Judgment :- 1. Defendants 1 and 3 are the appellants before us. The only question that arises in this second appeal is whether the appellant would come within the definition of Kudikidappukaran under S. 2 Cl. (c) of the Travancore Act XXII of 1124. S. 2 Cl. (c) runs thus: "[c] 'Kudikidappukaran' means a person who has no homestead or land of his own to erect a homestead and has been permitted by an owner of land to have the use and occupation of a portion of the land for the purpose of erecting a homestead with or without an obligation to pay rent for the use and occupation of the site so given; and 'kudiyiruppu' means the site so given together with the house, but or shed thereon which is used as a place of residence by the kudikidappukaran with the permission of the owner." The appellants came into possession of the properties as a result of a possessory mortgage given in favour of defendants 1 and 2 and another person. That other person is dead and defendants 3 and 4 are his legal representatives. The mortgage was given of a vacant site for securing an advance of Rs. 200/- made by the mortgagees to the mortgagor. The mortgage document provides that should the mortgagees happen to improve the properties by planting trees or erecting buildings thereon the value therefore would also be paid as price at the time of redemption, besides the mortgage money of Rs. 200/-. There was a decree for redemption of this mortgage. By the time that decree was sought to be executed, Act XXII of 1124 (Travancore) had come into force and the appellants sought to avail of that Act by contending that they were kudikidappukars within the meaning of S. 2(c) and that therefore they were immune from eviction under S. 7 which provides for eviction of a kudikidappukaran only for the grounds specified therein and no such ground exists in the case. Waste is one of the grounds on which a kudikidappukaran would be evicted. The decree-holder relied upon waste to entitle him to evict but that was found against and that question is not now in issue between the parties. The only question arising for determination in this second appeal is as already stated, whether the mortgagees are kudikidappukars within the meaning of S.2(c) of the Act. 2. The decree-holder relied upon waste to entitle him to evict but that was found against and that question is not now in issue between the parties. The only question arising for determination in this second appeal is as already stated, whether the mortgagees are kudikidappukars within the meaning of S.2(c) of the Act. 2. Both the courts below have found against the appellants. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that because the mortgagees had erected two buildings in the property mortgaged for which value has been directed to be paid in the decree for redemption and because these buildings were in existence and in the occupation of the appellants at the time the Act came into force, under S. 4 Cl. (2) which provides that: "4. [2] Every kudikidappukaran who is at the date of commencement of this Act in occupation of a kudiyiruppu to which this Act applies shall be deemed to be in occupation of such kudiyiruppu with the permission of the owner." The appellants have a permanent right of occupancy in the holding. To apply Cl. (2) of S. 4 the party relying upon it must be a kudikidappukaran. We are thus thrown back to the definition of kudikidappukaran in the first part of S. 2(c). In order that a person may be a kudikidappukaran under that sub-clause one of the requisites is that the land in question must have been given for the purpose of erecting a homestead. The relevant portion of the document of the mortgage was read before us. It shows that the land was given as security for the money advanced. It does not show that the purpose for which the land was given was anything other than affording security for the money advanced. In other words the purpose for which the land was given was not the erecting of a homestead by the mortgagees. Learned counsel for the appellants is not in a position to contend that at the time of the transaction of mortgage, its purpose was to enable the mortgagees to erect a homestead in the property. In other words the purpose for which the land was given was not the erecting of a homestead by the mortgagees. Learned counsel for the appellants is not in a position to contend that at the time of the transaction of mortgage, its purpose was to enable the mortgagees to erect a homestead in the property. His only contention is that because the mortgaged premises was a vacant site and because the mortgage document authorised him to erect buildings and claim compensation therefor at the time of eviction, and because on the date the Act came into force two buildings had been constructed and the appellants were in occupation thereof, S. 2(c) is attracted and that the appellants are immune from eviction. 3. The purpose of transaction must be determined as on its date and if a transaction had a purpose when it was entered into it cannot have a different purpose subsequently. The power of a mortgagee to improve the property by erecting buildings thereon and claim value therefor at the time of redemption will not make the purpose of the transaction one to make that erection. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants also contends that the view of the lower appellate court that because the transaction is a mortgage, the application of the Act is not attracted, is erroneous and relies upon S. 2(b) which defines a holding as "a compact block of land held by a person whether as owner, mortgagee, lessee or otherwise on any portion of which there is a kudikidappu". There is substance in this contention because if a party claiming relief under the Act happens to be a mortgagee, that circumstance by itself will not disentitle him to relief. A mortgagee may also claim relief under the provisions of the Act if otherwise he is entitled to that for the other reasons mentioned in the Act. In this case however the fundamental requisite under S. 2(c) namely that the purpose for which the land was given must be for erecting a homestead, is absent and for that reason alone the view taken by the courts below is correct and that be confirmed though not for reasons mentioned by them. 5. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Dismissed.