Wanchoo, C.J.—This is an appeal by Ramsingh against his conviction under sec. 302 of the Jaipur Penal Code and sentence of life imprisonment. The case has been reported for confirmation of the sentence because under the law of the former Jaipur State, a sentence of imprisonment for life had to be confirmed by the High Court. 2. The prosecution story was briefly this. The deceased Mst. Sia Dulari was the wife of the appellant. She was married to the appellant about four years before the incident took place on the 17th of May I949. She was then about fifteen years old. It is said that the relations between the appellant and his wife were strained because her father used to take her away often to his house. On the last occasion she had returned from her fathers house about eight days before the 17th of May 1949. Her father again came to take her away on the 26th of May and she then made some complaint to him against her husband. This had led to a quarrel between the appellants father and the father of the deceased. This annoyed the appellant and consequently, it is said that he murdered her on the morning of the 17th of May 1949 by stabbing her with a dagger. Thereafter, the appellant himself went to the Thana and made a report of the incident. This is Ex. P. 13. The police immediately arrested the appellant and took up investigation of the case. The condition of the appellant when he arrived at the Thana to make the first report has been described by Sub-Inspector Ramzan Ali. Both the appellants hands were smeared with blood. He was putting on two Dhoties one above the other and the Dhoti which was next to the skin was saturated with blood. There was also an injury on the right knee of the appellant and the blood on his hands and clothes appeared to be fresh. The Sub-Inspector took possession of the blood-stained Dhoti and prepared a recovery list. Thereafter, the appellant was taken to his house where the dead body of his wife was found in a room in the upper story. There were several wounds on the dead body and fresh blood was lying on the floor. An inquest report was prepared then and there. Thereafter, the appellant was taken to his house where the dead body of his wife was found in a room in the upper story. There were several wounds on the dead body and fresh blood was lying on the floor. An inquest report was prepared then and there. The Sub-Inspector also found a sheath of a dagger lying near the head of the dead body. The clothes which the deceased was wearing were also taken in possession and sealed and sent later for examination by the Chemical Examiner. Mst. Sarju, P.W. 1, produced a dagger and that was also taken in possession as it was supposed to be the instrument by which the murder had been committed and was blood-stained. 3. On the 20th of May 1949 the appellant was produced in the court of Pt. Jagdish Narain Sharma, Assistant City Magistrate, Jaipur, early in the morning which would be about 7 A.M. The Magistrate took him out of police custody and put him in the judicial lock up. Thereafter, he was sent for at about 11. 25. A.M. and bis confession Ex. P. 4 was recorded. There was no eye-witness of the murder and the appellant has been sent up for trial on the basis of circumstantial evidence and his own confession which he later retracted. 4. The appellant pleaded not guilty. He admitted that he had gone to the police to make a report but said that he had found his wife lying dead and had, therefore, gone to inform the police. He said at the Thana that his wife was lying dead and that the matter should be enquired into. The police, however, arrested and took him to his house. The body of his wife was then sent to the hospital and he was taken back to the Kotwali and the police asked him who had killed his wife. He replied that he did not know. Then they began to beat him and he was told that if he confessed, he would be saved. He, however, refused to make a confession. Thereupon, he was beaten mercilessly for some time. Then the beating was stopped for two hours. Thereafter, he was again given a severe beating and was told that if he did not confess, he would be beaten still more. So in order to avoid further beating, he confessed and signed the first report Ex. Thereupon, he was beaten mercilessly for some time. Then the beating was stopped for two hours. Thereafter, he was again given a severe beating and was told that if he did not confess, he would be beaten still more. So in order to avoid further beating, he confessed and signed the first report Ex. P 1 which, in effect, amounts to a confession. Further, the appellant denied that he was putting on two Dhoties at the time when he went to the police station. He also denied that the Dhoti Ex. P. 4 which had been taken from his person and which was saturated with blood belonged to him. He also denied that his wife had made any complaint against him to her father on the previous day. He admitted having made the confession Ex. P. 13 before the Magistrate but said that he had made that confession because of the inducement offered to him by the police As for the injury on his knee, he said that it had been caused because of his having fallen down on the Khura (pavement). No evidence was produced in defence. 5. It is thus clear that there is no direct evidence of eye-witnesses in the present case and the guilt or otherwise of the appellant has to be decided on circumstantial evidence and the confession that he has made. Before, however, we deal in detail with the evidence available, we should like to consider certain points of law which have been raised on behalf of the appellant. The first point that has been urged is that the appellant was given no opportunity 10 produce defence and was not questioned either in the court of the committing Magistrate or before the Sessions Judge whether he would like to produce defence. It is, therefore, urged that as a mandatory provision of the law has not been complied with, the trial is vitiated. 