Ram Labhaya Ag. C. J. -This is an appeal from an order of the learned Subordinate Judge, D. A. D., at Silchar, dated 9-6-1950, in Miscella­neous Case No. 5 of 1950. By this order, the learned Sub-Judge disallowed the objections raised by the judgment-debtor to the execution of the decree. The Union of India is the judgment-debtor in the case and this appeal has been pre­ferred on its behalf. The appeal was presented on 18-8-1950. During the pendency of this appeal in this Court, the Indian Independence Pakistan Courts (Pending Proceedings) Ordinance, 1951 (vi of 1951) was promulgated. The date of its promulgation was 29-10-1951. Before this appeal could be heard, the said Ordinance was replaced by the Indian Independence Pakistan Courts (Pending Proceedings) Act, 1952 (NO. ix of 1952). [2l The learned Government Advocate has urged first-that in view of the provisions contain­ed in S. 3 of the said Act, the decree in question cannot be given effect to by any Court or autho­rity in India. He points out that if this conten­tion prevails, it would not be necessary to decide other questions that arise from the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, which is under appeal. In this view, the learned Advocate is admittedly correct. It is, therefore, necessary first to deter­mine if the Indian Independence Pakistan Courts (Pending Proceedings) Act of 1952, hereafter called the Act, bears giving effect to the decree. The facts bearing on this question are as follows : [3] Mahim Chandra Datta, the respondent, •obtained his decree against the Governor-General of India in Council in a Money Suit from the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Sylhet. The suit was instituted on 29-7-47. It was disposed of on 27-9-49 some two years after the partition. The plaintiff was granted a decree for a sum of Es. 15,694-8-0 against the Governor-General of India. The Court of the Subordinate Judge at Sylhet had become at that time a foreign Court by reason of the partition of the country. On 8-12-49, the decree-holder applied to the Court at Sylhet for a certificate of non-satisfaction to be sent to the Court of the Additional District Judge, Cachar, in order to enable him to execute the decree there. On 8-12-49, the decree-holder applied to the Court at Sylhet for a certificate of non-satisfaction to be sent to the Court of the Additional District Judge, Cachar, in order to enable him to execute the decree there. It was ordered that a certificate of non-satisfaction, together with a copy of the decree and a copy of the order of the Court be sent to the Additional Judge, at Silchar. On 20-12-49, the decree, holder put in his application for execution in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Silchar (Cachar). The application was ordered to be registered. The Union of India raised objections to the execution of the decree under S. 47, Civil P. C. Those objections were disallowed, as stated above. But on the application of the judgment-debtor, further proceedings in execution were stayed, and the learned counsel for the parties are agreed that no further steps in execution have been taken since then. [4] Section 3 of the Act provides that "Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the Orders referred to in 8. 2, no decree to which this Act applies, shall be given effect to by any Court or authority in India in so far as such decree imposes any liability or obligation on any Government in India." The 6rst question that arises is - whether the decree in question in this case is one to which this Act applies. Section 2 of the Act defines the expression "decree to which this Act applies". According to cl. (i) of S. 2, any judgment, decree or order as is referred to in cl. (3) of Art. 4 of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, would be a decree to which this Act applies. Section 2 of the Act defines the expression "decree to which this Act applies". According to cl. (i) of S. 2, any judgment, decree or order as is referred to in cl. (3) of Art. 4 of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, would be a decree to which this Act applies. Art. 4 of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, provides that "Notwithstanding the creation of certain new Pro­vinces and the transfer of certain territories from the Province of Assam to the Province of East Bengal by the Indian Independence Act, 1947-(1) all proceedings pend­ing immediately before the appointed day in any civil or criminal Court (other than a High Court) in the Province of Bengal, the Punjab or Assam shall be continued in that Court as if the said Act had not been passed, and that Court shall continue to have for the purposes of the said proceedings, all the jurisdiction and powers which it had immediately before the appointed day." Clause (2) of Art. 4 provides for appeals and appli­cations for revision in respect of proceedings refer­red to in cl. (l); cl. (3), with which we are concerned, provides that "effect shall be given within the territories of either of the two Dominions to any judgment, decree, order or sentence of any such Court in the said proceedings, as if it had been passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction within that Dominion." The effect of cl. (3) was that judgments, decrees, orders or sentences in proceedings pending im­mediately before 15-8-1947, in the Province of Bengal, the Punjab or Assam had to be given effect to by the two Dominions as if they had been passed by Courts of competent jurisdiction within those two Dominions. The decree in this case was passed in a suit pending immediately