Judgment Sinha, J. 1. This appeal is on behalf of the defendants first party. The suit had been brought for declaration of title to and recovery of possession of lands measuring 4 bighas, according to the cadastral survey, and 3 bighas 5 kathas and 17 dhurs according to the revisional survey, together with mesne profits. 2. The plaintiffs case is that the suit lands are comprised in tauzi no, 3368 in village Amnaur Sultan. The ancestor of the defendants second party had given a zarpeshgi in favour of plaintiff 1 in respect of a part of this land for Rs. 250/-on 22-6-1901. There was a simple mortgage bond executed by the said ancestor of defendants second party in favour of plaintiff 1 on 17-6-1911 for Rs. 200/-. On 19-7-1915, another zarpeshgi deed was executed in respect of the lands in question for Rs. 600.00 by the defendants second party in favour of plaintiff 2. It further appears that on 24-7-1902, a simple mortgage bond had been executed by the defendants second party and their ancestor in favour of defendants first party, the appellants in this Court, who brought a suit on the mortgage (Mortgage suit no, 156 of 1915) for recovery of their mortgage money by sale of the mortgaged property, but in that mortgage suit the present plaintiffs were not impleaded. On 17-11-1917, there was a rehan majeed in respect of these very lands in favour of the plain-tiffs by the defendants second party. The mortgage suit ended in a decree, and in execution thereof there was a sale of the mortgaged lands on 12-9-1927, and the defendants first party purchased the mortgaged property. There was delivery of possession to the appellants on 29-6-1928, which was followed by an application for mutation of their names in the Land Registration Department. One Anjodhya Prasad, who had purchased the tauzi at revenue sale on 26-3-1909 objected to the mutation of the appellants names. The result was that the application for mutation by the appellants was rejected. In J.930, the appellants filed a title suit. Title Suit No. 41 of 1930, which was re-numbered as title suit no. One Anjodhya Prasad, who had purchased the tauzi at revenue sale on 26-3-1909 objected to the mutation of the appellants names. The result was that the application for mutation by the appellants was rejected. In J.930, the appellants filed a title suit. Title Suit No. 41 of 1930, which was re-numbered as title suit no. 47 of 1931 for declaration of their title to and recovery of possession of the mortgaged property which had been purchased by them on 12-9-1927, and in that suit plaintiff 2 and the father of plaintiffs 9 to 11 of the present suit were impleaded as defendants. The suit was decreed and delivery of possession was given on 2-3-1932. Thereafter there was a theft case brought by defendant 3, one of the appellants here, against plaintiff 2 and plaintiff 9 for cutting paddy in one of the plots in question. Plaintiffs 2 and 9 were convicted on 3-7-1942, and the appeal from the conviction was dismissed on 10-8-1942. The plaintiffs alleged that they were dispossessed soon after the decision in the criminal case from the lands in question on the 1st of Asin, 1350 Fasli by the defendants first party, and hence this suit. 3. A number of defences were raised by the contesting defendants, the appellants before this Court. They contended that the mortgage deeds referred to above in favour of the plaintiffs by the defendants second party or their ancestor were all sham and collusive transactions without consideration, that after the delivery of possession to the defendants on 29-6-1928, they were in possession of the lands in suit, and that the suit was barred by res judicata on account of the decree in their favour in title suit no. 41/47 of 1930/31. The bar of limitation was also pleaded on the ground that the suit had not been filed within 12 years from the date of the first delivery of possession. 4. 41/47 of 1930/31. The bar of limitation was also pleaded on the ground that the suit had not been filed within 12 years from the date of the first delivery of possession. 4. The learned Munsif found that the plaintiffs mortgage deeds were all genuine, valid and for consideration; that the plaintiffs were in possession of the lands in dispute all along in spite of the mortgage and the title suits mentioned above, and the two dakhaldehanis effected in consequence of the decrees in those two suits; that as a matter of fact the plaintiffs were dispossessed, as alleged, on the 1st of Asin, 1350 Fasli, and that the decree in the title suit could not operate as res judicata. 5. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge has upheld all the findings of the first Court, although in considering the question of res judicata he has not confirmed the finding of the learned Munsif to the effect that there was no service of summonses in the title suit no. 41/47 of 1930/31 on plaintiff 2 and father of plaintiffs 9 to 11 of this suit. 6. The only question raised in the second appeal is that both the Courts below were wrong in holding that the suit was not barred by res judicata. The question of res judicata depends upon the pleadings of the parties and the issues raised. In this case it has been found by the Court below that upon the pleadings in the plaint, it was not at all necessary for the plaintiffs, some of whom were defendants in the title suit, to have raised the question in regard to their zerpeshgi lands as that question did not arise. The Court below also found that no relief was claimed ragainst these plaintiffs in the previous title suit, and further that the cause of action alleged in the previous title suit related only to the rejection of the application of the present defendants for mutation by the Land Registration Court. Mr. Lalnarain Sinha has