ORDER : This is defendant's revision against judgment and decree of the District Judge, Gwalior, who dismissing her appeal confirmed the decision of both the lower courts. The facts of the case briefly are as follows. One Kalyan executed a sale deed of a house in favour of Mannomal on 24-1-24. Kalyan executed a rent note and continued to live in the same house. As rent was not paid for considerable period, Mannomal filed a suit for ejectment and for arrears of rent. That suit was decreed on 8-5-31. During the pendency of the suit, Kalyan died. Hence Mannomal executed the decree against Mst. Sasso and obtained possession of the house. This house was sold by Mst. Sasso to Sushila Devi on 22-1-32. Sushila Devi filed an objection under S. 342, Gwalior Code of Civil Procedure corresponding to O. 21, R. 100 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code. That objection was upheld and Mst. Sushila Devi was put in possession of the house on 2-3-33. The decree-holder filed a revision petition in the Gwalior High Court, which was dismissed on 9-1-35. Hence Mannomal filed the present suit for a declaration that the sale deed of 22-1-32 in favour of Sushila Devi is void and also for the possession of the house. That suit was decreed by all the lower courts. Hence the defendant has filed this revision. 2. The learned counsel for the applicant has raised two points before me. The first is that the suit is time barred and the second is that a part of issue No. 1 (in respect of ownership) has been wrongly decided. The second point can be disposed of on a short ground that in a revision no objection can be raised regarding erroneous appreciation of evidence. It is not contended by the applicant that the lower courts have decided the question of ownership in favour of Kalyan without any evidence. But the contention of the applicant is that it is against the weight of evidence that Kalyan has been found to be the owner of the suit house. The question regarding appreciation of evidence cannot be raised in revision; because it is not a question which affects jurisdiction. But the contention of the applicant is that it is against the weight of evidence that Kalyan has been found to be the owner of the suit house. The question regarding appreciation of evidence cannot be raised in revision; because it is not a question which affects jurisdiction. In 'APPU PILLAI v. NATARAJA PILLAI', AIR 1930 Mad 225 (2), it has been held that in a suit in an election dispute High Court cannot interfere in revision with the lower court's order on grounds which involve nothing more nor less than appreciation of evidence, and decide for itself on the question of fact, whether the votes were valid or not valid; the High Court has to confine itself to the question of jurisdiction only. Similar view was expressed in 'In re : KRISHNASWAMI IYER', AIR 1919 Mad 796. In 'GAYA PRASAD v. PARICHHAN SAHU', AIR 1937 Pat 357, Rowland, J., expressed the same view. In 'SAVLARAM GANGARAM v. VISHWANATH AN ANT', AIR 1945 Bom 386, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that a wrong decision by the lower court on a question e.g., whether certain land, in fact, was sold or was wrongly sold which it had jurisdiction to decide, cannot bring the question within the scope of S. 115, Civil P.C. The question is now well settled that erroneous appreciation of evidence cannot be the ground for revision under S. 115, Civil P.C. The point raised by the applicant, therefore, cannot be considered. 3. Turning now to the first point, the contention of the applicant is that the suit should have been filed within one year from the date of the adverse order passed under O. 21, R. 101. Civil P.C. There is no doubt that R. 103 of O. 21 (corresponding to sub-section 4 of S. 342, Gwalior Code of Civil Procedure) expressly provides that subject to the result of any suit the order passed under R. 101 shall be conclusive. But the suit contemplated by R. 103 is a suit to establish the right to the present possession of the property. If that suit is not instituted within one year, which is the period of limitation prescribed, then the adverse order would no doubt be conclusive. But it does not bar a suit which the claimant institutes on a different cause of action. If that suit is not instituted within one year, which is the period of limitation prescribed, then the adverse order would no doubt be conclusive. But it does not bar a suit which the claimant institutes on a different cause of action. If a suit is based on the adverse order passed under R. 101, then it, no doubt, has to be filed within one year which is the period prescribed by Article 11A, Indian Limitation Act (corresponding to Article 2 (a), Gwalior Limitation Act.) But a suit based on some other cause of action is not precluded by R. 103. Order 21. In 'LAKSHMIPATHIRAJU v. VFNKATASWAMI, AIR 1946 Mad 324 , it was held that if the title which was put forward as the basis of a suit was the same as the title which was put forward in execution proceedings as the basis for an order in a party's favour, then O. 21, R. 103 would be a bar; but not otherwise. In 'RUKHMABAI DATUSA v. FAKIRS A. HANMANTSA', AIR 1927 Bom 184, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held as follows: "Where the basis of the claim in the suit is the same as that put forward in the miscellaneous objection proceedings to the present possession, Art. 11-A would apply; but where the basis of the claim in the suit is distinct and different and the possession claimed is not present possession but only by way of consequential relief to the decree being set aside, the Article cannot apply." 4. Examining now the present suit in the light of this proposition, I find that the basis of the suit is entirely different from the basis of the claim put forward in the objection proceedings. In the objection proceedings Mannomal was executing his decree for ejectment. Basis of the claim put forward in the objection proceedings was the decree for ejectment and for arrears. In the present suit the plaintiff prays for a declaration that the sale-deed dated 21-1-1932 in favour of Sushila Devi be declared to be void and inoperative; and as a consequential relief he prays for the possession of the house. Consequently R. 103, O. 21 (corresponding to sub-s. 4 of S. 342, Gwalior Civil P. C.), is no bar to the present suit. The suit is governed by Art. 30 or 53, Gwalior Limitation Act. Consequently R. 103, O. 21 (corresponding to sub-s. 4 of S. 342, Gwalior Civil P. C.), is no bar to the present suit. The suit is governed by Art. 30 or 53, Gwalior Limitation Act. In both cases, the suit is within time. The contention raised by the applicant, therefore, cannot be accepted. 5. For the reasons given above, the revision is dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.