This petition of revision arises out of an execution proceeding initiated by the Shillong Co-operative Town Bank, Ltd., against Sailendra Kumar Datta, the present petitioner. The execution petition was opposed by the peti­tioner on the ground that it was barred by limitation. (2) On the 5th September, 1950, it appears that the counsel for the parties were heard on the objection raised by the judgment-debtor. After hearing them, the learned 'Ex-officio' Sub-Judge, Shillong, ordered that the records of execution cases mentioned in the petition for execution be put up on the 11th September 1950. On that date, the counsel for the judg­ment-debtor was present but the decree-hol­der and his counsel were both absent. The learned Judge dismissed the application for default stating that the decree-holder was absent and was taking no steps. On the 26th April 1951, the decree-holder applied for res­toration of the execution petition. The coun­sel for the parties were heard the same day and the execution petition was restored under S. 151, Civil P. C. The order passed by the learned Judge on the petition for restoration of the original petition for execution is very brief. All that it states is that "Heard Law­yers. Case restored to file under 151, Civil P. C." (3) This petition of revision is directed against this order. On behalf of the petitioner his learned counsel Mr. Barua has urged first that S. 151, Civil P. C., did not apply to exe­cution proceedings. The decree-holder whose execution petition had been dismissed for default could not invoke the provisions con­tained in it and the learned Subordinate Judge was not justified in resorting to his inherent jurisdiction for restoring the execution appli­cation. (4) In my opinion, this contention should not prevail. It is true that O. 9, R. 9, Civil P. C. does not in terms apply to execution proceedings. It could also be not applied to execution pro­ceedings even when read along with S. 141, Civil P. C. Their Lordships of the Privy Coun­cil held in 'THAKUR PRASAD v. FAKIR ULLAH'. 17 All 106, that the proceedings spoken of in S. 647 of the old Code to which S. 141 of the present Code corresponds include original matters in the nature of suits such as proceedings in probate, guardianship and so .forth and do not include executions. 17 All 106, that the proceedings spoken of in S. 647 of the old Code to which S. 141 of the present Code corresponds include original matters in the nature of suits such as proceedings in probate, guardianship and so .forth and do not include executions. Since this decision, there has been a large consensus of authority which holds that O. 9, R.9, cannot be applied to execution proceedings by virtue of the provisions contained in S. 141. The learned counsel for the parties also are agreed so far. The question is whether the Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction could restore an execution application dismissed for default in suitable cases. So far as this question is concerned, I am quite clear that the use of the inherent powers of the Court for restoration of an execution application dismissed for default cannot be excluded in its entirety. The exercise of in­herent powers for restoration of an execution petition may be unavoidable unless apparent injustice is allowed to be perpetuated in some case. Apart from this, the main reason for drawing on the inherent jurisdiction of the Court in dealing with an application for res­toration of an execution petition dismissed for default, is that the order of dismissal for de­fault when made is not covered by any ex­press provision in the Code. The Code is un­deniably not exhaustive. The Court has no option but to dismiss the application for de­fault if the decree-holder does not attend or refuses or neglects to take necessary steps to enable the Court to proceed with the execu­tion. If the case is not covered by R. 57 of O. 21, the dismissal for default of an execution appli­cation is possible only in the exercise of inherent powers of the Court. If the inherent jurisdiction can be resorted to for dismissal, it should be possible to restore the execution application in the exercise of that inherent power in suitable cases, particularly where the order dismissing the application for default is due to some misapprehension on the part of the Court or is otherwise obviously wrong, unjust or illegal or is not due to any wilful neglect or non-prosecution by the decree-holder. Where dismissal for default has oc­curred and the petitioner can show sufficient cause for non-appearance, refusal to restore it under S. 151 would amount to a denial of justice in some cases. Where dismissal for default has oc­curred and the petitioner can show sufficient cause for non-appearance, refusal to restore it under S. 151 would amount to a denial of justice in some cases. A decree-holder can put in a fresh applica­tion for execution if a particular application is dismissed for default. In such a case, when remedy by a fresh application is available the use of inherent jurisdiction may not be necessary. The decree-holder can be made to pursue it. The difficulty arises in cases where a decree-holder is left with no remedy without any fault or negligence on his part. Where a fresh application would be barred by time and the previous application was dismissed without negligence or default on his part, the ends of justice would require the use of in­herent powers for rectifying an obvious mis­take leading to injustice. (5) The authority in support of the view that the Court could in the exercise of its inherent powers under S. 151 restore an ap­plication for execution which had been dis­missed for default is voluminous. 