6. There is no doubt that the committing Magistrate did not ask the appellant whether he would produce defence. Sec. 210 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for the framing of the charge. Then comes sec. 211 which lays down that the accused shall be required atonce to give in orally or in writing, a list of the persons (if any) whom he wishes to be summoned to give evidence on his trial. Sec. 210 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for the framing of the charge. Then comes sec. 211 which lays down that the accused shall be required atonce to give in orally or in writing, a list of the persons (if any) whom he wishes to be summoned to give evidence on his trial. There is also provision for a further list being given by the accused but this depends upon the discretion of the Magistrate. In view of the provision of sec. 211 (1) it is the duty of the Magistrate to ask atonce the accused to give a list of his witnesses and the list may be given either orally or in writing. It appears that this provision was not complied with in this case and the accused does not appear to have been asked to give a list of his defence witnesses. The order-sheet of the 5th September 1949 in the committing Magistrates Court shows that the charge was framed on that day and the accused wanted to produce defence in the committing Magistrates Court and consequently, the 7th of September was fixed. The order-sheet of the 7th of September, however, does not say anything on this point and merely states that the accused was being committed to the court of Sessions. It may, however, be mentioned that the appellant was throughout represented by a Lawyer in the committing Magistrates Court and his lawyer also made no attempt to put in a list of defence witnesses. 7. When the case came to the Sessions Court, the Sessions Judge did not ask the appellant whether he wanted to produce defence. The note of the Sessions Judge in this connection is this:—"Accused has not named any witnesses before the Magistrate. He has no right now to have the witnesses summoned." Our attention has been drawn to sec. 289 (1) in this connection which provides that after the examination of the witnesses for the prosecution and the examination (if any) of the accused are concluded, the accused shall be asked whether he means to adduce any evidence. Further, sec. 291 provides that the accused shall be allowed to examine any witness not previously named by him, if such witness is in attendance but he shall not, except as provided in sec. Further, sec. 291 provides that the accused shall be allowed to examine any witness not previously named by him, if such witness is in attendance but he shall not, except as provided in sec. 211 and 231, be entitled of right to have any witness summoned other than the witnesses named in the list delivered to the Magistrate by whom he was committed for trial. It appears from the proceedings before the Sessions Judge that there was some question about defence, though there was no strict compliance sec. 289 (1) by the Sessions Judge. It appears that the accused was represented by counsel in the Sessions Court also throughout but no application was made by counsel under sec. 292 to the effect that witnesses were present and should be examined or that in view of the fact that the accused was not asked to give a list in the committing Magistrates Court, he should be permitted, in the interest of justice, to summon witnesses in the Sessions Court, 8. A review of these facts shows that there was technically no compliance with the (provisions of sec. 211 by the committing Magistrate and sec. 289 (1) by the Sessions Judge. It is, in our opinion, essential that the committing Magistrate should always question the accused whether he means to adduce any evidence and ask him either to give a list of his witnesses orally or produce a written list. It is also essential that the Sessions Judge should ask the accused whether he means to adduce any evidence as provided in sec. 289 (I). The question, however, still remains whether a trial becomes vitiated because these sections are not strictly complied with. We are of opinion that this is a mere irregularity in the proceedings and is covered by sec. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and unless it can be shown that the omission has in fact occasioned a failure of justice, the trial, cannot be vitiated. 9. We, therefore, turn to the question whether in this particular case it can be said that the -omission to put this question has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and unless it can be shown that the omission has in fact occasioned a failure of justice, the trial, cannot be vitiated. 9. We, therefore, turn to the question whether in this particular case it can be said that the -omission to put this question has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. It seems to us that considering that the appellant was represented throughout both in the committing Magistrates Court and in the Sessions Judges Court and the omission to, put the question about defence is not so serious and that if the appellant had really any defence to offer, his counsel must have either in one court or in the other insisted on the right which the appellant had under sec. 211 or under sec. 291 Cr. P. C. The very fact, that counsel never tried to produce a list of witnesses shows that the accused really had no witnesses to produce. Nor does this appear to us to be a case in which much good could have been done to the accused by the production of defence evidence on his behalf, the case depending practically on circumstantial evidence. We may also point out that in the grounds of appeal to this court which the appellant sent from Jail, he makes no grievances of the fact that he was not questioned whether he would produce defence. Further, he does not suggest that he wanted to produce defence evidence and the Sessions Court shut him out from doing so. Under these circumstances, we are of opinion that no prejudice has been caused to the appellant and the sentence cannot be reversed on this ground alone. 