Judgment :- 1. This second appeal presented by the 2nd defendant in O. S. No. 857/1110 on the file of the District Munsiff of Trichur arises out of proceedings in execution of that decree and the only point arising for determination is one of limitation. On account of the importance of the question and the possible frequency of its emergence, the case was referred to a Full Bench by one of us. 2. The suit was for eviction of garden lands on foot of two pattamchits of the years 1078 and 1091, executed in favour of the Jenmi who gave a mel pattom (Superior lease) in favour of the plaintiff. By the time of the suit, the leasehold became vested in various persons all of whom were impleaded as defendants 1 to 8, the last and the 9th defendant being the Jenmi himself. The lessees had effected improvements in the property. There was an offer in the plaint to pay the value of the said improvements against which the arrears of and future rent claimed were sought to be set off. Some of the defendants appeared and contested making separate and independent claims for value of improvements in respect of the several parcels of which they claimed possession. 3. On 22-8-1111 the Munsiff granted a decree to the plaintiff for eviction on his depositing Rs. 522-12-10 which was the amount fixed by the court as value of improvements upon the entire property. The dispute between the defendants inter se as regards their respective claims in the value of improvements was directed to be determined in a fresh suit to be filed in that behalf. The arrears of rent claimed as also future rent limited to three years from the date of the plaint was decreed. 4. Why future rent was limited to three years from date of the plaint (11-7-1110) is not known as the Code of Civil Procedure then in force (Cochin Act I of 1079) did contain in the 209th section a provision similar to the one in the Indian Code (Order XX, Rule 12) for grant of a decree for future rent or mesne profits till delivery of possession or three years from the date of the decree whichever event first occurs. The prayer in the plaint for setting off arrears and future rent against the value of improvements is not also seen granted by the decree. The prayer in the plaint for setting off arrears and future rent against the value of improvements is not also seen granted by the decree. The reason for not granting that relief to which the plaintiff is ordinarily entitled is also not known. 5. Within three years of the decree, that is on 19-8-1114 the decree-holder presented E. P. 1998/1114 for execution. The court ordered him to take steps for issue of notices to the judgment-debtors and on his default in payment of the requisite batta therefore, the execution petition was struck off on 21-11-1114. It is not contended that this is not a final disposal of that application. 6. The next application for execution was E. P. 1533/1119 which was filed on 1-5-1119, that is 4 years 5 months and 10 days after the order on the prior application. The question of limitation that arises is as regards this execution petition. 7. The decree-holder contends that it is within time claiming exclusion of two periods namely, the currency of Cochin Proclamation VI of 1117, and six months under Section 11 of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act, VIII of 1118. It is urged that these enactments constitute "an injunction or order by which execution of the decree has been stayed". Both the courts below upheld the said contention of the decree-holder and the 2nd defendant has appealed to this court. 8. Proclamation VI of 1117 was promulgated on 13-4-1117. (Cochin Acts & Proclamations. Vol. X,1117, page 10). The first section provides that it shall be in force "until such time as Government may withdraw it by notification in the Cochin Government Gazette", and the notification withdrawing it was published in the Cochin Government Gazette dated 22-7-1118 at page 407, Part I. (See Cochin Rules & Notifications, 1118, page 298). The 3rd section is as follows: "No suit shall be instituted against a verumpattamdar for eviction nor shall he be evicted from his holding in execution of a decree for eviction. All suits and appeals for eviction of verumpattamdars now pending in the courts shall be stayed but this shall not preclude courts from granting relief for arrears of rent due in respect of the holding." There are only three sections in the Proclamation and the second section is not relevant for this case. All suits and appeals for eviction of verumpattamdars now pending in the courts shall be stayed but this shall not preclude courts from granting relief for arrears of rent due in respect of the holding." There are only three sections in the Proclamation and the second section is not relevant for this case. The Cochin Verumpattamdars Act, VIII of 1118 came into force on 19-7-1118, that is three days before Proclamation VI /1117 was withdrawn. The relevant portions of the Act are: Section 4 which provides that: "Notwithstanding any law, custom or contract to the contrary, every verumpattamdar shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding and shall not be evicted therefrom except as provided in Section 8 of this Act." Section 8 which enacts that: "[1] No suit for eviction of a verumpattamdar from his holding or any portion thereof shall lie except on the following grounds - [a] xx xx xx xx [b] xx xx xx xx [c] xx xx xx xx [d] that he has not paid within six months from the commencement of this Act the entire arrears of pattam if any, due in respect of the holding at the commencement of this Act. [e] xx xx xx xx [f] xx xx xx xx" And Section 11 which reads that: "All decrees subsisting at the commencement of this Act for the eviction of a verumpattamdar from his holding shall be annulled if - [1] the entire arrears of pattom due in respect of the holding is paid within the time and in accordance with the provisions contained in clause [d] of sub-section [1] of section 8, and [2] the costs awarded under the decree and the costs, if any, incurred in execution proceedings are paid within six months from the commencement of this Act or where the decree is for the arrears of pattom scaled down under Section 16 of the Cochin Agriculturists' Relief Act. XVIII of 1114 on or before the date specified for the payment of the last instalment of such arrears by the said Act as modified by Proclamation III of 1117." 