid down by a Full Bench of the Cochin Chief Court in Anantha Vadhyar v. Popet Lal Moolji Sait (22 Cochin 633). This latter decision had been followed by a later Full Bench of the Cochin High Court in Viswanatha Iyer v. Lakshmi Ammal (1123) 39 Cochin 530). 9. This was exactly the principle laid down by a Full Bench of the Cochin Chief Court in Anantha Vadhyar v. Popet Lal Moolji Sait (22 Cochin 633). This latter decision had been followed by a later Full Bench of the Cochin High Court in Viswanatha Iyer v. Lakshmi Ammal (1123) 39 Cochin 530). 9. In all such cases the alienee's responsibility lies in proving the passing of consideration, and then the debt will be treated as one binding on the joint family properties of the alien or (father) and his sons. But if the creditor had obtained a decree on that debt, and had sold the properties in execution, then it was held in Venkiteswara Iyer v. Chidambara Iyer (18 T.L.J. 490 F.B.) that the sons could not succeed to avoid the sale unless they showed that the debt was either fictitious or incurred for immoral purposes. This decision has also laid down the principle that even if the mortgage of ancestral property executed by the father is not for discharging an antecedent debt, it will be binding on the property provided the debt is not immoral. This was the purport of another earlier Full Bench decision in Sivajanam Pillai Arumughom Pillai v. Sivajanam Pillai Sivasubramonia Pillai (23 T.L.R. 8). Both these decisions on this latter point were overruled by a later Full Bench in Sankara Chintamani v. Azhakappa Iyer (22 T.L.J. 71), The correctness of this latter decision was examined in 1946 T.L.R. 1, and it was held, that the decisions in 23 T.L.R. 8 and 18 T.L.J. 490 lay down the law correctly and that 22 T.L.J. 71 had to be overruled. An earlier decision in Devanayagom Pillai v. Ratnasikamoni Nadar (1944 T.L.R. 427) dealt with a case where ancestral property had been sold in execution of a money decree obtained against the father. The debt had not been incurred to discharge any antecedent debt. It was held in a suit for partition by the sons, that they were bound by the pious obligation under the Hindu Law to discharge the father's debts and that they could not recover possession of their share of the properties sold, except on proof that the decree-debt was vitiated by illegality or immorality. It was held in a suit for partition by the sons, that they were bound by the pious obligation under the Hindu Law to discharge the father's debts and that they could not recover possession of their share of the properties sold, except on proof that the decree-debt was vitiated by illegality or immorality. Thus, the initial burden in such cases is on the sons to show that the debt, to realise which the creditor had obtained the decree and sold the ancestral property in execution, was fictitious or tainted with illegality or immorality. 10. Bearing these rules in mind each of the documents impeached will now be considered. The first document about which very lengthy arguments were advanced is Ex. E or XLVI. It is a sale deed executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 3rd defendant for a total consideration of 28,000 fanams. The extent of the property is 6 acres and 34 cents, of which nearly 11/2 acres had been converted into paddy land, at the time of the sale on 8-2-1097. Ex. E or XLVI consisted of seven recitals. The first recital is a sum of 14,000 fanams received for taking the mortgage of item 1 in B schedule. The plaintiff's case was that item 1 of B schedule was acquired by the 1st defendant with the surplus income available in the family. There is absolutely no proof for this case of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had no case that B schedule item 1 was not sufficient security for 14,000 fanams advanced. They had also no case that the acquisition was not beneficial to the family. This property was in the possession of the family till 31-10-1109 when the 1st defendant had executed a release of this to the 13th defendant who had taken a sale deed for this and other properties from the 14th defendant. The evidence in the case was that the income from this property was Rs.140 a year. Dw.18 had spoken to the same. The plot covered by Ex. E sale deed was S. No. 4353 of Eraniel Pakuthy, with an area of 6 acres and 34 cents. One of the feeding channels of the Kothayar Project was running through this land. The land was rugged, and practically yielding no income, and was lying with a steep slope. Dw.18 had spoken to the same. The plot covered by Ex. E sale