10. We now turn to the second point that has been urged on behalf of the appellant and it relates to the first information report. As we have already pointed out, this report was made by the appellant himself and contains his confession of guilt. The argument of learned counsel is that as such this report is completely inadmissible under sec. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, which provides that no confession made to a Police-Officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. First information reports are reduced to writing under sec. The argument of learned counsel is that as such this report is completely inadmissible under sec. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, which provides that no confession made to a Police-Officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. First information reports are reduced to writing under sec. 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and are admitted in evidence as they are not statements to a Police Officer in the course of any investigation, which begins after the first information report has been made. A question, however, arises whether those first information reports which contain a confession of the accused should be completely ruled out in view of sec. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. The first authority on the subject is Dalsingh vs. King Emperor (A. I. R. 1917 P. C. 25). In that the question arose whether all first information reports made by accused persons were inadmissible in evidence. That was a case in which the accused was tried for the murder of another mans wife and for injuring that man with an axe. It was also said that that mans brother had beaten the accused in return with a lathi. The accused went to the police and made a report that he had been beaten by that man and his brother and, therefore, he was making the report. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that all reports made to the police by the accused were not inadmissible and that that particular report was admissible because it did not amount to a confession. The principle, therefore, which was laid down in this case was that such first information reports which did not amount to a confession were admissible in evidence even if they were made by an accused. 11. The next case to which we may refer is Emperor vs. Lalit Mohansingh Roy (A.I.R. 1921 Cal. III). In that case, the accused had committed murder and went and made a report at the Police Station in which he confessed to the murder. The question then arose whether the whole report was inadmissible or only that part of it which was in the nature of a confession. The learned Judges held that the preliminary portions of the first information report giving a history or narrative of events preceding the night of occurrence were admissible as statements not being confessions. The question then arose whether the whole report was inadmissible or only that part of it which was in the nature of a confession. The learned Judges held that the preliminary portions of the first information report giving a history or narrative of events preceding the night of occurrence were admissible as statements not being confessions. They also pointed out that the principle that portions of a statement or confession might be admitted and others excluded was recognized in the Indian Evidence Act itself vide sec. 27 12. The next case to which refe-rence may be made is Pakala Narayana Swami vs. Emperor (A.I.R. 1939 P. C. 47). This case does not deal directly with the point before us but has explained the meaning of the word "confession" in the following words at page 52: — "In their Lordships view no statement that contains self exculpatory matter can amount to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which if true would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. Moreover, a confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate subsequently all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact is not of itself a confession, e. g. an admission that the accused is the owner of and was in recent possession of the knife or revolver which caused a death with no explanation of any other mans possession." 13. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on certain cases to which we may now refer. The first of these is Harji and another vs. Emperor (A.I.R. 1918 Lah. 69). That was case of murder and the report had been made by one of the accused, Hira. The learned Judges were of the view that a first report was generally very valuable corroborative evidence of the testimony of the person who made it but where it was made by an accused, it was not admissible in evidence at all and constituted no corroboration either of the case against himself or of that against any other co-accused. No reference, however, was made in this case to any other authority and there is no reasoning in support of the view that the entire first information report made by an accused is inadmissible in evidence. 14. No reference, however, was made in this case to any other authority and there is no reasoning in support of the view that the entire first information report made by an accused is inadmissible in evidence. 