Order.- This Criminal Revision Petition is preferred against the order made by the Additional First Class Magistrate of Kumbakonam in M.C. No. 2 of 1951 directing that the properties involved in S. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, be attached under section 146, Criminal Procedure Code. 2. The short facts are: The question which fell to be considered by the Additional First Class Magistrate was as to who was in possession of S. No. 457/3 after 20th April, 1950, on 9th March, 1951, that is whether the field had come to be in the possession of Veerappa Chettiar or had continued to remain in the possession of Kandaswami Pillai. 3. The learned Additional First Class Magistrate has discussed in paragraph 14 of his judgment the reasons for his inability to be satisfied as to who was in possession of the property. The learned Magistrate after setting out the evidence adduced before him on this point has stated: “The oral evidence let in by both sides to prove possession after 20th April, 1950, is thus unreliable and unworthy of being acted upon. In fact the Sub-Inspector of Police, P.W. 9, stated in. reply to a question from the Court that he had no idea when he asked for orders under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, as to who had raised the crop on the land’and that both parties claimed to have raised that crop.” In other words, the learned Additional First Class Magistrate found that it was a case where the two sides were scrambling for possession and that he was unable on the evidence on record to satisfy himself whether the one party or the other was in effective possession on the crucial date. 4. Jurisdiction to attach arises only when adjudication is impossible, that is to-say when the Magistrate is unable to satisfy himself as to which of the party was-in actual possession. Inability to find must be after full enquiry as has been in this case. See In re Somnath Madhavji1; In re Sanganbasawa2; Neelamegam Pillai v. Mooroogappa Mudali3; In re Mukhoda Dossee4; Sheikh Mansar Ali v. Matiullah5; In re Venkatarama Hedge6; Brigpal Singh v. Ram Naresh Singh7; Parandhamayya v. Virayya8; Joyantikumar Mookerjee v. Middleton9; Thakurcharan Roy v, Shital Chandra Nahor10. This provision is not meant to relieve the magistrate from the duty of deciding on merits and which has not been the case here. This provision is not meant to relieve the magistrate from the duty of deciding on merits and which has not been the case here. There is no obligation on the Magistrate to make independent enquiry if parties given opportunities have not adduced clinching evidence as to possession. (Bengali Parida v. Banchhanidhi11.) There is no such invariable rule that justice must ultimately be done. Cases occur where a matter is left in doubt and real justice is not done. It is inadvisable that in following such a will-o’- the wisp as absolute justice parties should be put to-enormous expense and the time of Magistrate should be wasted (Debi Datt Tewari v. King Emperor12). In fact it is to meet such contingencies namely where the parties scramble for possession and seek to establish their version by unreliable and manufactured evidence that section 146, Criminal Procedure Code, has been enacted. The Katras Jherriah Coal Co. v. Sibkrishta Daw & Co.13, Sadar Ali v. Abdul Karim14; Alagiriswami Naidu v. Chinna Veerammal15. In such cases the Magistrate has merely to wind up the proceedings before him by attaching and leaving it open to both parties to approach the civil Court and obtain reliefs. 5. Therefore, the only point in this case which has to be considered is whether the Magistrate was merely trying to evade from discharging his duties or whether he was unable really to decide possession one way or the other. There can be no doubt that in this case both these parties, veteran litigants, who seem to have a long record of dispute between them, have gone in for a scramble for possession. But each has been brought to a standstill by the other as it was a case of Greek meeting. Greek (Madras version, Kumbakonam v. Kumbakonam). The result was adduction by both sides of equally doubtful and equally dishonest evidence. 6. Therefore the Magistrate could not but decide that he was unable to satisfy himself and I see no reason to hold that he took an abbreviated view of his own functions. The order of the lower Court is correct and I decline to interfere. In dismissing this petition, I am confronted by the thought that the appellant before us was only a lessee for one year and his lease period has also expired. K.S. ----- Petition dismissed.