Ramaswami, J.- This second appeal has been preferred against the decree and judgment of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge at Ellore in A.S. No. 184 of 1946 in O.S. No. 382 of 1944. 2. The facts are: The plaintiff is Bandi Narayanamma; her deceased husband Venkatarayudu and defendants 2 and 4 were the undivided sons of the first defendant Bandi Muneyya. The third defendant is a son of the second defendant. There is no dispute that all these persons constituted members of a coparcenary. This Bandi Narayanamma’s husband, Venkatarayudu, died about 1914. This widow in 1944 came with a case that she was entitled to separate maintenance at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per annum, for arrears of maintenance at that rate and for provisions being made for residence, utensils etc. The defendants set up the plea that the maintenance of this widow had already been settled by an arrangement with the father of the plaintiff at Rs. 100 per annum and it was being paid for several years at that rate. Therefore, the controversy between the widowed daughterin-law and the father-in-law and brothers-in-law was that the widow claimed Rs. 1,000 per annum on foot of the income of the family on the date of suit and the father-in-law and brothers-in-law sought to support the maintenance of Rs, 100 per annum on the foot of the income of the family on the date of the death of Venkatarayudu. 3. Both the lower Courts seem to have adopted a via-media course and decreed maintenance at Rs. 750 per annum apparently taking into consideration the increased income after the death of Venkatarayudu and as accruing on the date of the suit. This family income has been estimated at Rs. 7,000 on the date of suit. 4. In second appeal the learned advocate raised the point whether we should adopt as our datum-line the date of the death of the husband of the plaintiff or the date of filing of the suit which was one generation thereafter. He brings to my † 21st September, 1951. notice conflicting decisions of this Court which are summarised in Audemma v. Varada Reddy1. In that case the conflict was fully brought into prominence by the learned advocate, Mr. K. Umamaheswaram who was appearing for the first defendant. He brings to my † 21st September, 1951. notice conflicting decisions of this Court which are summarised in Audemma v. Varada Reddy1. In that case the conflict was fully brought into prominence by the learned advocate, Mr. K. Umamaheswaram who was appearing for the first defendant. The conflicting decisions are set out in that judgment as follows: “On behalf of the plaintiff reliance is principally placed on the decision in Manicka Mudaliar v. Sowbagia Ammal2. Dealing with a case where a widow of a deceased member of a joint Hindu family claimed maintenance against her husband’s brother and brother’s sons who had considerably enlarged the family estate since the death of her husband, it was held that the share the husband would get if he had been alive at the time of the suit should be taken into consideration and hot the share, if any, he was entitled to on his death.” After pointing out that the property out of which the plaintiff sought to be maintained was joint family property, that the defendants took the plaintiff’s husband’s interest by survivorship and that it formed the nucleus of the subsequent acquisition, Sankaran Nair and Spencer, JJ., held in that case that the plaintiff would get a reduced rate of maintenance if the family income diminished and that on the same principle she should be entitled to an increased rate of maintenance if the family income expanded. In Veerayya v. Chellamma3, Wadsworth, J., held following Manicka Mudaliar v. Sowbagia Ammal2 that, “the maximum which can be awarded to a widow will be the amount of the income of the share to which her deceased husband would have been entitled had he been alive and a coparcener at the date of the suit for maintenance.” The learned Judge notices that in Rangathayi Ammal v. Munuswami Chetti4 and Subbarayalu Chetti v. Komalavalli Thayaramma5 the income of the husband’s share was taken to be the income of the share which he would have got if a division had taken place in his lifetime, and that this was also apparently the basis of the decision in Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangammal6 in which the right of maintenance was treated as being limited to the share of the deceased husband, which had come by survivorship to the coparcener. The learned Judge then observes that, “On this question of the date with effect from which the husband’s share is to be estimated there is a very clear ruling of a Bench of this Court in Manicka Mudaliar v. Sowbagia Ammal2.” which is later than the case he first referred to. As the decision in Manicka Mudaliar v. Sowbagia Ammal2 had not been challenged by subsequent rulings of this Court in the 24 years which had elapsed since the decision was passed the learned Judges took it to be authoritative and allowed maintenance on the basis of the income of the share to which the plaintiff’s deceased husband would have been entitled on the date of the suit had he been alive and a coparcener. 5. On foot of these conflicting decisions Mr. Umamaheswaram seems to have suggested that they should be resolved by the decision of a Full Bench and he also brought to the notice of the Court that in Rangathayi Ammal v. Munuswami Chetti4 it was assumed without demur that the widow’s right to be maintained out of the interest of her deceased husband in the coparcenary property which on his death survived to the remaining coparceners should be calculated with reference to the share to which he would have been entitled if a partition had taken place between him and the remaining coparceners before his death and that the law was stated in similar terms in Srinivasa Iyer v. Lakshmi Ammal7, Ramzan v. Ram Daiya8 and Gurushiddappa v. Parwatewwa9. 