Judgment :- 1. The sole question raised in this case relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to appoint a receiver in respect of properties decreed to be surrendered by the defendants to the plaintiffs pending consideration of the objections to execution filed pursuant to notices issued under O. XXI R. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court below held that it had jurisdiction and appointed a receiver for collection of the rents and profits of certain items of properties which are paddy fields situate within its territorial jurisdiction and outstanding with tenants under the defendants. 2. The contention urged on behalf of the appellant first defendant is that under S. 51 (d) of the Code the appointment of a receiver is a substantive relief, that such an appointment was prayed for in the execution petition, and that the order passed by the court below amounts to the granting of that relief. It is contended that though under Cl. (2) of O. XXI R. 22 it is competent for a court to issue any process in execution without service of the notice enjoined by Cl. (1) the appointment of a receiver as a substantive relief in execution will not be the issue of such a process and that therefore the appointment made by the court below is ultra vires its powers. It is also urged on behalf of the appellant that the decree sought to be executed being of the year 1121 and three years having elapsed therefrom before the petition for execution was filed, the defendants are immune from liability from the enforcement of a claim for mesne profits in execution and that the appointment of a receiver prayed for with the object or purpose of securing the profits is beyond the scope of the proceedings in execution. 3. Though the learned counsel for the respondent-decree-holders stated that there having been an application for execution filed within one year of the decree by all the decree-holders against all the judgment-debtors no question of notice under O. XXI R.22 arises, in view of the fact that in the petition for execution which is now pending before the court below notices under the said Order and rule were applied for and issued, this case may be dealt with on the assumption of such notice being necessary though the necessity is not conceded. 4. 4. The order appointing a receiver passed by the court below is not pursuant to the prayer contained in the execution petition for that relief. It was on a special petition filed in that behalf by the decree-holders which is C.M.P. 440 of 1950 that the appointment of a receiver was made. The appellant has also taken the order as such and in that view has sought redress in this court by means of this civil miscellaneous appeal. An order appointing a receiver made under O. XL of the Code of Civil Procedure is appealable as an order under O. XLIII. If the order be considered as granting a substantive relief in execution, it would be appealable as a decree and not as an appealable order. Even in cases where orders are passed under O. XL in execution, an appeal as against a decree might be the proper remedy. But when a party takes the order complained of only as an appealable order and not as an order passed in execution and appealable as a decree, a contention urged on his behalf that the order is beyond the competence of the court as it is or amounts to the grant of a relief in execution cannot be accepted. The power of a court to appoint a receiver is very wide. The restrictions that there were as regards the property over and the stage of proceedings at which, the power could be exercised no longer exist and it is now competent for a court to appoint a receiver if it appears to be just and convenient so to do; such appointment can be made over any property and at any time whether before or after decree. Such an appointment is justified merely by the justice and convenience of the matter as it appears to the court and does not depend upon the eligibility or otherwise of the reliefs claimed and contested in the proceedings before it. 5. The second objection raised on behalf of the appellant would rather be a ground in favour than against the appointment of a receiver. The decree directed delivery of properties with mesne profits. It was up to the defendants to have respected that mandate by complying with it without being forced to do so by a further order passed or process issued by the court. The decree directed delivery of properties with mesne profits. It was up to the defendants to have respected that mandate by complying with it without being forced to do so by a further order passed or process issued by the court. If on account of non-compliance by the defendants for more than three years a process in execution for recovery of mesne profits has become not feasible, that would be a good reason why the court, should step in and assume possession of those properties to be dealt with according to the final decision of the court on the objections to execution raised by the defendants. Otherwise, it might be aiding the defendants to obtain an advantage on account of their default. If ultimately the objections are repelled the court will hand over possession to the decree-holders with the income collected during the period of the court's management. If on the other hand the objections are upheld the properties will be restored to the defendants from whom they were taken with the income collected by the officer of the court. It is but elementary justice that a party who has become entitled to delivery of property under a decree be enabled to realise the fruits thereof completely in the very proceedings in which the decree was made. 6. The appellant not being in actual possession of the properties no hardship can be caused to him. The case might perhaps be different if the defendants had been in actual possession and enjoyment. Here, it is only a question of money. The property belongs to a trust. Each of the contending parties claims to be the proper representative of the trust and they are or ought to be in agreement that the properties of the trust should be conserved for its benefit. An apprehension is expressed on behalf of the respondents that as the wealth of the appellant who is a religious head of his party is spiritual and not wordly, any collection of rents made by him hereafter would become irrecoverable and be lost to the trust. The reasonableness of this apprehension did not appear to us to have been seriously challenged. In our judgment the powers conferred on the court under the provisions of O. XL are paramount and can be exercised even overriding the limitations imposed by O. XXI R. 22 Cl. (1). The reasonableness of this apprehension did not appear to us to have been seriously challenged. In our judgment the powers conferred on the court under the provisions of O. XL are paramount and can be exercised even overriding the limitations imposed by O. XXI R. 22 Cl. (1). The order passed by the court below is therefore right and the civil miscellaneous appeal for its reversal should be dismissed with costs. Dismissed.