'PRATAP SINGH v. BHAGATRAM', AIR 1942 Lah 71; 'NABU SAHU v. KAMDEV MAITY', AIR 1928 Cal 179; 'RAGHUNATH HARIHAR v. KHA-TUM BI', AIR 1933 Nag 176; 'LALBUX v. CHOITHRAM KALIANDAS', AIR 1914 Sind 61 (2); 'RAM SHANKAR v RAM NARAIN', AIR 1928 All 301; 'MT. ACHARJI BIBI v. SWAMI SHESH SAHAI', AIR 1939 Lah 223, are cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the Court was utilised for restoring application for exe­cution dismissed for default. (6) 'BHOLU v. RAM LAL', 2 Lah 66, is the basic authority from the Lahore High Court which had been followed in several cases in that Court. In this case the view taken was that if the Court had the power to dismiss an execution application for default it should have the power also to restore it in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The 'ratio decidendi' was that the order for dis­missal for default could only be placed un­der S. 151. The same section could therefore, be utilised for restoration in suitable cases. The 'ratio decidendi' was that the order for dis­missal for default could only be placed un­der S. 151. The same section could therefore, be utilised for restoration in suitable cases. The view in the Calcutta High Court enunciat­ed first in 'SARAT KRISHNA v. BISWES-WAR MITRA: AIR 1927 Cal 534 was that "where there is no provision in the Code ex­pressly providing for a remedy and none which prohibits a remedy being administer­ed and such remedy is called for in order to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which it exists, the provision of S. 151 may and should be re­sorted to." The Calcutta view adds weight to the view which has prevailed in the Lahore High Court. (7) The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on 'NARAYANA CHETTIAR v. MUTHU CHETTIAR', 50 Mad 67. It was held in this case that the Court had no jurisdic­tion to act under S. 151 of the Code and res­tore an application for execution to its file even though another application for execution would be barred by limitation. The learned Judges of Madras High Court expressed the apprehension that an extended interpretation of S. 151 may lead the Courts to overlook the procedure of the Code. (8) With great respect to the learned Judges I find it difficult to subscribe to the view that the mere possibility that an extended inter­pretation of S. 151 may in some cases lead the Courts to overlook the procedure of the Code or other provisions contained in the statute would justify the conclusion that a Court should in no case restore an application for execution dismissed for default in the exercise of its in­herent powers under S. 151 or that the exercise of inherent power js excluded completely in such cases. The exercise of inherent jurisdic­tion is justified only when such exercise does not involve overriding express provisions of the law. In any case, the use of inherent power is discretionary, and the Courts in the exercise of their inherent power can easily guard against overlooking provisions contain­ed in the Code or in any other law for the time being in force. In any case, the use of inherent power is discretionary, and the Courts in the exercise of their inherent power can easily guard against overlooking provisions contain­ed in the Code or in any other law for the time being in force. (9) The learned Judges relying on 'DEBI BAKSH SINGH v. HABIB SHAH', 35 All 331 (P C), recognised that "where the Court passes an order inadver­tently or without being aware of certain facts which should have been brought to its notice it has power to correct an error committed by it, not owing to the negligence of a party, but owing to its not being await of certain facts." It would seem that the use of inherent power was not regarded as completely excluded where an order of dismissal for default may have been passed when there was no default. If, therefore, the order in this case was due to some inadvertence or mistake on the part of the Court, its power to correct its error would be there even according to the view taken in this case. (10) The only other case relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is 'RITU KUER v. ALAKHDEO NARAIN SINGHA', AIR 1918 Pat 67. In this case authorities from the Lahore and Calcutta High Courts were not considered. The fact that the dismissal of an application for execution in default is also in the exercise of inherent powers also was not noticed. The learned Judge who deliver­ed the judgment (Mullick. J.) appeared to be strongly averse to any Court using its inherent powers for the purpose of restoring execution cases. The only reason that the learned Judge gave was that execution creditors as well as the judgment-debtors have ample facilities un­der the existing law for restoring cases dis­missed for default. He did not refer to these facilities. Barring the fact that an execution-creditor has the right to put in a fresh appli­cation, there is no provision in the Code under which he may ask for restoration of an appli­cation dismissed for default unless the appli­cation is taken as covered by Sec. 151, Civil P. C. The remedy by a fresh application may not avail in a case where a fresh