14. The next case is Harnam Kishna vs. Emperor (A. I. R. 1935 Bom. 26). This was also a murder case in which the first information report had been made by the accused. The learned Judges were of the view that if the first information report was given by the accused to a Police Officer and that informant admitted his own guilt, it was a confession which sec. 25 did not allow to be proved. If the confession showed opportunity for the offence, motive for the offence, and commission of the offence, it could not be said that the portion of it which dealt with opportunity, or the portion of it which dealt at with motive, could be treated as no part of the confession. The Cal. case which we have referred above was distinguished in this case on the ground that the whole confession dealt with the events occurring on the night of the offence. The learned Judges however, doubted whether the principle on which the Calcutta High Court proceeded in that case could be justified. There was no reference, however, to the Privy Council cases which we have mentioned above. 15. The last case relied upon is Emperor vs. Knmmoji Brahman (A. I. R. 1940 Pat. 163). That was a case of murder and the first report was made by the accused. The learned Judges were of the view that the first information report was inadmissible as it was a confession to the police and as such under sec. 25 Evidence Act, it would not be proved as against the accused. They distinguished the Cal. case we have mentioned above on the ground that there were no parts of the first information report which could be extracted from the rest and said to be relevant in themselves and admissible as not being incriminatory. Their view was that the first information report in the case before them formed a single connected story and no part of it had any meaning or significance except in relation to the whole. Their view was that the first information report in the case before them formed a single connected story and no part of it had any meaning or significance except in relation to the whole. They thought it would, therefore, be wrong to extract fragments from it in which the accused did not make any self-incriminating statement, for, there were no such fragments which in themselves had any relevance or significance. 16. On a careful consideration of these authorities, we are of opinion that the entire first information report is not inadmissible in evidence merely because it has been made by an accused person. Parts of it which can be properly separated from the confess* ing part can be and should be admitted in evidence as first information. The view taken by the Cal. High Court in the case mentioned above appears, if we may say so with all respect, to be sound and in consonance with the view enunciated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in (A I. R. 1917 P. C. 25). Where, therefore, it is possible properly to separate parts of the first information report by an accused from that in which he had made a confession, that part which can be so separated should be admitted in evidence. It is with these principles in mind that we turn to the first information report made by the appellant in this case. We are of opinion that the following portion of the report can be properly separated from the portion which amounts to a confession and should be admitted in evidence, namely — "About four years back Mst. Sia Dulari, the daughter of Phulji, was married to me. She was of fourteen or fifteen years of age. I have had resentment against her for she would not learn the printing work that I wanted to teach her. She was taken away frequently and without my consent by her father owing , to which I had to cook my food several times. She had come to me only eight days back and again her father came to take her away. She made a complaint to her father against me which led to a voilent quarrel between my father and that of hers............... .....................I have left hear lying wounded and breathing in the tibari and there is no hope of her surviving. She had come to me only eight days back and again her father came to take her away. She made a complaint to her father against me which led to a voilent quarrel between my father and that of hers............... .....................I have left hear lying wounded and breathing in the tibari and there is no hope of her surviving. I. have come here having covered her with a cloth. The dagger is also lying by her. Hence I lodge this report". 17. The next point that has been urged on behalf of the appellant relates to the confession that he made before the Magistrate. The learned counsel urges that this confession should be ruled out because questions which ought to have been put to the appellant before the Magistrate recorded the confession in order that he may be satisfied that it was voluntary were not put to the appellant. Our attention is drawn to the provisions of sec. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in this connection. Sub-sec. (3) of that section reads as follows : — "A magistrate shall, before recording any such concession, explain to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that if he does so it may be used as evidence against him and no Magistrate shall record any such confession unless, upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to believe that it was made voluntarily; and, when he records any confession, he shall make a memorandum at the foot of such record to the following effect : —" 18. The learned counsel urges that this sub-section requires three things : (1) a warning that the accused is not bound to make a confession, (2) a further warning that if he does so, it will be used against him, and, (3) it is the duty of the Magistrate before he records any confession to question the person making it to satisfy himself that it was made voluntarily. 