deed was S. No. 4353 of Eraniel Pakuthy, with an area of 6 acres and 34 cents. One of the feeding channels of the Kothayar Project was running through this land. The land was rugged, and practically yielding no income, and was lying with a steep slope. Necessarily therefore, a large amount had to be spent to level up the same and convert it into paddy land, so that it might fetch some appreciable income. At the time of the sale, only 11/2 acres of this property had been converted. But it had not been properly attended or well cultivated, so that according to some of the defendant's witnesses, the income from this plot was not more than 4 or 5 Kottas of paddy a year The commissioner sent from the lower court estimated the amount spent for converting the remaining area. He submitted Ext. LXXVII report with a plan Ex. LXXVI showing the lie of the property. According to him, a sum of not less than Rs. 3000/- had been spent by the 3rd defendant after he obtained possession of the property under Ex. E. It was not possible for the 1st defendant to command so much money in order to improve the property. Without such conversion into paddy land, for which the State itself had given the necessary facilities by extending the operation of the Kothayar Project to the Eraniel Taluk, the property would have been worthless. He therefore thought it proper to alienate the same to acquire some other property and to discharge the prior debts. We think that the acquisition of B schedule item 1 with a portion of Ex. E consideration was only in the interests of the family and so the passing of consideration mentioned in this recital is upheld. It may also be mentioned here that Ex. E property had been purchased in 1082 by the 1st defendant's father for 7000 fanams. Ext. LV is the sale Sannad for the same. That property was sold for Rs. 4000, and by this, property to the value of Rs. 2000/-had been acquired and some of the debts of the 1st defendant had also been cleared. The second recital in Ex. E was a sum of 3000/- fanams due to the vendee himself on account of a promissory note, of the previous year. That property was sold for Rs. 4000, and by this, property to the value of Rs. 2000/-had been acquired and some of the debts of the 1st defendant had also been cleared. The second recital in Ex. E was a sum of 3000/- fanams due to the vendee himself on account of a promissory note, of the previous year. Ex. XLVII is the promissory note. It is in the hand-writing of the 1st defendant. Dw. 19 is an attestor to it and he proves the same. Dw. 19 who had also attested Ex. E sale deed had sworn that this money had been borrowed for improving the properties. This item is also therefore proved. 11. The third item was a sum of 500 fanams on account of the last instalment in a chitty started by the 3rd defendant who had been examined in this case as Dw. 22. He swears to the passing of the consideration, and in the circumstances, he can be believed. The 4th item was 21371/2 Fs. paid to the 1st defendant on 27-12-1096 when Ex. XLVIII agreement for sale of this property was executed by him. That was an amount borrowed by the father, and if this amount was not utilised for any illegal or immoral purpose, the sons would be bound by that, as was pointed out in the decision in Neelakanda Nadar v. Peerumuhammad (1945 T.L.R. 1). The 6th recital is a sum of 3000 fanams due to one Vakil Sivasubramonia Pillai under a promissory note Ex. XLIX. Sivasubramonia Pillai received the amount and endorsed this fact on the back of the promissory note itself. That endorsement is Ex. XLV. Sivasumbramonia Pillai is now dead, and this endorsement is proved by his clerk who was examined as Dw. 21. The 1st defendant's father-in-law is an attestor to Ex. XLIV. Though he was examined as Dw. 4, he was not asked anything about this attestation. But there is considerable similarity between his signature taken in his deposition and the signature in Ex. XLIX. This is also a debt proved and binding on the plaintiffs. 12. The sixth recital is a sum of 5250 fanams reserved for payment to one Perumal Pillai to whom money was said to be due under a promissory note dated 25-8-1096. The third defendant paid that amount and took a registered receipt Ex. L. Dws. XLIX. This is also a debt proved and binding on the plaintiffs. 