9. XVIII of 1114 on or before the date specified for the payment of the last instalment of such arrears by the said Act as modified by Proclamation III of 1117." 9. It is only if the decree-holder is entitled to exclusion of both the periods, namely the currency of the Proclamation VI of 1117, and of six months within which arrears of pattam could be paid under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Act, that the execution petition will be within time. If he be not entitled either to the one or the other, the execution petition will be barred by limitation. As in our judgment the decree-holder is not entitled to the exclusion of the second of the two periods, it is not necessary for us to consider nor have we considered the eligibility of his claim which is also debatable in view of the absence of a provision for excluding the period of pendency of the Proclamation in computing the period of limitation. The argument of learned counsel for the decree-holder for excluding the period of six months under clause (d) of section 8 of the Act is that by section 4, fixity of tenure in respect of his holding is conferred upon every verumpattamdar. Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 8 grants to a verumpattamdar a period of six months within which to pay up arrears of rent and section 11 enjoins the annulment of decrees for eviction on such payment being made. If, therefore, a decree for eviction be permitted to be executed within the said six months, it would be, it is contended, depriving the tenant of the right conferred upon him by the statute of paying up the arrears within six months from the date of the Act and getting the decree for eviction annulled. The Verumpattamdars' Act, it is urged, was enacted to benefit the tenant and it ought not to be so construed as to make an advantage afforded by the Act unavailable to him. The Verumpattamdars' Act, it is urged, was enacted to benefit the tenant and it ought not to be so construed as to make an advantage afforded by the Act unavailable to him. The decree-holder-landlord thus pleads the cause of his opponent the tenant because, if the tenant he immune from eviction for a period of time, there should be a corresponding disability on the landlord to take steps in eviction and if no steps could be taken to evict the tenant in execution of a decree, there must be deemed to be an injunction or order staying execution within the meaning of section 15 of the Limitation Act. This is the line of argument followed on behalf of the decree-holder by his learned counsel. 10. The argument is plausible but will not bear scrutiny. It involves an assumption that section 4 grants fixity of tenure to all verumpattamdars. That section, which has been read, says only that:- "Notwithstanding any law, custom or contract to the contrary, every verumpattamdar shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding and shall not be evicted therefrom except as provided in section 8 of this Act." We have read the section again to show that the conferment of fixity of tenure is only "notwithstanding any law, custom or contract to the contrary" but is not also "notwithstanding a decree." If a statute should be taken as encroaching upon existing rights in whatsoever manner they might have arisen, there should be words operating in that behalf. Several statutes impinge upon Tights secured to parties by decrees. The Cochin Agriculturists' Relief Act, (XVIII of 1114) for instance, provides in Section 7 that: 7. [1] Notwithstanding any law, custom, contract or decree of court to the contrary, all debts payable by an agriculturist at the commencement of this Act, shall be scaled down in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter," The non-inclusion of a'decree' in section 4 notwithstanding which also fixity is conferred, cannot be considered to be an accidental omission but is rather a deliberate exclusion because, Proclamation VI/1117 which was the precursor to the Act provided in section 3, which has been already read, that no verumpattamdar shall be evicted from his holding in execution of a decree for eviction. The explanation offered by learned counsel for the decree-holder that immunity from eviction in execution of decrees had to be provided for in the Proclamation, as fixity had not then been conferred but was only in contemplation, and that such fixity having been assured to the tenant by the Act, immunity from eviction in execution of decrees had not to be specially provided for therein, involves the fallacy of begging the question. What was it that conferred immunity from eviction in execution of decrees on a judgment-debtor verumpattamdar? Section 4 is the answer but section 4 does not say so, though it says that fixity is conferred notwithstanding any law, custom or contract to the contrary. Section 8 prohibits a suit for eviction against a verumpattamdar except for grounds (a) to (f) specified in clause (1) of that section of which, ground (d) is non-payment of the entire arrears of pattam, if any, due within six months from the commencement of the Act. The suit, the filing of which is prohibited, can only be a suit proposed to be filed after the date of the Act. It has not, nor can it possibly have, any application to a suit already filed and a decree already