JUDGEMENT : A.H. KHAN, J. This is an appeal against the order of remand passed by Nasrat Mohammad Khan, J. of Jaora High Court on 31-7-1948. 2. The short facts of the case are that the plaintiffs brought a suit on 1-4-1945 against the defendants on the allegation that plaintiff, Abdul Majid's son, Sharif Khan was engaged to be married to Must. Sugara, daughter of defendant No. 1. At the betrothal ceremony, some ornaments and clothes were given by the plaintiff to the defendant. But as the marriage could not come off and the betrothal was cancelled, the plaintiffs filed the suit for the return of articles given on the occasion of betrothal. 3. The Trial Court, holding that the betrothal was broken by the plaintiff, and that the suit was barred by time, dismissed it. In appeal, the District Judge of Jaora reversed the findings of the Trial Court and holding that the suit was within time, remanded it for the decision of other issues that had remained unsettled. Against this decision, the defendants went up in appeal, before the High Court of Jaora. The Single Bench of the Jaora High Court held that Article 120 and not Article 115, Limitation Act was applicable to the case and held the suit to be within time. According to Jaora High Court Rules, a further appeal is competent against the judgment of a Single Bench. Necessary permission having been obtained, the defendant has filed this appeal before us. 4. The question for our determination is whether the suit is or is not time barred. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that Article 115 is applicable to this case. He argues that the betrothal is a contract and the breaking of it amounts to the breach of contract and that this suit should be treated as one for compensation. The period prescribed for filing a suit is 3 years from the time the contract is broken. The learned counsel has referred us to 'MEWA SINGH v. NARAIN SINGH', AIR 1919 Lah 109 (1). 6. In the first place, I do not agree that the rase is covered by Article 115, Limitation Act. That a betrothal is a contract I agree. The learned counsel has referred us to 'MEWA SINGH v. NARAIN SINGH', AIR 1919 Lah 109 (1). 6. In the first place, I do not agree that the rase is covered by Article 115, Limitation Act. That a betrothal is a contract I agree. But on referring to the plaint of the case, I find that it is for the return of " and it is obvious that a suit for the return of the species cannot be treated as a suit for compensation. I have carefully gone through 'MEWA SINGH v. NARAIN SINGH', AIR 1919 Lah 109. It does not appear from it that it was a case for the return of ornaments that were given at the time of betrothal. On the contrary, it was a suit "on account of damages for breach of betrothal contract." I am afraid the Lahore ruling does not help the appellant. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant has also referred to Article 49, Limitation Act, and he says that if Article 115 does not apply, then the case is covered by Article 49 and in support of his contention he has cited 'BULAKHTDAS NARSINGDAS v. RADHAKISAN GOPIKISAN', AIR 1939 Nag 177. 8. Article 49 and Article 48 must be read together in order to have a clear idea as to what the law is. Both the articles apply to suits in which relief is sought in respect of specific movable property. In addition, they apply when the property is wrongfully taken or wrongfully detained. In Rustomji's law of Limitation it is said that Article 49 seems to refer to actions ex delicto, in other words, it applies to tortuous actions. But in this case, the suit is based on a breach of contract and the question of an action based on tort does not arise. In 'BULAKHIDAS NARSINGDAS v. RADHAKISAN GOPIKISAN', AIR 1939 Nag 177, it is said Art. 49 contemplates a case of a cause of action arising ex delicto. If it is so (and this view finds support elsewhere too) then there is no doubt that the present case is ex contractu and Article 49 would not apply. 9. In 'BULAKHIDAS NARSINGDAS v. RADHAKISAN GOPIKISAN', AIR 1939 Nag 177, it is said Art. 49 contemplates a case of a cause of action arising ex delicto. If it is so (and this view finds support elsewhere too) then there is no doubt that the present case is ex contractu and Article 49 would not apply. 9. It has been observed in 'VENKATA GURUNADHA RAM SESHAYYA v. TRIPURISUNDARI COTTON PRESS, BEZWADA', 49 Mad 468 (FB), that the Limitation Act is one of those unfortunate pieces of Indian legislation which, by trying to provide for everything conceivable, very often ends by leaving out cases of the most glaring description. To me it appears that it is precisely for cases such as the present one that the legislature in its wisdom enacted Article 120, which is often spoken of as the Omnibus article. It is common ground that the suit, if Art. 120 is applied is within time. 10. In the view that I take of the matter, I think the learned Judge of the Jaora High Court has rightly held that Article 120 of the Limitation Act applies to this case and there is no reason for any interference in the order of remand. 