12. The sixth recital is a sum of 5250 fanams reserved for payment to one Perumal Pillai to whom money was said to be due under a promissory note dated 25-8-1096. The third defendant paid that amount and took a registered receipt Ex. L. Dws. 20 and 22 proved the said consideration. Dw. 22 stated that he did not keep the promissory note as he had obtained a registered receipt for the same. The registered receipt itself was taken within a month of the sale deed. The sixth item of consideration is also proved. The last recital is a cash payment of 1121/2 fanams Dw. 22 speaks to it, and in the circumstances he can be believed. Even if was not accounted for properly by the vendee after a long interval of time, that is not a sufficient ground for setting aside a sale; and the decision in Gouri Sankar v. Jiwan Singh (A.I.R.1927 P. C. 246) and Ram Sundar v. Lachhmi Narain (A.I.R.1929 P. C. 143) support this view. The primary questions in case of alienations are, whether the sale itself was justified by necessity, and whether the purchaser had acted honestly if the existence of a family necessity for the sale was made out, and whether the price was unreasonably low. In view of the circumstances mentioned above, it is held that Ex. E or XLVI is a valid sale binding on the plaintiffs and it is not liable to be set aside. 13. It would be convenient here to dispose of the release Ex. XVI executed by the 1st defendant for item 1 of B schedule. Under this release, the 1st defendant had received only 3500/- fanams. The property belonged to the 14th defendant and it had been mortgaged by him to Dw. 18. He took a release Ex. XXII on 18-6-1096 and then executed Ex. XIX mortgage to the 1st defendant. The consideration mentioned in Ex. XXII would show that it was a valuable property, so that Ex. XIX was a beneficial acquisition so far as the family was concerned. The 14th defendant sold the property to the 13th defendant under Ex. XV. It was mentioned there, that out of the mortgage amount of 14,000 fanams, the 1st defendant had already been paid 10,500 fanams and that the balance alone remained due. XIX was a beneficial acquisition so far as the family was concerned. The 14th defendant sold the property to the 13th defendant under Ex. XV. It was mentioned there, that out of the mortgage amount of 14,000 fanams, the 1st defendant had already been paid 10,500 fanams and that the balance alone remained due. The 13th defendant had, therefore, been directed to take a release on payment of 3500 fanams. The 1st defendant had hypothecated this mortgage right to the 5th defendant under Ex. XVIII for 7000 fanams. In the release Ex. XVI executed by the 1st defendant, the direction was that this sum of 3500 fanams was to be paid to the 5th defendant and a receipt taken from him. Accordingly, the said amount was paid and Ex. XVII receipt obtained. It is true that in Ex. XVI, the 1st defendant had stated that he had already received 10500/- fanams from the mortgagee. But there is absolutely no evidence to show that there was such payment. No receipt in support of the same had been produced. We were not referred to any evidence, not even a formal evidence to show that the 1st defendant had really received 10600 fanams. 14. The learned Advocates for the 13th defendant stated that the acknowledgment of the receipt of 10500 fanams in Ex. XVI was sufficient evidence as to the passing of consideration to that extent. When transactions affecting the corpus of the family properties are questioned by the minor members, the burden of proving consideration lies heavily on the party who takes advantage under that transaction. Relying on the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jugal Kishore Acharjya Chowdri (I.L.R. 44 Cal. 180 P.C.) it had been laid down in Esakkimadan Nadan v. Chellamma Nadachi (27 T.L.J. 44) that a recital in a deed or other instrument is in some cases evidence against the party who makes it; but it is no more evidence as against other persons than any other statement would be. The decision in Kishori Lal v. Bhawani Shankar (A.I.R.1940 P.C.145 at 147) also supports this. In the absence of any evidence as to the passing of consideration to the extent of 10500 fanams, we have to hold that the plaintiffs, as members of the family, are entitled to claim this charged on B schedule item 1. The decision in Kishori Lal v. Bhawani Shankar (A.I.R.1940 P.C.145 at 147) also supports this. In the absence of any evidence as to the passing of consideration to the extent of 10500 fanams, we have to hold that the plaintiffs, as members of the family, are entitled to claim this charged on B schedule item 1. They will also get four per cent interest thereon from the date of the suit till the date of the lower court decree. Thereafter the aggregate amount will carry future interest at four per cent. 15. The next alienation is Ex. R