JUDGMENT : This is an execution appeal from an order passed in first appeal by the learned District Judge, Bhind on 16th September 1948, allowing the appeal and the objections of the judgment-debtor and dismissing the decree-holder's application for execution as time-barred. 2. The decree was passed in 1927 and in course of execution in 1937 a compromise was arrived at and on the basis of this compromise an order was passed by the Court on 27-7-1937 providing for payment of Rs. 200/- by the judgment-debtor within a period of 10 years by annual instalment of Rs. 20/- out of which Rs. 10/- were to be paid on 15th January and Rs. 10/- on 15th of May every year. It was further provided that in case of any default the entire sum could be recovered at once. It is admitted that the judgment-debtor did not pay any instalment and the decree-holder never made an application for execution before 1947. On 24-12-1947, the decree-holder for the first time applied for the execution of the decree for instalments. He mentioned in his application that he wants to get from the judgment-debtor seven instalments of Rs. 10/- each which have fallen due on (1) 15th May 1944, (2) 15th January 1945, (3) 15th May 1945, (4) 15th January 1946, (5) 15th May 1946, (6) 15th January 1947 and (7) on 15th May 1947. The decree-holder further alleged in the application that as a tenant of the judgment-debtor the previous instalments he had adjusted towards the rent which he was liable to pay to his landlord the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor objected to the execution of the decree and one of his objections was that the execution is time-barred. He also stated that he had filed a suit for arrears of rent against the decree-holder and the story of adjustment of the previous instalments towards rent is without foundation. 3. Apart from other considerations, the main question in this appeal is : can the decree-holder sleep over some of the instalments and apply for the remaining when they will be due specially when a default has taken place and when the decree-holder did not choose to enforce the default clause? 3. Apart from other considerations, the main question in this appeal is : can the decree-holder sleep over some of the instalments and apply for the remaining when they will be due specially when a default has taken place and when the decree-holder did not choose to enforce the default clause? In other words, the question is : when a single instalment is not paid did the default clause come into operation and did the decree cease to be an instalment decree and did it become, from the day of default, a decree for the payment of the whole decretal amount? or, could it retain, at the sweet will of the decree-holder, the nature of an instalment decree? 4. It is well settled now that where an instalment decree provides that in case of any default the entire sum could be recovered at once and no instalment is paid the decree-holder applying for execution of such a decree can rely on the decree as a whole, for the purpose of limitation, even though his application for the enforcement of the default clause may be barred. His claim to the instalments which are not time-barred is not barred on account of his failure to waive his right to claim the entire decretal amount on the first default. 'PEOPLES BANK OF NORTHERN INDIA v. AIJAZ ALI', 17 Luck 449. 5. It was observed in 'AJODHIA PRASAD v. BANSILAL', 11 Luck 276 by a Full Bench of the Oudh Chief Court : "If the decree-holders do not choose to enforce within limitation the provision which was inserted for their benefit, they may be debarred from enforcing it afterwards, but they ought not to be prevented from recovering the future instalments, the claim in respect of which is made within time. If the subsidiary right of enforcing the default clause has become barred by time, it does not follow that the primary right relating to payments by instalments is also barred." It therefore becomes clear that unless the decree leaves the decree-holder no option on the happening of a default but to execute the decree once and for all for the whole amount due under it, the decree-holder may execute it on the happening of the first, second, or any subsequent default, and limitation will run against him in respect of each instalment separately from the time when such instalment may become due 'SHANKAR PRASAD v. JALPA PRASAD', 16 All 371. 6. There is of course authority to the contrary also where it has been held that when, under an instalment decree with a default clause instalments have not been paid and the default clause can be brought into operation the decree ceases to be an instalment decree and becomes from the date of default a decree for the payment of a lump sum and time runs from that default; and in order that the decree may retain for the benefit of the decree-holder the nature of an instalment decree, the decree-holder must show unequivocally that he so intended, (vide cases referred to in the judgment of Broomfield, J., in 'BOMATU BHADU v. GOVARDHANDAS', AIR 1936 Bom 268 : 38Bom LR 492 : 163 IC 937. But in view of the judgment of the Privy Council in 'LASA DIN v. GULAB KUNWAR', 59 Ind App 376 : 7 Luck 442 : ( AIR 1932 PC 207 , these cases cannot be regarded as good law. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in this case held that as the default clause in the mortgage deed was a clause in favour of the mortgagee which he might or might not enforce, so he was not bound to enforce it, and that time ran not from the date on which the default clause might have been brought into operation, but from the date when the mortgage expired and the principal sum became due. This principle has been applied to default clauses in decrees where the decretal sum is payable in instalments by the Bombay High Court in 'VEHERBHAI VALLAVBHAI v. JAVER SOMA', 60 Bom 62 : AIR 1936 Bom 17, by the Allahabad High Court in 'RAM PRASAD RAM v. JADUNANDAN UPADHIA', 56 All 921 : AIR 1934 All 534 ; by the Sindh Judicial Commissioner's Court in 'LEKH RAJ SIRUMAL v. KHUB CHAND', AIR 1939 Sind 49 and by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in 'RANGALAL AGARWALLA v. SHYAMLAL TAMULI' 50 Cal WN 735 : 81 Cal LJ 325 : 226 Ind Cas 343 : AIR 1946 Cal 500. 7. The main question to be considered in such cases is whether the default clause in the decree is expressed in a mandatory or in a mere declaratory form i.e., whether the decree makes it obligatory on the decree-holder to execute it for the entire balance if a default occurs, or it merely gives him a choice and says either that "the entire balance shall become due", or that "the decree-holder shall have the power to execute the decree for the whole amount." In the first case the decree-holder has no choice and time runs from the date of default; but in the second case the decree-holder is given an option to demand immediate payment of the whole amount, and the decree-holder is at liberty to take advantage of the option, but if he does not take advantage of this option the provision for payment by instalments is not affected. The present case comes under the second class and I am clear in my mind that it was open to the decree-holder to execute the decree for instalments. The application being one for the recovery of certain instalments, it is an application to enforce payments which the decree directed to be made at certain dates. Consequently Art. 182(7) applies here and in my judgment the application was within time. 8. If the decree retained the nature of an instalment decree, the decree-holder could forgo certain instalments and apply for the remaining ones, in which case he would have, in respect of each instalment, three years time from the date it became due, under Art. 182(7), Limitation Act. 9. Mr. 8. If the decree retained the nature of an instalment decree, the decree-holder could forgo certain instalments and apply for the remaining ones, in which case he would have, in respect of each instalment, three years time from the date it became due, under Art. 182(7), Limitation Act. 9. Mr. Ramkrishna Dixit places reliance on 'PANDURANG VISVANATH v. MAHADEO VISHWESHWAR', AIR 1931 Bom 263 but that case is distinguishable as the decree-holder in that case had on the first default taken out execution for the whole amount and had exercised his option. Subsequently he attempted to execute the decree for instalments. It was held that once he had exercised his option for the whole amount he could not be allowed to execute the decree for instalments. This circumstance does not exist in the case before me, and, I am of opinion that a decree-holder cannot be deemed to have abandoned his rights under the order for instalments and elected to rely on the default clause unless there is clear proof of his having done so. 10. In this view of the matter, I allow the appeal with costs, set aside the order of the lower appellate Court and hold that the application for execution was within time. I remand the case back to the learned District Judge for disposing of appeal on other points. Appeal allowed.