Sharma, J.—This is the plaintiffs appeal. The suit out of which it has arisen was filed by Mat. Govindi plain-tiff against the defendant Chhaganlal alias Gulabchand on the allegation that she was the owner of a certain house situated in Chaukri Topkhana Desh, Rasta Khazanewalan, in the city of Jaipur. This house was purchased by her husband Narhulal at an auction sale held in execution of a decree on the basis of a mortgage made in favour of Nathulal in 1914. Before his death Nathulal executed a will on Kartik Sudi 12, St. 1989, corresponding to 10th November 1932 in favour of the plaintiff bequeathing the house in dispute, among other property, to the plaintiff. After the death of Nathulal the plaintiff had allowed the defendant to occupy a certain portion of the house for residence. This portion was shown by cross red lines in the map attached to the plaint. It was alleged that the plaintiff asked the defendant several times to vacate the house but he had not vacated it. It was, therefore, prayed that the plaintiff be put in possession of the property after dispossession of the defendant. 2. The defendant pleaded that he was the adopted son of Nathulal and as such inherited the property in suit after the death of Nathulal. It was alleged that the will set up by the plaintiff was fictitious and a forged one. The plaintiff had no other right in the property except that of residence and maintenance. Several issues were framed by the Civil Judge who tried the case but only the following issues are necessary for the purposes of this appeal:— (1) Whether Nathulal deceased had adopted the defendant as his son and the defendant was in possession of the property in suit since then? (2) Whether Nathulal executed the will set up by the plaintiff in her favour and, if so, what was its effect? 3. The learned Civil Judge gave his finding on the first issue given above in the affirmative and held that the plaintiff had been adopted as his son by Nathulal. The second issue was answered in the negative and it was held that the will was not genuine, nor had Nathulal any power to execute the will so as to defeat the defendants right. The result was that the suit was dismissed. 4. The second issue was answered in the negative and it was held that the will was not genuine, nor had Nathulal any power to execute the will so as to defeat the defendants right. The result was that the suit was dismissed. 4. The plaintiff filed an appeal in the court of the District Judge, Jaipur City, against the decree of the first court but his appeal was dismissed. She filed a second appeal in the Jaipur High Court and it was held that it was proved that the defendant had been adopted as his son by Nathulal. The Will was, however, held to be genuine but it was held that it was not clear as to whether the property conveyed by the said will was joint Hindu family property or the separate property of Nathulal. The following issue was therefore framed and remitted to the first court for the evidence of the parties and the finding of the first court thereon :— "Whether the house purchased by Nathulal under the sale certificate dated the 9th December 1922 was joint family property and could not be validly disposed of by Nathulal under bis will (Ex. 3) dated the 10th November 1932." 5. On receipt of the record the first court proceeded to record the evidence of the parties on the additional issue framed and the record was submitted along with this evidence and the finding of the first court. The Jaipur High Court having been abolished on the establishment of this Court, the appeal has come before it for hearing as the successor court. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for both the parties. Mr., J.N. Mathur appearing on behalf of the defendant-respondent contended in the first instance that the finding on the question of will by the Jaipur High Court was wrong and we should therefore examine the evidence in order to substitute our own finding 00 that point. Some authorities were cited for the view that in case after a certain finding an appellate court remands a case for a finding on certain additional issue the findings of the appellate court before the remand are not binding on it and the appellate court can examine the evidence on the point with a view to substitute its own finding. The following rulings were relied upon: — I. Gopinath Shukul vs. Sat-narain Shukul (A.I.R. 1923 All. 384), 2. The following rulings were relied upon: — I. Gopinath Shukul vs. Sat-narain Shukul (A.I.R. 1923 All. 384), 2. Gendalal vs. Hazarilal (A.I.R. 1936 All. 21), 3. Upendra-lal Gupta vs. Jogesh Chandra Roy (A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 118), 4. Man-mohan Das vs. Shib Chandra Saha (A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 353), 5. Muchu-mari Malliah vs. Yerravalu Gan-qanna and others (A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 830). 7. In the first case referred to above, it was held by Daniel, J. that where an appellate court at the first hearing does not decide the case but merely remits certain specific issues, it is open to the court before which the case ultimately comes to disregard the findings on those issues and equally to form its own opinion on the whole case irrespective of anything that is said in the remand order. The reason given is that an order remanding issues under Rule 25 is not a final order. The responsibility for the decree ultimately passed is entirely that of the court before which the case comes after remand. 