before 15-8-1947. It, therefore, fell within the scope of cl. (3) of Art. 4 of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, which gave it the status of a decree passed by a Court of competent juris­diction within the Dominion of India, notwith­standing the fact that it was passed by a Court at Sylhet in Pakistan, which is foreign territory. It, therefore, fell within the scope of cl. (3) of Art. 4 of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, which gave it the status of a decree passed by a Court of competent juris­diction within the Dominion of India, notwith­standing the fact that it was passed by a Court at Sylhet in Pakistan, which is foreign territory. It was by virtue of this provision that a certificate of non-satisfaction was brought from the Court at Sylhet to the Court at Silchar in Caehar, and the decree was sought to be executed against the Union of India, though it had been passed against the Governor-General of India in Council. The decree in this case is clearly covered by the defini­tion given in S. 2 cl. (i) of the Act (ix [9] of 1952); the Act, therefore, applies to the decree, Mr. Lahiri has not disputed this position. He has contended that the Act has no retros­pective operation; it was not so intended by the Legislature; and at any rate, the intention of the Legislature that it should have retrospective effect and should apply to pending proceedings, has not been brought out, expressly or by necessary impli­cation. As a consequence, he argues, that it cannot apply to a pending execution case. He has also urged, for reasons which will be dealt with later, that the Act is ultra vires the Legislature. Mr. Medhi the learned Government Advocate regards the Indian Independence Pakistan Courts Act (IX C9] of 1952) as procedural in character and inter­prets the Act as containing, not only by necessary implication, but in express terms, a direction that the Act will apply even to a pending execution case if the decree falling within the mischief of the Act had not been given effect to before the Ordinance which was replaced by the Act, came into force. He has referred us to a decision given by me sitting singly in S. M. A. No. 5 of 1950 in which he points out that the Ordinance which preceded the Act was applied to an execution case under similar circumstances. In that case, the Court of first instance had disallowed objections raised on behalf of the judgment-debtor and had ordered the 'execution to proceed. The judgment-debtor appealed. The appellate Judge held that the order directing the transfer of the decree to the Court at Silchar was without jurisdiction. In that case, the Court of first instance had disallowed objections raised on behalf of the judgment-debtor and had ordered the 'execution to proceed. The judgment-debtor appealed. The appellate Judge held that the order directing the transfer of the decree to the Court at Silchar was without jurisdiction. He also held that the Court at Silchar had no jurisdiction to execute the decree. It was during the pendency of that appeal that The Indian Independence Pakistan Courts (Pending Proceedings) Ordinance (vi [6] of 1951) came into force. The learned advocate for the decree-holder conceded that the Ordinance applied to decrees which had not been given effect to before it came into force. He regarded the alteration in the law as procedural in character. The question now raised by Mr. Labiri was not in controversy in that case and, therefore, has to fee decided as a question of the first instance. [5] In support of the first contention that the Act cannot be applied retrospectively, Mr. Lahiri has first referred to S. 6 of the General Clauses Act (x [10] of 1897) and hag pointed out that according to this section, where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of 4he Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or -hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, ' the repeal shall not -(b) affect the previous operation •of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered there under, (c) affect any right, privilege, obliga­tion or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment, as aforesaid, and for all these purposes, .any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. " He regards the Act as a repealing enactment and his contention is that the previous operation of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, the rights acquired under it by the decree-holder and the execution proceeding already instituted could not be affected by virtue of the provision contained in cls. (b), (c) and (d) of S. 6, General Clauses Act. (b), (c) and (d) of S. 6, General Clauses Act. As a consequence, he claims that the decree in question has to be treated as a decree passed by a competent Court within this Dominion; the decree confers on the decree-holder a right and a privilege which cannot be affected by the Ordinance (VI [6] of 1951) or the Act (IX [9] of 1952); nor can they apply to the execution case which is a pending legal proceed­ing, unless a different intention appears from the language of the Act. He has also referred us to p. 222 of " Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Edn. 9, " The pass­age referred to is as follows : "No rule of construction is more firmly established than that : that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of proce­dure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enact­ment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as pro­spective only. But if the language is plainly retro­spective, it must be so interpreted. At the same time, it is laid