or X dated 28-4-1098. It is a mortgage deed executed by the 1st defendant to the 19th defendant for A schedule items 1, 2, 4, 6 to 8, 20, 28, 29, 32, 36 and 37, for a total consideration of 42,000 fanams. There are also two purakkadams, Ex. S or XII dated 13-1-1105 for 4000 fanams and Ex. U or XIII dated 29-5-1111 for 4650 fanams. The circumstances under which these Purakkadams were executed will be mentioned hereafter. The first recital in this mortgage deed is a sum of 10,500/- fanams reserved with the mortgagee for being paid when a mortgage of 1082 as regards. A schedule items 34 and 35 were redeemed. It was admitted by the 19th defendant in paragraph 13 of his written statement that this amount had not been paid. It was in lieu of the payment of this amount also that the 19th defendant was given the mortgage of the above properties. If the provision had been that the 19th defendant was to redeem the said mortgage of 1082 and enjoy those properties as security for the mortgage amount and interest thereon then the nonpayment of this amount would not have affected the 19th defendant's liability. The 19th defendant, by the payment of the said sum of 10,500 fanams for redeeming two items of properties not included in the mortgage does not get any additional advantage, so far as himself and the mortgage security are concerned. He has therefore to account for the benefit derived by retention of this amount. It is seen that the mortgaged properties were taken back by the 1st defendant on lease, and for that purpose, 1500 fanams which is the fourth recital in the document was given as premium. He has therefore to account for the benefit derived by retention of this amount. It is seen that the mortgaged properties were taken back by the 1st defendant on lease, and for that purpose, 1500 fanams which is the fourth recital in the document was given as premium. The rent must have been fixed with reference to the yield from the properties and the 19th defendant was receiving the full rent without paying the entire amount due under the mortgage. The rent has to be proportionately reduced. The Purakkadams Exts. XII and XIII were executed for arrears of rent due from the 1st defendant to the 19th defendant. The liability of the family for these amounts has to be reduced by 25 per cent, that is, in proportion that, the unpaid portion of the mortgage amount bears to the entire mortgage sum. It is also clear that for redeeming Ex. R or X the plaintiffs are entitled to get the mortgage amount reduced by 10,500 fanams. There was also the third recital of 9000 fanams to redeem Ex. B or II mortgage. 16. As regards A schedule items 32 and 33, it was admitted that this mortgage also had not been redeemed by the 19th defendant. But since the mortgagee was allowed possession of the properties covered by that document, the question of any proportionate abatement of rent would not arise. Since it is admitted that this sum of 9000 fanams had not also been paid by the 19th defendant, the plaintiffs are not liable for that sum as well. The second recital is a sum of 7000 fanams received for acquiring a property. It is seen that the 1st defendant's father-in-law had on the same day mortgaged some of his properties to the 1st defendant for Rs. 1000/-. Ex. XI is that mortgage. That mortgagor has admitted, as Dw. 4 that he had executed this document. But he stated that after some time this property had been sold for this debt. There is no record to show that the statement given by Dw. 4 is true, for his evidence would indicate that he has come to court to help the plaintiffs as far as possible. It was seen that Ex. XI property was an yielding one, and it was very near to the 1st defendant's house. There is no record to show that the statement given by Dw. 4 is true, for his evidence would indicate that he has come to court to help the plaintiffs as far as possible. It was seen that Ex. XI property was an yielding one, and it was very near to the 1st defendant's house. It cannot be said that this was a transaction not binding on the sons. 17. After executing the mortgage of the properties under Ex. R, the 1st defendant had taken back the properties on lease. There is no case that this lease had not taken effect or that the 1st defendant had not utilised the profits for the benefit of the family. For purpose of this lease, a sum of 1500 fanams was reserved with the mortgagee-lessor - as Marayam. Subsequently, when the rent fell in arrears this amount had been given credit to, so that the fourth recital is one binding on the family. The fifth recital is a sum