Order.- This is a Criminal Revision Case which has been filed against an order made under section 143, Criminal Procedure Code. The facts are: On proceedings which were initiated by petitioners under section 147, Criminal Procedure Code, but which were taken on file and proceeded with under sections 133 to 143, Criminal Procedure Code, Chapter X (Public Nuisances) this order under section 143 came to be made in regard to the putting up of a wall in front of certain shops in Avalurpet village. In the village of Avalurpet there is a grama natham of the extent of 7 cents adjoining the village and comprised in R.S. No. 150/1-A. On the eastern side of this grama natham and inside that grama natham there are a number of shops belonging to Abdul Sathar Sahib. This village of Avalurpet consists of an overwhelming majority of Hindus and a small minority of Muslims. These Muslims among themselves are divided. The owners of these shops and other shops and supporting this Abdul Sathar Sahib are Muslim householders consisting of ten in number. There can be no dispute that in 1950 feelings between these ten Muslim householders and the Hindu inhabitants had become strained. Therefore what the Hindu respondents did was that they put up a wall practically adjoining the front of these shops and purported to enclose the rest of the grama natham and made it into Gandhi Park. On a portion of this grama natham a masonry platform has been put up on which a statue of Mahatma Gandhi has been installed and another cement platform has been put up but without anything being erected thereon. The learned Magistrate who enquired into this matter and who inspected this area found that this alleged conversion of the site into a park was nothing more than a mere pretence. He found there no shrubs or flower plants excepting two old rain trees. The only substantial structure was the cement granite wall six feet high put up in front of these shops and practically adjoining it and with a small opening at the place DE shown in the plan filed in this case. This opening itself was secured by doors and it was locked and the key was with the second respondent. In other words, by constructing this wall the respondents effectively walled in the shops and cut off all access thereto by the villagers. This opening itself was secured by doors and it was locked and the key was with the second respondent. In other words, by constructing this wall the respondents effectively walled in the shops and cut off all access thereto by the villagers. The result was that the shops remained closed for three months. Only after the Sub-Collector of Tindivanam came to the spot, he opened the door at DE and the shops became accessible through that opening. The narrow passage left between the front of the shops and the wall and the narrow opening let into the wall made the shops, according to the learned Magistrate who inspected the place, to look like cells in a prison enclosed by high prison walls and within the enclosure with very little elbow room. Therefore Abdul Samad Sahib, one of the shopkeepers therein, filed an application under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code against Annamalai Reddi and two others in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Tindivanam, on 31st January, 1950. Another application under sections 144, 147 and 148 was filed by Abdul Sathar Sahib, the undivided brother of that Abdul Samad Sahib, against the same respondents in respect of some other shop there on 3rd February, 1950. The former application was referred to the Circle Inspector of Police, Gingee, for report. The Circle Inspector who has inspected the place and who has been examined as a prosecution witness testified that he visited the place on 6th February, 1950 and submitted his report Exhibit P-2 and warned the Hindus not to persist in this course of conduct and that they did not heed his words and that he then visited the spot on 8th March, 1950, along with the District Superintendent of Police and they found the state of things unaltered and these Muslim shopkeepers put to trouble. Then these proceedings were proceeded with under section 133 and which it was perfectly competent for the Magistrate to do though the proceedings were presented under Chapters XI and XII, Criminal Procedure Code. There is no dispute that the correct procedure prescribed under sections 133 and 143 had been followed in this case. Then these proceedings were proceeded with under section 133 and which it was perfectly competent for the Magistrate to do though the proceedings were presented under Chapters XI and XII, Criminal Procedure Code. There is no dispute that the correct procedure prescribed under sections 133 and 143 had been followed in this case. The learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that the place on which this wall had been cons-tructed is a public place and a public way and that it constitutes an obstruction