These are three appeals from the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Kamrup and give rise to the identical point of law and accordingly these appeals are treated as analogous. The order in question refers to eviction of the parties from certain roadside lands within the municipal town of Gauhati alleged to be encroa­ched by the appellants. It is admitted on behalf of the appellants that they are in possession of portions of the roadside lands including the drain and have raised certain structures thereon of a permanent nature. Proceedings had been pending for long for eviction of these parties from the encroached lands but at a time they were dropped and subsequently they were revived and the order dated 18-11-49 was passed directing the parties to remove the structures from the road­side lands and they not having carried out the direction of the Deputy Commissioner, conveyed by this order, another order was passed on 4-1-50 imposing a fine of Bs. 200 for non-compliance with the order and a daily fine of Bs. 50 on each o£ the parties till the structures on the encroached lands were removed. All these appeals are directed against this order, and the main conten­tion of the appellants is that B. 18, cl. (2) of the Settlement Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulations has no application to the facts and circumstances of the case and as such, the orders were invalid in the eye of law. [2] This argument is based on the plea that the parties had a bona fide claim of right to possess the encroached lands in each case as they had obtained permission from the Gauhati Munici­pality to raise the structures which they have now been asked to dismantle. It is not seriously contended (disputed?) on behalf of the Government or the State that the parties obtained in each ease permission from the munici­pality to raise certain structures on the municipal land or the drain attached to the road. Section 55 (l), Assam Municipal Act (Act I [l] of 1923) pro-vides that subject to any special reservations made by the Provincial Government, all property of the nature of public roads including the soil, the pavement etc. Section 55 (l), Assam Municipal Act (Act I [l] of 1923) pro-vides that subject to any special reservations made by the Provincial Government, all property of the nature of public roads including the soil, the pavement etc. situated within the municipality shall vest in and belong to the Board and shall with all other property of whatsoever nature or kind which may become vested in the Board be under its direction, management and control. Under Sub-s. (2) of the said section it is provided that the Provincial Government may, by notifi­cation in the official Gazette direct that any property which has vested under Sub a. (i) in the Board shall cease to be so vested, and thereupon the property specified in the notification shall cease to be so vested, and the Provincial Govern­ment may pass such orders as it thinks fit regarding the disposal and management of such property. In this case, it is contended that the property which the appellants are alleged to have encroa­ched belonged to and vested in the Municipality in accordance with this Section and the Munici­pality having permitted the appellants to stay on the encroached lands or to continue the struc­tures, the Deputy Commissioner has no right to evict under R. 18, cl. (2) of the Settlement Rules under chap. I, Part II of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulations. Rule 18, cl. (2) provides that when a person enters into possession of land that has previously been reserved for roads or roadside lands and when further, there is no bona fide claim of right involved, he may be ejected or ordered to vacate the land forthwith and the Deputy Commissioner may sell, confiscate or destroy any corp raised, or any building or other construction erected, without authority on the land. [3] Here, the appellants' contention has been that they have raised the structure with the authority of the Municipality and that there is a bona fide claim of right involved. It is not dis­puted on behalf of the State as I have mentioned already that the appellants had obtained permis­sion from the Municipal authority and it would undoubtedly be for the civil Court to enquire what right the encroachers have acquired by virtue of the such permission from the Munici­pality. It is, however, manifest that in all these three cases bona fide right of claim is involved. It is, however, manifest that in all these three cases bona fide right of claim is involved. Under these circumstances, I am constrained to hold that the order by the Deputy Commissioner for forthwith removal of the structures is not in strict consonance with the provisions of the law. It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that the order not being in strict consonance with the provisions of K. 18, cl. (2) should be vacated as ultra vires. [4l Mr. Goswami on behalf of the State has contended that in case it is accepted that there is a bona fide right of claim involved with respect to the encroached lands, the case of the appellants come within B. 18, cl. (3), Settlement Rules, which provides that in all other cases ejectment shall be preceded by service of notice requiring the occu­pant to vacate the land within three months and to remove any building or structures etc. as provid­ed under subsequent clauses and the penalty may be imposed under cl. (5) of the same Rule. The appellants' contention is that encroachment of roads or roadside lands would come under E. 18, cl. (2) and cannot come under cl (3) of the said Rules. The point apparently is not without some difficulty. But if I look to the spirit of the B. 18, I am inclined to hold that the order of the Deputy Commissioner comes within cl. (2) read with cl. (5) of B. 18, and it admits of proper variation to suit the circumstances. I would, therefore, modify the order of the Deputy Commissioner to this extent that there should be no forthwith re­moval of the structures from the encroached lands but the encroaching parties should be given an opportunity to prove their title or claim of right to the encroached land by a properly instituted civil suit and accordingly, they should be given sufficient time for obtaining necessary orders from the civil Court declaring their rights and if they consider necessary they might obtain interim injunc­tion from the civil Court prohibiting the Deputy Commissioner from putting his orders immediately into effect. I do not feel called upon to decide whether it will be cl. (3) or cl. (2) that will be applicable with regard to the facts in this case and even if I hold that it is not cl. (2) but cl. I do not feel called upon to decide whether it will be cl. (3) or cl. (2) that will be applicable with regard to the facts in this case and even if I hold that it is not cl. (2) but cl. (s) that applies to the facts of this case, the provision of the Rule is substantially complied with if the parties get three months' time for the purpose of removing the structures. [5] I accordingly direct that the order of the Deputy Commissioner be modified to this extent that the appellants in each case be given three months' time for establishing their claim of right with respect to the encroached lands in a properly framed suit in a civil Court and in default of obtaining any stay order or a decree in their favour, the order of the Deputy Commissioner will be put into operation forthwith after expiry of three months from today. The final result will therefore depend on the civil suit in each case if brought within time and in case of any of the parties establishing a right to possess the en­croached roadside land or drain the order of eviction and fine shall automatically lapse. With this modification in the orders appealed against, I dismiss the appeals and make no order as to costs. The same judgment will cover all these three appeals. [6] Let the records go down immediately. Rules stand discharged. Order accordingly.