19. Reliance in this connection was placed on Emperor vs. Kammoji Brahman (A.I.R. 1940 Pat. 163) to which we have already referred. While dealing with the third of these conditions, the learned Judges were of the view that it was not necessary that the questions must be in any special form, but there must be some question or questions designed to reveal whether the statement was being made voluntarily. 163) to which we have already referred. While dealing with the third of these conditions, the learned Judges were of the view that it was not necessary that the questions must be in any special form, but there must be some question or questions designed to reveal whether the statement was being made voluntarily. Where there was no question asked to reveal whether the statement was voluntary, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to record a confession and, therefore, a confession recorded without asking any question to reveal its voluntary nature was inadmissible. We respectfully agree that it is the duty of the Magistrate before he records a confession to question the accused in order to satisfy himself that the confession is being made voluntarily and if no questions are put besides giving the two warnings, namely, (1) that the accused was not bound to make a confession and (2) that if he did so, it would be used in evidence against him, the confession would not be admissible in evidence as the mandatory provision of sec. 164 (3) would not be complied with. We have, however, to see what the Magistrate did in this regard. He told the appellant that there was no police pressure and inducement on him to make the confession and also asked him whether he was making the confession voluntarily. It. is thus clear in this case that besides giving the formal warning contemplated by sec. 164 (3) Cr. P. C. the Magistrate did put a few more questions in order to satisfy himself that the confession was being made voluntarily. What the value of these questions is will be considered by us later, But the confession cannot be ruled out on the ground that no questions were put and there was thus a breach of sec. 164 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The confession in this case will, therefore, have to be admitted and we shall later consider whether taking all the circumstances into account, it can be relied upon. 20. Another point that is urged in connection with this confession is that the Magistrate did not warn the appel-lant that he was not bound to make a confession and as such the confession is inadmissible in evidence. It appears from a perusal of the confession Ex. 20. Another point that is urged in connection with this confession is that the Magistrate did not warn the appel-lant that he was not bound to make a confession and as such the confession is inadmissible in evidence. It appears from a perusal of the confession Ex. P. 4 that the Magistrate did not tell the accused in the negative form that he was not bound to make a confession. What the Magistrate said to the accused was that he was quite free to depose voluntarily whatever he liked. In effect, these words mean the same thing, namely, that he was not bound to make a confession though they were put in the positive form. We may in this connection refer to sec, 29 of the Evidence Act which provides that if a confession is otherwise relevant, it does not become irrelevant merely because the accused was not warned that he was not bound to make a confession. Thus sec. 29 provides that even if the warning was not given in the negative form, the confession would be admissible provided, of course, the court was satisfied that the accused knew that he was not bound to make a confession. In this case, the Magistrate told the accused that he was free to say whatever he liked and we think that that amounts to a sufficient warning and that sec. 29 of the Evidence Act makes the statement admissible in evidence. It may also be mentioned that in the certificate, the Magistrate has said that he explained to the accused that he Was not bound to make a confession. We may in this connection refer to the case of Emperor vs. Nanua (A.I.R. 1941 All. 145) where it was held that although the Magistrate had not complied fully with sec. 164 Cr. P. C, that is, he had not before recording the confession, warned the person making it that he was not bound to make it, the defect was not fatal in view of sec. 29, Evidence Act, and did not make the statement irrelevant. The same view was taken in an earlier Ail. case Emperor vs. Lal-singh (I.L.R. LX All. 875) and by the Madras High Court in Re Vellamoonji Goundan (I.L.R. LV Mad. 711). We respectfully agree with it and hold that the confession is therefore admissible. 21. 29, Evidence Act, and did not make the statement irrelevant. The same view was taken in an earlier Ail. case Emperor vs. Lal-singh (I.L.R. LX All. 875) and by the Madras High Court in Re Vellamoonji Goundan (I.L.R. LV Mad. 711). We respectfully agree with it and hold that the confession is therefore admissible. 21. The next point that has been urged is with reference to the Chemical Examiners report. The two dhoties and one langot which the accused was wearing when he appeared at the Police Station the knife and the sheath were sent to the Chemical Examiner for report. The Chemical Examiner reported that ail these articles were stained with blood but he could not say whether the blood was human or otherwise. Learned counsel urges that under sec. 