and a nuisance and that the public right set up by the respondents is bogus and passed an order for demolition of the same and it is against this order that the present Crimnal Revision Case has been filed. In this case we have to consider four points: viz., (i) whether the wall which has been ordered to be demolished has been put up in a public way or a public place; (ii) whether it constitutes an obstruction and a nuisance; (iii) whether the public right set up by the respondents, (in the lower court) is bogus or bona fide, and (iv) whether in a petition under section 147 the Magistrate can proceed under Chapter X, sections 133-143, Criminal Procedure Code. On all these points I have come to the same conclusion as the learned Magistrate and here are my reasons: Point 1.-That the place on which this wall has been constructed is a public place and a public way cannot be seriously disputed. The place itself is registered as grama natham bearing R.S.No. 150/1-A. It is in evidence that the public are using it not for the celebration of Muthalamman and Mariamman festivals as was sought to be set up but for display of fireworks on festive occasions. The celebration of festivals was set up in order to make out that the Hindus were in exclusive possession and had the exclusive user of the property. The respondents when examined by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Tindivanam on 1st March, 1950, took up this position. Then when examined by the Executive First Class Magistrate, Tindivanam, on 13th August, 1951, after the case was remanded they stated that the land in dispute was in their possession and the petitioners had no right to possession. The respondents when examined by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Tindivanam on 1st March, 1950, took up this position. Then when examined by the Executive First Class Magistrate, Tindivanam, on 13th August, 1951, after the case was remanded they stated that the land in dispute was in their possession and the petitioners had no right to possession. The third respondent however admitted that the said place belongs to the public and in joint written statement filed on 13th August, 1951, before the same Magistrate they admitted that the concerned land is vacant site comprised in R.S.No. 150/1-A with the extent of 12 cents being grama natham intended for the use of the villagers. Exhibits D-1 and D-2 also did not lend any support to the contention of the respondents. It is clear that the land is Government porom-boke and is a public place. The learned Magistrate who inspected the place found that it was also being used as a public way. This land lies between the Avalurpet-Chetput road and the private property of petitioners and others. Near the point F in the plan filed in this case the Avalurpet-Chetput road and the Bazar street meet and the former is bus route. This plot now enclosed by the compound wall is necessary for the convenient use of both the roads both for vehicular as well as passenger traffic. In short it falls within the definition of a public road within the meaning of section 3(18) of the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920, where a public road is defined as meaning and including the drains attached to any such road, public bridge or causeway and the land which whether entered or not try any pavement, verandah or other structure, lies on either side of the road way up to the boundaries of the adjacent property, whether that property is private property or property belonging to Government. This public place and public way have not become the property of the villagers and the Panchayat Board which hastily passed a resolution, and which resolution is not being produced, had no authority to deal with this land. R.W.1 admitted that the land is not vested in the Panchayat Board and for erecting a permanent structure or wall the orders of the Government are necessary. He also admitted that no such order has been passed either by the Revenue department or by the Government. R.W.1 admitted that the land is not vested in the Panchayat Board and for erecting a permanent structure or wall the orders of the Government are necessary. He also admitted that no such order has been passed either by the Revenue department or by the Government. Therefore, point 1 has to be decided in the affirmative. Point 2.