Judgment :- Govinda Pillai, J. 1. This petition came up for decision by a Full Bench under the following order of reference by one of us: ORDER OF REFERENCE Govinda Pillai, J. "The 5th counter petitioner in the lower court is the revision petitioner. The matter arose in proceedings under Section 16 of the Debt Relief Act, On the death of the petitioner-debtor during the course of the proceedings a contention had teen raised by the revision petitioner that the petition under Section 16 became infructuous and could not be further carried on by his legal representatives. The court below held that after the death of the original petitioner the legal representatives were competent to continue the proceedings already started, so that they could claim the 1/4 share to which the original petitioner was entitled. 2. It has now been settled by the Full Bench ruling in Azhakappa Aiyer V. Sivakami Ammal [1947 T.L.R. 1] that by the use of the word "individual" in Section 16 of the Debt Relief Act a legal representative of the debtor was not entitled to put in a petition under the section for the settlement of the debts of the deceased man. But this ruling does not say that after the concessions allowed under Section 16 were invoked by an individual his legal representatives after his death could not continue the proceedings. This Full Bench ruling refers to a decision in C. R. P. 556 / 1119. That was decided by a Division Bench. Paragraph 2 of that decision is as follows: "There is no doubt that only the 'individual' who is unable to pay his debts under the foregoing sections can apply under Section 16. There is indication by the use of the word 'individual' that the right is personal, and this is not disputed. He must be unable to pay his debts also, meaning debts which he has contracted or is liable for The additional petitioner in the lower court is not shown to be an individual who is unable to pay his debts and even if he is, the debts here are the debts of the deceased payable out of the assets. In stating that the right to proceed under Section 16 is a personal right, we mean that it is an individual 'right to seek relief and the Act has been designed to relieve indebtedness. In stating that the right to proceed under Section 16 is a personal right, we mean that it is an individual 'right to seek relief and the Act has been designed to relieve indebtedness. Rights intimately connected with the individuality of the deceased will not survive." If that ruling is correct then the legal representatives of the person who put in the petition under Section 16 could not come in at any stage after the death of the petitioner, for, according to that ruling it was always a personal right which did not survive that individual. Though the word 'individual' is used in Section 16, the same word is not repeated in the following sections. On the other hand in Section 19 which lays down as to how the liabilities are to be settled and how the assets are to be divided, the word 'debtor' is used. One-fourth of the entire assets not exceeding Rs. 3000 in value shall be allotted to and given over to the debtor. Vide Section 19 [a]. In the proviso to that also the word 'debtor' is used in connection with the allotment of the homestead. Section 20 also deals with alienations made by the debtor. In Section 21 another word 'applicant' is used in relation to the execution of decrees obtained against the petitioner. It could have been held that the debtor referred to in Sections 19 and 20 was none other than the 'individual' mentioned in Section 16, but for the definition of debtor in the same Act. In Section 2 [5] it is stated that a debtor includes the heirs and legal representatives of a debtor. If that be so, then the debtor referred to in Section 19 [a] would also include his heirs and legal representatives, and if the petitioner died after filing the petition his legal representatives could continue the proceedings. The order in C. R. P. 556 of 1119 does not seem to have noticed the use of the word 'debtor' in Sections 19 and 20 instead of 'individual'. The order in C. R. P. 556 of 1119 does not seem to have noticed the use of the word 'debtor' in Sections 19 and 20 instead of 'individual'. In view of the different words used in Sections 16,19 & 20, it appears necessary to have an authoritative ruling on the question whether after the death of the 'individual' who filed the petition under Section 16, his legal representatives could continue the proceedings so that they could get the benefit of the one-fourth share which the petitioner would have got had he been alive till the termination of the proceedings. I therefore refer the above question and the civil revision petition to a Full Bench for decision." 2. The Debt Relief Acts II and III of 1116 were passed to give relief to debtors. In the first instance debtors were allowed to get a full discharge on payment of a major portion of the debt in instalments and sections 7 to 15 make provision for the same. There were debtors who were by force of circumstances unable to take advantage of these provisions, and so sections 16 to 21 made provision to give them relief. Section 23 further amended the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and considerably restricted the rights of the creditors to proceed against the person of the debtors. 3. While the original debtors, and their heirs and legal representatives were allowed to make full use of sections 8 to 15, a restriction was placed on the individual who was unable to discharge his liability under sections 8 to 15, in moving for the relief under section 16. When there was a doubt or dispute in respect of the amount payable under section 9 the debtor was given the option to apply under section 15 (1) to the court having jurisdiction conferred by section 15 (2) for an order fixing the amount. For this purpose it was not necessary that the individual who incurred the debt should by himself make the application. "Debtor" had been defined in section 2 (5) to include the heirs and legal representatives of a debtor and any person holding an interest in any property secured for the debt. Bat when we come to section 16, we see a complete change in the aspect. "Debtor" had been defined in section 2 (5) to include the heirs and legal representatives of a debtor and any person holding an interest in any property secured for the debt. Bat when we come to section 16, we see a complete change in the aspect. Section 16 (1) runs thus: "Any individual who is unable to pay his debts under the foregoing provisions of this Act may present an application to the court within whose jurisdiction he resides or ordinarily carries on business for a full settlement of his debts." This provision was the subject of judicial interpretation by a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court in 1947 T. L. R.1 mentioned in the order of reference. It was held that the word "individual" would seem to indicate a single man or woman as contrasted from the species or body of which he or she is a member along with other individuals. It was further pointed out that the individual petitioner must be unable to pay his debt, meaning debts which he had contracted or was liable for. Thus where the debts are debts of the deceased, payable out of the assets of the deceased, his legal representatives are not individuals for the purpose of section 16. The entire object of the Act would seem to be to give protection to an individual who cannot pay his debts under the sections preceding section 16, and who is anxious to retain at least one-fourth of his properties not exceeding Rs. 3000 for himself free from being proceeded against for the satisfaction of his creditors, secured or unsecured. 