JUDGMENT : This is defendant's second appeal against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Gwalior, who dismissing the appeal of the defendant confirmed the decree of the trial court. The facts of the case briefly are that Sardar Madhorao Falke filed a suit against premrao alias Hashmutulla and Mst. Basantibai in the Court of Sub-Judge, Lashkar. The plaint alleges that Hashmatulla defendant No.1's mother Mst. Chatro was in the keeping of plaintiff's father Sardar Ramrao Falke. She had a son by Sardar Ramrao Falke who is defendant No.1 Hashmatulla, that Ramrao Falke gave two houses Nos.3/5 and 4/511 to Mst. Chatro for use, that after the death of Mst. Chatro defendant No.1 continued to be in possession of these houses by permission, that on 1-4-32 defendant No.1 executed a usufructuary mortgage of house No.3/5 for RS.2500/-in favour of Basantibai defendant No.2. On these allegations the plaintiff prays for a declaration of title and for declaring the mortgage deed void as against the plaintiff and also for the possession of the house. The suit was decreed both by the trial court and the first appellate court. Hence Mst. Chandani Begam who is the daughter of Hashamatulla original defendant No.1 has filed this appeal. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant has raised two points before me. The first point is that issue No.2 has been wrongly decided in favour of the plaintiff and the second is that the suit is time barred. Issue No.2 is as follows : In order to support the claim of the plaintiff that the suit house belongs to the plaintiff, plaintiff has produced both documentary and oral evidence. Documentary evidence consists of the following documents: (1) Patta Parmat, dated 12-4-1897. (2) Teharir written by Lele dated 4-2-91. (3) Receipt by Bihari Thekedar. (4) Teharir by the defendant dated 4-11-14. (5) Copy of the order passed by the Home Member, Gwalior Government, dated 5-9-29. (6) Statement by Shankarrao Bhujang. (7) Statement by Dattraya Lonkar. (On consideration of Patta Parmat his Lordship held that it related to the house in dispute and proceeded:) 3-4. Teharir Municipality signed by Mr. Lele dated 4-2-91 states that Rs.2123-2-0 have been duly received and that orders have been issued to the Overseer to hand over the three shops and the land in Patankar Bazar. It appears from the papers that actually the house was purchased in 1891. Teharir Municipality signed by Mr. Lele dated 4-2-91 states that Rs.2123-2-0 have been duly received and that orders have been issued to the Overseer to hand over the three shops and the land in Patankar Bazar. It appears from the papers that actually the house was purchased in 1891. But the Patta was given in 1897. The counsel for the appellant contends that this Teharir has not been proved according to law. Under Section 90 of the Evidence Act a document 30 years old produced from proper custody and otherwise free from suspicions proves itself and no evidence of the handwriting, signature, sealing or delivery need in general be given. There is no doubt that the document purports to be 30 years old and that it is produced from proper custody. No circumstances have been pointed out to suspect its genuineness. There is no reason, therefore, why a presumption may not be drawn under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. Besides the presumption is rebuttable. No evidence has been produced by the defendant. In - 'Har Prasad v. Bikramajitsingh', 61 Ind Cas 959 (Oudh) it has been held that the question whether a presumption under Section 90 should or should not be raised is primarily a question for the trial court. It has also been held in several cases that the appellate court will not interfere unless the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely or without due consideration of relevant facts and circumstances of the case. Vide - 'Special Manager, Court of Wards, Baframpur v. Tribeni Prasad', 154 Ind Cas 965 (Oudh) and - 'Gomti Mt. v. Meghraj Singh', AIR 1933 All 443. It has not been shown that the lower court has exercised its discretion without due consideration of the facts or circumstances of the case. I, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the discretion exercised by the lower court. The objection raised with regard to the proof . of the Teharir dated 4-2-91, therefore, cannot be accepted. (His Lordship after considering other evidence held that the house in dispute was the property of the plaintiff and proceeded :) 5-7. Turning now to the second aspect of issue No.2, that is, whether the plaintiff's father gave the house in dispute to the mother of the defendant No.1 for use, it must be admitted that there is no direct proof of license. Turning now to the second aspect of issue No.2, that is, whether the plaintiff's father gave the house in dispute to the mother of the defendant No.1 for use, it must be admitted that there is no direct proof of license. But license can be presumed from