JUDGMENT : SHINDE, J. 1. These petitions have been filed under Art.226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a writ in the nature of Mandamus or alternatively for the issue of suitable directions and orders to restrain the opposite party from giving effect to, or acting in any manner by virtue of, Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act No.28 of 1951. Although several objections have been taken to the validity of the Act Mr. P.R. Das, learned counsel for some of the petitioners, has confined himself to two main contentions. His third contention that the impugned Act was passed by a Legislature not validly constituted, he has reserved for a possible appeal to the Supreme Court, as it has already been repelled by a Full Bench of this Court in - 'Shree Ram Dube v. The State', ILR (1952) Madh B 178 (A). His two main contentions are as follows : (1) there being no public purpose, the acquisition of Jagir lands is illegal; (2) some provisions of the impugned Act are ultra vires in so far as they constitute a fraud on the Constitution. 2. Mr. Das contends that unlike the Bihar and Uttar Pradesh Land Reforms Act, the impugned Act gives no indication as to the land-reforms which are proposed to be undertaken; Ss.19 and 20 of the impugned Act provide for land tenure but actually the position of the tenants is made worse under S.20 of the impugned Act and consequently it cannot be said to be a scheme for land-reforms. Mr. Chitale, the learned Advocate General, contends that the bill, which ultimately was passed into the impugned Act, was pending at the commencement of the Constitution and having been reserved for the consideration of the President has received his assent; consequently the inquiry as to whether there is any public purpose or not is barred by Art.31(4) of the Constitution. He further argues that the Supreme Court by majority held in the case of - 'The State of Bihar v. Kameshwarsingh. of Darbhanga', AIR 1952 SC 252 (B) that, inquiry into the question of public purpose is barred by Art.31(4) of the Constitution; and hence the question whether there was any public purpose for the acquisition of Jagir lands or not cannot be agitated in this Court. Mr. of Darbhanga', AIR 1952 SC 252 (B) that, inquiry into the question of public purpose is barred by Art.31(4) of the Constitution; and hence the question whether there was any public purpose for the acquisition of Jagir lands or not cannot be agitated in this Court. Mr. P.R. Das counters this argument by stating, that in the Bihar Case Mahajan, Mukherjea and Aiyar, JJ., held that public purpose is a justiciable issue even in a case covered by Article 31(4). Mahajan and Aiyar, JJ., clearly-stated in their judgments that Art.31(4) does not bar an inquiry as to the existence of a public purpose, for the acquisition of land. The opinion of Mukherjea, J., can be gathered from the following observations : "I had the advantage of going carefully through the judgment of my learned brother Mahajan J. and I concur entirely in the conclusions arrived at by him". (Vide AIR 1952 SC 252 , para.74 (B)." Another significant passage from which the opinion of his Lordship can be gathered is as follows : "As regards S.4(b) it has been held by my learned brother that the provision of this clause is unconstitutional as it does not disclose any public purpose at all. The requirement of public purpose is implicit in compulsory acquisition of property by the State or, what is called, the exercise of its power of 'Eminent Domain'. This condition is implied in the provisions of Art.31(2) of the Constitution and although the enactment in the present case fulfills the requirements of Cl.(3) of Article 31 and as such attracts the operation of Cl.(4) of that Article, my learned brother has taken the view that the bar created by Cl.(4) is confined to the question of compensation only and does not extend to the existence or necessity of a public purpose which, though implicit in, has not bean expressly provided for, by Cl.(2) of the Article. For my part I would be prepared to assume that Cl.(4) of Art.31 relates to every thing that is provided for in Cl.(2) either in express terms or even impliedly and consequently the question of the existence of a public purpose does not come within the purview of our enquiry in the present case. For my part I would be prepared to assume that Cl.(4) of Art.31 relates to every thing that is provided for in Cl.(2) either in express terms or even impliedly and consequently the question of the existence of a public purpose does not come within the purview of our enquiry in the present case. Even then I would hold that the same reasons, which have weighed with my learned brother in declaring S.23(f) of the impugned Act to be unconstitutional, apply with equal, if not greater, force to S.4(b) of the Act and I have no hesitation in agreeing with him as regards his decision on the constitutionality of this provision of the Act though I would prefer to adopt a different line of reasoning in support of the same" (Vide para.76)." The words 'For my part I would be prepared to assume' etc. and the words 'even then' in the following sentence are particularly significant. These words indicate that his Lordship did agree with Mahajan and Aiyar, JJ., in holding that the existence of public purpose is justiciable issue. Mukherjea, J., held that even on the ground of colourable legislation, S.4(b) was ultra vires. The inference that can be drawn, to my mind, is that according to his Lordship both on the ground of non-existence of public purpose and colourable legislation S.4(b) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act was ultra vires. In these circumstances the enquiry as to the existence of a public purpose is not barred by Art.31(4) of the Constitution. 3. It is no doubt true that the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act does not state any definite scheme of land reforms. The title of the Act, however, states that it is an Act to provide for the resumption of all jagir lands in the State and for certain other methods of land reforms in Jagir areas. Mr. Das admits that it is not necessary to specify public purpose and that it can be ascertained from the tenor and intendment of the Act. In - ' AIR 1952 SC 252 (B)', Mahajan, J., observed as follows : "It is a well accepted proposition of law that property of individuals cannot be appropriated by the State under the power of compulsory acquisition for the mere purpose of adding to the revenues of the State. In - ' AIR 1952 SC 252 (B)', Mahajan, J., observed as follows : "It is a well accepted proposition of law that property of individuals cannot be appropriated by the State under the power of compulsory acquisition for the mere purpose of adding to the revenues of the State. "The principle of compulsory acquisition of property", says Cooley "is founded on the superior claims of the whole community over the individual citizen but is applicable only in those cases where private property is wanted for public use, or demanded by the public welfare and that no instance is known in which it has been taken for the mere purpose of raising a revenue by sale or otherwise and the exercise of such a power is utterly destructive of individual right." (Vide para.54)." In the same case Mahajan, J., observed that the intention must be to benefit the community at large (para 52). From these observations, it is clear that the object of the Act must be to benefit the community at large. Jagir lands were taken in order to avoid concentration of large blocks of lands in a few hands and to follow the directive principle laid down in Art.39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. These directive principles are as follows : "The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing : (b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good; (c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment." 4. Evidently the object of this legislation is to distribute the ownership and the control of the material resources so as to subserve best the common good and to avoid concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. In the case of - 'State of Bihar v. Kameshwarsingh,' (B), Mahajan, J., made the following observations with regard to Bihar Land Reforms Act : "Now it is obvious that concentration of big blocks of land in the hands of a few individuals is contrary to the principle on which the Constitution of India is based. In the case of - 'State of Bihar v. Kameshwarsingh,' (B), Mahajan, J., made the following observations with regard to Bihar Land Reforms Act : "Now it is obvious that concentration of big blocks of land in the hands of a few individuals is contrary to the principle on which the Constitution of India is based. The purpose of the acquisition contemplated by the impugned Act therefore is to do away with the concentration of big blocks of land and means of production in the hands of a few individuals and to so distribute the ownership and control of the material resources which come in the hands of the State as to subserve the common good as best as possible. In other words, shortly put, the purpose behind the Act is to bring about a reform in the land distribution system of Bihar for the general benefit of the community as advised. The legislature is the best Judge of what is good for the community, by whose suffrage it comes into existence and it is not possible for this court to say that there was no public purpose behind the acquisition contemplated by the impugned Statute. The purpose of the statute certainly is in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Constitution of India" (Vide para 52). On the same subject Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J. :- made the following observations : "When the legislature declares that there is a public purpose behind the legislation, we have of course to respect its words. The object of the Act in question is to extinguish the interests of intermediaries like Zamindars, proprietors, and estate and tenure-holders etc., and to bring actual cultivators into direct relations with the State Government. To achieve this end several provisions have been enacted for the transfer and the vesting of such interests in the State as regards various items of properties. It is impossible to deny that the Act is inspired and dominated by a public purpose............ etc. (Vide para 129)." These observations apply with equal force to the present case. To achieve this end several provisions have been enacted for the transfer and the vesting of such interests in the State as regards various items of properties. It is impossible to deny that the Act is inspired and dominated by a public purpose............ etc. (Vide para 129)." These observations apply with equal force to the present case. Although the purpose of the Act is not specified, there is no doubt that it is inspired and dominated by a public purpose, it is obvious that the object of the Act is to extinguish the interests of the intermediary and to bring the actual cultivators into direct relations with the State Government and thereby to avoid concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. It cannot be denied, therefore, that there is a public purpose for the acquisition of Jagir lands. 5. This, however, does not mean that all the items proposed to be taken over by the impugned Act are for public purpose. As already stated the object of the Act is to do away with the concentration of large blocks of land in a few hands and to bring the actual cultivators into direct relations with the State Government. If this be the object of the Act, one fails to find the object behind the taking over of all buildings on Jagir lands used for schools, offices, hospitals and other purposes. They do not form part of the Jagir lands. Article 31A(2)(a) defines the expression "estate" as follows : "The expression 'estate' shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any jagir, Inam or Muafi or other similar grant." Section 2 of Kanoon Mal Gwalior Smt. 1983 defines the word "land". The definition clearly shows that the word "land" does not include buildings. The same Act also defines the expression "Khata" (holding). That definition also does not include buildings in the expression 'holding'. Dhar and Indore Tenancy Acts also define the expression 'holding'. Those definitions also do not cover buildings constructed on the lands. Qawaid-Jagirdaran which governs rights and obligations of Jagirdars in Gwalior State defines the expression 'Jagirdar'. The expression 'Jagirdar' includes twelve different kinds of grantees. That definition also does not include buildings in the expression 'holding'. Dhar and Indore Tenancy Acts also define the expression 'holding'. Those definitions also do not cover buildings constructed on the lands. Qawaid-Jagirdaran which governs rights and obligations of Jagirdars in Gwalior State defines the expression 'Jagirdar'. The expression 'Jagirdar' includes twelve different kinds of grantees. All these grantees, they are either holders of cash grant or of Villages or part of a village. Similarly, the Manual for Jagirdars of Holkar State also defines the expression 'Jagirdar' and 'Inamdar'. According to the definition they are grantees of one or more villages or part of a village. It is clear from these definitions that the expressions 'estate', 'Jagir' or 'Inam' only refer to the grant of lands. Besides the impugned Act is clearly designed to resume Jagir lands as is clear from the title of the Act. The expression 'Jagir lands' has been defined in the impugned Act as follows : "'Jagir land' means any land in which or in relation to which any Jagirdar has rights as such in respect of land revenue or other earnings;" This makes it quite clear that the impugned Act does not envisage taking over of any thing else except jagir lands over which Jagirdars have rights in respect of land revenue or other earnings. The purpose of taking over the jagir lands is as stated above to avoid concentration of large blocks of lands in a few hands and to bring the cultivators into direct relations with the State Government. This obviously is not the purpose of taking over the buildings on Jagir lands. Section 4(1)(g), therefore, has no connection with the scheme of land reforms envisaged by the impugned Act. No doubt the public purpose need not be specified; it can be gathered from the tenor and intendment of a statute. I, however, fail to see from the tenor and intendment of the impugned Act any public purpose behind the taking over of the buildings specified in S.4(1)(g). Adding to the resources of the State is not a public purpose. Mahajan J.'s observations and the passage from Cooley cited above fully bear out this proposition. 6. It has not been proved that the Jagirdars were under any legal obligation to construct schools, hospitals or other buildings for general public use. Adding to the resources of the State is not a public purpose. Mahajan J.'s observations and the passage from Cooley cited above fully bear out this proposition. 6. It has not been proved that the Jagirdars were under any legal obligation to construct schools, hospitals or other buildings for general public use. The Advocate General referred to Darbar Policy of the Gwalior State and argued that it is the duty of the Jagirdars to construct schools and hospitals etc. It may be stated that the Darbar Policy, as its very name suggests, is a policy to be followed. His Highness the Maharaja Madhav Rao Scindia who wrote this policy states in the foreword as follows : "The energy I have expended and efforts I have put forth in writing this Policy have mainly been inspired with the aim that the work may prove beneficial to the next generation (in which I have meant to include the Ruler as well as the Officers, subjects, etc.) so that for purposes of administering the State and shouldering the grave responsibilities thereof they might discover in this collection a storehouse which may serve to the Ruler, Officers and subjects of the State, as a guide, philosopher and friend." This makes it quite clear that it is not an Act. It is actually an advice tendered to the Jagirdars. The learned Advocate General also referred to the Education Manual. The Education Manual no doubt lays down that Jagirdars whose gross annual income is Rs.50,000/- and above will be provided with qualified staff by the Education Department if so desired by the Jagirdars and that their salaries will be paid by the Jagirdars. But it does not lay down that it will be the duty of the Jagirdars to open schools. Besides if there be any duty cast on the Jagirdars having a gross income of Rs.50,000/- and above, the manual imposes no duty on Jagirdars having less income. The Manual in its preamble states that it lays down the educational policy of the State. Therefore, it is not an Act creating legal rights or obligations. It may also be mentioned here that the impugned Act applies to Jagirdars of all States that comprise Madhya Bharat. Although the expression of a 'pious wish' regarding maintenance of schools and hospitals etc. Therefore, it is not an Act creating legal rights or obligations. It may also be mentioned here that the impugned Act applies to Jagirdars of all States that comprise Madhya Bharat. Although the expression of a 'pious wish' regarding maintenance of schools and hospitals etc. by some classes of Jagirdars appears in some books on Gwalior State, it has not been shown that any other State imposes any duty on the Jagirdars to open schools and hospitals The result is that there was no legal obligation placed on the Jagirdars to construct schools, hospitals or other buildings for public use. In these circumstances, by no stretch of reasoning can it be said that these buildings form part of Jagir lands. Consequently public purpose must be separately established for the taking over of the buildings. 7. Section 4(1)(g) of the impugned Act which authorises the taking over of all buildings is also inequitable in so far as it does not affect all the Jagirdars equally. Some Jagirdars who were benevolent by nature and who were more public-spirited spent money of their own accord and constructed schools, hospitals and other useful buildings. While others who thought more of their own pockets did not spend any money. The result of S.4(1)(g) is to penalise those who were (not?) benevolent and to put a premium on selfishness. The section also hits the provisions of Art.14 of the Constitution as it accords differential treatment to the members belonging to the same class. By virtue of Art.13, therefore, it is void. Article 31(b) cannot be invoked to afford protection as the impugned Act is not mentioned in the ninth schedule. In Uttar Pradesh Act all buildings situate within the limits of an estate and belonging to or held by an intermediary have been acknowledged to be the property of the intermediary. 8. Section 4(1)(g) is also bad on the ground of colourable legislation. Schedule 1 of the impugned Act computes income from forest, quarries and also excise income for purposes of calculating gross income. But the value of these buildings does not find place in the calculation of gross income. The result, therefore, is that the taking over of these buildings without any compensation amounts to confiscation. It is no doubt true that Article 31(4) debars the courts from enquiring into the adequacy of compensation. But the value of these buildings does not find place in the calculation of gross income. The result, therefore, is that the taking over of these buildings without any compensation amounts to confiscation. It is no doubt true that Article 31(4) debars the courts from enquiring into the adequacy of compensation. But the clause presupposes that the enactment is the result of a valid exercise of legislative powers conferred on the legislature. This legislation is obviously made in exercise of the powers conferred on the State legislature under Entry 38 of List 2 and Entry 42 of List 3, Schedule 7 of the Constitution. Entry 36 of List 2 states as follows : "Acquisition or requisitioning of property, except for the purposes of the Union, subject to the provisions of Entry 42, List III". Entry 42, List III is as follows : "Principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given." Although the legislature purported to act under these two Entries, in effect it evaded their provisions altogether. No principle has been formulated on which compensation is to be paid for the acquisition of buildings. In so far as the legislature has laid down no principle for determining compensation for the acquisition of buildings, it is a fraud on the Constitution. Mukherjea, J., with regard to S.4(b) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act made the following observations : "The clause presupposes however that the enactment is the result of a valid exercise of a legislative power conferred on the legislature by the appropriate entries in the Legislative Lists and if the legislature acts outside these entries or under the pretence of acting within them does some thing which is in flat contradiction with its contents. Cl.(4) of Art.31 could not be invoked to afford any protection to such legislation" (Vide para 80. AIR 1952 SC 252 (B)). These remarks are most apposite in respect of S.4(1)(g) of the impugned Act. Mahajan, J., on the same subject made the following observations : "The power of legislation in Entry 42 is for enacting the principles of determining such compensation and for paying it. AIR 1952 SC 252 (B)). These remarks are most apposite in respect of S.4(1)(g) of the impugned Act. Mahajan, J., on the same subject made the following observations : "The power of legislation in Entry 42 is for enacting the principles of determining such compensation and for paying it. The principles to be enacted are for determining the equivalent price of the property taken away. It may be that the determination of the equivalent may be left for ascertainment on the basis of certain uniform rules; for instance it may be laid down that the principles for determining compensation will be the rental basis or the market value of the property etc. But it is difficult to imagine that there can be any principles for nonpayment of compensation or for negativing the payment of compensation. No principles are required to be stated for non-payment of compensation". (Vide AIR 1952 SC 252 .para 60(B)). In the same paragraph Mahajan, J., makes the following observation : "An entry concerning payment of compensation in no sense includes legislative power of non-payment of compensation. The whole purpose of this head of legislation is to provide payment of compensation and not the confiscation of property." From these observations, it is clear that under Entry 42, List III of Schedule 7 it is incumbent on the legislature to formulate principles for the payment of compensation and if the legislature fails to do so, it is acting in flat contradiction of these provisions. Article 31(4) cannot be invoked to afford any protection to such legislation. If legislature intends to acquire buildings it must formulate principles for the payment of compensation. As no principles have been formulated for the payment of compensation for the acquisition of schools offices, hospitals and other buildings of public utility, the acquisition is ultra vires. The result is S.4(1)(g) is bad both for want of public purpose and for perpetrating a fraud on the Constitution. It is also void as it contravenes the provisions of Art.14 of the Constitution. 9. Mr. Das and Mr. Engineer contended that Sch.1, Cl.4(2) makes a deduction from the gross income which has no relation to actual facts. The deduction made on account of expenses of collection of rents (including irrecoverable arrears) is actually inflated in order to reduce the amount of compensation. This contention cannot be accepted. 9. Mr. Das and Mr. Engineer contended that Sch.1, Cl.4(2) makes a deduction from the gross income which has no relation to actual facts. The deduction made on account of expenses of collection of rents (including irrecoverable arrears) is actually inflated in order to reduce the amount of compensation. This contention cannot be accepted. Some expenses for the collection of rents were no doubt incurred by the Jagirdars. The question whether these expenses have been unduly inflated or not cannot be gone into as Art.31(4) precludes an inquiry into the adequacy of compensation. No further comment is therefore, needed on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel in this behalf. The contention in respect of Sch.1, Cl.4(3), (4) and (5) however, deserves careful consideration. Clause 4(3) of the Sch.1 is as follows : "The net income of a Jagirdar shall be calculated by deducting from the gross income of the Jagirdar : (iii) On account of land records and Chowkidari establishment, an amount equal to 12½ per cent, of the gross income." The first thing that we have to consider is whether the Jagirdars are under any legal obligation to incur any expenditure under the head of land records and Chowkidari establishment. Section 140 of Qawaid-Jagirdaran lays down that there should be a watchman in every Jagir village, if there is no watchman appointed in any Jagir village, attention of the Jagirdar first be drawn to it and if in spite of it no watchman is appointed he should be got appointed through the Muntazim Jagirdaran and the expenses of him shall be recovered from the Jagirdar. The Indore Tenancy Act of 1931 imposes a duty on Jagirdars to appoint a Chowkidar for each village (Vide section 129). Similarly, the Dhar Tenancy Act of 1940-1941 imposes a duty on Jagirdars to appoint a Chowkidar for each village. Both the Indore and Dhar Tenancy Acts have been repealed by the Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act of 1950. However, the Tenancy Act of 1950 has not repealed the provisions of Qawaid-Jagirdaran Gwalior State. Therefore, as far as S.140 of Qawaid-Jagirdaran is concerned it is still in force. Consequently the Jagirdars of Gwalior are still under a legal obligation to maintain Chowkidari establishment. However, the Tenancy Act of 1950 has not repealed the provisions of Qawaid-Jagirdaran Gwalior State. Therefore, as far as S.140 of Qawaid-Jagirdaran is concerned it is still in force. Consequently the Jagirdars of Gwalior are still under a legal obligation to maintain Chowkidari establishment. Although S.129 of the Indore Tenancy Act and S.167 of the Dhar Tenancy Act have been repealed, the Tenancy Act of 1950 imposes a duty to appoint Balais or village servants for each village (Vide Sec.139). It is not very material for our purpose to enquire whether Balai is the same functionary as the Chowkidar. It is possible that the duties of a Balai and a Chowkidar may differ in some respects. But the fact remains that they are both village servants and that expenses have to be incurred either on account of the appointment of a Balai or a Chowkidar. Deduction on account of Chowkidari establishment, therefore, cannot be said to be illegal. 10. The position with regard to land records appears to be the same. Under S.62(a) of Qawaid-Jagirdaran Gwalior State, it was the duty of every Jagirdar to appoint passed and competent Patwaris and to arrange the papers to be prepared in accordance with the rules of the Darbar. It does not appear, however, that any such duty was cast on Jagirdars in Indore, Dhar, Ratlam, or any other State. However, Jagir Land Records Management Act No.25 of 1949 was passed in 1949. Section 3 of the said Act lays down as follows : "Notwithstanding anything contained in any Act, Regulation or Rule in force in any Covenanting State of the United State, the preparation of the papers of Land Records of all the Jagirs within the United State, and the management of establishing an office for it and the appointment of village Patwari shall be done by the Government and the cost, which will be incurred by the Government in all this management shall in proportion to the land revenue of the Jagirs, be realised from them as arrears of Tanka". From this provision it is clear that at the time of the passing of the impugned Act the Jagirdars were under a legal obligation to incur expenditure for the maintenance of land records. Deduction, therefore, on this count cannot be said to be improper. From this provision it is clear that at the time of the passing of the impugned Act the Jagirdars were under a legal obligation to incur expenditure for the maintenance of land records. Deduction, therefore, on this count cannot be said to be improper. I am, therefore, of the opinion that deduction both on account of land records and Chowkidari establishment cannot be said to be invalid. 11. Sub-clause (4) of Cl.(4) of Schedule 1 of the impugned Act runs as follows : "In the case of a Jagirdar other than one holding a Jadid-Usul Jagir or Devasthani Jagir on account of education, Public Health and Roads, an amount equal to 15 per cent, of the gross income, if it exceeds Rs.2000/- or an amount equal to 10 per cent. of the gross income in other cases;" If is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that these deductions are arbitrary, as the Jagirdars were under no obligation to incur any expenditure on account of education, public health and roads. The learned Advocate General referred us to Education Manual and also Darbar Policy of the Gwalior State. The provisions of Education Manual and Darbar Policy have already been discussed in connection with the maintenance of schools by Jagirdars. I have already held that no duty has been cast on the Jagirdars in Gwalior State to maintain schools. In any case, no duty was imposed on Jagirdars in any other State to incur expenditure on account of education. The learned Advocate General was not able to show that the Jagirdars were under any obligation to incur expenditure on account of public health or roads. In these circumstances I am bound to hold that this deduction is arbitrary. 12. Sub-clause (5) of Cl.4 of Sch.1 is as follows : "In the case of a Jagirdar who or whose predecessor-in-interest, immediately before the 15th of May 1948 exercised : (a) Police powers, an amount equal to 7 per cent, of the gross income; (b) Revenue powers, an amount equal to 4 per cent, of the gross income; (c) Judicial powers, an amount equal to 2 per cent, of the gross income." These deductions can be justified if Police, Revenue and Judicial powers were necessary concomitant of a Jagirdar. Section 55 of Qawaid-Jagirdaran Gwalior State clearly states that no judicial powers can be claimed as a matter of right. Section 55 of Qawaid-Jagirdaran Gwalior State clearly states that no judicial powers can be claimed as a matter of right. It also appears from S.56 of the said Qawaid-Jagirdaran that Judicial powers were not conferred on Jagirdars whose income was less than Rs.5000/- p.a. Revenue powers were also conferred on Jagirdars on the recommendation of the Muntazim Jagirdaran. With regard to police powers, reference is made to Police Manual of Gwalior State. Section 191 of the Police Manual states that such Jagirdars whom the honour of keeping police has been conferred will follow the instructions given in this Manual. This section does not give any power to Jagirdars to keep police force. On the contrary, the section itself indicates that the honour of keeping the police is conferred by the Darbar in certain cases. The Indore State Manual of Jagirdars states that no judicial powers can be claimed as a matter of right. With regard to revenue powers, S.65 of the Manual indicates that these powers were conferred on individual Jagirdars. No provision in any Act has been referred to, to show that the Jagirdars in Holkar State enjoyed police powers as of right. We have not been referred to any enactment in Dhar, Ratlam, and other States which enables Jagirdars to exercise these powers by virtue of their position as a Jagirdar. The conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that the deductions on account of police, revenue and judicial powers are artificial and have no relation to facts. 13. We have now to examine whether the artificial deduction is allowed by Entry 36, List II, and Entry 42 of List III of 7th Schedule of the Constitution. In Bihar Land Reforms Act, the legislature proposed to deduct from the gross assets., cost of works of benefit to the Rayats by S.23(f). This clause was discussed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and it was held by majority that the clause is a colourable legislation. Mahajan, J., made the following observations : "Section 23(f), however, in my opinion, is a colourable piece of legislation. It has been enacted under power conferred by legislative Entry 42 of List III. It is well-settled that Parliament with limited powers cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly............ Mahajan, J., made the following observations : "Section 23(f), however, in my opinion, is a colourable piece of legislation. It has been enacted under power conferred by legislative Entry 42 of List III. It is well-settled that Parliament with limited powers cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly............ The provision herein impeached has not been arrived at by laying down any principles of paying compensation but in truth, is designed to deprive a number of people of their property without payment of compensation. The State legislature is authorised to pass an Act in the interests of persons deprived of property under Entry 42. They could not be permitted under that power to pass a law that operates to the detriment of those persons and the object of which provision is to deprive them of the right of compensation to a certain extent." (Vide AIR 1952 SC 252 Para 59 (B)). In the same case his Lordship further observed as follows : "The provision that four per cent, to twelve and a half per cent has to be deducted out of the net income on account of costs of works for the benefit of raiyats etc. has no relation to real facts. Even the earlier provision in Cl.