4. After thus conferring the right on the individual to apply for settlement of all his debts and for giving him one-fourth of his properties not exceeding Rs. 3000, free of all encumbrances, the Legislature apparently wanted the benefit thus granted being inherited by his heirs in case that individual died before the conclusion of the proceedings This is quite patent from the exclusion of the word "individual" in the following operative portions of the Statute. Instead of that word, "debtor" is used in those sections. The definition of the words and expressions in section 2 is not restricted in its operation to any section or sections of this Act. Instead of that word, "debtor" is used in those sections. The definition of the words and expressions in section 2 is not restricted in its operation to any section or sections of this Act. Subject to the provisions of sections 4 to 7, the Act is made to apply to all debts incurred before the 23rd day of Dhanu 1112 and subsisting at the commencement of the Act. See section 3. Debt is defined to mean any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured due from any person and the word debtor includes the heirs and the legal representatives of a debtor. After the application under section 16 is filed the court passes an order under section 17 fixing a date for hearing the same. Section 18 provides for the determination of the admissibility and amount of each claim. Section 19 then prescribes how the assets are to be distributed. It runs as follows: "The Court shall then settle the liabilities of the debtor in the manner mentioned hereunder, namely [a] One-fourth of the entire assets not exceeding Rs. 3,000 in value shall be allotted to and given over to the debtor Provided that in such allotment the homestead in which the debtor lives shall wherever possible be allotted to his share." 5. The use of the word "debtor" instead of 'individual", the "allotment" of property to that debtor, and the provision for the inclusion of the homestead wherever possible in which the debtor lives in the "share" to be allotted to him, would unmistakably indicate that the word "debtor" was used in the sense it was defined in section 2. Maxwell in the book on the Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edition at pages 322 and 323 stated with reference to the decided cases thus: "It has been justly remarked that, when precision is required, no safer rule can be followed than always to call the same thing by the same name. It is, at all events, reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act. It is, at all events, reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act. Accordingly, in ascertaining the meaning to be attached to a particular word in a section of an Act, though the proper course would seem to be to ascertain that meaning if possible from a consideration of the section itself, yet, if the meaning cannot be so ascertained, other sections may be looked at to fix the sense in which the word is there used." Again at page 324 it was thus laid down: "As the same expression is as a general rule to be presumed to be used in the same sense throughout an Act, or a series of cognate Acts, a change of language, probably, suggests the presumption of change of intention, and, as has been seen, the change of language in the later of two statutes on the same subject has often the effect of repealing the earlier provision by implication." 6. The assets distributed are the assets of the petitioner though he surrenders the same to the control of the court. Those properties, unlike in insolvency, do not vest in the court. It is out of these assets that a one-fourth share is returned to him. This one-fourth share could not be reduced by the volume of debts. That is a fixed measure and what remains to be done, is an order of court to divide that one-fourth not exceeding Rs. 3000 and give it to him. As far as possible his homestead is to come within this one-fourth share. It is therefore an ascertained quantity and it belongs to him. There is no reason to hold that this ascertained asset could not be inherited by his legal representatives. The Legislature also had no such intention and that is quite apparent from the omission to use the word "individual" in later sections, and in using the word "debtor" which had been given a meaning in the same Statute. 7. There is no reason to hold that this ascertained asset could not be inherited by his legal representatives. The Legislature also had no such intention and that is quite apparent from the omission to use the word "individual" in later sections, and in using the word "debtor" which had been given a meaning in the same Statute. 7. One of the learned judges who took part in Azhakappa Aiyar v. Sivakami Ammal (1947 T.L.R 1) had referred to a decision of a Division Bench in C. R. P. 556 of 1119 in support of this position that only an individual who was unable to pay his debts can file the petition under section 16 and not his legal representatives for the discharge of his debts. To this extent there can be no objection to that decision; but it went further to hold that with the death of the petitioner, the petition under section 16 will abate. It has to be stated, with all respects to the learned judges who passed that order, that this view is not correct. Their Lordships had not noticed the word "debtor" used in the following sections except in Sec. 21 where the reference is to the applicant. There was also no analytical study of the different provisions of the Act. To the extent that the said decision laid down that the application under section 16 will abate with the death of the individual who filed the same, and that the personal representative cannot continue the application as such, we overrule the same: Our answer to the reference is that after the death of the individual who filed the petition under section 16, his legal representatives can continue the proceeding so that they can get the benefit of the one-fourth share which the petitioner would have got had he been alive till the termination of the proceedings. The result is that the revision petition stands dismissed; but in the circumstances without costs. Subramonia Iyer, J. I agree to the order proposed that the revision petition be dismissed without costs. Dismissed.