8. In the second case referred to above, there is nothing which might support the contention for the respondent. 9. In the third case cited above, it was held by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that an order of remand made under Order 41 Rule 25 C.P.C. decides nothing, and the reasons that the court gives for its support are given merely for its own convenience for the purpose of the determination of the appeal under Order 41 Rule 26 C.P.C. and for helping the lower court to proceed rightly in carrying out the order. The court, either the same or differently constituted, when determining the appeal finally has ample jurisdiction to go back on the views as expressed in the order of remand passed under Order 41 Rule 25 C.P.C. and indeed it would fail in its duty if in deference to those views which are entitled to the highest respect, it persists in them, although it is satisfied that they are erroneous. 10. In the fourth case it was held that the mere fact that a Judge of the appellate court in the first instance remands a case for taking additional evidence cannot deprive him of his jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal at a later stage if it is found to be incompetent. 10. In the fourth case it was held that the mere fact that a Judge of the appellate court in the first instance remands a case for taking additional evidence cannot deprive him of his jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal at a later stage if it is found to be incompetent. The principle laid down in that case, therefore, does not help the respondent and is no authority for the proposition that the appellate court at the time of the final disposal of the appeal might substitute another finding in place of the finding already arrived at the time of remand. 11. In the fifth and the last case it was held by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court that though parties have no right to insist upon reopening questions that had been decided before calling for a finding, yet it is open to the court to do so if it thinks fit and it cannot be said to act without jurisdiction if it goes back upon the position taken by it previously so long as the case is not out of its hands. The learned counsel for the appellant agreed with the view taken in the last mentioned ruling of Madras High Court and cited a Full Bench ruling of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Mst. Chauli alias Subhadra Devi vs. Mst. Meghoo and others (A.I.R. 1945 All. 268) wherein it was held that where a Division Bench hearing an appeal records its findings on some of the issues and remits other issues to the lower court for recording its findings thereon and on return of those findings the appeal comes up for hearing before another Division Bench the position of the second Division Bench is exactly the same as would have been the position of the First Bench if the appeal had come up before it again when findings on issues were submitted by the lower court. The second Bench like the first is not bound by the previous findings and is entitled in its discretion, if it so desires, to reconsider those findings. 12. The second Bench like the first is not bound by the previous findings and is entitled in its discretion, if it so desires, to reconsider those findings. 12. It is conceded that this court may in its discretion consider the findings given by Jaipur High Court at the time of remand and may substitute its own findings on the same points but it should be very chary of doing so because Jaipur High Court had after a consideration of evidence recorded a finding of fact in favour of the plaintiff on this point and unless the said finding is vitiated by gross and palpable error there is no reason to disturb it. We have considered the arguments of both the learned counsel on this point and we perfectly agree with the views of the Madras High Court expressed in A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 830 and the views of the Full Bench taken in the Allahabad case just referred to. It is not the right of any of the parties to insist upon us to re-examine evidence on the points already decided by Jaipur High Court Bench with a view to find out if that finding is correct or not and to substitute our own finding. It is the discretion of this court to reopen that finding or not. We are of opinion that a rinding arrived at by the same court of appeal at the time of the remand of the case under Order 41 Rule 25 C.P.C. specially on a point of fact should not be lightly disturbed. The court will, however, be entitled in its discretion to reopen the finding if it finds any special and strong reasons for doing so. From the judgment of the Jaipur High Court Bench we find that the evidence on this point of fact was considered by the court and reasons have been given for accepting the evidence produced by the plaintiff and holding that the will was proved to be genuine. We do not find any palpable or patent error on the basis of which we might consider ourselves entitled to reopen the finding. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out from the plaint that the Hindi date of the will was given as Kartik Sudi 13, St. 1989 whereas the death of Nathulal has been given as Kartik Sudi 12, St. 1939. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out from the plaint that the Hindi date of the will was given as Kartik Sudi 13, St. 1989 whereas the death of Nathulal has been given as Kartik Sudi 12, St. 1939. It was argued that on the allegations contained in the plaint itself the will was not genuine as it could not be executed a day after the testators death. If only Hindi dates had been given in the plaint the allegations would certainly have been very startling, because it is not possible that a will could be executed after the death of the testator. On a close perusal of the plaint, however, it appeared that it was only on account of some clerical mistake that the date of death has been given as the date of the execution of the will and vice versa. In paragraph 5 of the plaint the plaintiff no doubt alleged that the will was executed on Kartik Sudi 13, St. 1989 but fortunately for her she has also given the corresponding English date as 10th November 1932. Similarly, in paragraph 6 she has given the corresponding English date of death of Nathulal as nth November 1932. On a reference to the calendar it was found that Kartik Sudi 12, St. 1989 corresponded to 10th November 1932 and Kartik Sudi 13, St. 1989 corresponded to nth November 1932. Moreover, the plaintiff has clearly alleged that the will was executed before the death of Nathulal. It cannot be expected that the plaintiff would be so foolish as to give the date of the execution of the will in the plaint itself which fell after the death of the testator. We are satisfied that it is merely a clerical error that Hindi dates had been reversed in the plaint. 14. The learned counsel also argued that although respectable witnesses were living in the locality, yet they were not produced. The evidence was, however, considered by the Bench of Jaipur High Court and it was convinced that the plaintiffs evidence was reliable and satisfactorily proved the will. According to the Civil Procedure Code which was then in force the Jaipur High Court was entitled to interfere even with a finding of fact concurrently arrived at by the two lower courts. The evidence was, however, considered by the Bench of Jaipur High Court and it was convinced that the plaintiffs evidence was reliable and satisfactorily proved the will. According to the Civil Procedure Code which was then in force the Jaipur High Court was entitled to interfere even with a finding of fact concurrently arrived at by the two lower courts. We do not, therefore, find any legal error in interfering with this finding of fact by the Jaipur High Court. We are not satisfied that special circumstances have been made out in this case which might induce us to revise the finding of the Jaipur High Court on this point. 15. So far as the question of adoption is concerned, it is no longer in dispute. The only question that has got to be seen is whether on the findings that the defendant is the validly adopted son of Nathulal and the will set up by the plaintiff was genuine, any right in the property in suit accrues to the plaintiff under the will. At the time of remitting the additional issue, the Jaipur High Court Bench was of opinion that it was necessary that it should be found whether the property in suit was the joint family property of Nathulal and the defendant, and could not be validly disposed of by Nathulal under his will (Ex. 3). There is no documentary evidence on this point. However, the parties produced a number of witnesses on the point. Looking to the allegation in the written statement we find that the defendant never set up the plea that the property in dispute was the joint family property of Nathulal and himself. He also did not take up the plea that Nathulal had no right to execute the will in respect of the property in suit. He clearly alleged that he was entitled to the property as the adopted son of Nathulal. In paragraph 4 of the additional pleas he has clearly alleged the property in suit to be the assets of Nathulal. According to his written statement, therefore, the defendants case is not that the property is the joint family property. On the contrary the allegations lead to the conclusion that the defendant himself accepted the property to be Nathulals self-acquired property. Under the circumstances, there was hardly any necessity for an additional issue and remitting the case for evidence thereon. According to his written statement, therefore, the defendants case is not that the property is the joint family property. On the contrary the allegations lead to the conclusion that the defendant himself accepted the property to be Nathulals self-acquired property. Under the circumstances, there was hardly any necessity for an additional issue and remitting the case for evidence thereon. However, as the evidence has been recorded and it has come before us we thought it proper to go through it and find out if on the strength of it the defendant can claim any such interest in the property in suit as would invalidate