of 1100 fanams received for the execution and registration expenses. It is binding on the family. The sixth recital is a sum of 7400 fanams received for discharging a promissory note debt Ex. XIV to the 14th defendant. In this promissory note the 1st defendant's father-in-law was an attestor. The amount was paid to the 14th defendant and a receipt Ex. XIV (a) was taken. This item of consideration is thus proved. The last item is a sum of 5500 fanams. This was paid before the Sub-Registrar and it had been utilised for the construction of a Pathayapura in the family. D. Ws. 8 and 11 speak to such construction. Thus Ext. R or X is supported by consideration to the extent of 22500 fanams and it is binding on the plaintiffs' family. 18. As regards Exts. XII and XIII it has been mentioned that the amounts covered by those documents have to be reduced by 25 per cent for the reasons already stated. Those two documents are also held to be binding on the family to the extent of three-fourths of the amounts covered by them. It is admitted, that in 1115, the properties were secured possession of by the mortgagee - the 19th defendant. As already shown, he is now in possession of the same for 22500 fanams. Those two documents are also held to be binding on the family to the extent of three-fourths of the amounts covered by them. It is admitted, that in 1115, the properties were secured possession of by the mortgagee - the 19th defendant. As already shown, he is now in possession of the same for 22500 fanams. He has to account for the interest on 10,500 fanams mentioned in the first recital in the mortgage deed. We direct him to pay four percent interest on this said sum from the date of the suit until this mortgage is redeemed. This sum will go to reduce the mortgage security. To the extent mentioned above Ext. R or X is upheld. 19. Ext. B or 11 dated 12-5-1096. This is a mortgage executed by the 1st defendant for A schedule items 32 and 33 on 12-5-1096. This is the earliest document executed by the 1st defendant. It was for 9000 fanams and this amount was received for converting A schedule items 12 to 16 and 24. These properties are described as dry lands in Ext A. It has already been mentioned that the conversion of dry land into paddy land is considered to be an act of good husbandry, and any amount borrowed for that purpose has to be upheld as binding on the family. Ext. E shows that, by Kanni 1097,11/2 acres of land had been converted. It is also seen that in 1097, the 1st defendant had borrowed money from the State as Agricultural loan. Ext C will show this. The 2nd defendant is dead and his legal representatives are defendants 21 to 27. The 24th defendant as D. W. 9 has spoken to the conversion of dry land into paddy land and also to the passing of consideration under that document. It is therefore clear beyond any doubt that Ext. B or II is one binding on the family and it is not liable to be set aside. 20. Ext VI dated 31-1-1106. It is a chitty security bond executed by the 1st defendant in favour of defendants 11 and 12 with respect to the A schedule items 5 to 10, 12,15,17,18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27,30 and 1 3/4 cents in 39 and B schedule items 4 and 5. It consists of four recitals. The first recital is a sum of Rs. It is a chitty security bond executed by the 1st defendant in favour of defendants 11 and 12 with respect to the A schedule items 5 to 10, 12,15,17,18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27,30 and 1 3/4 cents in 39 and B schedule items 4 and 5. It consists of four recitals. The first recital is a sum of Rs. 360 on account of the reduction made at the time of the bid. The third is a sum rs. 350/- due to the 11th defendant under a promissory note dated .15-2-1105 executed by the 1st defendant. The promissory note is Ext III and it is in the handwriting of the 1st defendant. The consideration for the same and for Ext. VI is spoken to by D. Ws. 5 and 7. The 12th defendant as D. W.14 also spoke to the same. It was the money really borrowed by the 1st defendant and so it is binding on the estate. The second item is Rs. 50/-allowed to be set off on account of the subscription for the third instalment. That was an amount due from the 1st defendant and the fourth recital is Rs. 240 paid in cash. D. W. 5 is an attestor to Ex. II and Dw. 7 an attestor to Ex. VI. Besides Dw.14 speaks to the consideration, and we believe them. Thus Ex. VI is supported by consideration and since it is not shown that the debt is tainted by illegality or immorality it is binding on the sons as well. The