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court may use in evidence the report of the Chemical Examiner but is not bound to do so. In this case the Chemical Examiner has not mentioned in his report what tests he used to find out that the articles sent to him were stained with blood. He, therefore, submits that the report should be discarded. Reliance was placed in this connection on Mst. Gojrani and another vs. Emperor (A. I. R. 1933 All. 394), in which it was held that the Chemical Examiner must state the grounds at which he arrives at his opinion. As he merely tendered a report and did not appear and give evidence, it was extremely desirable that the report should be full and complete and take the place of evidence which he would give if he were called to court as a witness. It may however, be pointed out that the report was not rejected in that case. 22. The next case that is relied upon is Happu vs. Emperor (A. I. R. 1933 All. 837). That was a case of arsenic poison and the learned Judges were of the view that the Chemical Examiner must prove by his evidence that two grains of arsenic were administered to the deceased before death. They also referred to the curious provisions of sec. 837). That was a case of arsenic poison and the learned Judges were of the view that the Chemical Examiner must prove by his evidence that two grains of arsenic were administered to the deceased before death. They also referred to the curious provisions of sec. 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which gave a dispensation to the Chemical Examiner and were of opinion that where a mans life was in the balance, it was a matter of consideration whether the Sessions Court should not, whenever it was of opinion that such action was necessary for the ends of justice, exercise its right to call the Chemical Examiner so that he may be examined on oath and be subjected to cross-examination. It was pointed out that the word in sec. 510 was "may" and not "shall" and it was, therefore, clear that a court had a discretion in the matter. 23. In this connection we may refer to the case of Emperor vs. Bachcha (A. I. R. 1934 All. 873). The judgment in that case is by Collister, J. who was also party to the case of Happu, He then held that where neither the accused nor his counsel objected to the admission of the Chemical Examiners report and did not request that the Chemical Examiner be called for and put into the witnesses box, the report of the Chemical Examiner was admissible in evidence. We agree that it is necessary that the Chemical Examiner should mention the kind of tests he has used and also give the grounds of his opinion. But where, as in this case, the report has been admitted without any objection by the accused or his counsel, it is too late in the day to rule out that report as inadmissible now. 24. We now turn to the evidence in this case. The main evidence against the appellant is only retracted confession which he made on the 20th of May 1949. He stated therein that he was married about four years ago and his wife began visiting his house for the last two years and a half. But she used to stay at his house for a few days and then remain for a few months at her fathers house. This resulted in difficulties and the appellant had to cook his own food. But she used to stay at his house for a few days and then remain for a few months at her fathers house. This resulted in difficulties and the appellant had to cook his own food. Further, the appellants wife did not use to listen to him and used to complain to her parents against him. This was a constant source of annoyance to him and he was very displeased with his wife. On the day previous to the murder, the deceaseds father had come to their house and she had complained to him and there had been a quarrel between the appellants father and the deceaseds father in that connection. Thereafter, the appellants father cried before the appellant and asked him why he was behaving in that way. This annoyed the appellant very much as he thought that his wife had made a complaint against him without any reason. He, therefore, decided to kill his wife and put the knife in an almirah for that purpose. He also did not speak to his wife on that day. Next morning, after his wife had cooked food and his father had gone away to ease himself, he took his wife to the room upstairs. Then he made her lie down and took out a knife. She began to cry and tried to come down. Thereupon, he attacked her with the knife repeatedly six or seven times and came down. He got an injury on the knee by accident. Then he covered himself up with another dhoti and went to the kotwali and made a report. 25. As we have already mentioned, the appellant retracted this confession in court and we have to see whether this confession was made voluntarily and is true. Learned counsel has attacked the voluntary nature of the confession on a number of grounds. In the first place, it is urged that the accused was in police custody when he was presented before the Magistrate and after the confession had been recorded, he was given back to police custody and was sent to jail only on the 21st of May 1949. It does appear that the appellant was all along in police custody before he was taken to the Magistrate for recording his confession. It does appear that the appellant was all along in police custody before he was taken to the Magistrate for recording his confession. But it appears from the Magistrates report of the confession that the accused was allowed time for about 4 hours to think over before the Migistrate recorded his confession. Thereafter, the Magistrate explained to him that he was entirely free to make whatever statement he liked and that if he made any statement, it would be given in evidence against him. The appellant had thus been removed from police influence for a sufficiently long period before the Magistrate began recording his confession and it cannot, therefore, be said that the confession which he made, after this time had been allowed to him to think over, was not voluntary. 