(d) that costs of management have to be deducted up to twenty per cent, has in its entirety no real relation to actual state of affairs. As already pointed out, it is partially of a confiscatory character in sufficient number of cases. The deduction under Cl.(f) from the gross income is merely a deduction of an artificial character, the whole object being to inflate the deductions and thus bring about non-payment of compensation. Such legislation, in my opinion, is not permitted by Entry 42 of List III. Suppose, for instance, instead of twelve and a half per cent, it declared that a deduction of seventy per cent be made on that account. Could it be said by any reasonable person that such a piece of legislation was legislation on principles of determining compensation or of making payment of compensation. This provision, therefore, in my opinion, has been inserted in the Act as a colourable exercise of legislative power under Entry 42 and is unconstitutional on that ground" (Vide Para 61). Could it be said by any reasonable person that such a piece of legislation was legislation on principles of determining compensation or of making payment of compensation. This provision, therefore, in my opinion, has been inserted in the Act as a colourable exercise of legislative power under Entry 42 and is unconstitutional on that ground" (Vide Para 61). On the same subject Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., observed as follows : "The provisions in section 23, sub-clause (f) that 4 to 12½ per cent of the gross assets can be deducted from the amount as representing 'costs of works of benefit to the raiyats'. This is an obvious device to reduce the gross assets and bring it down to as low a level as possible. The Act does not say that this charge represents the expenditure on works of benefits or improvements which the Zamindars and proprietors were under any legal obligation to carry out and which they failed to discharge. Nor are we told anything about the future destination of this deducted sum. It is an arbitrary figure which the legislature has said must be deducted from the gross assets. The deduction is a mere contrivance to reduce the compensation and it is a colourable or fraudulent exercise of legislative power to subtract a fanciful sum from the calculation of gross assets. Stripped of their veils or vestments, the provisions in the Act about 'arrears of rent' and the 'cost of works of benefit' amount to naked confiscation. Where the legislative action is arbitrary in the sense that it has no reasonable relation to the purpose in view, there is a transgression by the legislature of the limits of its power. Under the guise of legislating for acquisition, the legislature cannot enable the State to perpetrate confiscation, and if it does so, the Act to that extent has to be declared unconstitutional and void" (Vide AIR 1952 SC 252 Para 136 (B)). These observations are most apposite to the present case. The Jagirdars were under no legal obligation to incur expenditure on account of education, public health and roads or on account of police, revenue and judicial powers. These deductions are obviously a device to reduce net income and to bring it down to as low a level as possible. The object of these deductions appears to be to bring about a reduction in the compensation. These deductions are obviously a device to reduce net income and to bring it down to as low a level as possible. The object of these deductions appears to be to bring about a reduction in the compensation. These deductions, therefore, are of an artificial character whose object is to inflate the deduction and thus bring about either non-payment of compensation or reduction in compensation. This is nothing but a colourable exercise of legislative power under Entry 42. Consequently sub-cls.(4) and (5) of Cl.4 of Sch.I are unconstitutional and inoperative. 14. Section 4(1)(g) of the impugned Act and Sub-cls.(4) and (5) of Cl.4, Sch.I, can be separated from the rest of the Act. Consequently, the whole of the Act need not be declared ultra vires. 15. Mr. Bhagwandas Gupta contends that Art.31(5)(a) protects existing laws and consequently the Land Acquisition Act is still in force; compensation, therefore, must be paid in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Similar argument was advanced in the case of AIR 1952 SC 252 (B). But that argument was repelled. Mahajan, J., observed as follows : "This argument really has no force. Because the provisions as to assessment of compensation enacted in the Land Acquisition Act only apply to acquisitions that are made by notification under that Act. Its provisions have no application to acquisitions made under either local or Central laws unless they are specifically made applicable by the provisions of these Statutes (Vide AIR 1952 SC 252 para.68 (B)). Das, J., on the same subject observed that the provision for compensation applies only to land acquired under that Act, and that it has no application to lands acquired under other Statute (Vide para.111). This point, therefore, having been finally concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court, cannot be reagitated in this Court. 16. Mr. Bhagwandas Gupta also contended that the word 'acquisition' does not include the word 'resumption'. It is no doubt true that the impugned Act has used the word 'resumption'. But it is clear from the tenor and intendment of the Act that the legislature has actually treated Jagir lands as the property of the Jagirdars and adopted the procedure of acquisition. The position meted out to the Jagirdars, therefore, is better than what it would have been in the case of resumption. The word resumption' connotes taking back what was given. The position meted out to the Jagirdars, therefore, is better than what it would have been in the case of resumption. The word resumption' connotes taking back what was given. As, however, better treatment has been accorded to the Jagirdars the implications of the expression 'resumption' need not be enquired into. 17. Mr. Engineer contends on behalf of Raja Balbhadrasingh that as the petitioner was a holder of mediatised estate the impugned Act cannot be made applicable to him. This argument can be disposed of on the mere ground that Raja Balbhadrasingh held a sanad granted by the ruler of Gwalior. Besides the petitioner has not been able to show that his position is different from that of a Jagirdar. In these circumstances the contention put forward by Mr. Engineer cannot be accepted. 18. For the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that S.4(a)(g) and sub-Ss.(4) and (5) of S.4, Sch.I are not constitutional. The rest of the Act is valid. The petitions are, therefore, allowed only to the extent mentioned above. A writ of mandamus will issue to the State Government not to give effect to the provisions of the impugned Act stated above. In the circumstances of the case parties are directed to bear their own costs. 19. Mr. P.R. Das has asked for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from our decision. Having regard to the general importance of the questions raised in these petitions I would certify these cases as fit for appeal to the Supreme Court, and grant requisite leave to the petitioners as well as to the State. 20. DIXIT, J. :- In these forty-four applications under Art.226, Constitution of India, the petitioners who have variously described themselves as Jagirdars or proprietors of alienated villages, each claiming the proprietor of the soil in the village or group of villages set out in their applications, challenge the constitutionality of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagir Act, 1951 (Act No.28 of 1951 hereinafter referred to as the Act) on various grounds. They pray for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus or alternatively directions or a writ against the State of Madhya Bharat prohibiting them from giving effect to or acting in any manner by virtue of or under the said Act. 21. They pray for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus or alternatively directions or a writ against the State of Madhya Bharat prohibiting them from giving effect to or acting in any manner by virtue of or under the said Act. 21. On 30-11-1949, a Bill intituled "the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagir" was introduced in the Legislative Assembly of Madhya Bharat and was passed by the Legislature in 1951. The Bill having been reserved for the consideration of the President received his assent on 27-11-51. On 7-12-51, the Act was published in the Government Gazette and on the same day a notification under S.1(3) of the Act was published bringing into force the Act immediately. On 5-12-51, that is, before the Act came into force, Maloji Rao Shitole and some Other petitioners presented some of these applications to this Court for the issue of appropriate writs against the Government prohibiting it from taking possession of their property. On 7-12-51, this Court passed an interim order directing the Government to forbear until the disposal of these petitions from giving effect to or acting in any manner by virtue of or under the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagir Act, 1951. 22. In all these petitions, the validity of the Act is challenged substantially on similar grounds. The common grounds of attack stated in the petitions are : (a) The so called Legislature which passed the Act was not a Legislature within the meaning of the Covenant entered into by the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in Central India for the formation of the United State of Gwalior, lndore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat) or within the meaning of Schedule IV of the said Covenant. (b) The Legislature of Madhya Bharat was not competent to enact the said Act by reason of Entry 36, List II, 7th Schedule of the Constitution read with Entry 42, List III of the said Schedule and by reason of the fact that the said acquisition or resumption is not for a public purpose and there is no provision for payment of compensation as understood in law. (c) The interference by the said Act is not for a public purpose. (d) The said Act does not provide for payment of compensation as understood in law. (e) The compensation provided is wholly illusory. (c) The interference by the said Act is not for a public purpose. (d) The said Act does not provide for payment of compensation as understood in law. (e) The compensation provided is wholly illusory. (f) The Abolition Act is a discriminatory enactment depriving a particular class of ownership of its inherent rights over such properties. (g) The said Act constitutes a fraud on power or fraud on the Constitution. (h) The power exercised by the President in giving his assent to the said Act is a fraudulent exercise of power. 23. Not all these grounds require consideration now. The objection as to the validity of the Constitution of the Madhya Bharat Legislative Assembly is now concluded so far as this Court is concerned by a decision of a Full Bench in ILR (1952) Madh B 178 (A). So also as a result of the decision of the Supremo Court in the Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh zamindari cases reported in AIR 1952 SC 252 (B). to which I will refer hereafter as the Bihar Zamindari cases, the applicants are-precluded from raising objections as to the extent, adequacy or the illusory nature of the compensation provided by the Act or as to the competency of the Legislature to enact the said Act under Art.246 of the Constitution read with Entry 36, List II of 7th Schedule of the Constitution read with Entry 42 List III of the said Schedule on the ground that there is no provision for payment of compensation as understood in law. Mr. P.R. Das, the leading Counsel for the petitioners, frankly conceded that by the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, he was debarred from going into the question of the adequacy of compensation or from contending that the State Legislature had no power under Entry 36, List II read with Entry 41, List III to make a law for acquisition of property without providing for payment of just compensation. He reserved the liberty to raise these objections again in the Supreme Court, if need be, and confined his arguments, firstly, to the point that the acquisition of the Jagir Lands not being for a public purpose, the Act was unconstitutional, and secondly, that certain provisions of the Act constitute a fraud on the Constitution in that while they purport to be in conformity with the Constitution, were in fact, repugnant to the Constitution. 24. Before examining the provisions of the impugned Act, it is pertinent to state that Madhya Bharat is a composite State comprising of the former Gwanor, lndore and other indian States of Central india. The entire area of the State of Madhya Bharat is about 46166 sq. miles out of which the area of the jagir lands is 8449 sq. miles. There are nearly 1329 jagirs in Madhya Bharat. All these Jagirs are held under sanads or grants either express or implied. In some of the petitions, copies of the sanads and grants have been appended. The Jagirs in Madhya Bharat can be divided into various distinct groups according to their historical origin, into the details of this origin, it is unnecessary to enter here. They are given in official publications - too numerous to be cited here - issued before 1947 by the Government of India and the various Indian State Governments. A summary of the history and origin of Jagirs in Madhya Bharat is also given in the report of the Committee set up by the Government of India in 1949 under the chairmanship of Mr. C.S. Venkatachar to examine and report inter alia on the existing structure and the working of the Jagirdari system in Madhya Bharat. Mr. Das learned Counsel for the petitioners, objected to the reception of this report in these proceedings. But I think so long as we keep within the rule laid down by the Privy Council in - 'Martand Rao v. Malhar Rao', AIR 1928 PC 10 (C) that opinions expressed in official reports snouid not be treated as conclusive in respect of matters requiring judicial determination, there would appear to be no objection in referring to the report for the purpose of gathering historical facts which are not in issue here. To proceed it is sufficient to say that some of the Jagirs consist of estates mediatised and guaranteed by Sir John Malcolm and other British Officers at the time of the pacification In 1818. Some 43 of these estates were transferred by the British Government in 1921 to Gwalior Darbar and placed under the suzerainty of the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior and hold sanads from him. The petitioner Balbhadra Singh of Raghogarh in Civil Miscellaneous No.41 of 1952 is the holder of one such estate. (See Aitchison's Treatise, Engagements and Sanads, Vol.V, fifth Edition, pages 331, 357 and 517). The second group consists of a number of Rajput Chiefs who existed prior to the advent of the Marathas. and who when subdued by Marathas were allowed to hold a few villages as assignment subject to a payment of tribute. The petitioner Raja Pancham Singh of Pahargarh in Civil Miscellaneous No.638 of 1951 falls in this group. The third category comprises of jagir assignments made by the Maratha Rulers, to warriors who were instrumental in extending the Maratha conquests north-ward and in consolidating the newly acquired territories. The majority of the petitioners before us belong to this group. Besides the above groups of these Jagirs, there are also jagirs granted by the Rulers of the various Covenanting States of Madhya Bharat for a variety of purposes, both secular and religious, for services rendered or to be rendered. The rights, and obligations of the holders of jagirs in many of the smaller Indian States of Central India which now form parts of Madhya. Bharat were never legally defined, or demarcated by metes and bounds. In the territories of Madhya Bharat comprising of the former Gwalior State, the rights, obligations and privileges of the Jagirdars of Gwalior State, are regulated by 'Kawayad Jagindaran'; Samvat 1970 (manual for Jagirdars) which was promulgated by the Gwalior Darbar in Samvat 1970 and which is still in force. The rights, obligations and privileges of the Jagirdars of the former Indore State nave also been similarly denned in a Manual of Indore State. A few of the petitioners who are Jagirdars of the Gwalior State enjoyed until the end of 1948 revenue and police powers as also the right to levy customs duty and maintain their own excise arrangements. The rights, obligations and privileges of the Jagirdars of the former Indore State nave also been similarly denned in a Manual of Indore State. A few of the petitioners who are Jagirdars of the Gwalior State enjoyed until the end of 1948 revenue and police powers as also the right to levy customs duty and maintain their own excise arrangements. Be that as it may, the holders of these jagirs nave to-day only the right to collect revenue from their tenants with an obligation to pay to the State a certain amount generally Known as a 'Tanka' fixed in the remote past by the Rulers of the States granting the Jagir. These Jagirs are not transferable, they are impartible and the rule of primogeniture applies to them. The question whether a jagir grant confers on the holder thereof merely the right to collect the Government share of revenue or makes him a grantee of the soil depends as pointed out by the Privy Council in - 'Secretary of State v. Laxmibai', AIR 1923 PC 6 (D) on the terms of the particular grant and the whole circumstances connected; therewith and there can be no presumption one way or the other. Likewise, the question whether a jagir grant was resumable at the will of the Ruler also depends on the terms of the grant and the law and the rules made by the Ruler granting the Jagir in his State. The question whether the petitioners are proprietors of the soil is not of much consequence here. For the impugned Act purports to acquire whatever right, title and interest the Jagirdars have in the jagir lands. The question whether the petitioners are proprietors of the soil is not of much consequence here. For the impugned Act purports to acquire whatever right, title and interest the Jagirdars have in the jagir lands. Even if they are regarded as Having absolute rights in the soil, there is no bar under the Constitution to the acquisition of these proprietary rights The important point to note is that the petitioning Jagirdars destitute of the authority, powers and functions which they exercised at one time, are today only persons holding greater or smaller extent of lands with the power to collect and appropriate the land revenue either conditionally or unconditionally, They are, on a theory that all land belongs to the State and it atone is entitled as of right to take a portion of the produce of the land whether in kind or money, merely intermediaries between the State and the tenants in jagir areas the impugned Act has been enacted in conformity with this theory and in pursuance of the present-day policy of the State to do away with all intermediaries between the State and the cultivators. 25. For a proper appreciation of the points raised on behalf of the petitioners, it is necessary to give a short account of the provisions of the impugned Act. 26. The long title of the Act, is "an Act to provide for the resumption of all Jagir lands in the State and for certain other measures of land reforms in Jagir areas." 27. Section 1 of the Act provides that it shall extend to the whole of the Madhya Bharat and directs that it shall come into force on and from such date as the Government may by a notification appoint in that behalf. 28. Section 2 is the definition section. By clause (vi) of this section, it is provided that the term "Jagirdar" means "any person recognised as a Jagirdar under any law, rules, regulations or orders governing Jagirs in force in any part of the State." The next clause defines "Jagir land" as "any land in which or in relation to which any Jagirdar has rights as such in respect of land revenue or other earnings. 29. Chapter II deals with the resumption of Jagir lands, and the consequences of the resumption. 29. Chapter II deals with the resumption of Jagir lands, and the consequences of the resumption. Section 3 says that the Government may by a notification appoint a date for the resumption of all Jagir lands in the State. Section 4 enacts that as from the date of resumption, the rights, title and interest of every Jagirdar and of every other persons claiming through him (including a Zamindar) in his Jagir lands including forests, trees, fisheries, well, tanks, ponds, water channels, ferries, pathways, village sites, huts, Bazar and Mela grounds, and mines and minerals whether being worked or not, shall stand resumed to the State free from all encumbrances and further all rights, titles and interests created by the Jagirdar or his predecessor-in-interest in and over the Jagir lands shall, as against the Government cease and determine. Clause (g) of S.4 further lays down that the rights, title and interest of the Jagirdar in all buildings on Jagir lands used for schools, offices, hospital and other public purposes shall stand extinguished and such buildings shall be deemed to have been transferred to the Government. 30. Chapter III provides for the assessment of compensation and the procedure for the determination of the amount of compensation. A jagirdar on the resumption of his Jagir lands, becomes entitled to receive compensation at seven times the net income determined in accordance with Schedule 1 to the Act. Chapter IV contains provisions for the management and tenure of lands and includes incidental provisions dealing with the consequential changes on the resumption of Jagir lands. 31. Chapter V contains sections providing for miscellaneous matters and for appeals against the decisions of Tahsildar under S.23 in proceedings for the issue of certificates of Pacca tenancy and against the decisions of the Jagir Commissioner under Ss.4, 10, 11, 13, and 14, in the matter of resumption of Jagir lands and determination of compensation. Section 39 which is included in this Chapter empowers the Government to frame Rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. 32. Schedule I of the Act is important. It lays down the principles for determining the compensation payable to the Jagirdar whose Jagir land is resumed. Under Cl.5 of the Schedule, a Jagirdar whose Jagir land is resumed is entitled to receive and to be paid compensation at seven times the net income of his Jagir-land. 32. Schedule I of the Act is important. It lays down the principles for determining the compensation payable to the Jagirdar whose Jagir land is resumed. Under Cl.5 of the Schedule, a Jagirdar whose Jagir land is resumed is entitled to receive and to be paid compensation at seven times the net income of his Jagir-land. The net income is arrived at after deducting certain items from the gross-income. The "gross-income" in the Schedule means the aggregate of the rents which were payable in respect of the land in the Jagir for She agricultural year immediately preceding the agricultural year in which the Jagir-land is resumed, whether payable by a tenant or subtenants or the Raiyats and includes income of the previous agricultural year from forests, quarries, excise, giras-tanka, Dami including other amounts payable by the Government and Sewai Jama for the previous agricultural year. In the computation of the net income, under Cl.4 of the Schedule, the following items are deducted from the gross income. They are :- "(a) tanka due from the Jagirdar to the Government for the previous agricultural year; (b) expenses for collection of rents (including irrecoverable arrears) at the rate of ten per cent, of the gross income, if it exceeds Rs.2000/- or at the rate of 7 per cent, of the gross income, if it is less than Rs.2000/-; (c) a sum equal to 12½ per cent, of the gross income on account of land records and Choukidari establishments; (d) an amount at the rate of 15 per cent, of the gross income, where it exceeds Rs.2000/-, or at the rate of 10 per cent., if it is less than Rs.2000/- in respect of education, public health, roads, if the Jagir is one other than a Jadid-usul Jagir of Devasthani Jagir; (e) an amount equal to seven per cent., four per cent, and two per cent, respectively, in respect of the police, revenue and judicial powers, if the Jagirdar or his predecessor-in-interest exercised those powers immediately before 15-5-48; (f) and any sum due from Jagirdar to the Government for the previous agricultural year on any other account." 33. The proviso to Cl.4 of the schedule fixes a limit on the total amount of deductions on account of the above heads excluding the sum payable as Tanka. The proviso to Cl.4 of the schedule fixes a limit on the total amount of deductions on account of the above heads excluding the sum payable as Tanka. The limit varies from 5 to 50 per cent., according to the amount of the basic income, which has been defined in Cl.3 of the Schedule as that arrived at by deducting from the gross income, the amount of the tanka payable by the Jagirdar to the Government for the previous agricultural year. It must be noted that Cl.4 of the Sch.1 of the. Act which deals with the various deductions from the gross income treats all the different kinds of Jagirs in the various Covenanting States of Madhya Bharat on a uniform basis. 34. The validity of the Act depends on Arts.31, 31A and Art.246 read with entry 36 List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. These provisions have been the subject of a close examination in the Supreme Court in the Zamindari cases from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1952 SC 252 (B)) and there can no longer be any doubt as to the proper meaning, scope and effect of these Articles. The main enquiry here is therefore, whether on an application of the propositions laid down by the Supreme Court in the case referred to above to the present case, an attack on the validity of the Act founded on the absence of a public purpose and on "fraud on the Constitution" can be entertained; and if it can be, whether on the tests indicated by the Supreme Court of a 'public purpose', the impugned Act has been enacted for a public purpose; and whether the conditions on which the Supreme Court declared certain provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, as constituting a "fraud on the Constitution" and, unconstitutional, are present here. 35. I will first deal with the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners that the proposed resumption is not for any public purpose. On this point the argument of Mr. Das, which has been adopted by Mr. 35. I will first deal with the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners that the proposed resumption is not for any public purpose. On this point the argument of Mr. Das, which has been adopted by Mr. Engineer also, is that the existence of a public purpose and an obligation to pay compensation are the necessary concomitants of compulsory acquisition of property; that Art.31(4) protects the impugned legislation from attack only on the ground that "it contravenes the provisions of Cl.(2)"; that the only provision of Cl.(2) is that the law must provide for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fix the amount of the compensation or specify the principles which and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given; that Cl.(2) assumes but does not provide that the taking possession of or the acquisition of the property should be only for a public purpose; and that the existence of a public purpose being thus not a provision of Cl.(2), it is a justiciable issue. Mr. Das said that in the majority decision of the Supreme Court in the 'Bihar zamindari cases' (B), this argument has been accepted and it has been held that the provisions of Art.31(4) do not take away the Court's power to see whether' the acquisition has been made for a public purpose. Learned Counsel proceeded to say that the Act on the face of it did not show that it was for public purpose. It is conceded that the Act need not expressly state the purpose for which the property is being taken. It is, however, argued that from the whole tenor and intendment of the Act, it cannot be gathered that the Jagirs are being acquired either for the purposes of the Union or for the purposes of the State or for the purposes of the public or for the benefit of the community at large or for some other definite and tangible public purpose. It is said that by the abolition and resumption of Jagirs, the proprietary rights of the holders of Jagir are only affected by the impugned Act; that by the resumption no change and betterment, whatsoever, will occur in the nature of the tenure or the rights of the cultivators; that the Act does no more than intercept the rents payable by the tenants to the Jagirdars and does not affect the blocks of land in Khas possession of the Jagirdar; and that the Act is merely a device to increase the income of the State at the cost of the Jagirdars. Mr. Das referred us to certain passages in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 8th edition. Volume II, page 1118 (Foot Note) and in Willis' Constitutional Law, page 817 and to the decision of the Privy Council in - 'Hama Bai Framjee Petit v. Secretary of State', AIR 1914 PC 20 (E) and urged that acquisition of property for the mere purpose of augmenting the State revenue is not a public purpose; that the policy of the party in power is not a public purpose; and that public purpose must have as its aim or object the general interest and benefit of the community as distingaished from the private interest of an individual. It was further said that the provisions contained in Chapter IV of the impugned Act might have been designed to improve the position of the tenants and bring about land reforms, but the improvement and reforms contemplated by Chapter IV could not be regarded as a public purpose for acquisition of property under entry 36, List II, for the reason that Chapter IV of the impugned Act was essentially a legislation falling under Entry 18 in List II under which the State could legislate with respect to rights, in or over land, land tenure and other matters mentioned ,in the entry without there being a public purpose and without providing any compensation. Mr. Das suggested that the inclusion in the impugned Act of the provisions contained in Chapter IV for an alteration of land tenures to the benefit of the tenants was a pure accident and there was nothing to show that this improvement could not be affected except by the abolition of Jagirs. According to Mr. Mr. Das suggested that the inclusion in the impugned Act of the provisions contained in Chapter IV for an alteration of land tenures to the benefit of the tenants was a pure accident and there was nothing to show that this improvement could not be affected except by the abolition of Jagirs. According to Mr. Das there was a material difference between the impugned Act and the Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh Acts which were considered by the Supreme Court and the considerations on which the Supreme Court held those Acts as not bad for want of public purpose, did not exist in regard to the local Act, now under examination. It was said that in regard to the Bihar and Uttar Pradesh Acts, the Supreme Court inferred public purpose from the fact that the Bills culminating into those Acts were pending at the commencement of the Constitution in the Legislatures of the States and the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Bill was not considered by the Constituent Assembly. Learned Counsel stressed the fact that the Bihar Act as its very title showed was a Land Reform Act and contemplated the setting up of a land Commission and likewise the Uttar Pradesh Act provided for land reforms; but the impugned Act did not purport to be a Land Reform Act and that there was no land reform scheme within the four corners of the impugned Act. It is further urged that as there is nothing to suggest that large blocks of land are in possession and cultivation of Jagirdars, the directive principle contained in clauses (b) and (c) of Art.39 cannot be relied upon to say that there is a public purpose behind the impugned Act. Finally, it is said that the abolition of Jagirs does not in its nature import any public purpose; that the recital in the preamble of the impugned Act that it is an Act to provide for "certain other measures of land reform" is not supported by the provisions of the Act and that the impugned Act is not one of those Acts validated under Art.31-B. 36. In answer to these contentions, the learned Advocate General read out to us certain passages to which I will refer presently, from the judgments of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in - 'The Bihar Zamindari cases'. In answer to these contentions, the learned Advocate General read out to us certain passages to which I will refer presently, from the judgments of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in - 'The Bihar Zamindari cases'. (B) and said that according to the majority decision, the existence of a public purpose was not open to judicial scrutiny or review; that even if it was, on the tests laid down by this Court in - 'ILR (1952) Madh B 178 (A)' and by the Supreme Court in - 'The Bihar Zamindari cases' (B), the impugned Act fulfilled the requirements of a public purpose. Learned Advocate-General submitted that the transference of Jagir lands to the State being in consonance with Art.39(b) and (c) was a public purpose; that the recognition of the rights of actual tillers of soil and the grant of equal status to all tenants envisaged by the provisions contained in Chapter IV of the Act constituted a public purpose and that these provisions could not be put aside lightly by saying that the inclusion of these provisions in the Act was a pure accident. It is said that the abolition of Jagirs is a logical corollary to the extinction of Feudal Order, which is incongruous with the Constitution of India, and the policy of abolition of Jagirs and land reforms adopted by the State to accelerate national economic recovery and lay the foundation of democratic super-structure is a fulfilment of a public purpose. The learned Advocate General admitted that the impugned Act did not provide for setting up of a land Commission. He however, urged that the absence of such a provision did not negative the existence of a public purpose behind the Act. He also contended that the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Bill which subsequently became the M.B. Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951, was pending at the commencement of the Constitution in the State Legislature and this fact implied that in giving to the Act the protection of Art.31(4), the Constituent Assembly recognised that the legislation was for a public purpose. As to the omission of the Act from the 9th Schedule, it is said that the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Bill had not become an Act when the Constitution was amended and that the protection given by Art.31(4) and Art.31A is not limited only to the Acts specified in the ninth Schedule. 37. As to the omission of the Act from the 9th Schedule, it is said that the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Bill had not become an Act when the Constitution was amended and that the protection given by Art.31(4) and Art.31A is not limited only to the Acts specified in the ninth Schedule. 37. On a consideration of the above arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, I have arrived at a very definite view that the objection that the impugned Act is unconstitutional for lack of a public purpose must be rejected. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the existence of a public purpose is a justiciable issue, under Arts.31(4) and 31A. The impugned Act being a law falling within the description given in these Articles, it is plain that it cannot be called in question on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of Cl.(2) of Art.31. Now, if as Mr. Das contended before us, as he did before the Supreme Court in the Bihar Zamindari cases (B), the existence of a public purpose is not a 'provision' of Art.31(2) then clearly this Court has the power to see whether the proposed resumption of Jagirs is for a public purpose. On the other hand, if the existence of a public purpose is a provision of Art.31(2), then the attack on the Act based on the lack of a public purpose cannot be entertained. The answer to the contention of Mr. Das, as indeed to his other contentions also, is to be found in the views enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Bihar Zamindari case. His Lordship Patanjali Shastri, C.J., rejecting the contention that Art.31(2) did not provide for the acquisition of property for a public purpose said: "In my opinion, the clause seeks also to impose a limitation in regard to public purpose. The clause was evidently worded in that form as it was copied (with minor variations) from S.299(2), Government of India Act, 1935, which was undoubtedly designed to give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Parliamentary of their Report that two conditions' should be imposed on expropriation of private property. The clause was evidently worded in that form as it was copied (with minor variations) from S.299(2), Government of India Act, 1935, which was undoubtedly designed to give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Parliamentary of their Report that two conditions' should be imposed on expropriation of private property. "We think it (the provision proposed) should secure that legislation expropriating or authorising the expropriation of the property of private individuals should be lawful only if confined to expropriation for public purpose and if compensation is determined either in the first instance or in appeal by some independent authority." It is thus clear that S.299(2) was intended to secure fulfilment of two conditions subject to which alone legislation authorising expropriation of private property should be lawful, and it seems reasonable to conclude that Art.31(2) was also intended to impose the same two conditions on legislation expropriating private property. In other words, Art.31(2) must be understood as also providing that legislation authorising expropriation of private property should be lawful only if it was required for a public purpose and provision was made for payment of compensation. Indeed, if this were not so there would be nothing in the Constitution to prevent acquisition for a non-public or private purpose and without payment of compensation, an absurd result, it cannot be supposed that the framers of the Constitution while expressly enacting one of the two well-established restriction on the exercise of the right of eminent domain, left the other to be imported from the common law. Article 31(2) must therefore, be taken to provide for both the limitations in express terms." 38. His Lordship Das, J., observed with regard to Art.31(2) as follows : "The clause makes it clear at once and beyond any shadow of doubt that there are three limitations imposed upon the power of the State, namely, (1) that the taking of possession or acquisition of property must be for a public purpose, (2) that such taking of possession or acquisition must be under a law authorising such taking of possession or acquisition and (3) that the law must provide for compensation for the property so taken or acquired. These three limitations constitute the protection granted to the owner of the property and is the measure of his fundamental right under this clause. Unless these limitations were provisions of the Article, the Article would have afforded no immunity at all. These three limitations constitute the protection granted to the owner of the property and is the measure of his fundamental right under this clause. Unless these limitations were provisions of the Article, the Article would have afforded no immunity at all. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the existence of a public purpose as a prerequisite to the exercise of the power of compulsory acquisition is an essential and integral part of the "provisions" of Cl.(2) ...........................The existence of a public purpose as a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of compulsory acquisition being then, as I hold, a "provision" of Art.31(2) an infringement of such a provision cannot, under Arts.31(4), 31A, and 31B, be put forward as a ground for questioning the validity of the Act." 39. This view was not accepted by their Lordships Mahajan and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ., who held that the existence of a public purpose is not a provision or a condition precedent imposed by Art.31(2) as a limitation on the exercise of the power of acquisition. His Lordship Mahajan, J., was of the opinion that : "What Art.31(4) really says is that the contravention of the express provisions of Art.31(2) relating to payment of compensation will not be a justiciable issue. It has no reference to anything that may be implied within the language of that clause. The existence of a "public purpose" is undoubtedly an implied condition of the exercise of compulsory powers of acquisition by the State, but the language of Art.31(2) does not expressly make it a condition precedent to acquisition. It assumes that compulsory acquisition can be for "a public purpose" only, which is thus inherent in such acquisition. Hence Art.31(4), in my opinion, does not bar the jurisdiction of the Court from inquiring whether the law relating to compulsory acquisition of property is not valid because the acquisition is not being made for a public purpose." 40. His Lordship Chandrasekhara Aiyar stated his view in this way : "The bar created by sub-cl.(4) of Art.31 relates to the contravention of the provisions of Cl.(2). The provision of Cl.(2) is only as regards compensation as can be gathered from its latter part............... It is assumed, rightly, that the existence of a public purpose is part and parcel of the law and is inherent in it. The provision of Cl.(2) is only as regards compensation as can be gathered from its latter part............... It is assumed, rightly, that the existence of a public purpose is part and parcel of the law and is inherent in it. The existence of a public purpose is not a provision or condition imposed by Art.31(2) as a limitation on the exercise of the power of acquisition. The condition prescribed is only as regards compensation. Article 31(4) debars the challenge of the constitutionality of an Act on this ground but no other. Whether there is any public purpose at all, or whether the purpose stated is such a purpose is open, in my opinion, to judicial scrutiny or review." 41. It is upon the observations made by His Lordship Mukherjea J., that the whole controversy whether the existence of a public purpose is or is not open to judicial scrutiny or review turns. After prefacing his judgment with the observation that "I concur entirely in the conclusions arrived at by him" (that is by Mahajan, J.) and that "the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, is not unconstitutional, with the exception of the provisions contained in Ss.4(b) and 23(f) of the Act and these provisions alone must be held to be void and inoperative." His Lordship proceeded to say : "As regards S.4(b) it has been held by my learned brother that the provision of this clause is unconstitutional as it does not disclose any public purpose at all. The requirement of public purpose is implicit in compulsory acquisition of property by the State or, what is called, the exercise of its power of 'Eminent Domain'. This condition is implied in the provisions of Art.31(2) of the Constitution and although the enactment in the present case fulfils the requirements of Cl.(3) of Art.31 and as such attracts the operation of Cl.(4) of that Article, my learned brother has taken the view that the bar created by Cl.(4) is confined to the question of compensation only and does not extend to the existence or necessity of a public purpose which, though, implicit in, has not been expressly provided for by Cl.(2) of the Article. For my part, I would be prepared to assume that Cl.(4) of Art.31 relates to everything that is provided for in Cl.(2) either in express terms or even impliedly and consequently the question of the existence of a public purpose does not come within the purview of our enquiry in the present case. Even then I would hold that the same reasons which have weighed with my learned brother in declaring S.23(f) of the impugned Act to be unconstitutional, apply with equal, if not greater, force to S.4(b) of the Act and I have no hesitation in agreeing with him as regards the decision on the constitutionality of this provision of the Act though I would prefer to adopt a different line of reasoning in support of the same." 42. We were pressed by Mr. Das to hold that when His Lordship Mukherjea, J., said that he concurred entirely in the conclusions arrived at by His Lordship Mahajan, J., it meant that he also agreed with the conclusion of His Lordship Manajan, J., that the existence of a public purpose was not a provision of Cl.(2) and that Art.31(4) did not in any way touch the powers of the Court to see whether the acquisition was for a public purpose. I can find nothing in the judgment of His Lordship Mukherjea, J., to justify me in holding that according to him also the existence of a public purpose as a condition precedent for exercising the powers of compulsory acquisition is not a provision of Art.31(2) and that therefore, Art.31(4) does not prevent the Court from enquiring whether there is a public purpose at all, or whether the purpose stated is a public purpose. As i read the observations of His Lordship Mukherjea, J., it appears to me that the conclusions of His Lordship Manajan, J., with which he expressed his concurrence are the conclusions that Ss.4(b) and 23(f) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act of 1950 are unconstitutional and that the rest of that Act is good. As i read the observations of His Lordship Mukherjea, J., it appears to me that the conclusions of His Lordship Manajan, J., with which he expressed his concurrence are the conclusions that Ss.4(b) and 23(f) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act of 1950 are unconstitutional and that the rest of that Act is good. That the existence of a public purpose as an essential condition for the acquisition of the property is not a provision of Art.31(2) and that therefore, Art.31(4) does not bar the jurisdiction of the Court from examining whether the law authorising the compulsory acquisition of the property was made for a public purpose, is the process of reasoning by which His Lordship Mahajan, J., after examining the law and after finding that S.4(b) alone was not enacted for a public purpose came to the conclusion that the section was not constitutional and that the rest of the Act with the exception of S.23(f) was good. To my mind, His Lordship Munherjea, J., while considering the question of the validity of S.4(b) did not accept the reasoning of His Lordship Mahajan, J., as to the illegality of that provision. While agreeing with the conclusion that S.4(b) was not constitutional, His Lordship Mukherjea, J., preferred to adopt a different fine of reasoning. For the purposes of his judgment, he assumed that Cl.(4) of Art.31 related to everything that was provided for in Cl.(2) either in express terms or even impliedly and consequently the question of the existence of a public purpose did not come within the purview of the enquiry by the Court. The suggestion of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that in making this assumption, His Lordship Mukherjea, J., expressed his final opinion that the existence of a public purpose was not a provision of Art.31(2), I believe is completely mistaken. That assumption, it will be found, is preceded by a recital of His Lordship Mahajan, J.'s reasoning and not by an expression of His Lordship's own final opinion contrary to the assumption. That assumption, it will be found, is preceded by a recital of His Lordship Mahajan, J.'s reasoning and not by an expression of His Lordship's own final opinion contrary to the assumption. It is also followed by the declaration that the same reasons which weighed with His Lordship Mahajan, J., in declaring S.23(f) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act to be constitutional applied with equal, if not greater, force to S.4(b) of the Act and the concluding words of that declaration that "I have no hesitation in agreeing with him as regards his decision of the constitutionality of this provision of the Act, though I would prefer to adopt a different line of reasoning in support of the same," being added because of his difference with His Lordship Mahajan, J.'s reasoning for the conclusion that S.4(b) was unconstitutional. That reasoning was that the existence of a public purpose was not a provision of Art.31; that therefore Art.31(4) did not prevent the Court from enquiring as to the existence of a public purpose and that on an examination of S.4(b), it did not disclose any public purpose at all. His Lordship Mukherjea, J., declared S.4(b) as unconstitutional not on this reasoning but on the ground that it constituted a fraud on the Constitution and was a colourable piece of legislation. In my opinion, when the judgment of His Lordship Mukherjea, J., is carefully examined, it affords no ground for the contention that according to him the existence of a public purpose is a justiciable issue. It must be noted that this reading of the passage quoted above from the judgment of His Lordship Mukherjea, J., accords with his observations in the case of - 'Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India', AIR 1951 SC 41 (F). In that case His Lordship Mukherjea, J., observed : "Article 31(2) of the Constitution prescribes a two-fold limit within which such superior right of the State should be exercised. One limitation imposed on the acquisition or taking possession of private property which is implied in the clause is that such taking away must be for public purpose. The other condition is that no property can be taken unless the law which authorises such appropriation contains a provision for payment of compensation in the manner laid down in the clause." 43. The other condition is that no property can be taken unless the law which authorises such appropriation contains a provision for payment of compensation in the manner laid down in the clause." 43. As to the meaning of these observations I can do no better than quote what His Lordship Das, J., himself has said in his judgment in the Bihar Zamindari cases. He said : "I do not, however, see how the above observations of Mukherjea, J., in any way support the arguments of Mr. P.R. Das that the existence of a public purpose is not a provision of Art.31(2) but is an inherent condition of any legislation for compulsory acquisition of private property. It is significant that Mukherjea, J., recognises that Art.31(2) prescribes a two-fold limit. Surely a limit which is prescribed by the Article must be a provision thereof. In any case, what is implied in the clause must, nevertheless, be a provision of the clause, for the expression "provision" is certainly wide enough to include an implied as well as an express provision." 44. If this is the true meaning of the observations of His Lordship Mukherjea, J., in the case of - 'Chiranjit Lal' (F) and it must be so regarded in the absence of any qualification with regard to these observations from any other Judge of the Supreme Court, then consistent with those observations, there can be no basis for the implication that His Lordship Mukherjea, J., in the passage reproduced above from his judgment in 'the Bihar Zamindari cases' (B) intended to hold that the existence of a public purpose was not a provision of Art.31(2) and, therefore, in cases to which Cl.(4) of Art.31 applied, it could be called in question in any Court. I have made quotations from the views expressed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in - 'the Bihar Zamindari cases' (B) copious in order to show by their own inherent strength that the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that according to the majority of the Supreme Court the existence of a public purpose in cases to which Art.31(4) applies is a justiciable issue is not correct. On a careful reading of the judgment of His Lordship Mukherjea, J., on which learned Counsel rests his contention, there cannot be any serious misapprehension as to the conclusion actually reached by him and his reasons therefor. On a careful reading of the judgment of His Lordship Mukherjea, J., on which learned Counsel rests his contention, there cannot be any serious misapprehension as to the conclusion actually reached by him and his reasons therefor. In view of the pronouncement of their Lordships in the Bihar Zamindari case (B), I am not disposed to accept the argument of Mr. Das that the existence of a public purpose being not a provision of Art.31(2) the bar imposed by Art.31(4) does not preclude this Court from enquiring whether the impugned Act postulates a public purpose. 45. Even assuming that the question of the existence of a public purpose is at large, I am further of the opinion that the statute before us is definitely for a public purpose. The term 'public purpose' is not a new term. Its meaning and import in relation to different statutes passed in different times has been examined in a number of decisions. But I do not think much assistance can be derived from those decisions. For, as I indicated in the case of - 'ILR (1952) Madh B 178', (A) public purpose is an indeterminate concept which varies according to the Zeitgeist, i.e., according to the drift of thought and feeling in a period. To me it appears that public purpose is essentially a product of time and circumstances. Time moves on and circumstances change rapidly, and so does the concept of a public purpose. For our purposes, it is sufficient to seek the meaning and test of a public purpose from the decision of the Supreme Court in - 'Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh Zamindari cases' (B). That decision deals with Acts passed after the commencement of the Constitution and which are in principle analogous to the impugned Act. For our purposes, it is sufficient to seek the meaning and test of a public purpose from the decision of the Supreme Court in - 'Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh Zamindari cases' (B). That decision deals with Acts passed after the commencement of the Constitution and which are in principle analogous to the impugned Act. In those cases, His Lordship Mahajan, J., has observed that the phrase "public purpose" has to be construed according to the spirit of the times in which the particular legislation is enacted and that the concept of a public purpose is not a rigid concept and it has no settled meaning, He has also pointed out that the precise purpose for which property is being acquired need not be stated in express terms in the statute itself and if from the whole tenor and intendment of the Act, it can be gathered that the property was being acquired either for the purposes of the State or for purposes of the public and that the intention was to benefit the community at large then the statute must be held to have been enacted for a public purpose, and that the point to be determined in each case is whether the acquisition is in the general interest of the community, as distinguished from the private interest of an individual. His Lordship has also taken the view that a law made for the purpose of securing an end stated in Art.3b of the Constitution and which aims at "destroying the inferiority complex in a large number of citizens of the State and giving them a status of equality with their former Lords and prevents the accumulation of big tracts of land in the hands of a few individuals which is contrary to the expressed intentions of the Constitution" would be for a public purpose. To the same effect are the observations of his Lordship Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., who has said that if the object of the Act is to extinguish "the interests of intermediaries like zamindars, proprietors, and estate and tenure holders etc. and to bring the actual cultivators into direct relations with the Government", then there is a public purpose behind the Act. To the same effect are the observations of his Lordship Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., who has said that if the object of the Act is to extinguish "the interests of intermediaries like zamindars, proprietors, and estate and tenure holders etc. and to bring the actual cultivators into direct relations with the Government", then there is a public purpose behind the Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioners while accepting these tests of a public purpose, sought to distinguish the local Act from the Acts considered by the Supreme Court and attempted to demonstrate on the grounds already summarised that the impugned Act is wanting in public purpose. I am unable to see any essential difference in the principle behind the impugned Act, and that behind the Acts examined by the Supreme Court, and I do not think that on any of the grounds urged by the learned Counsel, the impugned Act can be pronounced as unconstitutional for lack of a public purpose. The impugned Act, no doubt, does not bear the title of a Land Reforms Act. There is however, nothing in a name. It is to the provisions of the Act that we must look for determining whether it has been enacted for a public purpose. Section 4 of the impugned Act vests in the State all Jagir lands resumed. The provisions contained in Chapter IV of the Act aim at elevating the status of tenants and bringing the actual cultivators into direct relations with the State. Under these provisions the Jagirdar is reduced to a Pacca tenant and his tenants are elevated to the Status of a Pacca tenant and thus equality of status is sought to be achieved. It is clear from S.4 and the provisions contained in Chapters II and IV that the object of the Act is to eliminate the interests of Jagirdars in their lands as intermediaries, to recognise the rights of the actual tillers of the soil and to bring about a reform in the land tenure system for the general benefit of the community. The vesting of the land in the State, the extinguishment of the rights of the Jagirdars as intermediaries, the conferment of equal status on all holders of the land and the consequential reforms that may take place in the land system are all purposes which accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. 46. The vesting of the land in the State, the extinguishment of the rights of the Jagirdars as intermediaries, the conferment of equal status on all holders of the land and the consequential reforms that may take place in the land system are all purposes which accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. 46. It is not denied on behalf of the petitioners that the resumption contemplated by the Act is for the State purpose and that Chapter IV of the Act does envisage some land reform. It is, however, urged that the policy of the abolition of proprietary interests of the Jagirdars is a policy of the party in power; that the impugned Act only aims at abolition of proprietary rights of Jagirdars and at intercepting the rents payable by the tenants to the Jagirdars; that by the provisions contained in Chapeter IV of the Act, the status of the tenants would in no way be improved and that in some cases it would actually be worsened and that in any case the alteration in the land tenure can be brought about without resuming the Jagirs. All these objections seem to me to be futile. The vesting in the State of all Jagir lands regarded by the State as the first essential step - and of this fact prima facie the State is the best judge - for securing the objects specified in Art.39(b) and (c) is clearly a public purpose and not a policy of the party in power. One may accuse the framers of the Constitution of writing in the Constitution the policy of a particular party, but nonetheless, the policy having been embodied as a principle fundamental in the governance of the Country, it is a State policy irrespective of the character of the party in power. The policy embodied in Art.39 may appear to some as revolutionary. To others, it may appear progressive. It may again become out-moded some years hence and come to be regarded as reactionary. But so long as the policy is a part of the Constitution, the States have to follow it in the governance of the Country. The policy embodied in Art.39 may appear to some as revolutionary. To others, it may appear progressive. It may again become out-moded some years hence and come to be regarded as reactionary. But so long as the policy is a part of the Constitution, the States have to follow it in the governance of the Country. The vesting in the State of all resumed Jagir lands being thus in itself a public purpose, the assertion that the impugned Act merely extinguishes the proprietary interests of Jagirdars and intercepts the rents payable by the tenants to them or that the provisions of Chapter IV do not really confer any benefit on the tenants, or again that the alteration in the land-tenures contemplated by these provisions can be secured without abolishing the Jagirs, cannot in my view, be accepted as indicative of the non-existence of a public purpose behind the Act. The fact that the alteration in the land tenure contemplated by Chapter IV could have been the subject of an independent legislation under Entry 18 in List II, fry no way destroys the nexus, that is apparent between the provisions contained in Chapter IV and the other parts of Act, which in "pith and substance" is a legislation falling under Entry 36 of List II. The provisions contained in Chapter IV of the impugned Act may operate to the detriment of a few individual tenants, but from this circumstance, it does not follow that the primary object of the provisions is not to benefit the tenants as a class. A public purpose has for its primary object the general interest of the community and not the direct benefit of any individual or individuals. A public purpose has for its primary object the general interest of the community and not the direct benefit of any individual or individuals. It is worthy of note that his Lordship Mahajan, J., held that the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, was enacted for a public purpose after observing that "there is no scheme of land-reforms within the frame-work of the Statute except that a pious hope is expressed that the Commission may produce one." Later on he has said "it may be conceded that the present statute does not disclose the Legislature's mind as to what it would ultimately do after the estates are vested in the State Government." In view of these observations, I think, it is impossible to contend successfully that the proposed resumption is not for a public purpose because the impugned Act gives no indication whatsoever as to what the Government proposes to do after the Jagirs are vested in the State or that it does not contain any scheme of land-reform. On the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in 'the Bihar Zamindari cases (B)', in my opinion, there can be no escape from the conclusion that there is a public purpose for the impugned Act. Indeed, Mr. Das himself felt a little unhappy in this branch of his arguments and during the course of his reply, he was constrained to say that he would not be surprised if by force of the decision of the Supreme Court, we came to the conclusion that the impugned Act postulated a public purpose. 47. Mr. Das next challenged the validity of. cls.(a) and (g) of sub-S.(1) of S.4 and sub-cls.(ii) to (v) of Cl.4 of Sch.I to the Act on the ground that they constituted a fraud on the Constitution. On this head learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and the learned Advocate-General addressed to us elaborate arguments and placed before us all the material they would get hold of both as to the facts and the law which could assist us in our responsible task. I propose to state in some detail their contentions later when considering each of the provisions of the Act which are said to be invalid. Briefly stated, the argument of Mr. I propose to state in some detail their contentions later when considering each of the provisions of the Act which are said to be invalid. Briefly stated, the argument of Mr. Das is this : that the impugned Act in providing compensation on the basis of net income rails to pay any compensation for the non-income fetching properties such as wells, tanks ponds, water-channels, open lands, unworked mines, buildings used for schools, hospitals, offices and other public purposes, which under Cls.(a) and (g) of S.4(1) vest in the State on the resumption of the Jagirs; that the deduction under Sub-cl.(ii) of Cl.4 of the Schedule on account of expenses of collection of rents is arbitrary and has no relation to the actual costs of collection; that the deductions from the gross income under sub-cls.(iii) to (v) besides being arbitrary and artificial, are about matters in respect of which the Jagirdars are under no legal obligation to defray any expenditure; that as each of these sub-clauses fixes a consolidated deduction at a certain percentage of the gross income in respect of the various items grouped together in the sub-clause, it follows that if the deduction in respect of any item in the sub-clause is unjustified, then the whole of the sub-clause must be held to be invalid; that in that event it would not be open to this Court to apportion the percentage of deduction" between other items, for so to do would be to amend the legislation. Mr Das using the words of Abbott, C.J., in - Fox v. Bishop of Coster', (1824) 107 ER 520 (G) said that by these "shifts or contrivances" the legislature has produced a scheme denying payment of compensation to the Jagirdars and thus while pretending to legislate in conformity with Entry 42 of List III and to lay down certain principles on which compensation is to be determined has really done something prohibited by the Constitution, namely the taking of private property without payment of compensation. On the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court in 'the Bihar Zamindari cases (B)', and the cases referred to therein for explaining the meaning of the term "fraud on the Constitution", it is maintained that Cls.(a) and (g) of S.4(i), and sub-cls.(ii) to (v) of cl.4 of the Schedule being colourable in character are ultra vires. Mr. Engineer in supplementing the arguments of Mr. Mr. Engineer in supplementing the arguments of Mr. Das pointed out that whereas S.4(1)(d) provided for deduction of the expenses of collection of rents at the rate of 7 per cent, Cl.4(ii) of the Schedule fixed the amount of deduction as regards these expenses at 10 p.c. of the gross income and that these provisions were contradictory and that therefore, it was obvious that the deduction under cl.4(ii) was not on a rational basis. Mr. Engineer also added that in considering the question whether the deductions contemplated by sub-cls.(iii) to (v) of Cl.4 of the Schedule were on account of items which the Jagirdars were under a legal obligation to bear it was necessary to bear in mind the constitution of Jagirs prior to the formation of Madhya Bharat; that there were different types of Jagirs in different Covenanting States of Madhya Bharat regulated by different laws and that what might have been an obligation of a Jagirdar in one Covenanting State could not be regarded as an obligation of a Jagirdar of another covenanting State but the impugned provisions overlooking this fact treated all Jagirdars on uniform basis. Mr. Samvatsar appearing on behalf of some of the petitioning Jagirdars of the former Indian States of Indore and Dhar, argued that under the laws of those States, the Jagirdars were under no legal obligation to incur any expenditure on account of any of the heads dealt with in sub-cls.