the will by which Nathulal bequeathed the property in suit to the plaintiff. We find that the defendant has not taken any definite stand as to how he had such an interest in the property in suit as to disable Nathulal from disposing it of by a will. He tried to suggest in the evidence produced by him that the property in suit was acquired by funds left by Nathulals father, Raghunath, with the formers first wife for acquiring some property for the defendant. This suggestion was however not substantiated by any legal evidence on the record and the learned counsel for the respondent rightly gave it up at the time of arguments. The other suggestion was that the property was purchased by the funds acquired jointly by Nathulal and the defendant. For this also no satisfactory evidence could be produced by the defendant. He had admitted that he was only 9 or 10 years old at the time of adoption. The property was purchased in 1922 and the adoption was made in St. 1978 near about the same period. It was, therefore, physically impossible for the defendant to acquire any funds by his sole or joint efforts with Nathulal. This is not all. The house was purchased in execution of a mortgage decree and the mortgage was made in 1914. Whatever was advanced was advanced at the time of the mortgage and nothing was paid at the time of sale. It is, there-fore, ridiculous to suggest that any funds acquired by the efforts of the defendant either singly or jointly with Nathulal were applied for the acquisition of the property. The learned counsel for the respondent advisedly did not lay much stress on this ground also. It is, there-fore, ridiculous to suggest that any funds acquired by the efforts of the defendant either singly or jointly with Nathulal were applied for the acquisition of the property. The learned counsel for the respondent advisedly did not lay much stress on this ground also. However, he took up the third and the last ground and it was that even though the property might be taken to have been the self-acquired property of Nathulal, yet it was blended with the joint family property and therefore acquired the character of a joint family property. For this a good deal of case law was placed before us on behalf of both the parties which will be presently considered. 16. In Maganlal vs. Mst. Krishna Bibi (A.I.R. 1935 All. 303) it was held that an allegation by adopted son that the properties existing at the time of his adoptive fathers death had been acquired by him as a member of a joint Hindu family so as to become joint family properties can succeed only if the evidence goes so far as to establish that the father abandoned all separate claims to the properties which he possessed at the time of the adoption and subsequently treated it and the properties acquired with its aid as joint family properties belonging to himself and his adopted son. A clear intention to waive his separate right must be established and this will not be inferred from acts which may have been done merely from kindness or affection. Merely because the adopted son also shared the management of the business, it is impossible to infer from it that the father and son became joint owners of the entire property originally belonging to the father and that acquired with its aid. 17. In G. V. Vythianatha Iyer vs. C. F. Varadaraja Iyer and others (A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 841) it was held that the presumption is against blending and it is only natural for a person to keep his self-acquired properties separate from the joint family property, meeting the expenses of the joint family from the joint family property. This being so, the mere failure of a member to keep separate accounts of his earning will not raise a presumption in favour of blending. 18. In Ulagalam Perumal Sethurayar Avergal and others vs. Rani Subbalahshwi Nachiar (A.I.R. 1936 Mad. This being so, the mere failure of a member to keep separate accounts of his earning will not raise a presumption in favour of blending. 18. In Ulagalam Perumal Sethurayar Avergal and others vs. Rani Subbalahshwi Nachiar (A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 721) it was held that acts of affection by person holding separate property such as giving maintenance to other relations do not amount to throwing the property into the common stock of the joint family. 19. In A.I.R. 1939 Sind 145 it was held that if the contracting business carried on by a father in fact was made by him a joint family business by taking his sons into the business not as servants, nor as partners but as coparceners, then undoubtedly the properties acquired from the profits of that business become joint family property. But, merely because father performed the ordinary duties of a father in that he fed, clothed and educated his sons and set up his grandson in business, it cannot be said that any presumption arises that he made his contracting business a joint family business. It must be shown that son was associated in the contracting business in such a manner as to raise a reasonable inference that father intended and did make the business a joint family business. 