Judgment Sarjoo Prosad, J. 1. This application has been presented by the plaintiffs. It is directed against an order of Mr. Gobind Saran, District Judge of Champaran, reversing the decision in appeal of the learned Munsif of that place. It arises out of an application for review under order 47, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, filed by the plaintiffs which was allowed by the learned Munsif in the following circumstances: The defendants 3rd party to the action out of which the proceedings arose had executed a zarpeshgi deed in favour of defendants 1 and 2 of the 1st party in respect of survey plots 138, 169 and 176. Subsequently, in November 1942, the said defendants sold to the plaintiffs plot 138 only. The plaintiffs then instituted the suit for redemption of the mortgage in favour of the defendants 1st party subsisting on all the above plots, and also claimed mesne profits and costs. This suit was decreed in September 1947, and mesne profits were allowed to the plaintiffs in regard to plot 138 only which the plaintiffs had purchased from the defendants 3rd party. On appeal, however, the decision was reversed and the case was remanded with a direction that the defendants 2nd party, who were subsequent mortgagees, should be also made parties to the suit (they having been expunged earlier), and the suit should be decided in their presence. When the matter went back to the court below in May 1948, the defendants 3rd party, who were the mortgagors and who continued to be the owners of plots 169 and 176, applied to be transposed to the category of the plaintiffs. This application, however remained pending, and it appears that no orders were passed thereon, and the suit was eventually decreed in September 1948; but again the decree as to mesne profits was confined only to plot 138 which had been purchased by the original plaintiffs. The defendants 3rd party, therefore, filed the application for review. This application, however remained pending, and it appears that no orders were passed thereon, and the suit was eventually decreed in September 1948; but again the decree as to mesne profits was confined only to plot 138 which had been purchased by the original plaintiffs. The defendants 3rd party, therefore, filed the application for review. It may be noted that In disposing of the suit, the court observed as follows: "It is to be noted that the mortgagors would have been entitled if they had joined as co-plaintiffs, to mesne profits in respect of the remaining plots, but no prayer has been made." The learned Munsif accordingly held that the above passage clearly showed that while delivering judgment, he intended to decree the suit for mesne profits even in respect of the other plots in favour of the mortgagors, but he was unable to pass such a decree because the mortgagors had not applied to be co-plaintiffs. This the learned Munsif held was an error apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as the learned Munsif had failed to dispose of the application for transposition already filed by the defendants 3rd party. Had the application been allowed, and the defendants 3rd party been transposed to the category of the plaintiff, then on the strength of the judgment itself they would be clearly entitled to mesne profits in respect of the other plots also. He accordingly allowed the application for review and directed that plaintiffs 1 and 2 should get possession of plot 138 and the other co-plaintiffs (defendants 3rd party), the mortgagors, should recover possession of the other two plots 169 & 176 by ejecting the mortgagees, the defendants 1st party or the defendants 2nd party, whosoever might be in possession; and he also directed that these plaintiffs including the mortgagors should get mesne profits in respect of all the three plots under mortgage. The defendants 2nd party appealed to the District Judge who allowed the appeal. 2. Mr. D.N. Varma on behalf of the petitioners has contended that the appeal before the learned District Judge against the order in question was entirely incompetent, and, therefore, the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the order in question. The defendants 2nd party appealed to the District Judge who allowed the appeal. 2. Mr. D.N. Varma on behalf of the petitioners has contended that the appeal before the learned District Judge against the order in question was entirely incompetent, and, therefore, the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the order in question. He points out that the order was not appealable because of the provisions of Order 47, Rule 7, Civil P.C., in which the right of appeal arises only under limited circumstances not applicable to the present case. Order 47, Rule 7 provides that an order rejecting the application for review shall not be appealable, but an order granting an application may be objected to on the ground that the application was in contravention of the provisions of rule 2 or of Rule 4 of the said Order, and such an objection may be taken at once by an appeal from the order granting the application. It is rightly contended that in this case the application was neither in contravention of Rule 2 of the Order nor in contravention of Rule 4. That being so, apparently the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 3. For the opposite party Mr. Mehdi Imam has strongly urged that an order granting a review was appealable under Order 43, Rule 1 Clause (w) C. P. Code. It seems to be, however, well settled that the said provisions of Order 43 are con-trolled by the provisions of Order 47, Rule 7. When a review is granted on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record, such an order is not appealable and is not covered by the provisions of Rule 7. Mr. Imam, however, con-tends that the application for review should have been rejected by the court inasmuch as there was no sufficient ground for review at all, and inasmuch as the court allowed the application which was in contravention of the provisions of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of Order 47, it must be assumed that the order would be appealable. The simple answer to this argument is that Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of Order 47 contemplates that the court shall reject the application where it appeared to the court that there was no sufficient ground for review. The simple answer to this argument is that Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of Order 47 contemplates that the court shall reject the application where it appeared to the court that there was no sufficient ground for review. Here the court had not done so, and evidently the court had held that there was a good ground for allowing the application for review. Consequently, such an order on the face of it cannot fall under the sub-rule in question. 4. Mr. Imam then urges that there having been already an appeal against the decision of the learned Munsif a review application could not be filed before the trial Court. It may be observed that the appeal against the decree of the learned Munsif had been filed not by the defendants 3rd party but by the defendants 2nd party. The defendants 3rd party had, of course, been made respondents to the appeal, but they themselves had not preferred any appeal against the decree in question and they could not in an appeal preferred by the defendants second party present to the appellate court the case on which they applied for review without themselves filing an appeal against the decree. They not having filed an appeal, it was open to them to file an application for review. This is clearly provided for by Sub-rule (2) of Order 47, Rule 1 which indicates that a party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party, except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. In thjs case none of the two exceptions comes into play; and, therefore, in my opinion, there was no bar to the application being made by the defendants 3rd party for review of judgment notwithstanding the appeal preferred by the defendants 2nd party. The application for transposition in this case was not by the plaintiffs and the defendants 3rd party jointly but by the defendants third party alone, and it was sheer oversight on the part of the court in not disposing of this application finally before deciding the suit itself. The application for transposition in this case was not by the plaintiffs and the defendants 3rd party jointly but by the defendants third party alone, and it was sheer oversight on the part of the court in not disposing of this application finally before deciding the suit itself. The learned Munsif is right in pointing out that when it purported to pass the decree in question, it thought of granting a decree for mesne profits to the mortgagors as well in respect of the two plots belonging to them, but in pure ignorance of the petition filed before him, the learned Munsif omitted to give such a decree. This oversight was rectified by the learned Munsif when the matter was brought to his attention. It is, therefore, futile to suggest that the learned Munsif had acted without jurisdiction in granting a decree for mesne profits in favour of the transposed plaintiffs. I see no substance in the contention of Mr. Imam that the utmost that the learned Munsif could do was merely to transpose the defendants 3rd party to the category of the plaintiffs and to rehear the suit after such transposition. I am not, of course, at present concerned with the merits of the decision itself, but I do not see any reason why the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to pass the order which he did pass and which he was fully justified in passing under the circumstances of the case. The order in revision passed by the learned District Judge is, therefore, misconceived and wholly without jurisdiction. 5. The application, therefore, must succeed, and the order of the learned District Judge must be set aside, and that of the learned Munsif restored. The petitioners are entitled to the cost of this application which is assessed at two gold mohurs.