(iii) to (v) of cl.4 of the Schedule. 48. The learned Advocate-General does not dispute the proposition that the competency of the State Legislature being limited under the Constitution, it cannot do indirectly what, it cannot do directly and that if the impugned Act and any provisions thereof are colourable in character in that under the guise or pretence of doing something permitted, they are in reality doing something prohibited by the constitution, then the Act or the provisions cannot be justified as valid. He, however, argues that having regard to Arts.31(4) and 31(A) it is not open to the petitioners to urge objections as to the quantum of compensation arrived at by a certain process of evaluating the gross income and determining therefrom after certain deductions'; the net income; that for purposes of compensation the Jagirs are regarded as a whole and that cls.(a) and (g) of S.4(1) are not unconstitutional on the ground that no compensation is provided for some items of properties which are to vest in the State under those provisions; that the amount of deduction mentioned in sub-cl.(ii) of cl.(4) of the Schedule has been evolved objectively and ah the deductions in the subsequent sub-clauses are related to the obligations of the Jagirdars. It is also contended that even if there was no legal obligation on the Jagirdars at the time of the passing of the impugned Act to incur any expenditure with respect to any item mentioned in sub-cls.(iii) to (v) of clause 4 of the Schedule, the fact that in the historical setting, all Jagirs sprang out of a feudal order and it was within the power of the Ruler of the State to call upon any Jagirdar in his State to shoulder any responsibility of administration that the Ruler thought fit, is in itself sufficient for regarding the deductions challenged as valid. 49. I now proceed to consider those provisions of the Act, the constitutionality of which is challenged by the petitioners. Taking S.4(1), (a) first, the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that this sub-section is invalid because it vests in the State many items of properties which are not producing any income and for which under the scheme of compensation provided by the Act, no compensation is being paid to the Jagirdars. On this point it becomes unnecessary to do more than to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the 'Bihar and U.P. Zamindari cases (B)', where a similar argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners in those cases, was rejected by the Supreme Court. On this point it becomes unnecessary to do more than to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the 'Bihar and U.P. Zamindari cases (B)', where a similar argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners in those cases, was rejected by the Supreme Court. In the case of - 'Raja Suryapal Singh v. The State of U.P. (B)', His Lordship Mahajan, J., while repelling the contention said, "It is true that the principles of payment of compensation stated in the Act do not give anything like an equivalent or 'quid pro quo' for the property acquired and provide only for payment of what is euphemistically described in the resolution of the U.P. Legislature as "equitable compensation" Properties fetching no income pass to the State without payment of any separate compensation and as comprising part of an estate which yields some net income to the proprietor..............." "In none of the cases could it be said that the provisions of the impugned Act would result in non-payment of compensation. Great emphasis was laid on the circumstance that nothing was being paid for non-income fetching properties. It has, however, to be observed that these non-income fetching properties are integral parts of an estate as defined in Art.31A and it cannot be said when payment of, compensation is provided for on the basis of the net income of the whole of the estate, that the legislation is of a confiscatory character. Different considerations might have prevailed if the estates as a whole were not being acquired but different pieces of property were made the subject-matter of acquisition. Properties comprised in an estate may be income-fetching and non-income fetching, the value of these to the owner in the market may well be on the basis of income and if the Act has laid down the principle of payment of compensation on the foot of net income, it cannot be said that the legislation is outside the ambit of Entry 42 of List 3." 50. To the same effect are the observations of this Court in ILR (1952) Madh B 178 (A) in which it was argued with reference to the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act. 1951 that it did not provide any compensation for non-income yielding properties, as the compensation under the Act was being determined on the basis of the net income of properties. 1951 that it did not provide any compensation for non-income yielding properties, as the compensation under the Act was being determined on the basis of the net income of properties. Rejecting this argument, Kaul, C.J., agreed with the view taken by the learned Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court in - 'Suryapal Singh v. State of U.P.', AIR 1951 All 674 (H) that it was not correct to regard the acquisition of an estate, as an aggregate of the acquisition of separate parts of or interest in the estate considered independently of each other. There is thus no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the applicants that S.4(1)(a) is ultra vires, because it vests in the State non-income yielding properties in the Jagir for which no compensation is being paid. 51. The validity of S.4(1)(g) is attacked mainly on the ground that if there was no legal obligation on the Jagirdars to maintain schools, hospitals and offices in their Jagirs, the buildings belonging to the Jagirdars which were being used in Jagir lands for these purposes cannot be acquired by the State without paying any compensation to the Jagirdars. The learned Advocate-General sought to justify the validity of these provisions by saying that there was a legal obligation on the Jagirdars to maintain schools, hospitals, etc. It would be convenient to consider this clause at a later stage along with sub-cl.(iv) of cl.4 of the Schedule, as its validity on the arguments addressed before us, depends solely on the existence of a legal obligation on the Jagirdars to open and maintain schools and hospitals in their Jagirs. 52. In regard to sub-cl.(ii) of cl.4 of the Schedule, which provides for a deduction of an amount at rates stated therein on account of expenses of collection of rents (including irrecoverable arrears), the objection advanced on behalf of the petitioners is not as to the principle of deduction, but it is as to the percent age of deduction. 52. In regard to sub-cl.(ii) of cl.4 of the Schedule, which provides for a deduction of an amount at rates stated therein on account of expenses of collection of rents (including irrecoverable arrears), the objection advanced on behalf of the petitioners is not as to the principle of deduction, but it is as to the percent age of deduction. It is said that this clause in fixing the amount of deduction at 10 per cent, of the gross income, where it exceeds Rs.2000/- and an amount equal to 7 per cent, of the gross income, where it is less than Rs.2000/- ignores the elementary rule of economics that costs of collection of revenue decrease as the gross income increases; that according to R.9 of the rules made by the Government under the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 (published at page 424 of Madhya Bharat Government Gazette dated 28-7-1951) the remuneration of Patels in Raiyatwari villages has been fixed at 3 1/8 per cent of the land revenue realised by them; that in S.4(1)(d) of the impugned Act itself the expenses of collection of rents and revenue have been fixed at 7 per cent, and that having regard to these facts, the percentage of deduction fixed in sub-cl.(ii) of cl.4 of the Schedule must be regarded as arbitrary, artificial, having no relation, whatsoever to the actual costs of realisation of the rents and having no other object than that of inflating of the deduction for the purpose of nullifying the provisions of the Act regarding the payments of compensation. To support his contention that if the deduction on account of expenses for collection of rents prescribed in the sub-clause has no relation to real facts, then the enactment of the provision must be declared as a "fraud on the Constitution" and therefore ultra vires, Mr. Das pressed into service certain observations of His Lordship Mahajan, J., in 'the Bihar Zamindari cases (B)' with regard to S.23(1)(e), Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, which provides for a deduction on a percentage basis out of the gross assets as costs of management. Das pressed into service certain observations of His Lordship Mahajan, J., in 'the Bihar Zamindari cases (B)' with regard to S.23(1)(e), Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, which provides for a deduction on a percentage basis out of the gross assets as costs of management. With regard to this provision of the Bihar Act, His Lordship has observed that the rates of deduction "have been fixed in an arbitrary manner bearing no relation, whatsoever, to the actual costs of management." At another place in the judgment, His Lordship has again said "the provision in cl.(e) that costs of management have to be deducted up to twenty per cent has in its entirety no real relation to actual state of affairs." On the strength of these observations of His Lordship Mahajan, J., Mr. Das sought to argue that in the judgment of His Lordship Mahajan J., with whom their Lordships Mukherjea and Aiyer, JJ., concurred, not only cl.(f) of S.23(1) of the Bihar Act but also cl.(e) thereof has been held to be unconstitutional on the ground that the deductions provided by these clauses were of artificial nature and had no relation to any actual expenses. Mr. Das suggested that the omission of any reference to S.23(1)(e) of the Bihar Act in the order of the Supreme Court was obviously due to oversight. He also stated that a petition for a review of the judgment of the Supreme Court on this point was pending in that Court. 53. Mr. Das suggested that the omission of any reference to S.23(1)(e) of the Bihar Act in the order of the Supreme Court was obviously due to oversight. He also stated that a petition for a review of the judgment of the Supreme Court on this point was pending in that Court. 53. The reply of the learned Advocate-General is that as stated in the affidavits filed on behalf of the Government, 10 per cent is the normal cost of collection of rents inclusive of irrecoverable arrears; that the rate fixed by the Rules issued in 1951 under the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act is as Rule 9 shows a temporary measure and only relates to the remuneration of Patels and not to all the costs of collection of rents; that the rate for the deduction on account of collection of rents in sub-cl.(ii) of S.4 of the Schedule is higher than that provided in S.4(l)(d) because the former includes the costs of collection of irrecoverable arrears of rents also, whereas the latter does not include this cost; that the rate of deduction specified in the sub-clause conforms to the rates prescribed in S.21 of Kanoon Raiyatwari of Gwalior State Samvat 1994 and S.509 Kanoon Mal Gwalior Samvat 1983 and other local Acts of the various Covenanting States. It was further said by the learned Advocate-General that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that according to the majority of the Supreme Court, S.23(1)(e) of the Bihar Act, was unconstitutional on the ground that it provided for a deduction having no relation to the actual expenses of costs of management, was based on a misreading of the judgment of His Lordship Mahajan, J., 54. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that sub-cl.(ii) of cl.4 of the Schedule is unconstitutional, is in my opinion, untenable. While there does not appear to me any logical basis for the variation in the rates of deduction according as the gross income is less than or exceeds Rs.2000/- I do not think the percentage of deduction provided in the sub-clause can be called as palpably unreasonable and arbitrary. It is for the petitioners who are challenging the validity of the sub-clause to show that the ten per cent deduction on account of costs of collections of rents is fantastic and arbitrary. It is for the petitioners who are challenging the validity of the sub-clause to show that the ten per cent deduction on account of costs of collections of rents is fantastic and arbitrary. It is worthy of note that in the various affidavits filed by the petitioners, though they have stated that the Government has by rules recently issued fixed the remuneration of Patels in Raiyatwari Villages at 3? per cent and that the deduction provided by sub-cl.(ii) is arbitrary, nowhere in those affidavits have they said anything about the actual costs of collection in their Jagirs. I do not see how from the fact that the Government has fixed the remuneration of the Patels at 3? per cent of the rent recovered by them, it can be inferred that the costs of collection provided in the sub-clause is arbitrary. Costs of collection of rents include many items of Expenditure besides the remuneration payable to a Patel. Again as R.9 of the Rules published on 28-7-1951 shows it is open to the Government to increase the remuneration of 3? per cent of the Patels if it is found not conforming to the actual existing condition. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government in 'Civil. Misc. No.106 of 1951, Chandroji Rao Angre v. the State', it has been stated that the said rate of remuneration of the Patels is low and that it is the intention of the Government to revise and increase those rates. As to the alleged inconsistency between S.4(1)(d) and the sub-clause under consideration, I do not think there is any. It will be noted that S.4(1)(d) and the impugned sub-clause deal with different matters. Section 4(1)(d) relates to the apportionment between the Jagirdar and the Government of all rents, revenue, cesses for the agricultural year in which Jagir is to be resumed, and recovered by the Jagirdars before the date of resumption and by the Government after that date. It is in connection with this matter that expenses of collection in that section have been fixed at 7 per cent of the rents and revenue actually recovered. The rates of deduction specified in sub-cl.(ii) of cl.4 of the Schedule on the other hand, cover the expenses that might be incurred for the recovery of irrecoverable arrears. It is in connection with this matter that expenses of collection in that section have been fixed at 7 per cent of the rents and revenue actually recovered. The rates of deduction specified in sub-cl.(ii) of cl.4 of the Schedule on the other hand, cover the expenses that might be incurred for the recovery of irrecoverable arrears. The higher rate in the sub-clause is, therefore, clearly justified on account of the trouble and expense involved in the collection of doubtful and irrecoverable arrears. Even if it is assumed that the percentage of deduction fixed by sub-cl.(ii) is high and does not correspond to the actual costs of collection of rents, I do not think it can be held that the provision having been enacted in colourable exercise of legislative power under entry 42 List 3 is unconstitutional. The argument of Mr. Das founded on certain observations of His Lordship Mahajan J., as regards S.23(1)(e), Bihar Land Reforms Act and on the fact of pendency in the Supreme Court of a petition for a review of the judgment in the Bihar Zamindari cases, must now be rejected for the simple reason that the said review petition has been summarily dismissed by the Supreme Court. This fact has been stated in an affidavit dated 30-10-52, filed on behalf of the Government - and accepted by Messrs. Gupta and Patankar Junior counsel for the petitioners - on the basis of information received from the Deputy Registrar Supreme Court. The assistance or comfort which the learned counsel sought to derive from the observations of His Lordship Mahajan, J., and the review petition is, therefore, not now available to him. I, however, venture to add that when His Lordship Mahajan, J., observed that the rates of deduction fixed in S.23(1)(e) of the Bihar Act on account of costs of management bore no "relation to actual state of affairs", he was obviously referring to the percentage of deduction and not to the principle involved in the deduction. While when he said in regard to S.23(1)(f) of that Act that the deduction thereunder on account of costs of works for the benefit of raiyats had "no relation to real facts", he questioned the principle itself of the deduction. This is made clear by the observation in. While when he said in regard to S.23(1)(f) of that Act that the deduction thereunder on account of costs of works for the benefit of raiyats had "no relation to real facts", he questioned the principle itself of the deduction. This is made clear by the observation in. the judgment of His Lordship Chandra Sekhar Aiyer, J., that "the Act does not say that this charge represents the expenditure on works of benefit or improvements which the Zamindars and proprietors were under any legal obligation to carry out and which they failed to discharge." It is important to remember that according to the majority of the Supreme Court S.23(1)(f)' of the Bihar Act was held unconstitutional on the ground that the deduction sought to be made by that provision was about a matter in regard to which there was no legal obligation on the zamindars and proprietors to incur any expenditure, and not on the ground that the rate of deduction fixed therein had no relation to the actual expenses incurred by the zamindars or proprietors. In fact, as is evident from the arguments of Mr. Das noted in the judgment of His Lordship Patanjali Sastri, C.J., in the Supreme Court Mr. Das attacked the validity of S.23(1)(f) by saying that "there was no evidence to show that it was usual for the zamindars to incur such expenditure, and that the deduction was a mere contrivance to reduce the compensation payable for the acquisition of their estates." It is thus clear that there is no basis for the suggestion that inasmuch as His Lordship Mahajan, J., while saying that the deduction in section 23(1)(f) of the Bihar Act had no relation to real facts held the provision unconstitutional on that ground, he also intended to hold S.23(1)(e) of the Bihar Act unconstitutionalhen he said that the rates of deduction fixed in that provision bore "no relation, whatsoever, to the actual costs of management." For these reasons I think the contention of Mr. Das that sub-cl.(ii) of cl.4 of Sch.1 is unconstitutional, must fail. 55. Coming now to the other sub-clauses of cl.4 of the Schedule, it must first be stated that the challenge to the validity of these sub-clauses rests on the decision of the Supreme Court as to the unconstitutionality of S.23(1)(f), Bihar Land Reforms Act of 1950. Das that sub-cl.(ii) of cl.4 of Sch.1 is unconstitutional, must fail. 55. Coming now to the other sub-clauses of cl.4 of the Schedule, it must first be stated that the challenge to the validity of these sub-clauses rests on the decision of the Supreme Court as to the unconstitutionality of S.23(1)(f), Bihar Land Reforms Act of 1950. Section 23(1)(f) of the Bihar Act provided for a deduction on a percentage basis out of the gross assets as costs of works of benefit to the raiyats of an estate or tenure in ascertaining the net assets on which compensation is based. The principle on which the majority of the Supreme Court held this section unconstitutional was that there was no legal obligation on the zamindars or proprietors to incur any expenditure on works of benefit or improvements in their estates or tenure and that therefore the legislature could not purporting to exercise the legislative power under entry 42 of List 3 insert the provision in the Act for the purpose of "negativing partially the provisions of the Act regarding the payment of compensation". From what I have stated in the previous paragraph, there can be no room for thinking that His Lordship Mahajan, J., held this provision unconstitutional on a ground other than that stated by His Lordship Chandra Sekhar Aiyer, J. There can also be no room for the suggestion that such a deduction would be valid if it is in respect of an imperfect obligation or in respect of an obligation which though not in existence at the time of the passing of the impugned Act could have been imposed on proprietors, zamindars or Jagirdars. In applying these principles, as I propose to do, to the present case, the main inquiry must, therefore, be whether the Jagirdars are under a legal obligation to incur expenditure on account of the various items specified in sub-cls.(iii) to (v) of cl.4 of the Schedule. I now address myself to that inquiry. 56. Sub-clause (iii) of cl.4 of Sch.1 provides for a deduction on account of land records of choukidari establishments at the rate of 12½ per cent of the gross income. The validity of this sub-clause was challenged before us solely with reference to the liability of the Jagirdars from the former Indian States of Gwalior, Indore and Dhar. 56. Sub-clause (iii) of cl.4 of Sch.1 provides for a deduction on account of land records of choukidari establishments at the rate of 12½ per cent of the gross income. The validity of this sub-clause was challenged before us solely with reference to the liability of the Jagirdars from the former Indian States of Gwalior, Indore and Dhar. I am, therefore, bound to presume that the sub-clause is valid in relation to the liability of the Jagirdars from other Covenanting States of Madhya Bharat to bear these charges. As a matter of fact in 'Civil Misc. Petn. No.113 of 1951 (Indore Bench)' the petitioner Thakur Uday Singh, who is a Jagirdar of the former Ratlam State, nowhere in his affidavit disputes his liability to bear these charges. All he says is that the 12½ per cent deduction in respect of these items is "a very exaggerated figure which has no relation to actual existing condition". Similarly in 'Civil Misc. Petn. No.109 of 1951 (Indore Bench)', the petitioner Thakur Pratap Singh, who is a Jagirdar of the former Sittamu State, also does not dispute his liability as regards these charges. Mr. Das appearing for Sardar Shitole and some other Jagirdars of Gwalior State while conceding in reply that the Jagirdars of Gwalior State were under a legal obligation to incur expenditure on account of Choukidari establishment said that no such liability was thrown on them under the Kawayad Jagirdaran Gwalior State, Samvat 1970 (Manual for Jagirdars with regard to land records, and that in any case if any such liability existed, it ceased after the enactment in 1949 of Jagir Land Records Management Act (Act No.25 of 1949) under which the Madhya Bharat Government took over the management of land records in all Jagirs. Mr. Engineer on behalf of the petitioners Sardar Angre and Balbhadra Singh, who are also Jagirdars of Gwalior State, on the other hand admitted that there was a legal liability on these Jagirdars to pay charges on account of land records establishment but said that they were under no legal obligation to defray any expenditure as regards choukidari. Mr. Engineer on behalf of the petitioners Sardar Angre and Balbhadra Singh, who are also Jagirdars of Gwalior State, on the other hand admitted that there was a legal liability on these Jagirdars to pay charges on account of land records establishment but said that they were under no legal obligation to defray any expenditure as regards choukidari. It was further said that the obligation to keep choukidars under the Kawayad Jagirdaran existed so long as the Jagirdars were allowed by the Government to levy a cess of 2 per cent of land revenue on the tenants for the purpose of meeting the expenses of keeping choukidars and that as the Government abolished this cess by a notification dated 24-11-51 (published at page 1008 of the Gazette dated 1-12-51) the Jagirdars were relieved of the responsibility of appointing choukidars at their own cost. On behalf of the Jagirdars of the former Indore and Dhar States, Mr. Samvatsar argued that a Jagirdar of Indore State was no doubt, required under S.129, Indore Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1931 and the rules framed under that Act to keep a choukidar at his own expense in his Jagir and that under S.167, Dhar State Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1940, a Jagirdar in Dhar State was also similarly liable to keep a choukidar, but that inasmuch as these provisions were repealed by S.3, Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (Act No.66 of 1950), the Jagirdars of these two States were no longer under any obligation to keep choukidars at their own expense. To controvert these contentions, the learned Advocate-General relied on the provisions of the Jagir Land Records Management Act, 1949, Ss.62A and 140, Gwalior State Kawayad Jagirdaran and S.139, Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration Act, 1950 (Act No.66 of 1950) and said that these provisions unmistakably showed that all the Jagirdars in Madhya Bharat were under a legal obligation to incur expenditure on account of choukidari and land records establishments. 57. I do not think there is any force in any of these contentions put forward on behalf of the petitioners. The liability of the Jagirdars in Madhya Bharat to bear expenditure on account of management of the land records is plain enough from the provisions of the Jagir Land Record Management Act of 1949 which replaced the Land Records Management Ordinance of Samvat 2005. The liability of the Jagirdars in Madhya Bharat to bear expenditure on account of management of the land records is plain enough from the provisions of the Jagir Land Record Management Act of 1949 which replaced the Land Records Management Ordinance of Samvat 2005. Sections 3 and 4 of this Act distinctly say that "notwithstanding anything contained in any Act, Regulation or Rule in force in any Covenanting State," the management of the land records and the appointment of village Patwaris in Jagirs shall be done by the Government and the costs thereof shall be realised by the Government from the Jagirdars as arrears of Tanka in a proportion to be determined under S.4 of the Act. Under S.4 of the Act, power is given to the Government to determine "the amount and the proportion of the cost to be realised" from Jagirdars for the maintenance of land records. In view of these clear provisions, there cannot be any doubt as to the liability of the Jagirdars in Madhya Bharat to pay land records management charges. Mr. Das said that if a liability in respect of the charges for the management of land records existed under this Act, it could be separately enforced against the Jagirdars. I do not see the point in this criticism. When the Jagirs are to be resumed and the Jagirdars are to be paid some compensation for the resumption, how else is the liability to be enforced except by making a deduction from the gross income while computing the amount of compensation payable on the basis of net income. As regards choukidars, it is clear from S.140 of Kawayad Jagirdars that the Jagirdars of the Gwalior State are under an obligation to appoint choukidars at their own expense in their Jagirs. This liability is, in no way, dependent on a supposed right of the Jagirdars to levy and collect a cess from their tenants for meeting the choukidari charges. The Jagirdars of Gwalior were no doubt levying this cess for some time in their Jagirs but as this cess was prima facie illegal, it was abolished along with other illegal cesses by the notification referred to by Mr. Engineer. The notification in no way affected the liability of the Jagirdars of Gwalior State to bear choukidari charges. The Jagirdars of Gwalior were no doubt levying this cess for some time in their Jagirs but as this cess was prima facie illegal, it was abolished along with other illegal cesses by the notification referred to by Mr. Engineer. The notification in no way affected the liability of the Jagirdars of Gwalior State to bear choukidari charges. The position of the Jagirdars of Indore and Dhar States in this respect is that under S.129, Indore Tenancy Act, 1931 and S.167, Dhar Tenancy Act, they had also to appoint choukidars in their Jagirs at their own expense. These provisions have, no doubt, been repealed by the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950. But then S.139 of this Act provides that for each village or a group of villages to which the Act applies there shall be village servants appointed in accordance with rules made under the Act and that the rules may also prescribe inter alia the remuneration and the duties of these village servants. Our attention has not been drawn to any rules framed under the Act regulating the duties and the remuneration of these village servants. But it appears to me that the expression "village servants" is wide enough to include a choukidar and as the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Raiyatwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, re-enacts with some modifications the provisions contained in the Indore and Dhar State Tenancy Acts, the rules framed under those Acts with regard to the duties and remuneration of choukidars must be deemed to have been issued under the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 and continuing in force by virtue of S.23, Madhya Bharat General Clauses Act, 1950 (Act No.84 of 1950). The contention, therefore, of Mr. Samvatsar that the Jagirdars of Indore and Dhar States were, at the time of the passing of the impugned Act, under no obligation to keep choukidars at their own expense cannot be accepted. During the course of his arguments, Mr. Das also said that the deduction from the gross income of only those expenses could be regarded as legitimate which had to be incurred for earning the gross income and that as expenditure on land records and choukidari was not of such a nature, the deduction on that account was not legal. During the course of his arguments, Mr. Das also said that the deduction from the gross income of only those expenses could be regarded as legitimate which had to be incurred for earning the gross income and that as expenditure on land records and choukidari was not of such a nature, the deduction on that account was not legal. The short answer to this argument is this that 'net income' has been specifically defined in Cl.4 of the Schedule and has not been left to be determined by other tests. Even on the test propounded by the learned Counsel, I do not think it can be said that expenditure incurred on land records and choukidars is not a necessary expenditure for earning the gross income. A Jagirdar cannot clearly know the amount due from his tenants, if he does not maintain land records. He also cannot collect with ease the rents due if he does not keep a choukidar one of whose well-known duties is to take the tenants to the officer entrusted with the duty of collecting rents for paying the rents due from them. It was then said that the deduction at the rate of 12½ per cent, of the gross income was exhorbitant. There is nothing to show that these charges are unreasonably high. Even if they are to a certain extent higher than the actual expenses, the sub-clause cannot, for the reasons which I have already stated in connection with the earlier sub-clause be declared invalid. For all these reasons, I am of the opinion that the deduction under sub-cl.(iii) is in respect of a legal obligation of the Jagirdars of Madhya Bharat to incur expenditure on account of land records and choukidari. The sub-clause must, therefore, be held as valid. 58. The next sub-clause provides for a deduction from the gross income in the case of Jagirs other than a Jadid usul Jagir or a Devasthani Jagir of an amount equal to 15 per cent. of the gross income, if it exceeds Rs.2000/- or of an amount equal to 10 per cent. of the gross income if it is less than Rs.2,000/-on account of education, public health and roads. On the question of this deduction the case for the petitioners, as put by their learned. Counsel Mr. of the gross income, if it exceeds Rs.2000/- or of an amount equal to 10 per cent. of the gross income if it is less than Rs.2,000/-on account of education, public health and roads. On the question of this deduction the case for the petitioners, as put by their learned. Counsel Mr. Das, is that the Jagirdars of Gwalior State are under no legal obligation to incur any expenditure in their Jagirs for education, public health or roads and that those Jagirdars who have so far defrayed expenditure on these items have done so voluntarily. It is also added that Jagirdars whose income exceeded Rs.5000/- made some contribution to the Gwalior Government for education and roads but never on account of public health; that by circular No.2 of Samvat 1980 of Gwalior Darbar, the Jagirdars were authorised to levy and recover a cess at the rate of one anna per rupee of land revenue from their tenants' for the purpose of meeting the expenses of schools, dispensaries, roads and sanitation; that it was out of this 'cess-fund' known as 'Anni fund' that the Jagirdars maintained schools, dispensaries and roads in their Jagirs and that with the abolition of this cess by a notification of the Gwalior Government (published at p.543 of Gwalior Government Gazette, 16-6-1945) the responsibility of the Jagirdars to establish and maintain schools, dispensaries and roads ceased. Mr. Samvatsar learned counsel for the petitioning Jagirdars from the erstwhile Indore and Dhar States also said that Jagirdars of those States were under no legal obligation to spend any money for education, roads and public health. The learned Advocate-General admitted that in Indore State, education and public health in jagir villages was looked after by the State itself at its own cost. In regard to the Jagirdars of Gwalior State, he, however, contended that their liability to incur expenditure on account of the above items arose under the Daibar Policy enunciated by His Late Highness Maharaja Madhav Rao Scindia of Gwalior and under S.2 of Part A of Chap.IV of the Education Manual of Gwalior State. In regard to the Jagirdars of Gwalior State, he, however, contended that their liability to incur expenditure on account of the above items arose under the Daibar Policy enunciated by His Late Highness Maharaja Madhav Rao Scindia of Gwalior and under S.2 of Part A of Chap.IV of the Education Manual of Gwalior State. As to the cess of one anna per rupee of the land revenue, the learned Advocate-General pointed out that the receipts from this cess accumulated into a fund known as "Anni fund," which was meant to be administered by a committee of the tenants and villagers for their own welfare; that this fund was abolished because it was found that a number of Jagirdars prevented such public bodies from administering the fund for the intended purpose; and that the abolition of the cess in 1945 did not, in any way, relieve the Jagirdars of their obligation to provide at their own expense educational, public health and road facilities in their Jagirs. 