application is barred by time. The dismissal in default may be wholly erroneous or due to inadver­tence on the part of the Court. The dismissal in default may be wholly erroneous or due to inadver­tence on the part of the Court. An execution creditor finding himself in such a predicament may not be left without any remedy. (11) On a consideration of the authorities cited at the Bar, I have no hesitation in adopt­ing the view that an execution application dismissed for default may be restored in suit­able cases in the exercise of inherent powers which vest in Courts under S. 151, Civil P. C. In this view, the learned Sub-Judge had the jurisdiction to restore the application for exe­cution which he had dismissed for default. (12) The learned counsel has next contended that the order restoring the execution petition is not sustainable on the merits. He points out that the application was disposed of in hot haste-the very day that it was put in. No notice was sent to the judgment-debtor. The learned Subordinate Judge did not give any reason in support of the order he made. He also failed to consider that the application for restoration was made some 6 months after the order of dismissal for default. (13) The application for execution was dis­missed in the presence of the judgment-debtor. According to the general principles of law, a I notice should have been issued to the judg­ment-debtor even though there is no express provision of the law requiring a notice to a party which may possibly be effected by the ex­ercise of inherent powers under S. 151. In this case, before the order restoring the applica­tion for execution was passed, the counsel for the judgment-debtor was informed. He ap­peared. The order of the learned Sub­ordinate Judge was passed after hearing the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the judgment-debtor did not pre­sumably state that he was 'functus officio' or that he wanted instructions in the matter. He does not appear to have asked for an adjourn­ment either. (14) The application was no doubt put in some 6 months after the order of dismissal for default. The delay, however, was sought to be explained in the petition. The explana­tion was that on the date the application was dismissed for default it was not obligatory on the decree-holder to attend. He and his counsel therefore, were not in attendance. (14) The application was no doubt put in some 6 months after the order of dismissal for default. The delay, however, was sought to be explained in the petition. The explana­tion was that on the date the application was dismissed for default it was not obligatory on the decree-holder to attend. He and his counsel therefore, were not in attendance. The order was passed in their absence and the applica­tion for restoration was put in immediately after they became aware of the fact of dis­missal for default. (15) On the merits, the position of the decree-holder who had applied for restoration was that on the 5th September 1950, the order of the Court merely directed that records of pre­vious execution cases be put up. The decree-holder had not to take any steps; nor was his presence necessary. The next date in the case was merely for these records to be put up. It was not, therefore, a date for the hearing of the case. If such an order had been made in a suit, it would not have been possible for the Court to dismiss the suit in default. Un­der O. 9, R. 8. a suit may be dismissed for default when it is called on for hearing and the plaintiff does not appear. The question of limitation had been argued. The Court had to see the previous records and then give orders. In these circumstances, the decree-holder could 'bona fide' believe that his at­tendance was not necessary. In any case, the dismissal for default in these circumstances was not proper. The learned Subordinate Judge obviously discovered his error and hastened to correct it. No inquiry on facts was necessary. The application for restora­tion was based on facts stated in a previous order of the Court. In view of this fact I do not consider a re­mand necessary in the case in spite of the some­what irregular nature of the order. No useful purpose would be served by it. The facts of the case are not in dispute. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that the dismissal of the petition in default was justified in law in the admitted circum­stances of the case. The order of restoration, in these circumstances, is substantially just and may not be interfered with in revision. The delay in filing the application for resto­ration was explained. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that the dismissal of the petition in default was justified in law in the admitted circum­stances of the case. The order of restoration, in these circumstances, is substantially just and may not be interfered with in revision. The delay in filing the application for resto­ration was explained. In any case as the application for restoration was not out of time, the learned - Subordinate Judge could entertain the application and dispose of it on the merits. The delay amounting to negli­gence may not be excused. But in this case the order was passed in the absence of the decree-holder and his petition is not barred by time coming as it did under S. 151 of the Civil P. C. (16) This petition is, therefore, disallowed. I make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.