down that regard must be paid to the dominant intention. " Another general rule applying to pending actions, to which our attention has been drawn, is stated at p. 229 of the same book; it is in these terms : " In general, when the law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decid­ed according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear inten­tion to vary such rights." He has also referred to a number of cases in which the rules of interpretation referred to above have been given effect to. [6] In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. [6] In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Income-tax Cominr., Delhi, A. I. B. 1927 p. c. 242, it was laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council that: " While provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construc­tion be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enact­ment or necessary intendment. Provisions which, if applied retrospectively, would deprive of their existing finality orders which, when the statute came into force, were final, are provisions which touch existing rights ;" It. is argued that in this case, notwithstanding the fact that the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, stood repealed by the Constitution of India, the decree in question was a binding final adjudication of the dispute between the parties, and effect could be given to it under Art. 4, cl. (S) of the Order. If the 1.1. P. C. (P. P.) Act (IX [9] of 1952) deprives that decree of its finality, by forcing the decree-holder to sue afresh, it would touch existing rights according to the decision referred to above. Reference is also made to Shiya Janki v. Kir-tanand Singh, A.I.R. 1936 Pat. 173 in this connec­tion, in which it was held by Fazl Ali J., that "a decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction re­mains a good decree until it is reversed or set aside on appeal. Such a decree cannot automatically become invalid merely because since the passing of the decree, the law has changed, unless there is some clear provision in the new enactment to make it applicable to pending suits and appeals. " Both these cases would show that an existing decree confers a right, of which a person may be deprived by subsequent legislation only if retro­spective effect has been provided for, either ex­pressly or by necessary implication or intendment. In Peoples Bank of Northern India,, Ltd. v. Wahid Bux, A. I. R. 1943 Lah. 170, exempting property from sale was not treated as a mere matter of procedure. It was held that it was a matter affecting the rights of the decree-holder and the obligations of the judgment-debtor. In Peoples Bank of Northern India,, Ltd. v. Wahid Bux, A. I. R. 1943 Lah. 170, exempting property from sale was not treated as a mere matter of procedure. It was held that it was a matter affecting the rights of the decree-holder and the obligations of the judgment-debtor. The conclusion that Mr, Lahiri draws from these authorities is that S. 3 of the Act affects rights which had accrued before the Act was passed. Mr. Medhi does not dispute the applicability of the well-recognised rules relating to the interpretation of statutes quoted from Maxwell. He concedes that these rules will apply even if the case is not covered by S. 6, General Clauses Act, which, he argues, does not apply in terms as the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Courts Order, 1947 was not repealed by the Pakistan Ordinance (VI [6] of 1951) or the Act (ix [9] of 1952), it having already been repealed by the Constitution. But he agrees that the Pakistan Courts Act (ix [9] of 1952) has to be interpreted according to the well-settled rule of interpretation reiterated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in A. I. R. 1927 P. c. 242. It follows, therefore, that if the Pakis-tan Courts Act (ix [9] of 1952) does touch existing rights by depriving decrees or orders of their existing finality, the Act should not have any retrospective effect unless it has been so expressly enacted' or is necessarily implied in the language of the statute. [7] Mr. Medhi hag, however, argued that the Pakistan Courts Ordinance and the Act which replaces it, did not deprive any order or decree of its existing finality. The decrees and orders remained good for enforcement in the Dominion of Pakistan. For India, they were foreign decrees or orders. They were placed on a par with de­crees passed in this Dominion for purpose of enforcement by a legal proceedings order. That order provided a method for the enforcement of the decrees. By reason of the provisions contain­ed in the Pakistan Courts Act (ix [9] of 1952), the usual method or procedure of enforcement that is available to decree-holders of foreign decrees, has ceased to be so, but the change does not affect the validity or the finality of the decrees in Pakis­tan. He points out that Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. He points out that Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Income-tax Commr., Delhi, A. i. R. 1927 P. C. 242 and the other two cases relied on by Mr. Lahiri are distinguishable inasmuch as they do not deal with foreign decrees. His con­tention is that a decree-holder who has a decree of a foreign Court has no vested right in the procedure that this Dominion may lay down for the enforcement of such decrees. He, therefore, cha­racterises the changes in the law as procedural and argues that unless retrospective effect to it is textually inadmissible the Pakistan Courts Act (IX [9] of 1952) should apply to even a pending exe­cution if the decree