59. In my view, sub-cl.(iv) of cl.4 of Sch.I is clearly ultra vires. That the Jagirdars of Indore State were under no legal obligation to defray expenditure on account of education, public health and roads is not in dispute. That the Jagirdars of Gwalior State were also under no such legal obligation cannot, as I will show in a moment, be doubted. Nowhere in the Gwalior State Manual for Jagirdars, is there any provision casting any obligation on the Jagirdars to expend money for the establishment, construction and maintenance of schools, hospitals and roads in their Jagirs. Nor is such obligation in respect of public health and education imposed on any Jagirdar by the terms of his Sanad. True, in Volume XI of the publication well-known as "Darbar Policy (Gwalior State)," there are passages reminding the Jagirdars of their duties to their tenants and exhorting them to spend money in their Jagirs lor the welfare of their tenantry. For instance in para.10 at page 7 of Volume XI of Darbar Policy, which has been relied on by the learned Advocate-General it is stated : "Besides fidelity and loyalty to their Suzerain, there are other obligations incumbent on the Jagirdars. For instance in para.10 at page 7 of Volume XI of Darbar Policy, which has been relied on by the learned Advocate-General it is stated : "Besides fidelity and loyalty to their Suzerain, there are other obligations incumbent on the Jagirdars. They must treat such of their subjects as are entrusted to their charge with justice, sympathy and humanity, endeavour to better their condition and carefully consider their education, sanitary condition and general welfare." But at page 37 of this Volume, it has been observed that : "Every one will admit that Public Works of utility such as the opening of hospitals and schools, the construction of roads and railways and the sinking of wells, building of tanks etc.. are essential for the prosperity and well-being of the State. But together with the opportunity and necessity of carrying out such works, there arises the question of money generally. Where money is available an estate just like the State, can undertake works of this nature to its advantage. The difference in the position of an estate and the State in such cases lies in the fact that if the estate is unable to bear the expenditure necessary for a road or a school, which is essential for it, in view of the mutual advantages to be derived, the Darbar itself provides the funds required." Again, in volume IV of the publication at p.68, His Late Highness remarked : "It is not compulsory on the Jagirdars that each one of them should have a separate hospital in his Jagir, for it depends upon the financial condition of his estate whether he can afford to have one or not, but where circumstances allow, one should certainly be opened and where a Jagir has not the means to do so, it should join its neighbours in maintaining a travelling dispensary." 60. Quite apart from these observations which show that the Jagirdars of Gwalior State were under no legal obligation to incur any expenditure on account of education, roads and public health, it is obvious that the 'Darbar Policy' as its very title implies and its content shows is a "Policy" and not a law defining and regulating the rights, duties, privileges and obligations of the Jagirdars of the quondam Gwalior State. It simply enunciates abstract declarations, pious aspirations, moral precepts and principles which His Late Highness desired should be followed in the administration of Gwalior State after his death. This is clear from the foreword in the first volume of the publication in which His Late Highness explained the aim and object with which he wrote the several volumes of 'Darbar Policy" he said : "The energy I have expended and efforts I have put forth in writing this Policy have mainly been inspired with the aim that the work may prove beneficial to the next generation (in which I have meant to include the Ruler as well as the Officers, subjects etc.,) so that for purposes of administering the State and shouldering the grave responsibilities thereof they might discover in this collection a store house which may serve to the Ruler, Officers and subjects of the State, as a guide, philosopher and friend; also the ways and the means for the well-being and prosperity of the subjects and those conducive to the progress and good name of the State may lie clearly chalked out before them and they may not have to wander aimlessly for want of a well-tried and sympathetic guide." 61. It is thus clear that no legal efficacy is attached to the Darbar Policy which merely embodies the principles for legislative and executive action. The practical efficacy of the principles enunciated in Darbar Policy was in fact, though not in law, considerable, inasmuch as a disregard of its spirit by any person concerned would have subjected him to strong disapprobation from the "higher authorities. But this consideration can have very little weight in considering whether the principles enunciated in 'Darbar Policy' are legal principles enforceable in any Court. As I have said before the Darbar Policy only lays down guides for political and administrative conduct and is not the source of law. 62. The learned Advocate-General placed some reliance on S.2 of Part A Chapter 4 of Gwalior State Education Manual to show that the Jagirdars were under a legal obligation to establish schools in their Jagirs. I do not see how this provision helps the State. It only prescribes the conditions under which schools could be opened in Jagir areas by the Gwalior Govt. This section by itself does not cast any obligation on the Jagirdars to establish and maintain schools in their Jagirs. I do not see how this provision helps the State. It only prescribes the conditions under which schools could be opened in Jagir areas by the Gwalior Govt. This section by itself does not cast any obligation on the Jagirdars to establish and maintain schools in their Jagirs. The learned Advocate-General then argued that the obligation of the Jagirdars to establish schools, dispensaries and construct roads in their Jagirs flowed from the historical fact that they constituted an "imperium in imperio" and that under the Jagir Manual of the Gwalior State, the Jagirdars of Gwalior State were bound to comply with the orders of the suzerain power, namely the Ruler of Gwalior State, for the care of the subjects entrusted to their charge. I do not propose to enter into, what seems to me, a profitless discussion of the polemic problem of the position of the Jagirdars of Gwalior State vis-a-vis the Ruler of Gwalior State. It as, however, clear to me that if in the relationship contended by the learned Advocate-General, the obligation of the Jagirdars to incur expenditure on account of education, roads and public health was inherent, it was a political obligation. The obligation, if I may say so, was an no way, different from the obligation, which existed on the administrators of the yore and which exists on the administrators of the present day of promoting the welfare of the people. Such an obligation is enforceable not in law but by political pressure. Learned counsel for the State felt the force of these considerations and then preferred to contend that the Ruler of Gwalior or Indore or any other State in the exercise of his sovereign authority could have imposed these obligations on his Jagirdars and in the event of their disobeying the orders of the Ruler, the Jagirs could have been also resumed by him. I am not disposed to deny that the Ruler of a former Indian State if he had chosen, could have passed an order calling upon the Jagirdars of his State to establish and maintain schools and hospitals and roads in their Jagirs and could have also taken appropriate measures to enforce his orders. I am not disposed to deny that the Ruler of a former Indian State if he had chosen, could have passed an order calling upon the Jagirdars of his State to establish and maintain schools and hospitals and roads in their Jagirs and could have also taken appropriate measures to enforce his orders. That the Rulers while preserving the rights, privileges and dignities of their Jagirdars did not effectively and legally compel them to ameliorate the condition or relieve the suffering of their tenantry may ever be a matter for disappointment. But the fact remains that no such order of any ruler imposing an obligation on all Jagirdars of his State is shown to exist and produced before us. What we are concerned with, is not the law as it would have been or would be in future, but the law as it is. The truth is that there is really no answer to the contention of the petitioners that the deduction under sub-cl.(iv) is unwarranted. The validity of this sub-clause must be judged on legal considerations and not political or moral considerations. In my opinion, as the petitioners were under no legal ligation to defray any expenditure for education, roads and public health in their Jagirs, this clause must be held, on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Bihar Zaimndari cases (B), as constituting a fraud on the Constitution and therefore, unconstitutional on that ground. If, as I think, there was no legal obligation on the petitioners to open schools and hospitals and construct roads in their Jagirs, it must follow that cl.(g) of S.4 (1) of the Act which wests in the State without any compensation all the buildings belonging to the Jagirdars standing on Jagir lands and being used for schools and hospitals must also be held to have been inserted in the Act "as a colourable exercise of legislative power under entry 42" of Concurrent List and unconstitutional on that ground. If the Jagirdars are under no obligation then clearly the buildings belonging to them and being used for schools and hospitals cannot be regarded as integral parts of a jagir estate for which no compensation need be paid separately. If the Jagirdars are under no obligation then clearly the buildings belonging to them and being used for schools and hospitals cannot be regarded as integral parts of a jagir estate for which no compensation need be paid separately. The learned Advocate-General said, as I understood him, that even if there was no legal obligation on Jagirdars to spend money on education, health etc., the mere circumstance that certain buildings belonging to them were in fact being used for schools and hospitals, would be sufficient to treat such buildings as parts of a Jagir Estate. I do not see how they could be so regarded when there is nothing to suggest that in permitting the user of these buildings for schools and hospitals, the Jagirdars intended to part with their proprietary rights therein. 64. The next and the last sub-clause which is assailed, is sub-cl.(v) which makes a provision for deduction from the gross income on account of police, revenue and judicial powers exercised by certain Jagirdars. Unlike the preceding sub-clauses, the language of this sub-clause is not general. Its applicability is restricted to those Jagirdars "who themselves or whose predecessors-in-interest immediately before 15-5-1948 exercised these powers." The question of the liability of the Jagirdars to defray the charges of police, judicial and revenue administration in their Jagirs arises with reference to some Jagirdars of the former Gwalior State. It is common ground that of the petitioners before us only some of the Jagirdars of Gwalior exercised before 15-5-1948 police, judicial and revenue powers. The submission of Mr. It is common ground that of the petitioners before us only some of the Jagirdars of Gwalior exercised before 15-5-1948 police, judicial and revenue powers. The submission of Mr. Das, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, is that no law of Gwalior State placed any obligation on the Jagirdars to exercise police, revenue and judicial powers and to incur expenditure on their account; that when any of these powers was conferred on a Jagirdar, he exercised it and spent money for the police, revenue or judicial establishment as the case may be, not as an obligation but as a privilege "only to satisfy his dignity." Learned counsel further pointed out that by the Jagir Courts, Revenue and Police Powers Abolition Act, 1949 (Act No.18 of 1949) and by the Ordinances which that Act replaced, the revenue and judicial powers of Jagirdars were withdrawn on 24-5-48, and the police powers were also taken away on 6-11-48; that from those dates, the Jagirdars were not exercising any of these powers or incurring any expenditure on these heads; and that there being thus no legal obligation at the time of passing of the impugned Act on the Jagirdars to exercise these powers or to bear their charges, the deductions provided in sub-clause (v) were illegal. In reply the learned Advocate-General placed reliance on Chaps. 13 and 14 of the Gwalior State Manual for Jagirdars, Samvat 1970 and on S.191 of the Gwalior State Police Manual, Samvat 1990 and argued that these provisions indicated that when a Jagirdar was invested with any of these powers, he had no option but to exercise the power as an obligation and bear charges for the necessary establishment for the exercise of that power. He also said that though the State of Madhya Bharat took away in 1948 the police, revenue and judicial powers from the Jagirdars their liability to contribute towards the expenses of the police, revenue and judicial administration in their jagirs continued. 65. Strictly speaking, the point raised can be disposed of by reference to the provisions of the Jagir Courts, Revenue and Police Power Abolition Act, 1949 (Act No.18 of 1949) which relieved the Jagirdars of their police, revenue and judicial powers. But it seems to me desirable to stress the status or title in which the Jagirdars exercised these powers before they were withdrawn in 1948. But it seems to me desirable to stress the status or title in which the Jagirdars exercised these powers before they were withdrawn in 1948. The relevant provisions bearing on the subject are to be found in Chaps.13 and 14 of the Gwalior State Manual for Jagirdars. A careful reading of these provisions shows that no Jagirdar could claim to exercise revenue or judicial powers as a matter of right. The power had to be specifically conferred by the Suzerain, namely the Maharaja of Gwalior for the time being, and it was subject to such conditions as the Maharaja imposed. The power could be enlarged, curtailed or taken away at any time. Again, on the death of a Jagirdar invested with these powers his successor or heirs could not exercise those powers without a fresh conferment of the power from the Gwalior Darbar, and the heir or successor could exercise only those powers which had been specifically conferred on him. It must be noted that the rights granted under a Sanad were also subject to the operation of Ss.56 and 57 of the Manual, which contained inter alia the rules stated above. Section 66 of the Manual laid down that the State would be entitled to the whole of the stamp revenue and judicial receipts of every kind as for examples, fines, forfeiture of security bonds etc., and the State would allot the necessary funds for the establishment of the Courts. An exception was, however, made in the case of Jagirdars, in whose Jagir sanads the term "Diwani, Foujdari" occurred. Such Jagirdars retained the entire judicial receipts and income, and were also required to defray the cost of the establishment of the Courts. There is no provision in the Jagir Manual as regards the investment and exercise of police powers. We have not been referred to any other law of Gwalior State regulating the conferment and exercise of police powers. The Advocate-General drew our attention only to S.191 of the Gwalior State Police Manual. But this section by itself does not deal with the conditions and circumstances in which a Jagirdar could be invested with police powers. It only lays down the directions which a Jagirdar invested with police power was required to follow in the recruitment and establishment of a police force in his Jagir. But this section by itself does not deal with the conditions and circumstances in which a Jagirdar could be invested with police powers. It only lays down the directions which a Jagirdar invested with police power was required to follow in the recruitment and establishment of a police force in his Jagir. It may be mentioned that S.191 of the Police Manual speaks of the exercise of police powers by the Jagirdars as an "Aijaz" (honour). Provisions similar to those contained in Chaps.13 and 14 of the Gwalior Jagirdar's Manual also exist in the Indore State Manual for Jagirdars. 66. It is clear from the above brief summary of the material provisions of the Manual for Jagirdars and S.191 of the police Manual that those provisions exclude the idea of the Jagirdars exercising these powers as a matter of right, independently of the sovereign power. On the other hand the provisions make it amply clear that whatever powers the Jagirdars exercised in police, revenue and judicial administration, they exercised in complete subordination to the Ruler of the State for the time being, from whom such powers were derived by specific conferment and on whose pleasure their continued exercise entirely depended. The provisions proceed on the premise that police, revenue and judicial powers are sovereign rights of the Ruler of the State and are not incidents or attributes of any right, even proprietary, in the soil granted by the Ruler to the Jagirdar. If, therefore, these rights could not be exercised without a specific conferment and if they could be withdrawn at any time, and if no Jagirdar could enforce those rights in a Court of law or claim damages from the State for the withdrawal of those rights, I am unable to see, how it can be asserted that in the exercise of police, revenue and judicial powers and in incurring expenditure for these purposes, the Jagirdars were acting not as persons on whom certain privileges had been conferred but were acting in the discharge of a legal obligation imposed on them by law or by the terms of their sanads. The privilege of exercising revenue, judicial or police powers, no doubt involved some expenditure on .the part of the Jagirdars for the establishment of police force and civil and revenue Courts. The privilege of exercising revenue, judicial or police powers, no doubt involved some expenditure on .the part of the Jagirdars for the establishment of police force and civil and revenue Courts. But those Jagirdars who sought these powers and exercised them, were evidently prepared to pay the price for privileges which many might regard as empty or burdensome. The voluntariness of the Jagirdars to bear the charges on account of police, judicial and revenue administration cannot clearly be regarded as an obligation imposed on them to exercise those powers and incur the necessary expenditure. No instance has, however, been cited before us in which without the conferment of these powers on any Jagirdar, he was asked to contribute towards the expenses of police, judicial and revenue administration by the State in his Jagir or in which on the withdrawal of those powers from him a demand was made on him for such a contribution. To me, it is clear that even before 1948, when the judicial, police and revenue powers were withdrawn from the Jagirdars, there was no legal obligation on the Jagirdars to exercise those powers and to incur any expenditure for police, revenue and judicial administration in their Jagirs. 67. The matter seems to me to be now concluded by the enactment in 1949 of the Jagir Courts, Revenue and Police Powers Abolition Act. This Act replaced two Ordinances promulgated in the previous year taking away the police, revenue and judicial powers of the Jagirdars. Sections 3 and 5 of the Act abolished all police, judicial and revenue powers of the Jagirdars and prohibited them from exercising those powers. Section 7 of the Act repeals inter alia "all provisions in, and powers under any other enactment, Manual, Circular, Rule or Order whatsoever, which are in force and are being exercised in any part of the United State (i.e., Madhya Bharat) and which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act." From what is provided in Jagir Courts Revenue, Police Powers Abolition Act, it is plain that the provisions contained in the Gwalior State Manual for Jagirdars about the conferment and exercise of the revenue and judicial powers stand repealed and that when the impugned Act was enacted, there was no obligation on the Jagirdars to exercise these powers or to meet any expenditure for police, judicial and revenue administration in their Jagirs. It is significant that the Jagir Courts, Revenue and Police Powers Abolition Act, unlike the Jagir Land Records Management Act 1949 (Act No.25 of 1949) does not contain any provision for the realisation from the Jagirdars of the expenses that might be incurred by the Government for police, revenue and judicial administration in the Jagirs as a result of the withdrawal of the powers exercised by the Jagirdars. To me, the omission is eloquent as emphasising the fact that the Jagirdars were at no time under any legal obligation to defray the costs of police, revenue and judicial administration in their Jagirs. Another section of the Act which deserves to be noted is S.6 (1) which says that "When a Jagirdar is unable to collect rent due to him, he may, according to the provisions of law, relating to rents, for the time being in force, in the area concerned apply before a competent Court or authority." The insertion of this provision in the Jagir Courts, Revenue and Police Powers Abolition Act, can only be explained by the fact that the Act presupposes that the grant of police, revenue and judicial powers to Jagirdars was to enable them to collect the rents due. If this is the real purpose of the grant of these powers, then I think it could be argued with considerable force that expenditure incurred by a Jagirdar for revenue, police and judicial establishments is a part of the costs of collection of rents, for which a provision has already been made in sub-cl.(ii) of cl.4 of Sch.I. 68. From what I have said above, it is clear that whatever may have been the position before 1948, since that year there is no legal obligation on the Jagirdars to incur expenditure for revenue, police and judicial administration in their Jagirs. As there was no such obligation at the time of the enactment of the impugned Act, sub-cl.(v) of Cl.4 of Sch.I, must on the strength of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Bihar Zamindari cases (B), be held as unconstitutional. During the course of his arguments, the learned Advocate-General suggested that it was sufficient to support the validity of the sub-clause if a legal obligation existed not at the time of the passing of the impugned Act but at some time anterior to it. I am unable to accede to this argument. During the course of his arguments, the learned Advocate-General suggested that it was sufficient to support the validity of the sub-clause if a legal obligation existed not at the time of the passing of the impugned Act but at some time anterior to it. I am unable to accede to this argument. If this test is accepted then one is led to the strange conclusion that if the legislature had chosen to provide for a very high deduction in respect of the legal obligation for which many of the Jagirs were originally granted,, to wit, to furnish a certain number of armed followers and cavalry, the deduction would be valid. I have no doubt in my mind that according to the decision of the Supreme Court in the Bihar Zamindari cases (B), the deduction from the gross income in order to be valid must be in respect of a legal obligation existing at the time of the passing of the impugned Act. 69. I am, therefore, disposed to think that sub-cl.(v) of Cl.4 of Sch.1 is colourable in character in that it provides for something which really cannot be done in the exercise of the legislative power under entry 42 of List III and is, therefore, unconstitutional. If this sub-clause is unconstitutional, it must follow that the buildings standing in Jagir lands and belonging to the Jagirdars which were being used by them for the exercise of police, judicial and revenue powers cannot vest in the State under cl.(g) of S.4(1). 70. It is not suggested that if cl.(g) of S.4(1) and sub-cls.(iv) and (v) of Cl.4 of Sch.I are invalid, then the whole Act is ultra vires. Mr. Das conceded that upon the principles indicated by the Supreme Court in the Bihar Zamindari cases (B), these provisions must be regarded as severable from the general scheme of the impugned Act of which they form a part,, and I think that they are so severable. 71. It only remains for me to consider the-special points urged by Mr. Engineer and Mr. Gupta with regard to some petitions. 72. Mr. Engineer contended that the Madhya Bharat Jagir Abolition Act, 1951 could not be made applicable to the petitioner Balbhaura Singh in petition No.1 of 1952 who was a holder of a 'mediatised' estate and not of Jagir granted by the Scindia. Engineer and Mr. Gupta with regard to some petitions. 72. Mr. Engineer contended that the Madhya Bharat Jagir Abolition Act, 1951 could not be made applicable to the petitioner Balbhaura Singh in petition No.1 of 1952 who was a holder of a 'mediatised' estate and not of Jagir granted by the Scindia. It was said that under the sanads given to the ancestors of the petitioner by the British Government, he was aii absolute owner of the estate exercising sovereign rights therein. In substance it is claimed that the petitioner Bhalbhadra Singh is an independent chief and the Madhya Bharat Government has no power to acquire compulsorily any part of his estate. The answer I would make to that contention is, that "an Indian State" has been defined in Art.366 of the Constitution as "any territory which the Government of the Dominion of India recognised as-such a State" and it is not the case of the petitioner Balbhadra Singh that his estate was recognised by the Government of the Dominion of India as an 'Indian State'. It is also clear from a copy of the Sanad granted by the Ruler of Gwalior which has been filed with the petition, and from the references, given in the appendices to the petition, to Aitchison's 'Treaties, Engagements and Sanads", Vol. V that the petitioner was at no time recognised even by the British Government as an independent Chief. On the other hand, it is plain from the pronouncement dated 14-3-1921 of Lord Chelmsford the then Viceroy of India (given at p.517 of Aitchison's "Treaties, Engagements and Sanads", Vol.V) that the petitioner's ancestors and other holders of 'mediatised' estates were since the beginning of 19th Century always under the suzerainty of the former Gwalior. State and that when in 1921 the British Government modified their practice in relation to the 'mediatised' estates and permitted the Gwalior Darbar to exercise those rights over the estates which belonged to it as a Suzerain, they only assured that the Gwalior Darbar would issue to the holders of these estates fresh sanads and honour the pledges given and the rights 'mediatised' by the British Government. Paragraph 8 of that pronouncement is very significant. Paragraph 8 of that pronouncement is very significant. It said : "In view of this settlement, Political Officers-will no longer concern themselves with your affairs and you will in future look to your Suzerain, His Highness the Maharaja Scindia for the time being, and his Darbar in all matters connected with your estates and tankas. You will, therefore, henceforth be entitled to the rights and subject to the obligations contained in the Manual of Jagirdars of the Gwalior State Samvat 1970, as in force for the time being." 73. In the face of this pronouncement, which was later implemented by the Gwalior Darbar, the claim of the petitioner that he is an independent Chief cannot seriously be countenanced. With the lapse of the British paramountcy over Indian States in 1947, the guarantees given by the British Government to the holders of. the 'mediatised' estates also lapsed and since then the holders of these estates are in their status or rights no better than the other Jagirdars of Gwalior State. I do not think it is necessary to say more on this point. For, the question whether any particular estate or village is, or is not a Jagir for the purposes of the impugned Act does not really arise at this stage. It can arise only when Government issues a notification under S.3 of the Act and claims by virtue, of that notification that certain lands being jagir lands have vested in the State. 74. Mr. Gupta appearing in cases Nos.628 and 629 of 1951 contended that under Entry 36 List II the State Legislature had the power to legislate with respect to acquisition of property but not with respect to resumption of property; that the impugned Act dealt with the resumption of Jagirs and was, therefore, beyond the competence of the State Legislature and ultra vires. Mr. Gupta also raised the point that the State Legislature could not pass any law with regard to the acquisition of Jagir properties and the payment of compensation for the acquisition, as the subject-matter of acquisition of land and compensation therefor was already covered by an existing law, merely, the Gwalior Land Acquisition Act. Mr. Gupta also raised the point that the State Legislature could not pass any law with regard to the acquisition of Jagir properties and the payment of compensation for the acquisition, as the subject-matter of acquisition of land and compensation therefor was already covered by an existing law, merely, the Gwalior Land Acquisition Act. It is also said that the two petitioners are holders of Jagirs in which lands have been settled on the Zamindari system and that under the scheme of compensation provided by the Act, as the zamindars in the Jagirs are to receive compensation out of the compensation payable to the Jagirdars, no compensation would really be received by the Jagirdars, and that on the other hand they would be required to pay from their own pockets substantial amounts for the payment of compensation to the Zamindars. 75. These contentions are devoid of any substance. I find it difficult to understand how the argument based on "the distinction between "acquisition" and 'resumption' really helps the two petitioners on whose behalf Mr. Gupta appeared. To me it appears that by advancing that argument Mr. Gupta is impliedly assenting to the proposition that a 'Jagir' is not the property of the holder thereof and is liable to be resumed. For 'resumption' connotes the idea that the land resumed is not the property of the persons from whom it is taken back by the rightful owner. On this argument it would follow that Jagirs could be resumed without any legislation and the Jagirdars are not entitled to any compensation for the resumption. The argument of Mr. Gupta ignores the fact that the rights of Jagirdars recognised by the impugned Act are actually higher than those claimed by Mr. Gupta on their behalf. It presupposes that the Jagirdars have by usage, prescription and grant acquired in relation to the lands a bundle of rights exercisable with respect to the lands; that this "bundle of rights" is a property which can only be acquired in consonance with the provisions of Art.31(2) of the Constitution. The impugned Act is, no doubt, described as an Act for the resumption of Jagir lands, but it is in essence an Act for the acquisition of the "bundle of rights exercisable by the Jagirdars with respect to the lands". The impugned Act is, no doubt, described as an Act for the resumption of Jagir lands, but it is in essence an Act for the acquisition of the "bundle of rights exercisable by the Jagirdars with respect to the lands". The argument that the State Legislature by enacting the impugned Act could not deprive the petitioners of the benefit of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, must also be rejected. A similar argument was raised in the Supreme Court in the Bihar Zamindari Case and was repelled. Rejecting the argument His Lordship Mahajan J., said "the provisions as to assessment of compensation enacted in the Land Acquisition Act only apply to acquisitions that are made by notification under that Act. Its provisions have no application to acquisitions made under either local or central laws unless they are specifically made applicable by the pro-visions of these Statutes." The position here is no different as to the contention that no compensation would really be paid to Jagirdars in whose Jagirs, land is settled on Zamindari system, I must confess I have had small success in appreciating the argument of the learned Counsel. In the affidavit filed by the petitioner Sardar Jadhav in 'Civil Misc. Case No.629 of 1951' details of the amount of compensation that would be payable to the petitioner and to his zamindari have been given and an attempt has been made to show that the compensation payable to the Zamindars is actually more than that the Jagirdar himself would get. The mistake in these calculations lies in the fact that the gross income of a Zamindar under cl.