obtained. To decrees obtained before the Act and subsisting on its date the applicatory provision is the 11th section which provides in clause (1) that on payment of the "entire arrears of pattam due in respect of the holding" within the time and in accordance with the provisions contained in clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 8, such decrees shall be annulled. The said entire arrears would comprise not merely the arrears for which there has been a decree but also the arrears in respect of which there has been no decree. As is clear from the reference to clause (d) of subsection (1) of section 8, the annulment of the decree is directed not only on discharge of the debt under the decree but on full payment of all the arrears till date of payment. , A period of six months having been allowed for making such payment, the arrears to be paid to become entitled to the annulment of the decree should include arrears for the period intervening the date of the Act and the date of payment. 11. , A period of six months having been allowed for making such payment, the arrears to be paid to become entitled to the annulment of the decree should include arrears for the period intervening the date of the Act and the date of payment. 11. The argument based upon this section is that the decree should be in existence in order that it might be annulled and if it should be in existence, it should not be capable of being executed after the Act within the time permitted to the judgment-debtor to pay up the arrears and obtain its annulment. The argument stands unsupported by the language of the section. The point of time at which the subsistence of a decree whose annulment is provided by the section is only the commencement of the Act. A decree then subsisting admits of being annulled under the section notwithstanding that it may be satisfied wholly or in part thereafter by compulsory process in execution. Here again the provision of Proclamation VI/1117 against eviction of a verumpattamdar in execution of a "decree which existed when the Act was passed and which was not incorporated in the Act attracts attention. As the non-mention of decrees in section 4, even so the non-insistence of their subsistence at any time after the commencement of the Act in section 11, has to be attributed to the intention of the Legislature to terminate the disability cast upon decree-holders by the Proclamation in getting eviction and to leave them free to pursue their remedies under the decrees subject, it might be, to the consequences, whatever they are, of the annulment of the decrees should the judgment-debtors verumpattamdars happen to avail themselves of the advantage offered to them by section 11 by complying with the conditions therein. 12. In Raja Kirtyanand Singh V. Prithi Chand Lal Chaudhury (1933) L. R. 60 I. A. 343), the Privy Council held that an order of Court issued to the decree-holder in another suit that he should wait for some time for payment of the decree amount is not in any sense a stay of execution by an injunction or order. 12. In Raja Kirtyanand Singh V. Prithi Chand Lal Chaudhury (1933) L. R. 60 I. A. 343), the Privy Council held that an order of Court issued to the decree-holder in another suit that he should wait for some time for payment of the decree amount is not in any sense a stay of execution by an injunction or order. There is not even such an obligation in this case unless it be considered that the concession granted to a judgment-debtor to pay up all the arrears within a certain time and obtain an annulment of the decree for a portion of those arrears as also for eviction, involves a correlative obligation on the decree-holder not merely to not execute the decree for the said arrears but even to not execute it far eviction. There is nothing in the Act imposing any such obligation upon the decree-holder. 13. "It is an elementary rule of construction that no statute should be construed as destructive of or prejudicially affecting any existing right unless such a result is brought about by express words or by necessary implication" said this court in Second Appeal 210 of 1950 which arose between the same parties and in relation to the identical decree. Applying that rule to the present case we hold that no manner of obstacle was offered by Act VIII of 1118 to the execution of the decree. The set off of arrears and future rent against the value of improvements prayed for in the plaint not having been allowed by the decree, execution as regards that claim is obviously barred by limitation as Proclamation VI of 1117 prohibits only eviction and expressly permits relief being pursued for arrears of rent.' 14. The set off of arrears and future rent against the value of improvements prayed for in the plaint not having been allowed by the decree, execution as regards that claim is obviously barred by limitation as Proclamation VI of 1117 prohibits only eviction and expressly permits relief being pursued for arrears of rent.' 14. In this view that we take of the Act, the questions of nicety and difficulty on which there is conflict of judicial opinion as to whether the injunction or order within the meaning of section 15 of the Limitation Act should be one issued by a court or could be one issued by any other competent authority, whether stay of execution of a part of the decree would entail exclusion of the period of its pendency even in computing limitation for the part not stayed and whether the imposition of a duty on the court to stay execution would place the decree-holder under an obligation not to apply for it, do not fall to be decided in this case. 15. In the result we allow the Second Appeal, set aside the orders passed by the courts below and dismiss the execution petition. The respondents will pay the costs of the appellant in all the three courts. Allowed.