ORDER This is an application under Order 45, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, for a certificate that the case is a fit one as regards the amount or value of the subject-matter and nature for appeal to the Supreme Court. It is directed against an order passed by this Court dismissing the applicant's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The applicant is a firm having its registered office at Calcutta. It does business in these territories, and by the order dated 8th April, 1950, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Amraoti, assessed the applicant to a tax of Rs. 58,657-14. The applicant preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Sales Tax. Under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 22, Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, an appeal cannot be admitted until the tax assessed on the appellants is deposited by him. The applicant did not pay the tax and therefore its appeal was not admitted by the Sales Tax Commissioner. It thereupon made an application to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution stating that it was not liable to deposit the tax as a condition precedent to the admission of the appeal. It, therefore, wanted this Court to issue a direction to the Commissioner of Sales Tax to admit the appeal even though the particular condition was not complied with. This Court rejected the petition. When the matter came up for hearing, the learned Counsel for the applicant stated that it founds its rights to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court on Article 133 of the Constitution and not on the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court rejected the petition. When the matter came up for hearing, the learned Counsel for the applicant stated that it founds its rights to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court on Article 133 of the Constitution and not on the Code of Civil Procedure. Clause (1) of Article 133 reads thus:- "An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil procedure of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies - (a) that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by Parliament by law; or (b) that the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value; or (c) that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court; and, where the judgment, decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below in any case other that a case referred to in sub-clause (c), if the High Court further certifies that the appeal involves some substantial question of law". According to the learned Counsel, the applicant's case falls within sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) of Article 133. A decision to be appealable under Article 133 must be "a judgment, decree or final order" and must have been arrived at in a civil proceeding of a High Court. It is not necessary for us to consider whether the proceeding before this Court was of a civil nature or not, because in our view the decision does not amount to "a judgment, decree or final order". We may, however, say that a proceeding by way of mandamus was held to be a "proceeding in a civil case" in The Justice of the Peace for the Town of Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Co. Ltd. (17 W.R. 364 (371)) by Couch, C.J., and Markby, J. The decision of the High Court is obviously not a decree. We may, however, say that a proceeding by way of mandamus was held to be a "proceeding in a civil case" in The Justice of the Peace for the Town of Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Co. Ltd. (17 W.R. 364 (371)) by Couch, C.J., and Markby, J. The decision of the High Court is obviously not a decree. But according to the learned Counsel it is a "judgment" or at least a "final order" because it finally decides the right of the applicant to prosecute the appeal before the Commissioner of Sales Tax without paying the tax assessed on the applicant. Further, according to the learned Counsel, the order passed by this Court dismissing the application is final so far as this Court is concerned and therefore it must fall within the expression "final order" used in Article 133. The Supreme Court has held in Seth Premchand Satramdas v. The State of Bihar ([1950] S.C.R. 799; 1 S.T.C. 319), in a case arising out of a proceeding under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, that the final order contemplated by Clause 31, Letters Patent of the Patna High Court, must of its own force, bind or affect the rights of the parties. In the case before their Lordships, the appellant had moved the High Court under Section 21, Bihar Sales Tax Act, to call upon the Board of Revenue to state a case and refer it to the High Court. That application was dismissed. The appellant thereupon applied for leave to appeal to the Federal Court, which the High Court granted following the decision of a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Feroze Shah Kaka Khel v. Income-tax Commissioner, Punjab and N. W. F. P. Lahore (A.I.R. 1931 Lah. 138). Their Lordships held that the Lahore case was not correctly decided and that as the order of the High Court standing by itself does not affect the rights of the parties and as also the final order in the matter was the order which was passed by the Board of Revenue, the appeal before their Lordships was incompetent. There is also a decision of the Federal Court in Mohammad Amin Bros. v. Dominion of India (A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 77), which lays down the test for determining the finality of an order. There is also a decision of the Federal Court in Mohammad Amin Bros. v. Dominion of India (A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 77), which lays down the test for determining the finality of an order. According to their Lordships the test is whether the judgment or order finally disposes of the rights of the parties. The mere fact that the order decides an important and even a vital issue is by itself, according to their Lordships, not material, unless the decision puts an end to the suit. The finality must thus be a finality in relation to the suit. In the present case, the applicant can completely ignore the order of this Court. The final order, so far as the question raised before us is concerned, is that of the Commissioner of Sales Tax stating that the appeal is "filed". The final order regarding the applicant's liability to pay the tax is, however, that of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax. We are further of the opinion that a judgment or a final order to be appealable to the Supreme Court must affect the merits of the case between the parties by determining some right or liability. In the present case, the order of this Court is not an order on merits, that is, with regard to the applicant's liability to pay the tax, and does not determine any right except the one to prosecute the appeal before the Commissioner of Sales Tax without paying the tax assessed on it. The right to continue the appeal without paying the tax has nothing to do with the merits of the appeal and therefore the decision of this Court negativing the applicant's contention cannot be regarded as a "judgment" or a "final order". This Court has done no more than to point out to the applicant that the Act must be complied with. The view which we take finds support from a decision of the Bombay High Court in P. V. Rao v. Ahmed Haji (A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 125). In this view, we cannot grant a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution and dismiss the application. We, however, make no order as to costs. Application dismissed.