20. In Radhakantlal and others vs. Nazma Begum and others (A.I.R. 1917 P. C. 128) it was held by their Lord-ships of the Privy Council that a member of a Hindu family may convert his self-acquired property into ancestral family estate by throwing it into the common stock and properties once brought into a common stock cannot be taken out of it again. One common account into which all receipts and payments are brought, though not consisting of a regular cash book and ledger, is sufficient to show that all the properties, separate and ancestral, were blended together as one. 21. In A.I.R. 1923 P. C. 57 it was held that when members of a joint family, who have control over the joint estate, blend that estate with property in which they have separate interests, the whole property becomes joint. Whether separate estate is brought into a joint family account or the joint family property is brought into the separate accounts, the result is the same. Whether separate estate is brought into a joint family account or the joint family property is brought into the separate accounts, the result is the same. The real question for determination is what is the true conclusion to be drawn when people united, by bonds of close relationship and living as a joint family, draw for the joint family expenses out of a fund enriched by other contributions. If the members of a joint Hindu family confuse the incomes of their joint properties with their separate properties, their intention presumably is that the properties acquired with such mixed-up funds are for the joint family. 22. In Jetharam vs. Hazarimal (1951 Rajasthan Law Weekly 377) it was held that the mere fact that the father thought it proper to add his minor sons name in the patta does not prove that the property was acquired jointly by the father and his son. Nor is the fact, that sons and grandsons lived with the father in the same house, sufficient for any presumption or finding that the father had voluntarily thrown the property in the common stock with the intention of abandoning all separate claims upon it. 23. The common principle therefore which emerges from all these rulings is as has been very ably summed up by Mayne in his Hindu Law and Usage, nth Edn, by N. Chandra-shekhara Aiyer at page 348. The learned author says that the property which was originally self-acquired may become joint property, if it has been voluntarily thrown by the owner into the joint stock, with the intention of abandoning all separate claims upon it............. The question whether he has done so or not, is entirely one of fact, to be decided in the light of all the circumstances of the case; but a clear intention to waive his separate rights must be established and will not be inferred from acts which may have been done merely from kindness or affection. 24. Similarly, Mulla in bis Hindu Law, 1946 Edn., says at p. 251 that "Property which was originally the separate or self-acquired property of a member of a joint family may become joint family property, if it has been voluntarily thrown by him into the common stock with the intention of abandoning all separate claims upon it. 24. Similarly, Mulla in bis Hindu Law, 1946 Edn., says at p. 251 that "Property which was originally the separate or self-acquired property of a member of a joint family may become joint family property, if it has been voluntarily thrown by him into the common stock with the intention of abandoning all separate claims upon it. A clear intention to waive his separate rights must be established, and it will not be inferred from the mere fact of his allowing the other members of the family to use it conjointly with himself nor from the fact that the income of the separate property was used to support a son." 25. Bearing these principles in mind we might now see whether there is any evidence in the present case from which it might be inferred that Nathu-lal had by a clear intention waived his separate rights in the property in dispute. The evidence produced is that of a mason who has stated that he made certain repairs in the house in dispute some time in St. 1982 but apart from the fact that this witness appears to be an altogether untruthful witness because he gives a description of the house different from that of the house in dispute, all that he has said is that expenses of repairs were paid by the defendant. It is admitted that Nathulal was alive at that time. It is also admitted that he carried on a shop of perfumery at that time. As regards costs of materials the witness says that they were not paid in his presence, so he cannot say from where they were paid. As regards wages, he says that these were paid from the perfumery shop on which Nathulal and the defendant both used to sit. Against this evidence there is the evidence of Rampertap D.W. 9 who was a partner with the defendant in a kirana business that expenses of the repairs of the house were paid from the kirana partnership shop. It is, therefore, clear that the defendant has no one theory as to from where the expenses of construction or repairs, if any, were paid. It is, therefore, clear that the defendant has no one theory as to from where the expenses of construction or repairs, if any, were paid. So far as perfumery shop is concerned, it has been admitted by Rampertap that the defendant and Nathulal both worked on that shop and it has also been