has not already been given effect to. The question raised is - whether any one has any vested right in the procedure provid­ed for the execution of a foreign decree. This is a very interesting question and is by no means simple. No authorities have been cited before on this aspect of the question, and as at present advised I am finding it difficult to say that the Pakistan Courts Act (ix [9] of 1952) has deprived the decrees and orders that fall within its mischief of their existing finality, but this ap­peal may not be allowed on this ground as, in my opinion, even if it is assumed that existing rights are touched, the Act fully authorises re­trospective effect being given to it. [8] The preamble to the Act is very significant and revealing. It states in no uncertain terms the object of the Act. It is to render ineffective cer­tain decrees and orders passed by Courts in Pa­kistan against any Government in India and to provide an alternative remedy to persons who have secured such decrees or orders; it is clear that certain decrees and orders passed by Courts in Pakistan had to be rendered ineffective and the persons who had obtained those decrees or orders were to be provided with an alternative remedy. In order to achieve this object, S. 3 of the Act categorically declares that : "Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the orders referred to in S. 2 (and one of the orders referred to is the I. I. (L. P.) Order), no decree to which this Act applies shall be given effect to by any Court or authority-in India in so far as such decree imposes any liability or obligation on any Government in India." The intention of the Legislature could not have been expressed in clearer or more emphatic terms. Decrees which had been obtained before the Act came into force had to be made ineffective; a re­medy was intended to be taken away from the decree-holders for another remedy which has-been conferred; in other words, the method of enforcement of a Pakistan decree available before the Act was replaced by another mode. It is not possible to mistake the meaning of the Legisla­ture in this case. Short of using the term 'retros­pective,' it has done everything to indicate its intention in express terms that the Act applies to decrees passed by Pakistan Courts which are covered by the definition given in s. 2. I have no doubt that retrospective effect was fully and consciously intended. The expression of the intention is also not lacking in strength or definiteness. This, however, does not dispose of the whole of the contention raised by Mr. Lahiri. His case in the alternative is that even if the Act was intended to operate retrospectively, its retrospec­tive effect should not extend to pending proceedings. He emphasises that the presumption is that the Legislature does not intend what is unjust, and urges that the tendency against giving statutes retrospective effect rests on this presumption. He does not discover anything in the Act which would justify its application to pending proceedings. Though this question is not entirely free from difficulty, I do not find anything in the Act which would indicate that the intention was to limit the retrospective operation of the Act to decrees of which execution had not been sought. As its title indicates, it deals with 'pending proceedings.' It affects rights, if any, acquired under a Pend­ing Proceedings Order. The very subject-matter of the Act is 'pending proceedings.' It is quite comprehensive in character. As its title indicates, it deals with 'pending proceedings.' It affects rights, if any, acquired under a Pend­ing Proceedings Order. The very subject-matter of the Act is 'pending proceedings.' It is quite comprehensive in character. In order to make certain decrees and orders passed in Pakistan in­effective, it ordains that the decrees covered by the Act shall not be given effect to by any Court or authority in India. All subsisting and unsatis­fied decrees are clearly within its ambit. In this case, the decree had been transferred and an exe­cution application also was put in. No further steps have yet been taken. The decree-holder can get no relief unless the Court at Silchar agrees to give effect to the decree; it has been forbidden from doing so. If not expressly, at least by necessary implica­tion, the Act has been made applicable to decrees which have not so far been executed, though an application for execution may have been put in, for, once it is conceded that the Act was intend­ed to have retrospective effect, it becomes diffi­cult to discriminate between decrees of which execution has been sought and decrees about which no application is pending. Decrees which have not been given effect to, so far cannot be saved from its operation. The Act may appear harsh, but the Legislature admittedly had the competence to pass it. The recognised rules of construction do not deny the Legislature power to enact laws with retrospective effect to such an extent that they may apply to pending litiga­tions. The general rule that alterations in the law during the pendency of an action do not affect the rights of the parties which have to be decided according to the law as it stood when the action was begun cannot apply to this Act. Its title, preamble and the operative part-all lead irresis­tibly to the conclusion that decrees which had not been given effect to before it came into force are within its mischief. For ascertaining the inten­tion of the Legislature, the title and the pream­ble can be looked to and taken into consideration without objection. Its title, preamble and the operative part-all lead