the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. (His Lordship after considering the evidence held that the house in dispute was given to Mst. Chatro for use only and proceeded:) 8. The second point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the suit is time barred. The first question to consider in this connection is whether article 142 applies to the case or article 144. From the facts already found it is clear that the defendant was in permissive possession of the property. Article 142 applies where the plaintiff being in possession is either dispossessed or discontinues his possession .A person can be said to be dispossessed or to discontinue his possession only when another person enters on the property in the possession of the plaintiff and such entry is adverse to the plaintiff. Where the plaintiff is in possession and the defendant has entered on the property but his entry is under a right derived from the plaintiff or is permissive it cannot be said that the entry itself is in contravention of the plaintiffs title, though by reason of subsequent events his possession may become adverse to the plaintiff. Adverse possession means hostile possession, that is, possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Where possession which is permissive to begin with, becomes adverse to the plaintiff by some act of the defendant article 144 would apply and not article 142. In - 'Zainuddin Hossain v. Muhammad Abdur Rahim', AIR 1933 Cal 102 their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court held as follows : "In the present ease there was no transfer of any interest in immovable property at all but only permission to reside in the premises, and so there was no dispossession, not any discontinuance of possession on the part of the plaintiff, notwithstanding the permission, such possession as the grantor of the leave or license could have, he had in the premises. It has also been argued that the defendants and their predecessors acquired by virtue of adverse possession for over twelve years a limited interest, namely, a right to reside which could not be defeated. One amongst several answers to this contention is that there was never any such right asserted adversely to the plaintiff at any time before the solicitor's letter Ex. C. In our opinion the article applicable to the case is article 144 of the Act and time began to run only after the plaintiff's right to Khas possession was denied......" The same view has been expressed in - 'Jaichand v. Girwarsingh', 41 All 669. In the present case from the facts found above, it is clear that the defendant was in permissive possession .His first act which makes his possession adverse to the plaintiff is the execution of the mortgage deed on 1-4-32. The case, therefore, clearly attracts article 144 of the Limitation Act and the period of limitation of twelve years began to run from 1-4-32 when the possession of the defendant became adverse to the plaintiff. The suit was filed on 12-8-36. The suit is, therefore, clearly within time. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has raised a further contention that Sardar Ramrao Falke died in 1914. Hence license terminated on his death and the defendant's possession after his death became adverse to the plaintiff. It is true that Sardar Ramrao died in 1914. But from the facts as they appear on record, it is evident that the plaintiff impliedly gave permission to the defendant to use the house as before. Hashmatulla states in his deposition that Ajgarli, who was in the service of the plaintiff, used to realise the rent of the house in dispute and utilize it to meet his expenses. The fact that an officer of the Sansthan was allowed to realize the rent and spend it over the defendant testifies that the plaintiff had given implied permission to the defendant to use the house. The order of the Home Member dated 5-9-29 also supports the same conclusion. Rental of the house was treated as an allowance from the Sansthan to the defendant. From the same order it also appears that the plaintiff's Sansthan defrayed the expenses of the marriage of defendant's daughter. The order of the Home Member dated 5-9-29 also supports the same conclusion. Rental of the house was treated as an allowance from the Sansthan to the defendant. From the same order it also appears that the plaintiff's Sansthan defrayed the expenses of the marriage of defendant's daughter. Taking all these facts into consideration there is no doubt in my mind that the plaintiff gave implied permission to the defendant to use the house as before. In these circumstances the defendant's possession after the death of Sardar Ramrao Falke does not become adverse to the plaintiff. As already stated defendant's possession became adverse on 1-4-32, the day on which he executed the mortgage deed. The result is that the contention of the appellant that the suit is time barred fails. 10. For the reasons given above the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.