admitted by him that the shop was started by Nathulal himself, because before him his father Raghunath used to supply perfumes by visiting the house of his customers and did not sit at any shop. All other evidence is with respect to the source from which funds came for the mortgage of the house but that evidence is entirely hearsay and unworthy of credit and the learned counsel for the respondent himself did not rely upon it. One of his witnesses Damodar says that the repairs and the new constructions in the house were made with the joint income of the defendant Chhaganlal and Nathulal. He has however admitted that the shop was started by Nathulal and the defendant began to work at the shop at the age of 8 or 10 years. He is a relation on the father-in-laws side of the defendant and is not a resident of Jaipur but of Nimara. He has been living in Jaipur only for the last two years. Similarly, the father-in-law of the defendant, Gopinath (D.W.6) has admitted that repairs and new constructions were made with the joint income of Chhaganlal and Nathulal and that the income came from the shop and the shop was started by Nathulal on which Chhaganlal also began to work. He has admitted that the wages to labourers and the cost of materials were not paid in his presence. The defendant himself has admitted that the house in dispute was not purchased by joint earnings of himself and Nathulal. He has admitted that the perfumery shop was started by Nathulal but that he also used to conduct the business. He has admitted that the material was brought from the market by Nathulal. Although it has been admitted that accounts of kirana shop were kept yet no accounts have been produced to show that the costs of repairs were paid from that shop. 26. He has admitted that the material was brought from the market by Nathulal. Although it has been admitted that accounts of kirana shop were kept yet no accounts have been produced to show that the costs of repairs were paid from that shop. 26. The result of the whole evidence produced by the defendant is at the most this that the defendant after adoption lived jointly with Nathulal, that Nathulal had a shop of perfumery on which the defendant also began to sit and worked after he attained the age of discretion. It has not been proved that there was any income from joint family property, with which the income from the house in question was mixed up. There is also nothing to show that any particular constructions were made in the house in dispute in the life-time of Nathulal, for which the defendant paid any expenses. Merely because the defendant lived and messed jointly with his adoptive father Nathulal and because the defendant lived with him in the house in dispute and that there was a shop of perfumery of Nathulal at which the defendant used to sit and work along with Nathulal, it cannot be inferred that the house in dispute which was the self-acquired property of Nathulal was blended with any joint family property and thrown into the common stock. There is no evidence direct or circumstantial from which it can be inferred that Nathulal had clearly intended to waive his right to the house in question as his self-acquired property. The learned Civil Judge who has given a finding in favour of the defendant thought that the burden of proving that the house in dispute was not thrown in the common stock was on the plaintiff and has not looked into the question from a proper angle. We are not satisfied that it has been proved that the house in dispute was blended with any joint family property and was thrown into the common stock. 27. We may also take note of a passing argument of the learned counsel for the respondent. He argued that an agreement was executed at the time of adoption and it was stated in that agreement by Nathulal that even if a real son, be born to him, the defendant will have a preferential right. 27. We may also take note of a passing argument of the learned counsel for the respondent. He argued that an agreement was executed at the time of adoption and it was stated in that agreement by Nathulal that even if a real son, be born to him, the defendant will have a preferential right. We need not examine as to what would have been the effect of this document against a real son, if any had been born to Nathulal. Suffice it to say that reading the document carefully we do not find anything in it by which Nathulal could be said to have deprived himself of his absolute disposal over the house in question which was his self-acquired property. Moreover, this agreement was not relied on in pleadings by the defendant and he never raised a plea that on account of this agreement Nathulal was disabled from executing a will bequeathing the house in dispute to his wife Mst. Govindi. 28. On the above findings we are unable to hold the decree of the lower court. 29. The appeal is therefore allowed and the decrees of the lower courts are set aside and the plaintiffs suit is decreed, but as she falsely denied the adoption of the defendant and set up a false plea that he began to reside in the house in dispute with her permission after the death of Nathulal, she will not get any costs from the defendant respondent and the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.