(2) of Sch.II has been taken to be the gross income of the Jagir-dar under cl.(2) of Sch.I. A perusal of these clauses of the two Schedules will show that the gross income of a Jagirdar in the case of land settled on the Zamindari system, is not the same as the gross income of a zamindar. It includes the land revenue payable to the Jagirdars by the Zamindars and many other item. In the calculation set out in the affidavit of Sardar Jadhav, the land revenue payable by the Zamindar to the Jagirdar or income under other heads has not been included, as it should have been, in the gross income of the Jagirdar. There does not appear to me any force in this contention. 76. In the calculation set out in the affidavit of Sardar Jadhav, the land revenue payable by the Zamindar to the Jagirdar or income under other heads has not been included, as it should have been, in the gross income of the Jagirdar. There does not appear to me any force in this contention. 76. In the result on the arguments addresses : before us, I take the view that the Madh Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951, with the exception of the provisions contained in S.4(1)(g) and sub-cls.(iv) and (v) of cl.4 of Sch.I is valid. The excepted provisions are, in my opinion, unconstitutional and a writ of mandamus should be issued to the Madhya Bharat State Government not to give effect to the provisions contained in S.4(1)(g) and sub-cls.(iv) and (v) of cl.4 of Sch.I. In the circumstances of these petitions, I would make no order as to costs in any of them . 77. Mr. Das learned Counsel for the petitioners has asked for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from our decision. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Bihar Zamindari Cases, it cannot clearly be certified that these cases involve a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. I would, however, having regard to the general importance of the questions raised in these petitions certify these cases as fit for appeal to the Supreme Court and grant leave to appeal to the petitioners, as well as to the State. 78. CHATURVEDI, J. :- I have had the advantage of going through the draft judgment dictated by my learned brother Dixit. I agree that inasmuch as an estate is being acquired and the non-income fetching properties such as wells, tanks, ponds, water channels, open lands, unworked mines etc., are integral parts of an estate as defined in Art.31A of the Constitution the observation of Mahajan J. in - 'Raja Suryapal Singh v. State of U.P.', 1952 SCJ 446 (B) are fully applicable to the facts of this case and the contention of Shri P.R. Das that S.4(1)(a) is invalid must be rejected. I also agree that the contentions of Sardar Jadhav in 'Civil Misc. Case No.629 of 1951' have no force and should be rejected. I also agree that the contentions of Sardar Jadhav in 'Civil Misc. Case No.629 of 1951' have no force and should be rejected. On other questions, I have approached the subject on entirely different lines, and, I feel, I should give my reasons and conclusions in my own words. I also think that some of the observations of the Supreme Court in Bihar Appeals '(1952 SCJ 354 (B))' if made applicable to the case of Jagirdars will require suitable modifications as the rights of the Zemindars are altogether different from those of the Jagirdars. During the course of arguments I could see considerable confusion at the Bar as to the exact rights and obligations of a Jagirdar. In my opinion the Jagirdari System as it developed in Central India is something different from that developed in other parts of former British India and the questions argued in this case require adjudication keeping in mind this difference. The material provisions of the impugned legislation as well as the provisions governing the Jagirs, in the Covenanting States of Madhya Bharat, in my opinion, cannot be fully understood independently of the historical evolution of different kinds of Jagirs in Central India. I, therefore, propose to give a very brief description of the evolution of Jagirs in Madhya Bharat and then discuss the various provisions of the Manual for Jagirdars to show that exact nature and rights of the Jagirdars at the formation of Madhya Bharat State. I would then discuss the development since 1948, and would also briefly refer to the legislation coming in its wake that affected the interests of Jagirdars. It is in the light of these facts that I think it proper to consider the two main contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners. 79. The Jagirdari system had its origin in the military-cum-political contracts, or what could be regarded as such, within whose scope a large part of North and Central India during the Mohammadan period had been brought. The Moghuls apportioned their territory into Khalsa and Jagir lands. The former was divided into charges and managed by State officials. The rest was divided out into blocks or estates which were made over to military commanders or courtiers who took the revenues for their own support, or that of a military force which they were bound to maintain. The Moghuls apportioned their territory into Khalsa and Jagir lands. The former was divided into charges and managed by State officials. The rest was divided out into blocks or estates which were made over to military commanders or courtiers who took the revenues for their own support, or that of a military force which they were bound to maintain. At first Jagirs were granted only for life time (Baden Power : Land Systems in British India, Vol.I, page 257) and, only by the Emperor, or, on the recommendation of the Governors of the most important of the distant provinces, as Kabul, Bengal and the Dakhan. In the times of the decline, however, all sorts of local governors granted them, the precautions and rules fell into abeyance, and the grant became hereditary (ibid, page 530). In its inception causes were at work which were trying military service to the tenure of the land and so the Jagir grants were connected with military or State service of some kind. Jagir is a Persian word (from 'Jai' - place, and Gir - holder) meaning an assignment of the land revenue of a territory to a chief or noble to support troops, etc. (ibid page 189). There were other grants which involved the remission of the revenue and in time came to constitute actual estates in land. One such revenue - free grant was called 'altamgha', i.e., grant by the royal seal or stamp (tamgha). The grant of the Dewani to the East India Company was an 'altamgha' (ibid page 530). The system of assigning the revenues of a tract as a reward for good service, or for the support of troops was continued by the Marathas and also by the British. The Mahratta leaders granted Jagirs in Central India to their warriors in the Camps, to cadet members of the chief's families for their support and maintenance, to temples (Devasthani), or, to sacred institutions (Dharmadaya), and to several Rajput Chiefs who had helped them and whom they recognised as their Jagirdars. Several independent small Rajput Chiefs who had fought against them and who had been defeated and driven from their possessions found refuge in the hills and jungles and avenged themselves by levying contributions from the detached villages which had been usurped by the stronger powers. Several independent small Rajput Chiefs who had fought against them and who had been defeated and driven from their possessions found refuge in the hills and jungles and avenged themselves by levying contributions from the detached villages which had been usurped by the stronger powers. The larger States were compelled to purchase immunity from their raids by paying them blackmail money, known as Girasia. The districts in Malwa and in Central India were in so disorganised a state as to be unsafe even for troops to pass through. There were few places that were not subject to murderous 'forays', and few in which the cultivator could safely ply his peaceful calling. All parties at this time solicited the interference of the British Government, and, as it afforded them an opportunity of breaking the continuity of the Mahratta powers, Sir John Malcom, on their behalf, intervened and induced the petty chiefs to desist from the predatory incursions, by asking their superiors to grant them lands under the British guarantee or by guaranteeing to them payments equivalent to the Girasia which they levied. The various engagements were concluded in 1818 and the degree of interference exercised by the British Government in the affairs of the guaranteed estates varied with the nature of the engagements concluded (Aitchison : Treaties, Engagements and Sanads; Vol.IV pages 5 to 7). A hundred years later, the larger states desired that these "guaranteed estates" be handed over to them and as it was proving a matter of much difficulty to the British to manage them they were entrusted to the Suzerainty of their overlords. These Jagirdars, known as "guaranteed Estate-holders" always claimed semi-independent jurisdiction. In March 1921, for the first time, Suzerain rights of Gwalior Durbar were restored over 43 Guaranteed Estates and the announcement was made by the Viceroy at a Darbar held at Delhi on 14th March. The Gwalior Darbar thereafter granted new perpetual Sanads to these 43 holders. I shall deal with this matter later in connection with certain contentions advanced on behalf of the Guaranteed Estates. 80. The granting of Jagirs had been going on since the Moghul Period and so in Gwalior and other States it was decided to scrutinise each and every Sanad. The Gwalior Darbar thereafter granted new perpetual Sanads to these 43 holders. I shall deal with this matter later in connection with certain contentions advanced on behalf of the Guaranteed Estates. 80. The granting of Jagirs had been going on since the Moghul Period and so in Gwalior and other States it was decided to scrutinise each and every Sanad. In case a defect was found in the Sanad the Jagir village was to be surveyed and assessed at the cost of the State and in supersession of the old Tanka (tribute), the amount of the new Tanka was to be fixed at 50 per cent of the Nikasi after setting apart 5 per cent, of the gross Nikasi for expenses on account of Patwari and Chowkidar, In case the old amount exceeded 50 per cent of the Nikasi it was to be reduced to that standard. These Jagirs were termed as 'Jadid-Usul-Jagirs'. A new Sanad was to be given to the holders in new terms. The amount of Tanka was thus for the first time regularised in terms of land revenue. Formerly there was no rule regulating the Tanka and the amount varied from time to time depending upon political exigencies of the occasion. At least one thing was certain that it was not based upon any system of assessment and had no connection with the crop or with the average harvest price of a series of years and could not be called a "share in the produce". The contention of Shri P.R. Das that, in order to calculate 'net income' only 'tanka'"should be deducted from the gross income of a Jagir thus loses its force. From the figures given at page 30 of the Report of the Rajasthan - Madhya Bharat Jagir Enquiry Committee it will be apparent that there are in all 1329 Jagirs in this State having 4,249 villages deriving an annual income of roughly rupees 74 Lakhs out of which the State receives nearly 12 Lakhs of rupees in the form of Tanka, a major portion of the income (nearly 62 Lakhs) remaining in the pockets of Jagirdars benefiting neither the State, nor the tillers of the soil. The Jagirdars contend that accord-ling to the terms of their Sanads the Jagirs are their property and they are not bound to spend any portion of their income towards the general welfare of the subjects. 81. The Jagirdars contend that accord-ling to the terms of their Sanads the Jagirs are their property and they are not bound to spend any portion of their income towards the general welfare of the subjects. 81. The terms of the earlier Sanads vary from place to place and from time to time. Generally the form is "these villages are given to you for maintenance of your family, from generation to generation". Some times a condition is imposed : "you or your relation or any other shall not disturb the peace of the Fort and the Fergana. If somebody does mischief due compensation shall be taken and the Sarkar will confiscate the properties" '(C.M. Case No.G19 of 1951)'; or "you will obey the order of the Sarkar, remaining in service. If you cause disturbance of peace in the territories of the Sarkar or of those of the East India Company your Jagir will be confiscated" '(C.M. Case No.4 of 1952)'; or, "you shall not create disturbances in the territories of the Sarkar, those of the Company or in those of other States. You shall not mix with them, nor shall give shelter to criminals of the Sarkar. You shall keep Chowkies in your territories and protect roads and be responsible for any damage that might occur." '(C.M. Case No.631 of 1951)'; or, "in all 14 villages yielding thirty thousand rupees as Nankar and cash payment for 100 horsemen (Cavalry) and 200 footmen (infantry) are hereby conferred. Enjoy the same as Nankar year to year plus cash for the expenses of the horsemen and footmen." '(C.M. Case No.3 of 1952)'. 82. There is no invariable line of demarcation between one Sanad and another and sometimes a Sanad appears to be an extremely formless document. I have mentioned these things in order to show the complexity of the problem and to bring out the importance of the following two points that should be kept in mind : (1) First, that the enforcement of obligations laid down in the sanads could have been dictated by conscience, or by political caprice, or by force of arms, but not by a positive vinculum juris; (2) Secondly, it must be impossible to lay down general principles for payment of compensation to the Jagirdars which would not fail in several cases. It was not till 1913 when the creative initiative of His late Highness Maharajah Madhav Rao Scindia of Gwalior State brought about rules and regulations for the governance of the Jagirs and reduced the Sanads to a more systematic and standard form. These rules and regulations received recognition from the Viceroy when he told the 43 guarantee-holders : "In view of this settlement, Political officers will no longer concern themselves with your affairs, and you will in future look to your Suzerain, His Highness the Maharajah Scindia for the time being, and his Darbar in all matters connected with your estates and tankas. You will, therefore, henceforth be entitled to the rights and subject to the obligations contained in the Manual of Jagirdars of the Gwalior State, Sambat 1970, as in force for the time being" (Aitchison, Vol.5, para 8, page 518). The contention of the guarantee-holders that the guarantee of continuance of possession should be respected can be disposed on the short ground that political treaties of guarantee do not devolve upon successors, but become void through the extinction of the contracting parties (Oppenheim's International Law, vol.II, chapter XI, page 851; 7th Edn. 1948). 83. In 1928, the Manual for Jagirdars was, with slight modifications, adopted by the Indore State and since then the Jagirs are being governed by the provisions of these two Manuals in Gwalior and Indore State. The Jagirdars of the Covenanting States other than Gwalior and Indore have not argued that the rules in their States differ in any fundamental manner from the two Manuals and so it will be proper to examine closely the provisions of the two Manuals only to know the exact nature of the rights and obligations of the Jagirdars. 84. The first provision which attracted comments and lengthy and elaborate arguments is that the Jagir is an indivisible and impartible property, inalienable except under certain conditions, and that the rule of primogeniture has invariable application to it. On behalf of the petitioners, Shri P.R. Das and Shri Samyatsar have contended that there are Zemindaries which are impartible and which descend to a single member and that restriction on alienation can also be imposed on private Zamindaries by statute. Obviously the Punjab Alienation of Land Act (Act 13 of 1900) was in view. On behalf of the petitioners, Shri P.R. Das and Shri Samyatsar have contended that there are Zemindaries which are impartible and which descend to a single member and that restriction on alienation can also be imposed on private Zamindaries by statute. Obviously the Punjab Alienation of Land Act (Act 13 of 1900) was in view. It is true that, in the interest of agriculture and of agriculturists, statute has often imposed restrictions on alienation of land. In order to create a strong-rooted peasantry, in Germany, the Nazi legislation of 1933 had prohibited the alienation or division of farms of medium size. The land descended in toto to one heir and was put beyond the reach of creditors (Paton : A Text Book of Jurisprudence p.388). So in several places primogeniture, or, in other ultimogeniture was designed to keep the estate of the deceased as a unit whereas division among all the children was considered as leading to difficulties in an agricultural community as the units of land become too small as subsistence. Then alienation of land may also be forbidden by religious scriptures or in the interest of family estate. In Hindu Dharma Shastra the sale of land is not contemplated. Though a gift of land is extolled, yet the sale of family land is regarded as sacrilegious. Passages pointing to the inalienability and even to the impartiality of ancestral property may be found in the Smriti Chandrika chapter VII para 44. The inseparableness of the family lands from the family to which they belonged was a favourite notion, almost throughout antiquity, both with the populace and with philosophers. "The difficulty placed in the way of alienation fostered the natural attachment to the soil they had tilled, which the Hindus shared with other races of men, and which still makes them, in general, greatly prefer a mortgage or lease with fine to a sale" (2 Bom 299 at pages 328-329). 85. A perusal of the two Jagirdari Manuals will, however, make it clear that the provision of inalienability and impartibility and of the rule of primogeniture in Jagirs had no other motive than a purely political one. 85. A perusal of the two Jagirdari Manuals will, however, make it clear that the provision of inalienability and impartibility and of the rule of primogeniture in Jagirs had no other motive than a purely political one. In the preamble to both the Manuals it is provided that "a Jagir is generally conferred as a reward for loyal and meritorious services and the Ruler (or the Government) has a direct interest in the preservation of Jagirs in their integrity and their continuance in their particular families on which they were conferred, and, that it is with that end in view that restrictive regulations against alienations are enforced - restrictions from which private property is generally immune." As the Jagir was generally conferred on persons, whom we may call officers of State, landless men, and professional careerist in the service of the Ruler, the motive could not have been actuated by a desire to benefit the agriculturist class. As it will be seen hereafter that the Jagir was liable to be resumed and given to another person the motive for making it descend as an integral whole could not have been for safeguarding the family estate. It was always for the Ruler's advantage that he should have but one heir to deal with and one man whom he can hold responsible for production of armed warriors and for maintenance of order in the Jagir. Thus though inalienability, irnpartibility and rule of primogeniture may have been common to Jagirs and to big Zemindaris, yet their introduction must have been with different motives. Hence the principle enunciated in - 'Naraganti Achammagaru v. Venkatachalapati', 4 Mad 250 (I) and in - 'Sartaj Kuari v. Deoraj Kuari', 10 All 272 (J) cited by Shri P.R. Das and the observations at page 635 of Mulla's Hindu Law (10th Edition) relied upon by Shri Samvatsar have no material bearing on the facts of the present case. In fact Jagir rights have never been governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law which governs the property of a Hindu in these parts. Even for adoption of a son by a Jagirdar, the Ruler's consent or permission was necessary. Of course there was nothing which prevented the Ruler to split up one Jagir into two or three Jagirs but that would not make it partible property. Even for adoption of a son by a Jagirdar, the Ruler's consent or permission was necessary. Of course there was nothing which prevented the Ruler to split up one Jagir into two or three Jagirs but that would not make it partible property. There, have been several cases of splitting up; but that was always the Ruler's choice. Whenever a vassal became strong and showed signs of insubordination and the ruler was afraid of him, politically, it was to his advantage to split the Jagir amongst the sons of the last Jagirdar. This rule of prudence was acted upon in other countries also. It is said that the King at Paris would not have been sorry to see the great inheritance split amongst co-heirs (Pollock and Maitland : History of English Law, Book 2, page 265). The descent in the feudatory's or Jagirdar's family must be governed by the rules laid down by the Suzerain. This principle was also adopted in S.8, Punjab Laws Act (Act IV of 1872) and also in Ss.7 and 8, Punjab Jagirs Act 1941 (No.5 of 1941). At least it was natural that the Suzerain who looked to one man for a unit of fighting power should refuse to recognise an arrangement which would split that duty into fractional parts; and it is not surprising that the two Manuals adopted the rule of primogeniture which had the great merit of simplicity. 86. It has also to be borne in mind that before the British era, there was no difference between a Jagirdar and a Zemindar so far as their duties were concerned. Both were responsible for the defence of the territory and the maintenance of peace and tranquillity and with the general administration of the areas under them. 86. It has also to be borne in mind that before the British era, there was no difference between a Jagirdar and a Zemindar so far as their duties were concerned. Both were responsible for the defence of the territory and the maintenance of peace and tranquillity and with the general administration of the areas under them. The following passage from a judgment of the Privy Council is significant : "It appears that the Zemindars were entrusted, previously to the British possession of India, as well with the defence of the territory against foreign enemies, as with the administration of law and the maintenance of peace and order within their district; that for this purpose they were accustomed to employ not only armed retainers to guard against hostile inroads, but also a large force of Tannahdars or a general police, and other officers in great numbers, under the name of Chowkidars, Pykes, and other descriptions, as well for the maintenance of order in particular villages and districts as for the protection of the property of the Zemindars, the collection of his revenue, and other services personal to the Zemindar. All these different officers were at that time the servants of the Zemindar, appointed by him. and removable by him and they were remunerated in many cases by the enjoyment of land rent free or at a low rent in consideration of their services." ('Joykishen Mookerjee v. Collector of East Burdwan', 10 Moo Ind App 16 at pages 40-41 (K)). 87. After the British conquest the "Tannah-dary" lands were made resumable by the Government which took upon itself the maintenance of the general Police force and relieved the Zemindar from that expense (section 8(4) Bengal Regulation 1 of 1793). The Zemindar, in 1743, was a Government servant '(page 207 of 6 WR)' and had lands for certain political and governmental purpose but subsequently he lost the political functions along with the lands, thereafter remaining a mere intermediary. The family usage of inalienability, impartibility of estates and the rule of primogeniture which presumably had been introduced for political reasons previously however continued to remain with the new purpose of safeguarding family estate. Historically it may be interesting to note that in other countries also (e.g. in England) family functions of land had commenced only after the decay of its political functions. Historically it may be interesting to note that in other countries also (e.g. in England) family functions of land had commenced only after the decay of its political functions. The big and old Zemindars, where the rule of primogeniture was in vogue and which by custom were impartible and inalienable, represented the function of land on the basis of family organisation while Jagirs in Madhya Bharat are still the symbol of the political function of land. In order to make my meaning clear and to bring the distinction most forcefully, I think it proper to quote an extract from page 275 of Dr. Julius Stone's "The Province and Function of Law" (1946 Edition) where dealing with "Real Property and Commercial Law" the learned author observes : "The idea of a man's land as his absolute property, like his watch, is only the latest of three ideas which have successively moulded the land law. In essence, it had begun in the feudal period as an aspect of government service being provided to the King in return for tenure of land, which was thus not property in the modern commercial sense. The three centuries prior to the Statute of Tenures, 1660, saw a transition of the land law to suit a new function of land as a basis of family stability and organisation. From about 1660 to 1883, the land law had been moulded to its new function, on the basis of the system of estates, by the Court of Chancery's invention of the trust and the complex of devices known as the family settlement. This transformation of the nature of land had taken place by devious fiction-ridden procedures, only occasionally aided by statutes to clear away the debris. Most of the debris remained, and a major problem crying out for attention in Bentham's time was the expurgation from the law of the fictions and anomalies used by ingenious lawyers to kill the political idea of land, and realise the family idea. This purging process was only to begin with the Report of the Real Property Commissioners in 1828 and the Fines and Recoveries Act, 1833, and was only virtually completed in England by the property legislation of 1922-25. But this was only a part of the urgent need for reform. The family idea of the function of land was itself out of tune with the developing needs of Bentham's age. But this was only a part of the urgent need for reform. The family idea of the function of land was itself out of tune with the developing needs of Bentham's age. The industrial revolution brought to the fore the role of land as a commodity, marked by the retreat of family estates before factory sites, and the rise of the industrial middle class, for whom land was worth its market value, no more, no less." Again at page 532 the learned author writes : "The law of feudal tenures dominated medieval English Law; behind it stood, however, not merely claims of substance in the modern sense, but claims for the efficient conduct of governmental institutions. Feudal landed property was in part governmental in function. It was with the decay of tenures and growth of equitable interests in land that the property aspect became dominant. Even then, however, the individual claims of substance were closely allied in their pressure with claims to the stability of the family and the general social structure. It was around the "family settlement" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that legal change was concentrated and that the elaborate apparatus of life estates, legal and equitable contingent remainders, executory interests, rule of remoteness and limitations were clustered, gradually with the sporadic aid of statute moulding the land law from the governmental to its familial function.......................It was not until the reforms of the nineteenth century that individual claims of substance came to dominate the scene, as land became a vital element in the system of capitalist production and investment." 88. Though I would not like to pursue the analogy further still it may be observed that from all that has been said above it would appear that like the feudal lord's right one can regard a Jagirdar's rights as bearing a political rather than a proprietary character. At any rate there is a gulf of difference between his rights and the rights of a Zemindar, who had paid valuable consideration for his Zemindari. The unfathomable chasm between the rights of the two will be manifest when other provisions of the two Manuals are considered. 89. At any rate there is a gulf of difference between his rights and the rights of a Zemindar, who had paid valuable consideration for his Zemindari. The unfathomable chasm between the rights of the two will be manifest when other provisions of the two Manuals are considered. 89. The question relating to succession and adoption in a Zemindar's family could be determined by a Court of law but chapter 22 of the two Manuals clearly laid down that "questions regarding adoption, succession and maintenance shall be outside the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. Such questions shall be decided departmentally." Every Jagirdar, in addition to the duties and obligations specified in his Sanad was bound to render any service demanded of him by the Darbar or the Government (S.117, Gwalior Manual, and S.120, Indore Manual). A Jagirdar before going to a foreign territory (for longer than one month) - and a foreign territory included at that time even British India and other Indian States - was to apply for leave to the Muntazim Jagirdaran in Gwalior State and to the Government in Indore State stating the place where he intended to go and the period for which leave was required. If he was to leave for a period less than one month no permission was required in Gwalior State; but before his departure he was bound to communicate his address to Muntazim Jagirdaran. In Indore State he was to apply for leave to the Collector of his District (S.100, Gwalior Manual, and S.105, Indore Manual). If Jagirdars even moved in their state territory and were to be absent for more than a month from their Jagir timely information of the same was to be given to the Inam Commissioner in Indore State and Muntazim Jagirdaran in Gwalior State (S.122, Indore Manual, and S.119, Gwalior Manual). They were also required to send the report of births and deaths and marriages in their houses to Muntazim Jagirdaran of the Gwalior State and Inam Commissioner of the Indore State (S.120, Gwalior Manual, and S.123 Indore Manual). Chapter 18 of the two Manuals gave the Jagirdars a privileged position so far as their trial for offences was concerned. They were also in a privileged position in cases of execution of decrees against the Jagir or the Jagirdar. 90. Chapter 18 of the two Manuals gave the Jagirdars a privileged position so far as their trial for offences was concerned. They were also in a privileged position in cases of execution of decrees against the Jagir or the Jagirdar. 90. The most important provision, however, was contained in S.45 in the Gwalior State Manual and S.48 in the Indore State Manual which laid down that "the Jagirs whose holders may be found guilty of disloyalty or criminal offence or disobedience to Darbar's Law and Orders, or are notorious for profligacy and extravagance or, who keep the State dues in arrears from wanton neglect or contumacy shall be resumed subject to the following rule : "In case of disloyalty towards the Darbar or the British Government, or in case of heinous offence or offences in respect of coinage or stamps the Jagirdars will be permanently deprived of their status and estate. In the remaining cases, the holders for the time being will be suspended from powers over the estate for a longer or shorter period or will be set aside altogether in favour of any one having the right to succeed, under chapters 2 and 3, according to the degree of the delinquency or dereliction committed." It was further made clear that holdings of persons answering to this description which had been resumed in the past would remain so, as no consideration of their cases are possible. Section 87, Dhar State Land and Tenancy Act, 1940, is also to the same effect. Resumption of Jagirs had often been ordered and many cases can be cited from the Gwalior Administration Reports which are authorised Government publications. Two examples may be sufficient in this respect. At page 157 of the Administration Report of Gwalior State, 1940-41, we read : "Nine estates were ordered to be taken under the direct management of the Court of Wards during the year under report. Two of them M and K were taken under direct management on account of oppressive behaviour of the Jagirdars towards the Jagir ryots and wilful disobedience of orders on their part. In the case of M the Jagirdar behaved so badly with the Jagir ryots that the Durbar were obliged to depose him permanently and forbid his entry into the estate." (I have omitted the full names purposely). In the case of M the Jagirdar behaved so badly with the Jagir ryots that the Durbar were obliged to depose him permanently and forbid his entry into the estate." (I have omitted the full names purposely). Then at page 223 of the Administration Report of Gwalior State for the year 1945-46 it is mentioned that "Thakur D.S.D. who was deposed and removed from his Jagir in 1937 for ten years was re-instated and permitted to use the title of Raja and enter the Jagir territories." Some other instances have been mentioned by the Revenue Secretary in his affidavit and I need hardly observe that the provision about resumption of Jagir in the Manual was not an empty threat. 