6. The Bench declined to refer the matter to a Full Bench on the ground that it was not necessary for purposes of that case to get this conflict decided and went on other lines for coming to their decision and with which we are not concerned here. 7. The conflict pointed out is a real and important one and affects the award of maintenance in hundreds of suits pending and which are likely to be filed in our Courts. 8. In this case also if it is held that the datum-line for holding the award of maintenance to the respondent is on the date of the death of Venkatarayadu, then the appellant before me has a very good case. 8. In this case also if it is held that the datum-line for holding the award of maintenance to the respondent is on the date of the death of Venkatarayadu, then the appellant before me has a very good case. If, on the other hand, it is held that the maintenance should be awarded as on the date of suit then the appellant has got a fairly thin case. 9. I therefore direct the papers be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for having the matter decided by a Full Bench if he considers such a course appropriate. Both parties request me that the entire controversy namely, the appeal and the memorandum of cross-objections which are within a short compass may also be disposed of by the Full Bench hearing the point of law. The appeal and the memorandum of cross-objections will also be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for such appropriate action as my Lord deems fit. This appeal came on for hearing in pursuance of the abovesaid Order of Reference before the Full Bench. K. Ramachandra Rao for Appellants. Y.G. Krishnamurthi for Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Rajamannar, C.J.-This second appeal was first heard by Ramaswami, J., who considered that an important question affecting the award of maintenance to the widow of a deceased coparcener against the surviving co-parceners arose in this case, on which there appeared to be a conflict of judicial opinion. Hence this reference to a Full Bench. The second appeal arises out of a suit filed by the respondent for the recovery of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per annum from the date of suit and for arrears of maintenance for about a year before the institution of the suit at the same rate, for provision for residence and other minor reliefs. The respondent’s deceased husband, Venkatarayudu, and defendants 2 and 4 who are appellants 1 and 3 were the undivided sons of the first defendant. The third defendant (second appellant) is the son of the first appellant. The respondent’s husband died undivided from the family nearly 30 years before the suit. The respondent claimed a sum of Rs. 1,000 as a proper rate of maintenance on the allegation that the family owned about 150 acres of land fetching an annual income of Rs. 20,000 and had also a large money lending business. The respondent’s husband died undivided from the family nearly 30 years before the suit. The respondent claimed a sum of Rs. 1,000 as a proper rate of maintenance on the allegation that the family owned about 150 acres of land fetching an annual income of Rs. 20,000 and had also a large money lending business. The defendants pleaded inter alia that soon after the plaintiff’s husband’s death there was an agreement between the plaintiff’s father acting on her behalf and the first defendant that the plaintiff should be paid a sum of Rs. 100 per annum towards her maintenance and that neither the plaintiff nor the defendants should ask for its alteration at any time. This amount was fixed, according to them, having regard to the extent of the family estate at the time of the plaintiff’s husband’s death, namely, about 54 acres of land of which 6 acres alone were wet. The learned District Munsif of Kovvur who tried the suit held that the arrangement set up by the defendants was not true and proceeded to fix the maintenance. He held that the quantum of maintenance had to be fixed taking into consideration the income of the family on the date of the suit and the plaintiff’s husband’s share therein if he had been alive. He estimated the net income of the family at not less than Rs. 7,000 and fixed a sum of Rs. 750 per annum. He also awarded her arrears of maintenance at the same rate for the year 1943. The defendants appealed to the Subordinate Judge, who confirmed the decision of the District Munsif except as regards costs. The defendants thereupon filed the second appeal which is now before us. The main ground which was taken in the memorandum of appeal was that the lower Courts should have held that the plaintiff was entitled to maintenance only from the share of her husband in the properties that the family owned and possessed at the time of his death. Learned counsel for the appellants pressed only this point before us. He contended that the rate of maintenance should be fixed having regard to the properties which were owned by the joint family at the time of the plaintiff’s husband’s death and she should not get the benefit of subsequent acquisitions made by the family. On this question there is direct authority in this Court. He contended that the rate of maintenance should be fixed having regard to the properties which were owned by the joint family at the time of the plaintiff’s husband’s death and she should not get the benefit of subsequent acquisitions made by the family. On this question there is direct authority in this Court. In Manicka Mudaliar v. Sowbagiammal1, it was held by a Division Bench consisting of Sankaran Nair and Spencer, JJ., that the amount of maintenance should be fixed with reference to the income of the family as it stood at the date of the suit and not as it