subscriptions in the chitty ware defaulted and defendants 11 and 12 had obtained a decree Ex. XXXI on the same. In execution of that decree some of these properties were sold and purchased by defendants 11,12 and 17. Ex. VIII is for A schedule items 9 and 27, Ex. 26 for A schedule items 5,10,12,14,15,17, 22, 23, 25, 30 and B schedule items 4 and 5. Ex. XXVII is for A schedule item 21. Exts. VIII and XXVI sales were held before the present suit was filed in Karkadakam 1111 by the plaintiffs. It is true that the confirmation of the sale was after the suit was filed. The execution sale evidenced by Ext. XXVII was after the suit. But all these sales were confirmed afterwards. Since Ex. VI is supported by consideration and Ex. VIII and XXVI sales were held before the present suit was filed in Karkadakam 1111 by the plaintiffs. It is true that the confirmation of the sale was after the suit was filed. The execution sale evidenced by Ext. XXVII was after the suit. But all these sales were confirmed afterwards. Since Ex. VI is supported by consideration and Ex. XXXI decree against the 1st defendant was for the amount due under Ex. VI, the sons could not impeach this document unless they show that the debt was fictitious or tained by illegality or immorality. Since the decree which was passed on 32-10-1108 is a valid one, the execution proceedings taken thereunder are not liable to be set aside as there is absolutely no evidence to show that the debt was tainted. The question of lis pendens, so far as Ex. XXVII sale is concerned, does not call for consideration. The decree and the execution proceedings are confirmed and it is held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to question the same. 21. Ex. F or IV dated 23-11-1101 is a sale deed executed by the 1st defendant to the 4th defendant for A schedule items 34 and 35 for 22,000 fanams. These properties were outstanding on an old mortgage of 1082 executed by the 1st defendant and his father, and so, 10,500 fanams had been given credit for redeeming that mortgage. This is the first recital in Ex. R or X to the 19th defendant and he had not redeemed it. The second recital is 3500/- fanams reserved with the vendee to pay the 19th defendant on account of arrears of Pattom of the properties taken by the 1st defendant on lease from the 19th defendant regarding Ex. X properties. This amount was paid to the 19th defendant " on 3-1-1102 and Ex. VII receipt taken by the vendee. Dw. 8 the Kariasthan of the 19th defendant family has spoken to the receipt of this amount. It is therefore binding on the plaintiffs. The third recital is a sum of 3500 fanams obtained by the 1st defendant to purchase a house site with a house thereon adjoining his own family house. A sale deed Ex. V was taken and the plaintiffs have no case that this acquisition was in any way prejudicial to their interest. It is also binding on the plaintiffs. The third recital is a sum of 3500 fanams obtained by the 1st defendant to purchase a house site with a house thereon adjoining his own family house. A sale deed Ex. V was taken and the plaintiffs have no case that this acquisition was in any way prejudicial to their interest. It is also binding on the plaintiffs. The last recital is a sum of 4500 fanams received for converting A schedule item 21 into paddy land. It is now a paddy land and Ex. A of 1094 shows that it was then only a dry land. It is therefore a recital that is binding on the plaintiffs. Hence Ex. F or IV is not liable to be set aside. 22. Ex. I dated 10-7-1103 and J or XXV dated 7-8-1111: The 1st defendant had executed a hypothecation bond Ex. I on 10-7-1103 for A schedule item 13, and B schedule items 2 and 3 for 3500 fanams in favour of the 6th defendant. The interest was not paid and so far the principal amount and interest, Ex. J or XXV mortgage with possession was executed. Dw. 2 is an attestor to Ex. I and the 6th defendant as Dw. 13 speaks to the consideration. Their evidence is accepted and it is found that Ex. I is supported by consideration. 23. Ex. L or XXXIV dated 22-4-1105. It is a mortgage for A schedule item 19 for 6000 fanams in favour of the 9th defendant. Defendants 1 and 9 have married sisters. There is no enmity between these two persons and the 9th defendant as Dw. 16 has spoken to the payment of consideration. The 9th defendant hypothecated this mortgage right to defendants 11 and 12 under Ex. XXXV on 16-3-1108. Then he executed a sub-mortgage to them and defendants 11 and 12 are now in possession under the sub-mortgage. Exs. XLII and XLIII are the tax receipts produced to show that the 9th defendant really obtained possession under Ex. L (50). The 19th defendant as Dw. 12 speaks to his possession and we do not see any ground to disbelieve defendants 9 and 12. It is held that this is a transaction binding on the plaintiffs. 