Bapna, J.—This is a second appeal by the plaintiff in a suit for declaration and injunction. 2. The appellant sued the respondent on 17th April, 1942 on the allegations that the parties resided in Mohalla Dhan Mandi at Balotra and that between the houses of the parties there was certain open land, a portion whereof marked A B C D E and F in a plan attached to the plaint was his patta-shud land and was in his possession. It was alleged that the plaintiff built a wall A B on the site of an old wall which had fallen down some years ago, but the defendant objected to the said construction and took proceedings under sec. 147 Cr. P. C. and got the wall demolished on 9th of May, 1941. The plaintiff claimed a declaration of his title to the said land, and an injunction against the defendant restraining him from obstructing in the construction of the wall A B. The original plan filed with he plaint having been lost, the plaintiff filed a copy in the court of Civil Judge after remand, and is marked Ex P.1. The plaintiff also claimed Rs. 200/- by way of damages for wrongful demolition of the wall, but on the matter coming up in revision in the High Court at Jodhpur, the plaintiff reduced his claim for damages to the nominal amount of Re. 1/. The respondent did not admit the plaintiffs ownership of the land A B C D E F, denied the existence of the previous wall, and claimed rights of easement over the said land and pleaded that the plaintiff had no right to construct the wall which he wanted to build. Various issues were raised. The trial court found that the area at site was less than the combined areas mentioned in the patta of the plaintiff and the defendant, and that any construction on the plot by the plaintiff would result in overcrowding, and in the opinion of the court, the plots of the plaintiff and the defendant should remain unbuilded. He accordingly dismissed the suit. 3. On appeal, the learned Sub-Judge,Balotra, found that the place A B where the plaintiff wanted to build would fall within the patta-shud land of the defendant, and the plaintiff had no right to build at the place. He accordingly dismissed the suit. 3. On appeal, the learned Sub-Judge,Balotra, found that the place A B where the plaintiff wanted to build would fall within the patta-shud land of the defendant, and the plaintiff had no right to build at the place. He was, however, of opinion that the land had been used by the parties in connection with marriages and deaths in the family and should be kept open. He accordingly confirmed the decision of the lower court. 4. On the case coming up before this Court, it was observed that the user of the land on the occasions of deaths and marriages in the family did not create any right of easement. It was further observed that the case was not properly tried on the specific plea of the defendant that he enjoyed a right of way over the plaintiffs land as an easement and the plaintiff had no right to obstruct that right by construction of a wall as intended by him. Three issues were, therefore, struck after allowing an amendment of the written statement :— (1) What would be the correct measurements of the plots of the plaintiff and the defendant at the site? (2) Whether the defendant enjoyed a right of way as an easement openly and peaceably as of right without interruption over the plaintiffs land for over 20 years? (3) What would be the minimum width of passage required for access to and from the defendants house? A direction was sent to the first appellate court to allow parties to lead evidence and to submit findings to this Court. 5. The learned Civil Judge Balotra, after recording evidence of the parties and getting a correct plan of the site prepared by one Kanmal and marked Ex. C. I, has given his findings as under:— On the first issue he found that the width of the land at the road-side mentioned in the pitta of the plaintiff is 4-1/2 yards, while the width of the land at the same place mentioned in the patta of the defendant is 6 yards. The total measurement at the mouth of the lane according to the pattas comes to 10-1/2 yards (21 feet), but the land actually at site is only 183". The total measurement at the mouth of the lane according to the pattas comes to 10-1/2 yards (21 feet), but the land actually at site is only 183". By reducing the proportionate width of the plot of each party, he has held the plaintiffs land to be 710" wide, and the defendants adjacent land to be 105" wide at the mouth of the lane, and the point where these two lands meet is the imaginary point B. On the second issue, the court held that the defendant had a right of way over the plaintiffs land in respect of passage 89" wide including the land of the defendant himself. This width according to the learned Civil Judge is the width between the defendants house and the point A-I of the plaintiffs house. This is the first corner in the plaintiffs house after entering the open space from the road-side. On the third issue he held that the land required for the passage of the defendant would be sufficiently left if the plaintiff were restricted in his construction from the point A-I to the imaginary point B mentioned above. In other words, the land of the plaintiff from the imaginary point B, where the plots of the parties meet on road-side, to the point A-I which is the first corner in the plaintiffs building, was not necessary for preserving the plaintiffs right of way. 6. Both parties filed objections. On behalf of the defendant it was urged that the lower court had commi-ted an error in finding that the plot of land from the imaginary point B to A-I on the plaintiffs side was not required for the exercise of the right of way of the defendant. On behalf of the plaintiff it was urged that the width of the lane at the northern side of the defendants house was only 48", near the house of Lalchand, and the lower court had erred in allowing the width of the passage to be in excess of 48" would be entirely covered by the land belonging to the defendant. It was urged by learned counsel for the plaintiff that the lower court should have found that the defendant did not exercise his right of way over any portion of the plaintiffs land. 7. It was urged by learned counsel for the plaintiff that the lower court should have found that the defendant did not exercise his right of way over any portion of the plaintiffs land. 7. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the lower court in deciding the width of the passage has only taken into consideration the requirement of foot-passengers. The court should also have taken into consideration the requirement of bullock carts or camels which have been using the open land while bringing fuel and other goods. The lower court did not accept this contention and observed as follows : — "The witnesses of the parties have all admitted that in case the wall is allowed to be constructed, carts would enter the defendants courtyard but would not be able to take a turn. But this is only a claim of convenience. Corts do not come daily and it is not necessary that in the locality of Balotra, lanes and by-lanes should be wide enough to enable carts and cars to reach every door-way. Fuel sticks are carried on camels ladas and the defendants open land is quite sufficient for that purpose. It is not an absolute necessity". 8. The view taken by the lower court does not appear to be correct. The law in this respect has been explained by Jessel, M. R., in Canon vs. Villars (1878 Vol. VIII Chancery Division, 415) at page 421 : — Prima facie the grant of a right of way is the grant of a right having regard to the nature of the road over which it is granted and the purpose for which it is intended to be used; and both those circumstances may be legitimately called in aid in determining whether it is a general right of way, or a right of way restricted to foot-passengers or restricted to foot-passengers and horsemen or cattle, which is generally called a drift way, or a general right of way for carts, horses, carriages, and everything else". In an earlier passage, at page 420, the learned Master of Rolls observed :— "Where you find a road constructed so as to be fit for carriages and of the requisite width, leading up to a dwelling-house, and there is a grant of a right of way for all reasonable purposes required for the dwelling-house, and would include, therefore, the right to the user of carriages by the occupant of the dwelling-house if he wanted to take the air, or the right to have a waggon clean up to the door when the waggon was to bring coals for the use of the dwelling-house". There is nothing on the record to suggest that the right of way was restricted to foot-passengers only. There is clear evidence on the record that cart loads of fuel go right from road-side to the point A-1 and come back by taking a turn there, and that it would not be possible to do so if the plaintiff is allowed to build a wall from the imaginary point B on the roadside to the point A-I. The plaintiffs, witness Kheemraj, for instance, states that in this open land, the carts of both the plaintiff and the defendant come and go and if the wall is built by the plaintiff where he intends to do, the carts may be able to go, but will not be able to turn and come back. Misrimal, plaintiffs witness, also makes the same statement. Hasti-mal plaintiff also concedes that after the intended wall is built by him, the carts will not be able to take a turn although they will be able to go to the place where they go at present. He adds that about 10 yards (20) of land in width is required for taking a turn. As stated above, the width of both the plots taken together, at the mouth of the lane on the road-side, is 183", and while it appears from the plan that the entire width of the two plots is slightly larger at some place in the interior, it would not in any case be more than 20* at any place. In the circumstances of this case, it must be held that the right of way does not mean only a right of way for foot-passengers, but also for carts and camel-loads. In the circumstances of this case, it must be held that the right of way does not mean only a right of way for foot-passengers, but also for carts and camel-loads. On the evidence it is also clear that this right of passage will be obstructed if the plaintiff were allowed to build a wall on any portion of the land found to belong to him. The plaintiff has no doubt been able to prove that the land on the east of the imaginary line drawn from the imaginary point B on the road-side mentioned above, to the point A in Ex. C-I prepared by Kanmal on 23rd November, 1950, and which is the second corner of the plaintiffs building as you go inside from the road, belongs to the plaintiff, but he has no right to build on it and obstruct the right of way of the defendant. 9. The main point in dispute in this case was the plaintiffs claim that he was entitled to construct a wall so as to enclose his land and this was resisted by the defendant. The plaintiff, as described above, has been held not entitled to make the intended construction and thereby interfere in the right of easement of way acquired by the defendant in respect of foot-passengers and carts. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. It may be pointed out that the area of the plaintiffs and the defendants land will remain as found out by the learned Civil Judge on remand, but no declaration of title is necessary as the title of the land of the plaintiff, though originally denied by the defendant, was later admitted and was, thus, never seriously in dispute. The plaintiff appellant will pay the costs of the defendant respondent in all the three courts.