-I have already indicated sufficiently to show that this wall constructed on a public place and a public way constitutes an obstruction and nuisance. It was sought to be suggested that this will only hit the shop keepers and not the public. The evidence in this case shows that this obstruction would also affect the unascertained members of the public whose ordinary avocations may take them to the neighbourhood of such shops, apart from the customers and that therefore this would constitute both obstruction as well as public nuisance. Public nuisance is nuisance caused nof only to the persons as in this case living in the shops but also to, as I have just now pointed out, unascertained members of the public whose ordinary avocation may take them to neighbourhood. Queen-Empress v. Jasodanand1 and Begg v. Lamessor2. In other words this is not merely a case of infringement of a private right or a private dispute which is outside the scope of Chapter X of the Criminal Procedure Code. Point 3: The powers embodied in sections 133 to 137 with regard to the obstruction of public ways, are not intended to be exercised where there is a bona fide dispute as to the existence of the public right; see In re Narayan Jivan Mestri3. Where there is such a dispute, the Court should pass no order under those sections until the public right has been established by proper legal proceedings, civil or criminal. See Basaruddin Bhuiah v. Bahar Ali4, In re Venkanna5, Budhainath v. Nil Mahanth6, Asker Mia v. Sabdar Mia7, Lalmiah v. Nazir Kalashi8 and Queen-Empress v. Bissessur Sahib9. Where there is such a dispute, the Court should pass no order under those sections until the public right has been established by proper legal proceedings, civil or criminal. See Basaruddin Bhuiah v. Bahar Ali4, In re Venkanna5, Budhainath v. Nil Mahanth6, Asker Mia v. Sabdar Mia7, Lalmiah v. Nazir Kalashi8 and Queen-Empress v. Bissessur Sahib9. But the mere assertion of a claim of title made without reasonable ground, or honest belief in it, or honest intention to support it will not oust a criminal Court of its jurisdiction under sections 133 to 137 of the Code; Luckhee Narain Banerjee v. Ram Kumer Mukharjee10, Queen-Empress v. Bissessur Sahib9 Nasaruddi v. Akiluddi11, Mukundalal Dey v. Haribole Saha12, Upendranath Bhuttacharjee v. Krishnachandra Bhuttacharjee13, Queen-Empress v. Kedarnath14, Belat Ali v. Abdur Rahim15 In re Maharana Shri Jaswat Sangji16. It is not open to any person illegally causing obstruction to public property to set up a bogus question of title for the purpose of ousting the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and notwithstanding the raising of such a question the Magistrate is entitled to hear a case sufficiently to enable him to make up his mind whether or not bona fide question of title is raised. It is quite true that when it is found that this claim of title is advanced in good faith and is supported by prima facie respectable evidence the Magistrate cannot proceed further and decide whether the title so set up does or does not exist but must leave the matter to be decided by the civil Court: Emperor v. Dost Muhammad17, Matuk Dhari Tewari v. Hari Madhab Das18, Preonath Dey v. Goburdhonemalo19, Rakhal Chandra Saha v. Kailash Chandra Sarkar20. In this case the Magistrate has followed the correct procedure and has only come to the conclusion that the respondents’ claim was not a bona fide question of title but only an attempt to cause annoyance and inconvenience to the persons with whom they were at enmity and their act amounted to obstruction and a public nuisance and made the order absolute under section 137, Criminal Procedure Code. Nundo Gopala Chatterjee v. Kusum Kumar Banerjee21. Point 4: Section 133 does not oust the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to proceed under section 147 and vice versa. Nundo Gopala Chatterjee v. Kusum Kumar Banerjee21. Point 4: Section 133 does not oust the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to proceed under section 147 and vice versa. The contrary view held in In re Lindsay22 and a similar obiter dictum in In re Latchmiah Maistry23, was not followed in Karuppanna Goundou v. Kandaswami Goundan24. The only restriction naturally is that when proceedings are instituted and action taken under section 133, Criminal Procedure Code, orders under section 147 cannot be passed since the two sets of proceedings are under entirely different chapters, governed by different procedure in detail and orders are made for entirely different purposes; Abdul Rahman Mia v. Safar Ali25. The instant case is not one such instance. There are no grounds to interfere with the correct order made by the learned Magistrate and it will be sufficient only to indicate to him that in regard to the further proceedings after section 143, Criminal Procedure Code, he must have recourse to the instructions given in G.O.No. 133, dated 14th January, 1933, dealing with the financing of the initial expenditure which might have to be incurred under section 140(2), Criminal Procedure Code. The initial expenditure should be debited to contingencies and the costs, if any, recovered from the parties should be credited to the Miscellaneous head of account and in cases where the costs are not recovered separately but are included in the fine levied by the Court, the fine or realisation should be credited to “Administration of Justice General Fees, Fines and Forfeiture.” In the result, this revision case is dismissed. K.C. ----- Revision case dismissed.