24. Ex. K dated 10-8-1104. It is a sale deed for 16 cents out of 40 cents in A schedule item 22. The lower court had set aside the sale. 12 speaks to his possession and we do not see any ground to disbelieve defendants 9 and 12. It is held that this is a transaction binding on the plaintiffs. 24. Ex. K dated 10-8-1104. It is a sale deed for 16 cents out of 40 cents in A schedule item 22. The lower court had set aside the sale. But the plaintiffs were not allowed to recover possession of the same, as according to the learned Judge, Ex. K property was also included in Ex. XXVI sale certificate. This is not correct. The total extent of A schedule item 22 is 40 cents of which Ex. K is only for 16 cents. Ex. XXVI clearly shows that what was sold in execution of Ex. XXXI decree was only the remaining 24 cents and there is no justification in disallowing possession of these 16 cents to the plaintiffs. We allow the same. 25. Ex. P dated 27-9-1109: It is a mortgage for A schedule item 27 to the 16th defendant for 1000 fanams. This document is set aside by the lower court. But no relief was given to the plaintiffs as it was included in Ex. VIII sale certificate. Ex. VIII covers the whole of A schedule item 27. This mortgage itself was after Ex. XXXI decree which was passed giving a charge on this property also. The mortgage could not have therefore any effect so far as the auction-purchaser in that case was concerned. The direction of the lower court is therefore correct and the plaintiffs can get no relief regarding the same. 26. Ex. Q dated 27-6-1110, was a sale deed for A schedule items 3 and 5 to the 18th defendant. This sale was set aside by the first decree passed by the lower court. That decree was set aside so far as 18th defendant was concerned and the suit restored to file. Subsequently a decree dismissing the plaintiffs suit relating to Ex.Q was passed and there was no appeal against that. The plaintiffs cannot therefore get any relief so far as Ex. Q is concerned. Besides, it is seen that the fifth item is included in Ex. XXVI sale Sannad which we have upheld. In any event, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief regarding this transaction. 27. These exhaust the alienations impeached. The plaintiffs cannot therefore get any relief so far as Ex. Q is concerned. Besides, it is seen that the fifth item is included in Ex. XXVI sale Sannad which we have upheld. In any event, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief regarding this transaction. 27. These exhaust the alienations impeached. Our conclusion arrived at in the proceeding paragraphs requires the decree of the lower court to be modified in the following matters: I). The plaintiffs' right to A schedule items 11 and 26 and 13 cents in item 25, is declared. Since they are not shown to be in the possession of any of the defendants, no order for delivery of possession is necessary. II) The decree of the lower court setting aside Ex. K is confirmed and the plaintiffs are allowed to recover possession of the 16 cents in A schedule item 22 mentioned in Ex. K from the legal representatives of the 7th defendant. They are defendants 31 to 34. The plaintiffs will get mesne profits from the date of suit till they get delivery of possession of the same. There is no proper evidence as to the annual mesne profits and so it is directed that the same will be determined in execution. III) While confirming Ex. B or X to the extent of 22,500/ fanams, we reduce the amount covered by the Purakkadams Ex. S or XII and U or XIII by twenty five per cent. The 19th deft, is also made liable for interest on 10,500 fanams at four per cent from the date of the suit, as mentioned in paragraph 18 of this judgment. IV) The plaintiffs are allowed to realise 10,500 fanams with four per cent interest from the date of suit till date of the lower court decree and thereafter at four per cent interest on the aggregate decree amount from B schedule item 1. The appeal is allowed to the above extent. The plaintiffs will pay the costs of defendant 45, defendants 11 and 12,17, defendants 21 to 27, defendants 28 to 30 and defendants 6 and 9. Only one set of Advocate's fee is allowed. Advocate's fee will be calculated on the amounts in which these defendants are interested. The remaining defendants will bear their costs. Decree modified.