irresis­tibly to the conclusion that decrees which had not been given effect to before it came into force are within its mischief. For ascertaining the inten­tion of the Legislature, the title and the pream­ble can be looked to and taken into consideration without objection. Both together afford the key to the understanding of the purpose of the Act as the Legislature usually utilises them for express­ing its intention, though neither the title nor its preamble can be utilised for restricting or extend­ing the meaning of the operative part when its language is clear and not open to doubt. They do not override the clear meaning of the enactment' but, in this case there is no conflict whatsoever between the title and the preamble on one side and the operative part on the other. [9] Mr. Lahiri has relied upon certain cases in which repealing Act or Acts affecting rights which had accrued (even though retrospective in effect) were not applied to pending actions. These cases are distinguishable on facts. In Peoples Bank of Northern India Ltd. v. Wahid Bux, A. I. R. 1943 Lah. 170 (P. B.), Act 12 of 1940 had been held to have taken away a substantive or vested right in the decree-holder who had attached property before the Act came into force, by exempting certain properties from sale. The decree-holder in that case had attached property before the Act came into force. In the absence of any express provisions in the Act giving the new provision retrospective effect, it was held that it did not apply to pending execution proceedings in which attachment had already been effected. There is nothing in common between the Act which was under consideration in that case (i. e. Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act 12 of 1940) and the one that we have before us. Besides one reason which forms the basis of the decision in that case, which was that attachment had been effected and by the attachment itself, the decree-holder had acquired substantive rights in the property attached, even though the attachment did not amount to a charge. In the case before us, execution has not reached any such stage. A distinction was made between proceedings in which property had been attached and those in which property had not been attach­ed in the Lahore case. In the case before us, execution has not reached any such stage. A distinction was made between proceedings in which property had been attached and those in which property had not been attach­ed in the Lahore case. The conclusion of the learned Chief Justice who delivered the judgment was as follows : "To hold that the section (S. 35 of Act 12 of 1940) applies not to pending proceedings after attachment, does no violence whatsoever to the terms of the section, but on the contrary, gives full effect to the words used. That being so, I am bound to hold that the section is not retrospective and does not apply to execution proceedings pending at the time the Act came into force where attach­ment had already been effected." The contention that an Act intended to have retrospective effect could not apply to an execu­tion proceeding initiated before the Act came into force, is not supported by this decision. In Thistleton v. Frewer (1862) 31 L. J. Exv 230 (page 229 of 'Maxwell on Interpretation of Statu­tes'), S. 32, Medical Act, 1858 (c. 90), which, as amended by subsequent statutes, enacted that no person should, after the 1st January 1859, recover any charge for medical treatment "unless he shall prove at the trial" that he was on the Medical Register, was held not to apply to an action for medical services, commenced before that date. In Moon v. Durden, (1848) 2 Ex. 22, the effect of S. 18, Gaming Act, 8 and 9 vict. chap. 109, came up for consideration before the learned Barons of the Exchequer. The section provided that all con­tracts or agreements, whether by parol or in writing by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void and that no suit shall be brought or maintained in any Court of law or equity for recovering any gum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager, or which shall have been deposited in the hands of any person to decide the event on which any wager shall have been made. It was held that the section did not apply to suits which had been instituted, though not decided before the Act came into force. Peoples Bank of Northern India Ltd. v. Wahid Bux, A. I. B. 1943 Lah. It was held that the section did not apply to suits which had been instituted, though not decided before the Act came into force. Peoples Bank of Northern India Ltd. v. Wahid Bux, A. I. B. 1943 Lah. 170 In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Income-tax Commr., Delhi, A. i. R. 1927 P. c. d42, the effect of S. 66A (2) which was added to the Income-tax Act, was considered. Section 66A (2) provided as follows : . "An appeal shall lie to His Majesty in Council from any judgment of the High Court delivered on a reference made under S. 66 in any case which the High Court certifies to be a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council." A right of appeal to His Majesty in Council was allowed for the first time. The amending Act by which S. 66A was added, was held to be not retrospective. The language of cl. (l) of S. 66A indicated that the application of the provision was meant to be prospective. In United Provinces v. Mt. Atika Begum, A. i. B. 1941 P- c. 16, the United Provinces appeal­ed to the Federal Court from the decision of the High Court in a suit by two landholders for their share of the arrears of rent for a certain period against the defendants who were the kadars (les­sees of proprietary rights in agricultural lands) under a registered document, dated 20fch April 1923, fixing an annual rent of Rs. 948 and entitling the the kadars to make collection of rents from tenants. While the appeal was pending in the High Court, the U. P. Regularization of Remissions Act (Act 14 of 1938) came into force. Sulaiman J., while dealing with the applicability of the Act to pending cases, observed as follows : "The Legislature was presumably aware of the previous decision in Mahomed Abdul Qaiyum v. Secy, of State, 7.. L. E. (1938) All. 114, and must also have been aware that numerous other suits for arrears of rent must be pending. And yet no express words were put in the impugned Act to show that it should apply to all actions pending in appeal. L. E. (1938) All. 114, and must also have been aware that numerous other suits for arrears of rent must be pending. And yet no express words were put in the impugned Act to show that it should apply to all actions pending in appeal. Farther, the provision that no such order shall be called in question has a certain amount of ambiguity in it and leaves it doubtful whether only the parties are prevented from questioning the order, or even the Court is debarred from ignoring it as having been issued by an unauthorised body, and enforcing the law that has not been repealed or amended by the U. P. Act." .... "In view of the trend of judicial decisions already referred to, I am of the opinion that the impugn ed Act was not applicable to the appeal pending before the High Court." In Dooldbdas Pettamberdass v. Bamloll Tha-ckoorseydoss 5 Moo. Ind. App. 109, the Act in question (Act of the Indian Legislature, No. 21 of 1848) provided "That all agreements, whether made in speaking, writing, or otherwise, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void; and no suit shall be allowed in any Court of Law or Equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won on any wager, or entrusted to any person to abide the event of any game, or on which any wager is made." It was held that there are no words in the Act sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights. In the opinion of their Lordships, the Act could not be construed as affecting existing contracts, at all events, not those contracts on which actions have already been commenced. The Act declared all agreements by way of gaming or wagering null and void. It also provided that no suit shall be allowed in any Court of Law or Equity. In Asikannessa Bibi v. Dwijendra Krishna, A. I. R. 1931 Gal. 92 (2) an application for setting aside a sale was made under o. 21, R. 90, Civil P. C. The application was dismissed. An appeal was sought to be preferred against the order of dismissal. The District Judge, however, refused to admit the appeal on the ground that the decretal amount had not been deposited. 92 (2) an application for setting aside a sale was made under o. 21, R. 90, Civil P. C. The application was dismissed. An appeal was sought to be preferred against the order of dismissal. The District Judge, however, refused to admit the appeal on the ground that the decretal amount had not been deposited. The amendment of S. 174, Bengal Tenancy Act, which required the deposit of the decretal amount, came into force long after the application under O. 21, R. 90, Civil P. C. had been made. It was held that the amendment had no retrospective effect. In Kanak Kanti v. Kripa, Nath, A. I. R. 1931 Gal. 321, the sub-section introduced in the Bengal Tenancy Act by an amending Act of 1925, declar­ed that in construing S. 20 "a person shall be deemed to have continually held land in a village, not with studding that such village was defined, surveyed and recorded as, or declared to constitute a village at a date subsequent to the commencement of the said-period of 12 years." In Shiya Janki v. Rirtanand Singh, A. I. R. 1936 Pat. 173, a decree was passed by a Court of com­petent jurisdiction before the Bihar Tenancy Act (viil [8] of 1934) came into force. It was held that the Act could not apply to pending litigations in which decrees had been passed by Courts of com­petent jurisdiction before the Act came into force. In Jyotirindra Narayan Singh v. Purna Chandra, A.I.R. 1950 Assam 161, it was held that: "It is a recognised rule of construction that larger re­trospective power is not to be read into an Act or a provi­sion contained in an enactment than what was clearly intended by the Legislature." The Act in question in that case was applicable to pending suits and appeals, and it was held that it could not apply to pending execution proceedings. In Moohomed Amir Khan v. Mohd Khalil, A. I. R. 1947 Lah. 180, a District Magistrate issued a notification under the Defence of India Rules during the pendency of a suit for ejectment. In Moohomed Amir Khan v. Mohd Khalil, A. I. R. 1947 Lah. 180, a District Magistrate issued a notification under the Defence of India Rules during the pendency of a suit for ejectment. The notification provided that: "No tenant or sub-tenant shall be evicted from any such accommodation so long as he pays and is ready and willing to pay rent according to the terms of the tenancy and subject to the limit fixed in the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act and otherwise in the opinion of the District Magistrate, Sargodha, conducts himself as a good tenant both as regards personal conduct and rea­sonable care of the property." It was held that there was nothing in the notifica­tion to show that it was intended to have retros­pective operation, so as to affect pending actions. In Jaga Mohan v. Behari Barui, 