11. Appeal disallowed with costs. 12. SHINDE, J. :- The question for consideration in this appeal is what Article of the Limitation Act is attracted in this case. My learned brother Abdul Hakim Khan, J., is of the opinion that Article 120 which is generally referred to as the omnibus Article is applicable to this case. I find certain amount of difficulty in concurring with this view. Although I agree with my learned brother that the suit is not barred by time, my grounds for holding the same are different and hence I am constrained to write a separate judgment. 13. The facts of the case briefly are these. Plaintiff, Abdul Majid's son, Sharifkhan was engaged to be married to Mst. Sugara, daughter of Naharkhan defendant No. 1. At the time of betrothal, and on other occasions the plaintiff alleges that he gave ornaments, clothes, and sweetmeats worth Rs. 199/13/- and also incurred miscellaneous expenses to the extent of Rs. 49-12-6. He further alleges that the defendant broke the contract and married Mst. Sugara to some one else on 28th April 1942. At the time of betrothal, and on other occasions the plaintiff alleges that he gave ornaments, clothes, and sweetmeats worth Rs. 199/13/- and also incurred miscellaneous expenses to the extent of Rs. 49-12-6. He further alleges that the defendant broke the contract and married Mst. Sugara to some one else on 28th April 1942. On these allegations, the plaintiff seeks the following relief : The trial court holding that the betrothal was broken by the plaintiff and that the suit was barred by limitation dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. On appeal the District Judge, Jaora, reversed the findings of the trial court and holding that the suit was within time remanded the case for the decision of other issues. Against that order of remand, the defendants preferred an appeal before the High Court of Jaora. The Single Bench of the Jaora High Court held that Article 120 and not Article 115, Limitation Act, was applicable to this case. Against that decision the defendants have filed this appeal. 14. As already stated we have to see what Article is applicable to this case, as detailed in uses the words "(vernacular matter omitted) turn of ornaments and clothes) actually the plaintiff is not asking for the return of specific ornaments and clothes. He is actually asking for a decree for Rs. 249-9-6. If that were not so, the relief would have distinctly stated that in case the plaintiff fails to return the ornaments and clothes, their price may be allowed to the plaintiff. Besides the relief claims a decree not only for ornaments and clothes but also for other expenses incurred. These other expenses incurred cannot be specifically decreed. Consequently, the relief cannot be for the return of the ornaments. Although the words 'return of ornaments' have been used in the prayer, a joint relief has been claimed for ornaments, clothes and other expenses incurred. There is no doubt, therefore, that the relief claimed is for the price of ornaments and clothes and compensation for the expenses incurred. 15. Moreover, the heading of the suit is as follows : This supports my view that the suit is not for the return of the specific ornaments and clothes. From the facts detailed in the plaint, it is clear to me that the suit is for damages for the breach of contract. 15. Moreover, the heading of the suit is as follows : This supports my view that the suit is not for the return of the specific ornaments and clothes. From the facts detailed in the plaint, it is clear to me that the suit is for damages for the breach of contract. Under S. 73, Contract Act, when a contract is broken the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach. This is precisely what the plaintiff is asking for. He alleges that as the defendant broke the contract of marriage he may be given damages caused to him by the loss of ornaments, clothes and other expenses incurred in consideration of the marriage. The suit, in my opinion, therefore, is covered by Article 115, Limitation Act. I am supported in this view by the decision of the Lahore High Court reported in 'MEWA SINGH v. NARAIN SINGH', AIR 1919 Lah 109 (1). 16. Even if Article 115 is applied to this case, Ihe suit does not become time barred. In the case of Article 115, the period of limitation begins to run from the date the contract is broken. In para No. 4 of the plaint, it is stated that the defendant married his daughter to some one else on 28th April 1942. Evidently, therefore, the contract was broken on 28th April 1942. The suit was filed on 1-4-1945. As the suit is filed within three years from the date on which the contract was broken it is clearly within time. 17. For these reasons I see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Judge of the Jaora High Court. Appeal dismissed.