91. Then provisions were laid down in the two Manuals for investing the Jagirdars with Revenue and Judicial powers. In Revenue matters a Jagirdar could be invested with the power even of a Collector for his Jagir. In civil matters a Jagirdar could be invested with the powers of a Munsiff, Sub-Judge, or even District Judge; and in Criminal matters he could be a Magistrate of any class or even a District Magistrate for his Jagir. Subject to certain conditions the Jagirdar could also delegate these powers either in whole or in part to his Kamasder, Kamdar, or Manager, who was expected to be qualified for the discharge of those duties (chapters XII and XIV of the two Manuals). There is no provision in the Manuals for police powers, but it is a fact that in Gwalior State several big Jagirdars had been invested with Police powers and subject to certain conditions could recruit their own police force. It was contended that in the Covenanting States other than Gwalior, Jagirdars were not invested with Revenue, Judicial or Police powers. It does not appear to be true; for, two petitioners have admitted before us that they had been exercising these powers till 1948, in 'C.M. Case No.112 of 1951' an affidavit has seen sworn by Maharaj Anand Pal Singh of former Ratlam State, para 8 of which runs as follows : "I did not enjoy Police powers. 1 enjoyed Judicial powers. I was vested with the powers of Second Class Magistrate. I also enjoyed all Revenue powers. But no extra expenditure was incurred in exercise of these powers. 1 enjoyed Judicial powers. I was vested with the powers of Second Class Magistrate. I also enjoyed all Revenue powers. But no extra expenditure was incurred in exercise of these powers. It was a privilege conferred on me and yielded a small income of about Rs.2500/- (twenty five hundred) per year in the shape of Nazrana." In 'C.M. Case No.110 of 1951', paras.9 and 10 of an affidavit sworn by Thakur Jaswant Singh. Jagirdar of Bidwal, Dhar State run as follows : "I enjoyed certain judicial and police powers till 1948, but had to incur no extra expenditure in the exercise of these powers. On the contrary there was income about Rs.2000/-from stamps, Rs.1000/- from fines, Rs.1000/-from Lawaris and Rs.1000/- from cattle-pounds." "I enjoyed all Revenue powers in respect of my villages till the year 1948. In the exercise of Revenue powers I incurred no expenditure. But on the contrary there was an income of Rs.2000/- in the shape of Nazrana." So there was an income of Rs.7,000/- (seven thousand rupees) per year in this Jagir. It is difficult to say whether the temptation to increase the income of the Jagir had not gone so far as to make it an engine for oppression. 92. The question that now arises is : whether the Jagirdars had acquired any proprietary right in the soil by long possession of their estates? A similar question had confronted the British after their conquest of the Punjab. A large number of Jagirs were handed down to them by the Sikh Rule; some of them had been created by it, and others represented the remains of the chiefships and dignities of that Government. The British told the Jagirdars that they did not require service from them as a condition of tenure; in some cases where such a condition was distinctly existent when the Jagirs came up for confirmation, the British commuted it for a small money payment in reduction of the Jagir allowances. In the settlement arrangements, the original landholding communities or individuals were settled with and retained full proprietary rights. The Jagirdar was made a mere assignee of the revenue, taking part of what would otherwise go to the State. (Baden Powell : Land Systems of British India, Vol.2, pages 699 and 701). In the settlement arrangements, the original landholding communities or individuals were settled with and retained full proprietary rights. The Jagirdar was made a mere assignee of the revenue, taking part of what would otherwise go to the State. (Baden Powell : Land Systems of British India, Vol.2, pages 699 and 701). Many rules had been framed in this connection and a great body of orders and circulars on the point were collected in the Financial Commissioner's Consolidated Circular No.37. This Circular accepted the fact, and this is important, that the assignee's interests may have come to be something different from that of a mere assignee of Government revenue, and may have grown into more or less complete proprietary or sub-proprietary status. "The grantee may have resided on the land and directly acquired fields; he may have made gardens, erected buildings and tombs, may have sunk wells, or made other improvements. He may be able to show particular facts which connect him with the land and which entitle him to be called proprietor in some sense or to some degree", (ibid page.700). This will, of course, be a question of fact to be decided by competent authorities, but it appears to me that this principle has been properly considered by the Madhya Bharat State in the impugned legislation and the Jagirdar has been acknowledged as proprietor of Khud Kasht lands, of open enclosures used for agricultural or domestic purposes which had been In continuous possession for twelve years, of all open house-sites purchased for valuable consideration, of all private buildings and places of worships and wells situated in, and, of trees standing on, such lands-if these are within the limits of a village-site. In addition, all groves wherever situate, all tanks, trees, private wells and buildings in occupied land belonging to or held by the Jagirdar are recognised to be the property of the Jagirdar (S.5). 93. As regards the estates themselves the Jagirdars claim to be the owners. In addition, all groves wherever situate, all tanks, trees, private wells and buildings in occupied land belonging to or held by the Jagirdar are recognised to be the property of the Jagirdar (S.5). 93. As regards the estates themselves the Jagirdars claim to be the owners. I have already discussed the various sections of the Manual of the two States to ascertain their true position; and there is no escape from the conclusion that the Jagirdars were only feudatories or vassals of the Rulers, holding, free of revenue, an assignment from them, consisting of one or more whole villages, enjoying temporarily certain proprietary rights over them; occupying office and entrusted with certain administrative duties subject to such orders of their Suzerain as may be received from time to time. The learned Advocate General urged that this was definitely a feudal order; and there is no doubt that several authors dealing with Indian States have used this term. The Viceroy in his announcement of March 1921 also used the term 'feudatories' for the Jagirdars. Even in the comments of Sir Charles Aitchison upon the treaties this phrase has been used at many places. Even a small state like Dhar claimed to have "twenty-two feudatories" (Dhar State Administration Report, 1941-42, page 2, para 6). After a lengthy discussion of the subject Tupper had come to the conclusions that it was 'inchoate feudalism' in India and that there was "no general system which can properly be termed feudal in the European sense of the word" (Our Indian Protectorate, page 246; and Lee Warner : The Protected Princes of India, pages 376-377). 94. I feel reluctant to use the term 'feudal order' for several reasons. Institutions, tenures, Government and laws which developed during the feudal period were so widely different from -those which developed here in the Covenanting States of Madhya Bharat that we may embarrass ourselves if we make use of arguments drawn from one system for the purpose of inferences as to the other. The word 'feudalism' is extremely vague and represents a very large piece of world history of every century from the eighth or ninth to the fourteenth or fifteenth, the ideal or the principles governing it not remaining the same from place to place and from century to century. "Feudalism is an unfortunate word" observe the authors. The word 'feudalism' is extremely vague and represents a very large piece of world history of every century from the eighth or ninth to the fourteenth or fifteenth, the ideal or the principles governing it not remaining the same from place to place and from century to century. "Feudalism is an unfortunate word" observe the authors. "In the first place, it draws our attention to but one element in a complex state of society and that element is not the most distinctive; it draws our attention only to the prevalence of dependent and derivative land tenure. This however, may well exist in an age which cannot be called feudal in any tolerable sense. What is characteristic of the feudal period is not the relationship between letter and hirer, or lender and borrower of land, but the relationship between lord and vassal or rather it is the union of those two relationships. Were we free to invent new terms, we might find 'feudovassalism' more serviceable than, feudalism." (Pullock and Maitland; History of English Law, Book I, chapter III, Second Edition, pages 66-67). The second reason is that even feudalism, as-it was developed in English Law and as we understand it now, was founded upon the notion of contract and not of command (C.K. Allen : Law In the Making, page 10). The vassal and the lord both had clearly definite rights and obligations and the fief could not be resumed unless the act of the vassal came within the four corners of the principles laid down by common law regulating their relations. In India, on the other hand, there was no living, sense of the reciprocal services and relations of overlord, lord, and vassal, and, as Lee Warner points out, no constitutional germs emerged, from the Indian system which was maintained by force of arms (Protected Princes of India, page 377). In the Covenanting States of Madhya Bharat, a Jagir could be resumed if there was any disobedience to any order of the Ruler or if the vassal was found to be extravagant. Whether it was merely a suspected case or a proved case was a question of fact to be decided by the Ruler and there could be no appeal from his decision. Whether it was merely a suspected case or a proved case was a question of fact to be decided by the Ruler and there could be no appeal from his decision. It was his order that had to be complied with and the system seems to have been based not on the notion of contract but on that of command. The affidavit of the Revenue Secretary giving several instances of recent resumption of Jagirs in Gwalior State is-clear on the point. The Jagirdar's property and office and, in fact, his fate, depended upon the Ruler's pleasure. If he was pleased, the Jagirdar could be invested with Judicial, Revenue and Police powers and even become a Minister. If the Ruler was displeased it was difficult for the Jagirdar to retain his Jagir in peace. We, therefore, see that the relics of feudalism along with the distinction between Sovereignty and Suzerainty had been fading out and the Ruler's authority had become paramount. It follows that in the Jagirdari system in the Covenanting States of Madhya Bharat every thing had been organised on a system of perpetual political tutelage. The system derived its life from above, and, its vitality depended not on the roots in the native soil but on the benevolence of a distant, despotism and most of the Jagirdars had to depend on political or royal caprice. The Court of an all powerful Suzerain under these circumstances would appear to be more attractive than district life, and though there must be one or two notable exceptions, yet ordinarily the absentee Jagirdar's only interest in his Jagir would remain in the hard-wrung remittances from his Kamdar or manager. The condition of the peasantry can well be realised when we find that a big Jagirdar with his influence at the Court had the power to issue coercive processes for the realisation of the arrears of land revenue from the tenants and he had his own Tehsildars, Kanoongos, Patwaris, Sub Inspectors and Magistrates. In this respect, the Jagirdari system in Madhya Bharat altogether differed from the system prevailing in the Punjab or other States (see S.5, Punjab Jagirs Act, No.V of 1941). In fact, in the Covenanting States of Madhya Bharat, Jagir remained a political institution till 1948 and the Jagirdars were administrative functionaries, the bigger ones remaining as part and parcel of the Ruling class. 95. In fact, in the Covenanting States of Madhya Bharat, Jagir remained a political institution till 1948 and the Jagirdars were administrative functionaries, the bigger ones remaining as part and parcel of the Ruling class. 95. It was this system that continued to exist till 1948, when the bloodless revolution, the most radical in the history of our country, swept the sub-continent. The Rulers of Covenanting States in Madhya Bharat read the writing on the wall and gave their consent to the formation of a single union comprising of 22 States in May 1948. It is difficult to ignore the evolutionary crisis and the transformation that took place immediately after it. The rapid process of integration and democratization that came in its wake changed the map of the former Indian States in Madhya Bharat. With the loss of the powers of the Rulers the Jagirdari system received a severe set back and fell a heap as ivy does from the uprooted tree that so long gave its support. It was now left as a form without a foundation, and with the onslaught of democratic movement, the whole Thing stood discredited and constituted an anachronism. After the formation of the Congress Ministry in the former Gwalior State in Jan.1948 the Government supported the popular view that the existence of quasi-independent administrative and judicial powers in the hands at jagirdars constituting an "imperium in imperio" must be done away with immediately. On May 24th the Gwalior State Ordinance No.13 of 1948, was promulgated which deprived the Jagirdars of the judicial and revenue powers. After the coming into being of the State of Madhya Bharat, the Jagir Courts and Revenue Powers Abolition and Police Ordinance (Ordinance No.19 of 1948) was promulgated on 6-11-1948 and it extended the provisions of the Gwalior Ordinance to the whole of Madhya Bharat. This was followed on 12-2-49 by an Act of the Legislature (Act No.18 of 1949). All police stations and the Magistrates and' Judge's Courts which were under the authority of a Jagirdar came directly under the State of Madhya Bharat. The power of Jagirdars to issue coercive processes for the realisation of arrears and revenue was also done away with. 96. This was a prelude to several enactments affecting Jagirs which may briefly be referred to here. The power of Jagirdars to issue coercive processes for the realisation of arrears and revenue was also done away with. 96. This was a prelude to several enactments affecting Jagirs which may briefly be referred to here. The Government on 29-1-1949 acquired power to take over the management of a jagir during abnormal times for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity by virtue of Jagir Areas Administrative Ordinance (No.40 of 1948). On 6-11-48 the Jagir Land Records Management Ordinance (No.21 of 1948) was promulgated which was on 7-5-1949 followed by an Act of the Legislature (Act No.25 of 1949). The Patwaris of the jagir villages and the Revenue Officers of Jagir thus came under the jurisdiction of the State Government. On the same date Jagir Tenants Restoration of Land Act (Act No.26 of 1949) came into force which, notwithstanding a decree for ejectment passed by a Jagir Court, conferred upon the Government and on the Revenue Board power to restore possession to a tenant who after 15-8-1947 had been unjustly dispossessed thereof by a Jagirdar. The Scheduled Areas Jagir Maintenance Ordinance was also passed which was on 28-7-1949 enacted as an Act of the Legislature (Act No.1 of 1949), conferring on the Government the power of taking over the direct management of jagirs in Scheduled Areas. It was followed by the Jagir Forests (Prevention of Indiscriminate Cutting) Act (Act No.55 of 1950), which tried to stop indiscriminately cutting of forests by the Jagirdar in their jagirs. In August 1949 the Government of India had constituted a Committee to examine and report on the Jagirs and land tenure system of Rajasthan and Madhya Bharat. The Committee submitted its report at the end of the year. Meanwhile on 30-11-1949 that is within a short period of passing of the Act (No.18 of 1949) the Bill for Abolition of Jagirs was introduced in the Legislative Assembly of the State and it was entrusted to a Select Committee on 11-4-1950. The Select Committee's report was published on 15-10-1951, and eleven days after, the Bill was passed by the said Assembly. Then it was reserved by His Highness the Raj Pramukh for the President's assent which it received on 27-11-1951. 97. The Select Committee's report was published on 15-10-1951, and eleven days after, the Bill was passed by the said Assembly. Then it was reserved by His Highness the Raj Pramukh for the President's assent which it received on 27-11-1951. 97. I have referred to the various dates not only to show that the impugned legislation was hit by the provisions embodied in Arts.31 (4) and 31A of the Constitution but also to show that the various enactments coming one after another in rapid succession must be viewed as parts of an organic whole. Through these enactments, the intention of the Legislature was made quite clear that it regarded the Jagir estates as properties not of the Jagirdars, but of the State. Though the Jagirdars were deprived of their powers, still there is nothing in these Acts which could show that these Acts impaired, in any way, the "vassalage" that, in my opinion, remained intact. The Suzerain sometimes invests the vassals with power and sometimes deprives them of it. So the legislation depriving the Jagirdars of their powers could not materially affect their position, though for all practical purposes, they were reduced to the position of assignees of revenue. The compensation to them on the basis of their position just on the formation of the Madhya Bharat State is to be seen in this light and it is against this background that we have to consider the two main contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners. 98. The first contention of Shri P.R. Das is that the impugned legislation is without a public purpose. In - ' AIR 1952 SC 252 : 1952 SCJ 354' (B) the learned Chief Justice of India was of opinion that the objection based on the lack of a public purpose is barred under Art.31(4) of the Constitution. Justice S.R. Das concurred in this view and was of opinion that the existence of a public purpose as a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of compulsory acquisition being a provision of Art.31(2), an infringement of such a provision cannot, under Art.31(4), be put forward as a ground for questioning the validity of the Act. The contrary view was expressed by Mahajan, J., who held that the barring provisions of Art.31(4) do not in any way touch the powers of the Court to see whether the acquisition has been made for public purpose. The contrary view was expressed by Mahajan, J., who held that the barring provisions of Art.31(4) do not in any way touch the powers of the Court to see whether the acquisition has been made for public purpose. Justice Chandrase-khara Aiyer expressed the same opinion. Shri P.R. Das strenuously argued that Mukherjea had concurred in the conclusion arrived at by Mahajan J., but the following words of His Lordship's judgment are quite clear on the point : "For my part I would be prepared to assume that Cl.(4) of Art.31 relates to every thing that is provided for in Cl.(2) either in express terms or even impliedly and consequently the question of the existence of a public purpose does not come within the purview of pur enquiry in the present case." 99. From the above words it is apparent that His Lordship (Mukherjea, J.) put his weight in favour of the view held by the Chief Justice of India; and the majority judgment of the Supreme Court, in my opinion, is to the effect that the validity of an Act cannot be questioned under Art.31(4) on the ground of lack of public purpose. If it be assumed that the question whether there is any public purpose or not is open to judicial scrutiny, even then it will be difficult to deny that the impugned legislation was inspired and dominated by a public purpose. In the words of Mahajan, J., "the legislature is the best judge of what is good for the community, by whose sufferance it comes into existence and it is not possible for the Court to say that there was no public purpose behind the acquisition contemplated by the impugned Statute" (at page 274 in AIR 1952 SC 252 (B)) It, therefore, follows that the public policy of the State as it has found expression in a legislative enactment is entitled to weighty consideration and all reasonable doubts on the question are to be resolved in favour of a legislative declaration thereon (Corpus Juris, Vol.50, page 361). So a decision of a Legislature is not to be reversed unless it is palpably and manifestly arbitrary and incorrect (ibid; footnote 88a). So a decision of a Legislature is not to be reversed unless it is palpably and manifestly arbitrary and incorrect (ibid; footnote 88a). If the abolition of the intermediary between the State and the cultivator in the Khalsa area is for a public purpose as has been held in Bihar Appeals, surely the doing away with the political vassal and administrative functionary and an intermediary - all combined - in Jagir area, must be held to be for a public purpose. The integration between the two areas must be complete; for, how can there be two sets of rights for people living in areas within the same State? The Jagir system, being a creation of the Ruler and an appanage of his rule, the system could not have existed when the rulers had lost their power. I agree with the learned Advocate-General that the abolition of "imperium in imperio" and the abolition of the relics of the feudal order must be held to be for a public purpose. Then, if the demolition of an edifice is considered for a public purpose, can it be contended that the dismantling of the corner towers, the carved balconies, and balustrades of various designs, which either decorated or supported the edifice, is not for a public purpose? Keeping in view the historical background, the socio-economic trends of the present times, the recital in the preamble to the impugned legislation, and Chap. IV of the impugned Act, I have no doubt in my mind that from the whole tenor and intendment of the Act it can fairly be inferred that the amelioration of the peasantry living in jagir areas and the emancipation of this class of sub-human serfs from the medieval and archaic bondage which was non-conducive to the general interests of the community was the main purpose i behind the impugned legislation, and, in my judgment, on this ground the first contention of Shri P.R. Das must be rejected. 100. Next it was contended that the impugned Act is a fraud on the Constitution and therefore void. Mr. P.R. Das strenuously contended that the impugned Act pretended to make elaborate provisions for paying compensation but by shift and contrivance it has provided for the evasion of its payment. 100. Next it was contended that the impugned Act is a fraud on the Constitution and therefore void. Mr. P.R. Das strenuously contended that the impugned Act pretended to make elaborate provisions for paying compensation but by shift and contrivance it has provided for the evasion of its payment. The learned counsel took us through various clauses of Ss.4 and 5 of the Act and various sub-clauses of Cls.2 and 4 of Sch.I and argued that the deductions from the gross income under sub-cls.(ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) of Cl.4, Sch.I, are merely deductions of artificial character, the whole object being to inflate the deductions and thus bring about non-payment of compensation. The learned Advocate-General's main argument was first that the jagir was State property and that Jagirdars had no rights in the Jagirs and that they cannot claim as of right any compensation for the resumption of the jagirs. Secondly, he contended that the compensation has been paid and is not illusory, and, thirdly, that Art.31(4) of the Constitution is a complete answer to the contentions advanced by Shri P.R. Das and Shri Engineer. 101. Now where there is admittedly a scheme of payment of compensation provided under various clauses of various sections it seems to be necessary to treat them together as part of an organic whole and to see how they interact. It will therefore be useful for reference to quote here various sections which are material for the purpose of this case : 102. (After mentioning the relevant sections of the Act, the judgment proceeds as follows) : It will be seen that a sliding scale for assessment of compensation has been laid down and the smaller and the poorer Jagirdar has been dealt with more liberally than the bigger and the wealthy Jagirdar. In Jagir with a basic income of Rs.5000/- the total deduction that could be made would not exceed Rs.500/-. In other words, he will get compensation seven times Rs.4500/- or Rs.31,500. On the other hand, a Jagirdar with a basic income of one lac will be hit hard but he too cannot get less than 7 x 50,000 or Rs.3,50,000/-. A Jagirdar with a basic income of 4 lakhs cannot get less than fourteen lakhs. In other words, he will get compensation seven times Rs.4500/- or Rs.31,500. On the other hand, a Jagirdar with a basic income of one lac will be hit hard but he too cannot get less than 7 x 50,000 or Rs.3,50,000/-. A Jagirdar with a basic income of 4 lakhs cannot get less than fourteen lakhs. These figures of 31,5000/-, 3,50,000 or Rs.14,00,000 though inadequate or rather grossly inadequate to our sense of justice for persons who had been in possession of their Jagirs for several generations and who had been holding a very high status in society and the State, yet they can by no stretch of imagination be termed as illusory. Howsoever inequitable the compensation may appear to be this Court's hands are tied by the provisions of Art.31(4), and, I feel, we have no power to examine the contents of the Act on the question of quantum of compensation. If the quantum cannot be challenged, in my opinion, the process by which the quantum has been arrived at too cannot be challenged. The Supreme Court's judgment in Bihar Appeals has only taken note of a distinction between items reasonably related to real facts and items having no reasonable relation to the purpose in view, a distinction similar to that which is observed between a 'causa causans' and a 'causa sine qua non' (a remote cause and a proximate cause) in assessing damages. It is always a question of degree which is to be decided "according to the ordinary plain common sense of the business". In my opinion the judgment of the Supreme Court lays down that the item which has no reasonable relation to actual facts should not be considered in computing the quantum of compensation. If it is taken as a factor in computing it the deduction should be considered to be a mere contrivance to reduce the compensation so it will amount to a colourable or fraudulent exercise of legislative power if a fanciful sum is subtracted from the calculation of gross assets. In 'Bihar Appeals' 1952 SCJ 354 (B) only two items were, on this basis, eliminated from consideration. The first was the "arrears of rent" due to the landlord for a period before the Zamindari was vested in Bihar State. In 'Bihar Appeals' 1952 SCJ 354 (B) only two items were, on this basis, eliminated from consideration. The first was the "arrears of rent" due to the landlord for a period before the Zamindari was vested in Bihar State. It was held that such arrears could not vest in the State as a normal result of acquisition of any estate or interest therein, and that giving of 50 per cent, of these, arrears was only a mere device or pretence to deprive a Zamindar of his money which was not a subject-matter of acquisition. Then the second item was the provision in sub-clause (f) of S.23 of the Bihar Act 30 of 1950 laying down that 4 to 12 1/2 per cent. of the gross assets would be deducted from the amount of compensation as representing "costs of works of benefit to the ryots". It was held to be invalid as it had also no reasonable relation to the purpose in view. In this connection again and again Shri P.R. Das drew the attention of this Court to the following observations of Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. in that case : "The Act does not say that this charge represents the expenditure on works of benefit or improvements which the Zemindars and proprietors were under any legal obligation to carry out and which they failed to discharge." 103. According to Shri P.R. Das there ought to be a legal obligation on the Jagirdars to carry out certain work of public utility (e.g., in relation to roads, schools and dispensaries) before a certain percentage could be deducted from the gross income. 104. With very great respect, I feel that the above observations of His Lordship cannot be made applicable to the case of Jagirdars who could not have gone to a Court of law for the enforcement of their rights against the Suzerain. In India a Civil Court can entertain a suit about a Jagir only when a Deputy Commissioner or a Collector gives a certificate that a particular question can be determined by the Courts (see Ss.4 and 6, Pensions Act, Act 23 of 1871). In the Covenanting States of Madhya Bharat, on the other hand, a Civil Court's jurisdiction was completely barred and a suit against the Suzerain was unthinkable. In the Covenanting States of Madhya Bharat, on the other hand, a Civil Court's jurisdiction was completely barred and a suit against the Suzerain was unthinkable. Considering that the relations of the Jagirdars with the Suzerain were political, there was no possibility of legal rights and legal obligations flowing from this relation. Whatever obligations there were could have been enforced only by the exercise of the Suzerain powers. So the observations of His Lordship Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. do not apply to the facts of this case. It, however, appears to me that His Lordship was using the term 'legal obligation' in a wide and very comprehensive sense and was not confining it merely to contractual obligations. In attempting a classification of "legal obligations" Salmond in his Jurisprudence (Art.174, p.473, Edn.10) says that they are either (1) Contractual, or (2) delictal, or (3) quasi-contractual, or (iv) innominate. Explaining the last term, the learned author observes that : "It is necessary to recognise a final and residuary class which may be termed as 'innominate' as having no comprehensive and distinctive title. Included in this class are the obligations of trustees towards the beneficiaries." That the Jagirdars had an obligation towards the ryots admits of no doubt. But these obligations could have only been enforced by the Suzerain, not by the Courts of law. A very broad view is, however, to be taken of these obligations. At the time when the Sanads were-drafted, or, when the Manuals were framed, nobody could have dreamt that compensation would have to be paid for resumption of Jagir lands and that such compensation would depend upon specific words by which an obligation for the welfare of the subjects could be created. At that time no Jagirdar could have-gone to a Court of law against an order of resumption or could have claimed compensation, from the Ruler. So there was no need for creating an obligation for the welfare of the subjects in specified terms. We should not therefore expect any clear-cut form for laying, down obligations on a Jagirdar for the general welfare of the subjects. It is true that 'law' comes from the Ruler as the sole proper source of sovereign control; but it has to be borne in mind that at that time it used to come sometimes in the form of 'orders' and sometimes in the form of 'advice' to the Jagirdars. It is true that 'law' comes from the Ruler as the sole proper source of sovereign control; but it has to be borne in mind that at that time it used to come sometimes in the form of 'orders' and sometimes in the form of 'advice' to the Jagirdars. It is too well-known now that an 'advice' emanating from the political Suzerain gives the dependant no option and that it is meant to be accepted in its entirety. Such 'advices' are specially noticeable in the far-reaching formative work done by His Late Highness Maharaja Madhava Rao Scindia of Gwalior State during, whose regime, in 1913, (Samvat 1970), the rules and principles for the governance of Jagir had been framed. In the last paragraph of the Preface to this Manual for Jagirdars His Late Highness observed : "If an aristocracy is to be maintained and is-to be worthy of the name, it must be at once an enlightened and a prosperous aristocracy for ah impoverished or illiterate aristocracy is worse than useless. Hence the Suzerain must see that the dignitaries of his State maintain themselves in prosperity and 'at the same time enable their ryots to enjoy the same advantages of wise and beneficent management as are enjoyed by the direct subjects of the Suzerain power'." 