stood at the date of the husband’s death. In that case the plaintiff’s husband died in 1897 and the suit for maintenance was brought in 1911. When the plaintiff’s husband died the joint family was possessed of about 1 acre of wet land and about 1½ acres of dry land and was carrying on a small trade in cloth. After his death the trade increased and the profits became large and properties were purchased out of the income from the trade. The income of the family on the date of the suit was estimated at Rs. 17,500 per annum on an average. The District Judge awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs. 50 per mensem. It was contended that the lower Court was wrong in fixing the maintenance with reference to the present income of the family, but this contention was overruled. They observed: “It is not contended that the property out of which the plaintiff seeks to be maintained is not joint family property; that the defendants did not take her husband’s interest by survivorship and that formed in part the nucleus of this acquisition. It is also clear that if the family income had been reduced, the plaintiff would only get a reduced rate of maintenance and she would not be entitled to have it fixed with reference to the family income at the date of her husband’s death.” They followed two rulings of the Bombay High Court in Madhavrav Keshan Tilak v. Gangabai2 and Adhibai v. Gurusandas Nathu3. In Madhavarav Keshav Tilak v. Gangabai2, Westropp, C.J. and Kemball, J., had held that a Hindu widow is not entitled to a larger portion of the annual produce of the joint family property as maintenance than the annual proceeds of the share to which her husband would have been entitled on partition were he then living, and this decision had been followed in the later case. Wadsworth, J., followed the decision in Manicka Mudaliar v. Sowbagiammal1 in Veerayya v. Chellamma4. No doubt, that was a suit for enhancement of maintenance already fixed by a decree of Court. But the principle applied was the same. He held that the maximum which could be awarded to the widow would be the amount of the income from the share to which her husband would have been entitled had he been alive and a coparcener at the date of the suit for enhancement. The learned Judge pointed that the ruling in Manicka Mudaliar v. Sowbagiammal1 had not been challenged by subsequent rulings of this Court in the 24 years which had elapsed since that decision had been passed. The only support which learned counsel for the appellant sought for the contrary view for which he contended was from certain observations in two decisions of this Court. The only support which learned counsel for the appellant sought for the contrary view for which he contended was from certain observations in two decisions of this Court. In Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma5, Bhashyam Aiyangar, J., said: “When an undivided Hindu family consists of two or more males related as father and sons or otherwise and one of them dies leaving a widow, she has a right of maintenance against the surviving coparcener or coparceners, quoad the share or interest of her deceased husband in the joint family property which has come by survivorship into the hands of the surviving coparcener or coparceners, and though such right does not in itself form a charge upon her husband’s share or interest in the joint family property, vet, when it becomes necessary to enforce or preserve such right effectually, it would be made a specific charge on a reasonable portion of the joint family property, such portion of course not exceeding her husband’s share or interest therein.” In Rangathayi Ammal v. Munuswami Chetti6, the following passage occurs in the judgment in a discussion as to the amount of maintenance which a Hindu widow is entitled to: “No hard and fast rule can be laid down that she is entitled to a particular fraction of the income, although she could, in no event, claim more than the income of the share of the estate which her husband would have been entitled to, if a division had taken place during his lifetime.” As pointed out in Bansidhar Lala v. Champoo Bibi Mst.7, the observations in Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma5 cited above can scarcely be regarded as authority for the proposition that the maximum limit for the maintenance allowance of a Hindu widow is her husband’s share in the income of the family property at the time of his death. In that case no question arose as to the amount of maintenance. A creditor of the deceased husband of a widow had obtained a decree on a promissory note executed by him and in execution of that decree he became the purchaser of the house which belonged to the deceased in which the widow was living. In that case no question arose as to the amount of maintenance. A creditor of the deceased husband of a widow had obtained a decree on a promissory note executed by him and in execution of that decree he became the purchaser of the house which belonged to the deceased in which the widow was living. When the decree-holder proceeded to obtain delivery of the house he was resisted by the widow on the ground that she had a right of residence during her lifetime and that she could not therefore be ejected from the residential portion of the house. The District Judge upheld her contention. But the learned Judges of this Court reversed the decision of the District Judge on this point. It was in the course of dealing with the nature of the widow’s right of maintenance that the learned Judge made the observations above extracted. In Rangathayi Ammal v. Muniswami Chetti1, no doubt the question was, what was the proper rate of maintenance to be awarded to a widow against her step-son. It appears from the facts set out in the judgment that no considerable time elapsed between the