26. The next point that is urged is that the Magistrate did not take sufficient precautions to satisfy himself that the confession was being made voluntarily. It appears, however, that the Magistrate gave the usual warnings and told the appellant that he was entirely free to state whatever he liked and that any statement that he might make would be given in evidence against him. Besides this, the Magistrate told him that he need not consider himself under police pressure and that he should not rely on any inducement offered to him by the police. The appellant was further told that if he made any statement, he could be convicted on that statement. It does appear, therefore, that the Magistrate tried to satisfy himself that the appellant was not making the confession on account of any pressure or inducement by the police and he had also warned the appellant that he might be convicted on his own confession. On the whole, therefore, it cannot be said that the Magistrate did not question the accused generally in order to satisfy himself that the confession was being made voluntarily. There is nothing to show that the allegation of the appellant that he had been beaten by the police again and again in order to make him confess is correct. No mark of any injury of any kind was found on the person of the appellant when he was brought to the Magistrate or when he was admitted to the jail next day. No mark of any injury of any kind was found on the person of the appellant when he was brought to the Magistrate or when he was admitted to the jail next day. We are, therefore, not prepared to accept his allegation that he was beaten in order to compell him to make the confession and that he made the confession merely to avoid further beating. On a! careful consideration, therefore, of the circumstances in which this confession was recorded, we are of opinion that it was a voluntary confession and it had not been made under any pressure or inducement by the police. As a matter of fact, the appellant does not allege "even that there was any inducement by the police. His case is that he was compelled to make the statement because he was beaten and this we do not believe to be true. 27. The next question that arises then is whether this confession is true. The confession (as it reads appears to us to be quite natural and might have been made by a person who was fed up with his wife and therefore, killed her. Further it has in our opinion, been corroborated in material particulars by the circumstantial evidence that is available. In this confession, the appellant has said that he and his wife had both taken their food upstairs where she was killed. The post-mortem report shows that about a pound of partly digested food material was found in the stomach of the deceased, thus corroborating the appellants statement that his wife had taken her food shortly before the murder. Then there is the fact that when the appellant appeared in the thana, the dhoti which he was wearing was saturated with blood as stated by Sub-Inspector Ramzanali. His hands were also smeared with blood. The dhoti was taken in possession at the Police Station and has been found to be smeared with blood though the Chemical Examiner was not able to say whether it was human blood. The appellant, of course, has denied that his dhoti was taken in possession at the Police Station, but there is no reason to disbelieve the statement of Sub-Inspector Ramzanali. Mahadeo was called at the thana when the dhoti was taken in possession and he has also stated that it was saturated with blood. There is no reason to disbelieve his evidence either. Mahadeo was called at the thana when the dhoti was taken in possession and he has also stated that it was saturated with blood. There is no reason to disbelieve his evidence either. The appellant also states in his confession that he had on another dhoti over this one and this fact has also been corroborated by Sub-Inspector Ramzanali and Mahadeo who both say that he was putting on another dhoti over the dhoti which was saturated with blood. Then we find in his confession that he was injured on the knee by accident while stabbing his wife. The evidence shows that when he arrived at the thana, he had an injury on the knee. He was examined by the Doctor at 5 P.M. on the 17th of May and a punctured wound was found on his right knee which appeared to be eight hours old. The Doctor has stated that this wound could have been caused by the point of the knife which is said to have been used to inflict injuries on the deceased. Further, the appellant has stated in his confession that he had left the knife as well as the sheath lying near his wife. Sub-Inspector Ramzanalis evidence is that when he went to the spot, he found the sheath, which he took in possession, lying near the head of the corpse. As for the dagger, the statement of Inspector Rajpal Singh is that it was produced by Mst. Sarju. The evidence of the father of the appellant which he gave in the committing Magistrates Court about this dagger was that he found the bloodstained dagger lying near the dead body and picked it up and asked Mst. Sarju to conceal it and latter, when the police came, Mst. Sarju gave it to them. In the Sessions Court, the appellants father Girdhari went back on this statement but the evidence of Mst. Sarju shows that the statement which Girdhari had made in the committing Magistrates Court must be correct. She says that she was the person who found the deceased lying dead in the room upstairs. She immediately raised an alarm. Thereafter, Girdhari gave her a packet which she put on the shelf. When the police came, she pointed out that but she did not know what the packet contained. She says that she was the person who found the deceased lying dead in the room upstairs. She immediately raised an alarm. Thereafter, Girdhari gave her a packet which she put on the shelf. When the police came, she pointed out that but she did not know what the packet contained. We