H.D. Ujjwal—This is an application to review our order dated 13.4.1951 by which we rejected the revision application filed by the petitioner on the ground that the first application filed by the applicant had been heard by the Additional Commissioner and no second application was provided under the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, and, therefore, the order of the Additional Commissioner had become final. 2. After the above decision a full bench decision in another case was given in which it was held that the Additional Commissioners were not invented with the powers of the Board and the decisions given by them were not on behalf of the Boar J but in their capacity as Commissioner. 3. In view of this later full bench decision about the powers of the Additional Commissioner in cases decided by them it is urged by the petitioner that the order of the Additional Commissioner which had been upheld by this court by its order dated 13.4.1951 had become a nullity and the revision against it had been wrongly decided and it should therefore, be reheard by accepting this review application. 4. It is contended by the counsel for the opposite party that the review application was in the first instance time barred and secondly such an application on the basis of the subsequent decision of the court did not lie. 5. The period fixed for review under the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Act, Schedule I is 30 days and the review application had been filed after 3 months of the original order and is clearly time barred. The petitioners counsel has tried to show that the period of limitation should be counted from the subsequent full bench decision of this Board and not from the order passed in their revision application. This is obviously unacceptable. The limitation runs from the order passed in the case in which any application for review is filed and not from the decision in any other case. 6. On the other ground also their review application is not worthy of acceptance. It has been held in A. I. R. 1943 Oudh 136 that a subsequent decision in another case or a subsequent reversal of decision on the basis of which a judgment was given is not sufficient ground for review. 6. On the other ground also their review application is not worthy of acceptance. It has been held in A. I. R. 1943 Oudh 136 that a subsequent decision in another case or a subsequent reversal of decision on the basis of which a judgment was given is not sufficient ground for review. If cases decided long back could be reviewed on decision of any legal point according to which the former decisions might have been wrong there would be no end to the revival of old decided cases. We, therefore, hold that the review does not lie on this ground also. 7. Lastly it was urged by the counsel for the petitioner that his petition may be treated as a revision application for which no period of limitation is laid down. There is no provision of law for treating a review application as an application for revision. A court cannot revise its own order and no revision application against its own order can lie so review application can never be treated as a revision application and this contention of the petitioner also has no force. The review application is therefore rejected.