contended that it is true that no specific mention was made in the plaint about these bakasht lands in question, but the question relating to bakasht lands was implicit in the question regarding their proprietary interest. Mr. Lalnarain Sinha has contended that it is true that no specific mention was made in the plaint about these bakasht lands in question, but the question relating to bakasht lands was implicit in the question regarding their proprietary interest. He says that if declaration and recovery of possession were sought for in respect of their proprietary interest, they by themselves included declaration of title to and recovery of possession of the lands in question which were bakasht lands of the proprietor, and, in that view of the matter, he says, it was not at all necessary to have mentioned in express terms the relief for these bakasht lands. If Mr. Sinha is right, some of the plaintiffs, who were defendants in that suit, should have raised the plea about the lands in question. In my judgment, it is not necessary to decide the question in the abstract as to whether the proprietary interest shall always convey the bakasht lands included in the proprietary interest. This question will depend upon the facts of each particular case. If proprietary interest is sought to be transferred, whether the bakasht lands also are transferred with the proprietary interest will depend on the facts of each particular case. In this case I have been taken through the certified copy of the plaint on record and the issues framed in the suit of 1930-31, and, in my judgment, it was not at all necessary for some of the plaintiffs of this suit, who were defendants in that suit, to have raised the question about the bakasht lands which were in their possession, as, upon, the reading of the plaint, it does not appear that any challenge was made regarding the bakasht lands nor was any question of title to or possession of those lands raised in that suit. We have seen that in 1901 a portion of the bakasht lands was given in zarpeshgi to plaintiff 1, in 1911 also there was a simple mortgage in respect of the bakasht lands alone, and in 1902 when the simple mortgage was created in favour of the defendants first party, it was in respect of the proprietary share of the defendants second party. There is, therefore, in my opinion, a clear case where the two interests, proprietary interest and the interest in the bakasht lands, were separately dealt with. There is, therefore, in my opinion, a clear case where the two interests, proprietary interest and the interest in the bakasht lands, were separately dealt with. It is also conceded that even in the dakhaldenani which followed the decree in the title suit of 1930-31, there was no express delivery of possession over the bakasht lands against the present plaintiffs. In that view of the matter, I must hold that when some of the plaintiffs were impleaded in that title suit, it was not at all necessary for them to have raised the question in their pleadings about the title to or possession of or both in respect of the bakasht lands. The issues raised in that suit also did not relate to any controversy over the bakasht lands. 7. It is conceded that there was no express mention in the pleadings about the bakasht lands. The question arises whether the declaration in the title suit is res judicata according to the provisions contained in explanation 4 of Section 11, Civil P. C., which says: "Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit." The question, therefore, is whether those plaintiffs who were defendants in that suit might and ought to have raised the question about the bakasht lands. I have given my finding already that it was not necessary for them to have raised that question. Even if it is held that they might have raised it, I cannot possibly accept the contention that these plaintiffs might and ought to have raised that question. It may be that in certain cases the defendants to an action might raise a particular pleading, but to come within explanation 4 it must be held that that question not only might have been raised but also ought to have been raised. The word and which occurs between the words might and ought must be read as conjunctive, and unless it is held that the question might and ought to have been raised in the previous litigation, the plea of res judicata under explanation 4 of Sec.11, Civil P. C. cannot possibly succeed. (Vide -- Government of the Province of Bombay V/s. Pestonji Ardeshir, AIR 1949 PC 143 (A)). 8. (Vide -- Government of the Province of Bombay V/s. Pestonji Ardeshir, AIR 1949 PC 143 (A)). 8. There is another answer to the question about res judicata. In the previous title suit only plaintiff 2 and the father of plaintiffs 9 to 11 of this suit were made parties. Even if they were bound to raise the question about the bakasht lands as defendants to that suit, any decision arrived at in that suit cannot possibly bind the other plaintiffs in the present suit. If plaintiff 2, in whose name the zarpeshgi deed stood, had been made party in his capacity as the person representing the entire family, the whole family must have been bound by that decision. The plaintiffs of that suit having chosen to implead plaintiff 2 and the lather of plaintiffs 9 to 11 of this suit, the family cannot be said to have been properly represented if the other plaintiffs in the present suit were left out. In that view of the matter also the bar of res judicata cannot succeed (Vide - Ganganand Singn V/s. Rameshwar Singh, AIR 1927 Pat 271 (B) ). 9. In the view which I have taken, I hold that the Courts below were right in their decision that this suit by the plaintiffs is not barred by res judicata. The appeal, therefore, fails and must be dismissed with costs.