105. In para.10 on p.7 of the Durbar Policy Vol.11, His late Highness succinctly stated the' duties of the Jagirdars in the following words : "Besides fidelity and loyalty to their Suzerain there are other obligations incumbent on the Jagirdars. They must treat such of these Ruler's subjects as are entrusted to their charge with justice, sympathy and humanity and endeavour to better their condition and' carefully consider their education, sanitary condition and general welfare." These words could well have been written by other Rulers also in other States on the obligation of a Jagirdar towards his subjects. The obligations there were not different from those in Gwalior State. We have only to see the actual intention behind the words. In my opinion the advice should be viewed not merely as a pious wish but as laying down a foundation for an altogether new and enlightened interpretation of all sanads (old and new). The Durbar Policy had in 1925 acquired the status of a Durbar Circular (see Gwalior Government Gazette Vol.74 p.1, dated 21-2-25). In my opinion the advice should be viewed not merely as a pious wish but as laying down a foundation for an altogether new and enlightened interpretation of all sanads (old and new). The Durbar Policy had in 1925 acquired the status of a Durbar Circular (see Gwalior Government Gazette Vol.74 p.1, dated 21-2-25). The laconic and often obscure terseness of the early Sanads has to be seen in the light of the changed surroundings. There being no necessity of military and political service, the Jagirdars; were asked to devote their time and money towards the general welfare of their subjects. The progressive wants of society imposed new responsibilities on those who were charged with the administration. The cesses that were levied from holders of old grants were increased and money was utilised by the State for the welfare of the subjects. The old Sanads were scrutinised and whenever an opportunity offered itself the sanads were declared defective, the Tanka was revised and was raised to 50 per cent, of the village Nikasi after a survey of the village at the cost of the State (R.42 of the Gwalior Manual). It was further declared that Road-cess, School-cess, Naksha-Navisi and all other cesses levied on the holders of the grants were to be included in the 'half assets' standard and were not to be realised over and above the 50 per cent, of the Nikasi. Besides paying the new Tanka at 50 per cent, basis the holder was also bound to render services in furtherance of works for the benefit of the public (S.43(A), Gwalior Manual). What, then, does all this indicate? The intention of the ruling authority was nothing but that a large portion of the Nikasi should be spent on the welfare of the subjects. I need hardly observe that the views of Gwalior Durbar worked as a propelling force in other States as well. It is however stated on behalf of the old Jagirdars of Indore State that the principles on which the Gwalior Jagirdars were governed could not be made applicable to them. It appears to me that the Gwalior Ruler's opinion was sufficiently persistent to prevail in the end, when in 1928, the Indore State adopted, with some modification, the same rules and principles which had been governing Jagirs and Jagirdars in Gwalior State since 1913. It appears to me that the Gwalior Ruler's opinion was sufficiently persistent to prevail in the end, when in 1928, the Indore State adopted, with some modification, the same rules and principles which had been governing Jagirs and Jagirdars in Gwalior State since 1913. Chapter 8 of Indore Manual deals with special Tenures for Jagirs resting on defective sanads or titles and lays down in R.III, S.45 that in supersession of the old Tanka the 'half assets' rule would also apply there; and that if the old Tanka exceeded 50 per cent of the Jama, it would be reduced to that standard. The old sanad was then replaced by a new one in the form given in Appendix B. It meant clearly that the Indore State also adopted the principle that a Jagirdar should spend a portion of his income for the general welfare of his subjects. Since 1928 it is this Sanad that is regarded as the standard sanad and it clearly mentions in cl.(1) of "Terms and Conditions" that there are several cesses which are being levied from holders of old sanads. In the presence of this note I do not understand how it is said that old Jagirdars in Indore State were not paying cesses or had no obligation in this- respect. The appointment of Patwaris and Chowkidars being made compulsory by the statute, one is entitled to ask the question : for what purposes these cesses were being levied? Every sanad for grant from Ruler thereafter reminded the grantee of his responsibility for the welfare of his subjects. The following paras from the prescribed form of a sanad at p.45 of the Indore Manual for Jagirdars are important : "(4) you should assist according to your capacity in the management and promotion of institutions of public utility; such as village Panchayats, schools etc. (5) you shall serve the State faithfully, shall keen the ryots pleased, and. by extending and developing cultivation, shall improve the village and maintain it in a prosperous condition." A similar provision in Marathi in a sanad can be seen at p.13 of the Hindi Gwalior Jagirdar Manual.... ......... ............ ..... ... Matter in vernacular is omitted 106. (5) you shall serve the State faithfully, shall keen the ryots pleased, and. by extending and developing cultivation, shall improve the village and maintain it in a prosperous condition." A similar provision in Marathi in a sanad can be seen at p.13 of the Hindi Gwalior Jagirdar Manual.... ......... ............ ..... ... Matter in vernacular is omitted 106. If we come to the conclusion from what I have stated above that all Jagirdars, old and new, were bound to spend some portion of their income for the general welfare of their subjects then, in my opinion, the State should have power to determine, in a general way, the capacity of a Jagirdar for spending money on this account or the extent to which a Jagirdar could be made liable on this account for the purpose of giving him compensation. The State should also have the power to split the obligation, towards "the general welfare of the subject" (which is after all a vague term) into suitable Heads e.g. into those "for Education, Public Health and Roads" as has been done in the impugned legislation. A Ruler's doing or not doing anything for the Jagir subjects in this respect has nothing to do with the Jagirdar's liability. It, therefore, comes to this that if a Jagirdar had obligations towards the general welfare of the ryots, though these obligations could be enforced only by the exercise of the Suzerain powers yet they would have to be considered in computing the quantum of compensation. Then comes the element of precariousness in the position of Jagirdars. As stated above the sword of Damocles was always hanging on the head of a Jagirdar. Any displeasure of the Ruler was bound to make the Jagir liable to resumption and the Ruler's decision was not subject to challenge or judicial review. After the formation of Madhya Bharat State, the rights of the Rulers had devolved on the Madhya Bharat Government by virtue of Art.VI(a) of the Covenant. It is the element of precariousness that has also to be taken into consideration while awarding pecuniary compensation to a Jagirdar. 107. The learned Advocate-General contends that a Jagirdar has no rights in the Jagir and has no property. I am clear in my mind that the Jagir lands including forests, quarries, mines, tanks etc. belong to the State and not to the Jagirdars. 107. The learned Advocate-General contends that a Jagirdar has no rights in the Jagir and has no property. I am clear in my mind that the Jagir lands including forests, quarries, mines, tanks etc. belong to the State and not to the Jagirdars. The Jagirdars could be regarded only as political vassals under the Suzerain in possession of the properties with a right to enjoy the income thereof, and, also as administrative functionaries responsible for the administration, and, their position was bound to vary, with any change in the political set-up of the State. In my opinion, the Jagirdars were entitled to political pension or to compensation as commutation of pension. Whatever compensation on whatsoever basis may be paid to them by the Suzerain cannot be challenged by them as they have no right to demand any compensation. It has always to be borne in mind that the power which confers can always take away that which it has granted and the question of compensation does not arise at all. On this ground I should dismiss these petitions. 108. There is however another side of the question which should also be considered. Article 31A of the Constitution, contemplates framing of laws by the State for the acquisition of any estate or of any rights therein; and, further lays down that the expression "estate" includes any Jagir, inam, muafl or other similar grant. The impugned legislation seems to have been prepared on this basis and lays down principles for awarding compensation. The word 'property' has not been defined anywhere in the Constitution; and, though I am not sure, still I am disposed to think that the Jagirdar may be said to have a right, as an occupant of a Jagir, to enjoy many kinds of income therefrom subject to certain restrictions and subject to certain obligations so long as his Jagir was not resumed according to the relevant provisions of the Manual of Jagirdars. It is the loss of this right that may give him a right to compensation. It is the loss of this right that may give him a right to compensation. The word 'property' is an ambiguous term in law; for, its meaning varies according to the purpose in hand; and as Lord Porter observed at p.1051 in (1940) AC 1014 : "The word property is not a term of art, but takes its meaning from the context and from its collocation in the document or Act of Parliament in which it is found and from the mischief with which that Act or document is intended to deal". To-day many instances can be given which extend the term 'property' to cover whatever has a present or potential material value. In my opinion, the Jagirdar, in this sense, may be said to have 'property'; and this 'property' is to be acquired. This aspect of the question also merits consideration. The correct assessment of the value of that property which is subject to many obligations and restrictions and which has an element of precariousness involved in it must however present an extremely complicated and speculative problem. Under the provisions of our Constitution the law has however to abstract some principles to reduce the right to terms of money "not perhaps on grounds of pure logic but simply for practical reasons". If the State has abstracted some principles on the basis of experience gained in the Jagir Department of Gwalior State which had been dealing with more than 500 Jagirdars and where a high water-mark had been reached in Jagir administration, this Court must hold its hand and leave the principles as they are; for, the Legislature and the executive it controls had the necessary information, the knowledge,, and the experience to judge what percentage should be deducted for what item. On this ground, I do not think it proper to embark on detailed and close enquiry into the provisions of various sub-clauses of the clauses of Sch.I. This Court cannot arrogate to itself the powers of an appellate Court in this respect. If the Legislature had merely laid down that the compensation to be paid to a Jagirdar would be three times the gross income surely we could not have set it aside as 'ultra vires' or as a fraud on the Constitution. If the Legislature had merely laid down that the compensation to be paid to a Jagirdar would be three times the gross income surely we could not have set it aside as 'ultra vires' or as a fraud on the Constitution. We should, on the other hand, be satisfied that the Legislature in this case has not attempted to disguise or conceal the process by which the quantum of compensation has been arrived at. I will therefore be satisfied with general observations relating to the practice regarding various sub-clauses of Cl.4 of Sch.I. 109. Sub-clause (ii) : It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the percentage on account of expenses of collection of rent is too exorbitant. I do not think it merits any consideration. It is 7 per cent, for Jagirs with a gross income upto Rs.2,000/- and 10 per cent, for above this amount. In Gwalior Qannon Ryotwari of Samvart 1974 the Patel was allowed one anna per rupee (or 61 per cent.) on actual realisation of the rent (S.22). The Gwalior Revenue Manual of Samvat 1990 (S.212) allowed 10 per cent, as charges for collection of rent. In my opinion a reasonable percentage has been laid down in the impugned legislation which is the same as in Madhya Bharat Zamin-dari Abolition Act (Act 13 of 1951). 110. Sub-clause (iii) : The next item disputed is on account of land records and Chowkidari establishment on which 12 1/2 p.c. is to be deducted. Shri P.R. Das urged that the two items are lumped up without any reason and 12 1/2 per cent. has no relation to actual facts. In my opinion the village Watchman and the village Patwari are like the acid and the alkali combining to form the salt of village administration. It is difficult to conceive how a village can be managed in the absence of either of them. I can find no fault in 'lumping' them together. Apart from provisions of law, it was incumbent on a Jagirdar to engage a patwari and a chow-kidar for discharging his obligations in regard to the Jagir village and for maintaining it. It is difficult to conceive how a village can be managed in the absence of either of them. I can find no fault in 'lumping' them together. Apart from provisions of law, it was incumbent on a Jagirdar to engage a patwari and a chow-kidar for discharging his obligations in regard to the Jagir village and for maintaining it. It is not in dispute that every Jagirdar in Gwalior, Indore and Dhar State was bound to maintain a Chowkidar (vide S.140 of Gwalior Jagir Manual, S.197 of Gwalior Police Manual, Ss.129 and 130 of Land Revenue and Tenancy Act of Holkar State; Revenue Circular No.26 of 2-2-1932 Holkar State and Ss.167 and 168 of the Dhar State Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (Act 1 of 1940). It is however, urged that the Indore Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1931 and the Dhar Land Revenue Tenancy Act, 1940-1941 have been repealed by virtue of S.2(3) of Madhya Bharat Revenue Administrative and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 (Act 66 of 1950) and that there is no provision in the new Act for Chowkidars. It is conceded that S.139 of the said Act 66 of 1950 deals with the appointment of village servants but it is urged that no rules have been formed by the Government for appointment of village servants and therefore the Jagirdars now are not bound to pay the Chowkidars. In my opinion the contention is not well founded. A village watchman is a 'village servant' within the meaning of S.139 of Act 66 of 1950 and the proviso to S.2 saves all such Rules, Standing orders and Circulars as are not inconsistent with or contrary to any provision of the new Act until they are superseded or repealed by Rules made under the new Act. So the Rules framed for appointment of Chowkidars in Jagirs made under S.135 of the Indore Act 1 of 1931 and under S.173 of the Dhar Act 1 of 1940-41 are still in force. 111. As the Jagir Manuals have not yet been repealed the Jagirdars of former Gwalior State could not raise this objection; but it was argued on their behalf that Chowkidari cess from tenants having been stopped with effect from 1-11-1951 (vide Vigyapti Revenue Department No.72332/9B dated 24-11-1951, Madhya Bharat Government Gazette dated 1-12-1951) they are freed from their obligation in this respect. I need hardly observe that the Jagirdars were realising a number of cesses from their tenants and they had to be stopped by an order of the Raj Pramukh; but this in no way affects their liability towards the Chowkidars. 112. As regards the Patwaris it was laid down in the Jagir Manuals that a Jagirdar had to engage passed and competent Patwaris (S.62A of Gwalior Manual and proviso to S.66 of Indore Manual). The Patwaris of Jagirs and Land records of those areas came under the jurisdiction of State Government by virtue of Ordinance 21 of 1948 which was followed by an Act 25 of 1949. It was laid down in Ordinance and the Act that the appointment of patwaris will be done by the Government and the cost in proportion to the income of the Jagirs to be determined by the Government shall be realised from the Jagirdars as arrears of Tanka. The experience of three years in managing the land records and Patwaris establishment in Jagirs by the State officials has to be given its due weight. It may also be mentioned here that under R.3 of S.42 of the Jagirdars Manual of Gwalior State, in Jadid-Usul Jagirs 5 per cent, on the gross Nikasi was to be left to the holder for expenses on account of Patwaris and Chowkidars. This amount was found to be insufficient and had to be raised to ten per cent, on 10-3-1945 by a Durbar Order (vide p. 960 of Gwalior Government Gazette 11-8-1945). In my opinion 12 1/2 per cent. deduction on this account in 1951 cannot be challenged. 113. 'Sub-clause (iv) : The third deduction is that of 15 per cent, of the gross-income, if it exceeds Rs.2000/-, otherwise an amount equal to 10 per cent, in other cases, on account of Education, Public Health and Roads. This is in fact for "the general welfare of the ryots", the remarks on which made above in Paras.28 and 29 will be relevant in this connection also. This deduction is based on the Gwalior practice. Under S.98 of the Manual for Jagirdars of Gwalior State it was incumbent on all Jagirdars having an annual gross income exceeding Rs.10,000/- and on those Jagirdars, having less income as the Darbar may specify, to submit an Annual Report in the form given in Appendix C to the Darbar every year in September. Under S.98 of the Manual for Jagirdars of Gwalior State it was incumbent on all Jagirdars having an annual gross income exceeding Rs.10,000/- and on those Jagirdars, having less income as the Darbar may specify, to submit an Annual Report in the form given in Appendix C to the Darbar every year in September. According to Chap.VI of Appendix C (see p.73 of the Manual) information was required in the prescribed form on the following points : 32. Small pox. Vaccination arrangements. 33. Number of Schools and students leading in them. 34. Hospital or Dispensary 35. Sanitation. 114. It was laid down in Darbar Policy Vol.IV, (p.68, para.19) that it is not compulsory for the Jagirdars that each one of them should have a separate hospital in his Jagir for it depends upon the financial condition of his estate whether he can afford to have one or not, but where the circumstances allow, one should certainly be opened and where the Jagir has not means to do so, it should join its neighbours in maintaining a travelling dispensary." 115. As regards Schools, it was laid down in R.2, Chap.IV of the Education Manual of Gwalior State that in Jagirs having gross income of Rs.50,000/- or more, no school would be opened by the State. They were to be provided with qualified staff by the State if so desired by the Jagirdars who had to pay the salary of such teachers. In other Jagirs, the Jagirdars had to construct the school buildings at their own costs. If the number of students exceeded 100 then the addition and extension was to be done by the State. If the Jagirs paid school cess then the Education Department would provide teachers for Schools and would pay their salaries and contingent expenses. If however the Jagirs maintained their own schools then it was laid down that they would be entitled to remission of School Cess. 116. Then, the Road Cess was also being levied on the Jagirdars and with the concurrence of the Government of India it was recovered from the guaranteed Estates as well. The order of Gwalior Darbar dated 5-10-1942 (re. 116. Then, the Road Cess was also being levied on the Jagirdars and with the concurrence of the Government of India it was recovered from the guaranteed Estates as well. The order of Gwalior Darbar dated 5-10-1942 (re. repairs of Neori-Bhonrasa Road in File No.123/32 of 1997 Department Muntazim Jagir-daran Gwalior State) to recover the outstanding amount of the Road Cess from Sardar Angre who had not paid Road cess for ten years is sufficient to show that the Jagirdars were always held liable for its payment. The policy was to encourage the Jagirdars in building roads in their area. If they built roads in Jagirs they were excused from payment of road cess. "In consideration of the Jagirdar Sahib of Pohri having built many roads in his Jagir and his doing other good work in the interest of the Jagir people he was excused from plying road cess in 1917-18" (Darbar Policy, Vol.IV, p.27). A general order was issued in 1924 laying down that Jagirdars having a gross income above Rs.5000/- would not have to pay Road and School Cess provided they constructed Roads and maintained Standard Schools, in their Jagirs (vide Gwalior Government Gazette dated 22-11-1924; Notification of Home Department, Jagir Section). By this Notification the cesses which the Jagirdars realised from their tenants were also stopped. 117. In Civil Miscellaneous Case No, 1 of 1952 it is admitted by the Raja of Raghogarh that in 1924, during his minority, an Abwab (Road and School Cess) of Rs.1208/- had been imposed on his estates. The Raja states that he had protested, but this is not material here. The practice of imposing Road-School Cess on the Jagirs in Gwalior State is very well proved. The new perpetual sanads given to the 43 guarantee-holders in 1924 also refer to these cesses in the following terms in Marathi : "(Road and School Cesses and other cesses which have been levied, according to the existing rules, on the income of the villages, and which have been specified in Naksha should be deposited within the specified period). (See the sanad of the Raja of Raghogarh)." It will thus be seen that the Jagirdars in Gwalior State were considered liable to spend portion of their income for Education, Public Health and Roads. 118. (See the sanad of the Raja of Raghogarh)." It will thus be seen that the Jagirdars in Gwalior State were considered liable to spend portion of their income for Education, Public Health and Roads. 118. Considering the duty of the Jagirdars (in paras.4 and 5 of Indore Form of Sanad quoted above) for assisting, according to capacity, in the management and promotion of the institutions of public utility, for maintaining the village in a prosperous condition and for improving it, in my opinion, according to the well-known rule of 'ejusdem generis', a Jagirdar in Indore State was also liable for expenditure in connection with Education, Public Health and Roads. Para 4 definitely says that a Jagirdar should "assist in promotion of institution of public utility (e.g. Village Panchayat, schools etc.)." Then he was to keep ryots pleased and to improve the village and maintain it in a prosperous condition. Unless there is sanitation and eradication of disease from the area where tenants and agriculturists reside and unless there are roads or good pathways to and from the village, it is difficult to conceive how it can be improved or how it could be maintained in a prosperous condition. The capacity of a Jagirdar to spend money for these improvements will, of course, be judged by the State while laying down principles for giving him compensation. It is however to be borne in mind that the State has only prepared a working basis of a general system for payment of compensation after establishing approximate uniformity in essentials. If all Sanads (or old Sanads of all Jagirdars) are to be closely scrutinised the result would be bewildering diversity of terms leading to confusion without serving any useful purpose. In my opinion, we should not allow, divergences in Sanads to impair the symmetry' of the main fabric. The Ruler's intentions about the duties of the Jagirdars had been expressed in new form of sanads which had been the basis of the administration in Jagirs in Holkar State since .1928. Whatever the State may be doing for the Jagir population can in no way affect the Jagirdar's liability for the welfare of his subjects. The Ruler's intentions about the duties of the Jagirdars had been expressed in new form of sanads which had been the basis of the administration in Jagirs in Holkar State since .1928. Whatever the State may be doing for the Jagir population can in no way affect the Jagirdar's liability for the welfare of his subjects. Sections 109 and 122 of Gwalior State Jagirdars Manual and Ss.113 and 125 of the Holkar State Manual also lay down that the departmental chief will arrange, if the Jagirdars so desire, for technical advice being given in matters relating to Public Works, Land Rewards, and other matters in the interest of the Estate. If the Jagirdars had not felt their loyal duty for making general improvement in their estates these provisions would have been unnecessary. 119. As I hold the deduction valid, it follows that the School buildings and the Dispensary buildings built by the Jagir money should belong to the Jagir villages (i.e., the State) and not be considered as private property of the Jagirdar. In this view I hold that cl.(g) of S.4(1) of the Act is also valid. 120. 'Sub-clause (v)' :- The last deduction is on account of Police, Revenue and Judicial powers. This affects only those Jagirdars who on 15-5-1948 exercised those powers. There is no provision in the two Manuals for investing a Jagirdar with Police powers. The only relevant provision was to be found in S.191 of Gwalior State Police Manual of Samvat 1999 which has been repealed by the Police Ordinance (Ordinance 30 of 1948) promulgated on 13-11-1948. This Ordinance was followed on 12-5-1949 by the Police Act (Act 32 of 1949) which in its turn was repealed by the Madhya Bharat Police Act (Act 76 of 1950). The management and control of the Jagir Police passed under the Inspector-General of Police by virtue of Ordinance 19 of 1948 (Madhya Bharat Government Gazette dated 6-11-1948). 121. Chapters 13, 14, 15, 16 and 21 of the Manual for Jagirdars of Gwalior State contained provisions for investing a Jagirdar with Judicial and Revenue powers. The Gwalior Ordinance No.18 of Samvat 2004 promulgated on 24-5-1948 deprived the Jagirdars of their Judicial and Revenue powers and repealed the aforesaid chapters of the said Gwalior Manual. 121. Chapters 13, 14, 15, 16 and 21 of the Manual for Jagirdars of Gwalior State contained provisions for investing a Jagirdar with Judicial and Revenue powers. The Gwalior Ordinance No.18 of Samvat 2004 promulgated on 24-5-1948 deprived the Jagirdars of their Judicial and Revenue powers and repealed the aforesaid chapters of the said Gwalior Manual. This had been followed by fee Madhya Bharat Ordinance 19 of 1948 (Madhya Bharat Gazette dated 6-11-1948) and the Madhya Bharat Act 38 of 1949 (Madhya Bharat Government Gazette dated 12-2-1949). Both the Act and the Ordinance had repealed all the provisions in the laws of Covenanting States which related to the investing of Jagirdars with Police, Revenue and Judicial Powers. 122. It is noteworthy that the provisions repealed do not state anything about the expenditure in connection with Revenue and Police powers. It is conceded that the practice was that the Jagirdars were bearing these charges. A Jagirdar in Gwalior State invested with Police powers had also to submit in his annual administration report an account of the number of Police force in the estate, arms in possession of the above Police force with details, and about expenses on account of the maintenance of the above force (see p.72 of the Manual). That the Jagirdars were bearing expenses of Revenue and Police staff admits of no doubt. It is contended that the repealing statute should have clarified the matter as to whether the Jagirdars should continue to bear expenses even when they were deprived of their powers. In my opinion, whether the liability is imposed in the repealing statute or in the impugned legislation that should make no difference. As I stated above, the various enactments affecting Jagirs passed one after another in rapid succession from 1948 to 1951 should be viewed as component parts of the same machine; they should have little meaning if each is examined in isolation. It has to be borne in mind that the Jagirdars were permanently deprived of their Judicial, Revenue and Police powers only on 12-2-1949 by Act 18 of 1949. Within few months of the passing of this Act, the Bill for Abolition of Jagirs had been . introduced in the State Legislative Assembly. It has to be borne in mind that the Jagirdars were permanently deprived of their Judicial, Revenue and Police powers only on 12-2-1949 by Act 18 of 1949. Within few months of the passing of this Act, the Bill for Abolition of Jagirs had been . introduced in the State Legislative Assembly. It appears to me that the legislature had at that time made up its mind for resuming the Jagirs and it wanted to keep the liability of Jagirdars for the Police and Revenue powers subsisting only for the purpose of making deduction when laying down principles for payment of compensation to the Jagirdars. The same consideration would apply to the expenditure in connection with Judicial powers. The Jagirdars had lock-ups for prisoners and had to meet expenditure for under-trial prisoners. They had to submit the details of this expenditure in their Administrative Reports (p.72 of the Gwalior Manual). Sections 66 and 67 of the Manual of Gwalior State do not state anything about this expenditure which the Jagirdars had been meeting from the income of their Jagirs. The presumption is that in laying down the percentage of deduction the State : has duly taken into consideration the income, if any, the Jagirdars had been getting from the Judicial and Revenue work. It is not open to us to see whether the deduction is adequate or inadequate. It is difficult to appreciate the argument that the Jagirdars can spend this money for the sake of their 'prestige' but once they have been deprived of their powers they would not be prepared to undertake the expenditure and the liability. This smacks of dictating terms to Suzerain which cannot be allowed. The State has the right to tell the Jagirdars that it was due to their mismanagement that it had to incur expenditure in overhauling the entire system in the Jagir area and also in absorbing the Jagir employees in the service of the State and that the concerned Jagirdars would have to bear proportionate expenses. The intention of the Legislature is clear on this point. I need hardly repeat what I had observed in the beginning (para 17 above) that the Jagiri system in Madhya Bharat was not based on the notion of contract, but on that of command. There is nothing in these deductions, in my opinion, which may be termed as unrelated to actual facts. I need hardly repeat what I had observed in the beginning (para 17 above) that the Jagiri system in Madhya Bharat was not based on the notion of contract, but on that of command. There is nothing in these deductions, in my opinion, which may be termed as unrelated to actual facts. I hold these deductions valid. 123. 'Clause 2, sub-clause (c)' :- As regards calculation of gross income in cl.2 Sch.I, it was contended on behalf of the Raja of Raghogarh '(C.M. Case No.1 of 1952)' that gross income has been reduced deliberately by calculating the Forest Revenue in sub-cl.(c) on the basis of data regarding average yield for 20 years preceding the basic year. It was urged that the price of forest products has only recently gone up, and, that before the war it was very low, so it should be deemed to be a case for reducing artificially the figure of gross-income. It is no doubt true that in case of quarries (sub-cl.d), the average income of ten years is taken as the basis; and in case of forests, the average income of 20 years is taken for the purpose of calculating gross income. The figures speak for themselves; but the petitioner has to overcome the strong presumption which the decision of the Legislature in enacting the Jagir Forests (Prevention of Indiscriminate Cutting) Act (Act 55 of 1950) is calculated to raise against the Jagirdars. The presumption is that the Jagirdars in Madhya Bharat were bent upon frittering away the forest resources of their Jagir by indiscriminate and unplanned cutting of trees. It is possible that what was not done during last twenty years for conserving and developing the resources (S.118, Gwalior Jagir Manual) was undone during the last two or three years in order to earn as much money as possible. The figures given on behalf of the Raja are to the effect that before 1940, the annual income from the products of his forest was only Rs.15,299/- but this year it has reached Rs.2,16,727. Instead of providing a rebuttal, the presumption is re-inforced by the figures, and in these circumstances, the contention must be rejected. 124. This disposes of all contentions raised. 125. The result is that, in my judgment, there is no force in any of the contentions and all the petitions must be dismissed. I order accordingly. 126. Instead of providing a rebuttal, the presumption is re-inforced by the figures, and in these circumstances, the contention must be rejected. 124. This disposes of all contentions raised. 125. The result is that, in my judgment, there is no force in any of the contentions and all the petitions must be dismissed. I order accordingly. 126. I agree that leave to appeal to the Supreme Court be granted to the parties. "ORDER OF THE COURT" 127. BY COURT :- The result is that the Abolition of Jagirs Act 28 of 1951 is declared to be valid except as regards S.4(1)(g) and sub-cls.(iv) and (v) of cl.4 of Sch.I which are declared to be illegal and inoperative. A writ of mandamus will issue to the State Government directing not to give effect to the provisions of the impugned Act stated above. Parties to bear their own costs. The order of ad interim injunction is vacated. Permission to file an appeal is granted to both the parties. Order accordingly.