are of opinion that it was really the dagger which was handed over to the police by Mst, Sarju and she is now avoiding admitting the fact directly, but her evidence does show indirectly that she had given something to the police and it could only have been the dagger. Another witness Lakshminarain, who was called when the police reached the spot, deposes to the seizure of the clothes on the body of the corpse, but he says that he does not recollect if the sheath of the dagger was lying there. Nathulal was another witness who was called when the police arrived at the scene. He said in his examination-in-chief that a blood stained dagger which he identified in court was handed over to the police by Mst. Sarju, but in cross-examination, he made a slight change and said that the dagger was already in the hands of the Police Officer when he came down. There is, however, no reason to disbelieve the evidence of Sub-Inspector Ramzanali and Inspector Rajpal Singh in this connection and we have no doubt that the sheath was recovered near the dead body and the dagger was handed over by Mst. Sarju to whom it had been handed over by the father of the appellant for concealment. 28. The contention of the appellant is that he was away from his house and he found his wife dead when he returned. But the statement of Girdhari, his father, in the committing Magistrates Court was that when he left the house, the appellant was at home doing printing work. In the Sessions Court, of course, Girdhari changed that statement and said that the appellant had gone to the bazar. Bat it seems to us that the statement which Girdhari had made earlier was true and he has changed it now in order to make it appear as if his son was not at home about the time when the murder could have taken place. Bat it seems to us that the statement which Girdhari had made earlier was true and he has changed it now in order to make it appear as if his son was not at home about the time when the murder could have taken place. Lastly, the motive for the attack mentioned in the confession has also been corroborated, in the first place, by the portion of the first report which we have admitted in evidence. Further, there is the evidence of Phoolchand, father-in-law of the appellant, which shows that a day before the incident, he had gone to her daughters place and then she had complained to him that the appellant had been beating and abusing her. He had then asked the appellant why he had been doing so and the appellant said that it was a lie. He had then complained to the father of the appellant who said that the appellant had never beaten his wife in his presence. The evidence, therefore, of this witness also corroborates that part of the confession which shows that there was bad blood between the appellant and his wife and he was particularly annoyed with her on the previous day because of, what he called, her lying complaints to her father. On a careful consideration, therefore, of the entire evidence, we are of the opinion that the confession made by the appellant is true and he is liable to be convicted on that confession even though he has retracted it. 29. Before we leave this case, we would like to point out that the manner in which the Sessions Judge has taken down the statement of the appellant is not satisfactory. The Sessions Judge merely read over the statement made by the appellant in the committing Magistrates Court and asked him whether he had made it. Then he asked the appellant if he had anything more to say and the appellant said "No". This in our opinion, is a most unsatisfactory way of recording the statement of an accused person by a Sessions Judge. It is the duty of the Sessions (fudge to examine the accused in detail and put to him all the circumstances appearing in evidence against him so that he might give such explanation as he might think proper. This in our opinion, is a most unsatisfactory way of recording the statement of an accused person by a Sessions Judge. It is the duty of the Sessions (fudge to examine the accused in detail and put to him all the circumstances appearing in evidence against him so that he might give such explanation as he might think proper. We may in this connection refer to the case of Tarasingh vs. the State (A, I. R. 1951 S.C. 441) where the importance of the examination of an accused person under sec. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been stressed. It has been laid down that it is not a proper compliance to read out a long string of questions and answers made in the committing Court and ask whether the statement is correct. It is not even sufficient compliance to string together a long series of facts and ask the accused what he has to say about them. The accused must be questioned separately about each material circumstance which is intended to be used against him. The questioning must be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or an illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that in view of this unsatisfactory manner in which the appellant was examined, the trial was vitiated. The answer to this argument is also given by this very case where it has been laid down that every error or omission in this behalf does not necessarily vitiate a trial because errors of this type fall within the category of curable irregularities. Therefore, the question in each case depends upon the degree of the error and upon whether prejudice has been occasioned or is likely to have been occasioned. In this case, we are of opinion that no prejudice has been occasioned or likely to be occasioned because the conviction depends upon the belief by the court of the retracted confession of the appellant. 30. There |is no force in this appeal and we hereby dismiss it. The reference is accepted and the sentence is confirmed.