death of her husband and the institution of the suit for maintenance by the widow. No question therefore arose as to whether the income of the family on the date of the husband’s death or on the date of the institution of the suit should be taken into consideration in fixing the amount of maintenance. We cannot therefore take this decision as a direct authority on the question now before us. We may also mention that there is no reference by the learned Judges to the Bombay decisions which were referred to in Manicka Mudaliar v. Sowbagiammal2. On principle we are in entire agreement with the decisions in Manicka Mudaliar v. Sowbagiammal2 and Veerayya v. Chellammal3. The law is well settled that the widow of a deceased coparcener in a joint Hindu family has a right of maintenance against the surviving coparceners quoad the share of her deceased husband which survives to them. This is an absolute right which accrues to her as a member of the joint family. The law is well settled that the widow of a deceased coparcener in a joint Hindu family has a right of maintenance against the surviving coparceners quoad the share of her deceased husband which survives to them. This is an absolute right which accrues to her as a member of the joint family. The correct conception of the widow’s right is thus set out in Lingayya v. Kanakamma4: “The wives of the male coparceners in a Hindu family are not entitled to equal shares with the males in the family estate, nor do they take their husband’s shares by representation on their death, but in place thereof, they are entitled to a portion of their estate for their enjoyment during their lifetime sufficient to maintain them in comfort according to the means of the family. This is an absolute right due to their membership in the family and does not depend on their necessity arising from their want of other means to support themselves.” (Vide also Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bhagwati5.) It must not be overlooked that the wives or widows of the coparceners, though they may not be themselves coparceners are members of the undivided family along with the males. (Bhagwati v. Commissioner of Income-tax6.) There can be a joint family even with the single male member provided there are widows of the deceased coparceners or other persons entitled to maintenance from him (Vedathunni v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras7. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee expressly say that they do not agree that a Hindu joint family necessarily consists of male members only. (Kalyanji Vithal Das v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal8.) There can be a joint family where there are widows only, for a Hindu joint family is not finally terminated so long as it is possible in nature or law to add a male member to it. Any of the widows can bring into the family a new male member by adoption (Mayne’s Hindu Law, 11th Edn., page 334). It follows, therefore, that on the death of her husband a widow continues to be a member of the joint family along with the male coparceners. Her fortunes are bound up with the fortunes of the family. If the income of the family increases she will be entitled to the benefit of it. It follows, therefore, that on the death of her husband a widow continues to be a member of the joint family along with the male coparceners. Her fortunes are bound up with the fortunes of the family. If the income of the family increases she will be entitled to the benefit of it. Likewise, if the income of the family decreases she must submit to a reduction of her maintenance. The learned advocate for the appellants did not contest the proposition that the quantum of maintenance to which a widow is entitled is subject to variation, even when fixed by the court, by reason of a change of circumstances. This feature is inconsistent with the contention of the appellants that the widow’s maintenance should be fixed taking into consideration her husband’s share in the income of the joint family at the time of his death and at no subsequent time. Reference was made to the decision in Audemma v. Varadareddi1. The exact question which is now before us did not arise in that case. But Govindarajachari, J., notices the apparent conflict between Rangathayi Ammal v. Muniswami Chetti2 and Manicka Mudaliar v.Sowbagiammal3. It was unnecessary for the purpose of that case to resolve the conflict. But we agree with the following observations made by the learned Judge in dealing with the claim for maintenance by a widow against coparcenary property in which at one time her husband was a sharer: “If it is borne in mind that the widow’s right of maintenance is the truncated right which still remains out of what was at one time a claim to a share of the family property, there will be no difficulty in recognising that, as a necessary and logical consequence of the nature of the right possessed by the widow, her maintenance would be dependent upon the varying fortunes of the family. Her comforts would dwindle if the family property is reduced; but, if the family becomes more affluent, she will be entitled to participate in that affluence.” We have therefore no hesitation in holding that in fixing the rate of maintenance the Courts below were right in taking into consideration the income of the joint family at the time of the institution of the suit. Having regard to the net income estimated at Rs. 7,000, we think that the amount fixed by the Courts below, namely, Rs. Having regard to the net income estimated at Rs. 7,000, we think that the amount fixed by the Courts below, namely, Rs. 750 per annum, is proper and reasonable. We see no reason to alter that figure. The second appeal and memorandum of objections are dismissed with costs. K.S. ----- Appeal and memorandum of objections dismissed.