39 cal. W. N. 1006, S. 188, Bengal Tenancy Act, as amended by Act iv [4] of 1928, was found to be not so retros­pective in operation as to apply to a pending suit which was for enhancement of rent under S. 52. It was held that S. 188, as amended by Act IV [4! of 1928, conferred a new right of action and, therefore, could not apply to pending suits. In Sudliya Bamji v. Mohammed Issak, A. I. R. 1950 Bom. 236, it was held that : "Where the statute is passed pending an action as distinct from 'after the date of the cause of action,' strong and distinct words are necessary to alter the vested rights of either litigant as they stood at the commencement of the action." [10] The rule of construction followed in the cases above referred to is very well recognised. There is no controversy about it, and the learned Government Advocate has no quarrel with it, as stated above. What he has contended is that in this case the Legislature has made its intention manifest, the language employed in the Act is not doubtful-it does not admit of two interpreta­tions; it forbids the Courts from giving effect to certain decree. The provisions of Acts, whether they were amending Acts or not, when they affect existing rights, were not given retrospective effect, so as to make them applicable to pending suits or appeals or actions in cases relied on by Mr. The provisions of Acts, whether they were amending Acts or not, when they affect existing rights, were not given retrospective effect, so as to make them applicable to pending suits or appeals or actions in cases relied on by Mr. Lahiri, but the finding in each case was that there was nothing in the language of the statute by which the law was changed during the pen­dency of an action, to indicate that it was meant to apply to pending actions. I have set out the provisions of Acts, the effect of which came up for consideration in those cases. I do not see any similarity in the provisions contained in the Acts dealt with in those cases with the provisions in this case. In all those cases, retrospective effect was not provided for either expressly or by neces­sary intendment. The Act in the present ease is very different. It embodies an unqualified manda­tory provision by which it prevents Courts from .giving effect to existing decrees; the result is that all decrees to which effect had not been given before the Act came into force, fall within its ambit. The meaning of the operative part of the Act as also the intention of Legislature cannot be mistaken. The decree can be saved from its operation only if, in the circumstances of this ease, it can be said that effect has already been given to it. This is a very difficult thing to say. All that has happened in the case so far is that a certificate of nbn-satisfaction has been sent by the Court which passed the decree to the Court in which the decree is sought to be executed. An application for execution of the decree also has been put in. The judgment-debtor objected to the execution of the decree on certain grounds. These objections were overruled, but no further steps were taken in execution, and the proceedings were stayed. I do not think it can be urged with reason that the decree has already been given effect to. If it has not been given effect to so far, the Courts have no power to give effect to it. To this extent the Act was intended to have retrospective effect, and the intention of the Legislature appears in express terms. [11] The next important contention raised by Mr. If it has not been given effect to so far, the Courts have no power to give effect to it. To this extent the Act was intended to have retrospective effect, and the intention of the Legislature appears in express terms. [11] The next important contention raised by Mr. Lahiri was that the Act is ultra vires the Constitution inasmuch as it contravenes cls. (i) and (2) of Art. 31 of the Constitution. This con­tention seems to me to be without any merit. Clause (l) of Art. 31 provides that "no person-shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." Assuming for the sake of argument that the Act deprives the respondent of his property, it has clearly been done by authority of law. The law in this Article refers to Statute law. It is obvious that private property may be taken away by legislative sanction, though not by a mere execu­tive order. It is not contended that the word 'law' in this Article would not include a law made by Parliament. No contravention of cl. (l) of Art. 31 is involved in the legislature enacting the impugned Act. Clause (2) of Art. 31 also has got no application; it applies to cases only where property, movable or immovable, including any interest in or in any company owning any commercial or industrial undertaking, is taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition. Assuming even here that the right to execute the decree, which the decree-holder had under the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order of 1947, was property within the meaning of Cl. (2), the application of cl. (2) would be attracted if the property was taken possession of or acquired for public purposes. In this case, the decree in favour of the respondent has not been taken possession of or acquired for any public purpose. The acquisition or taking also should be under some law, which is not the case here. This clause has, therefore, no application. The learned counsel also urged in the alternative that the provisions contained in the Act contravene Art. 19 (l), cl. (f) of the Constitution. Clause (f) of Sub-s. (l) of Art. 19 of the Constitution guarantees to the citizen the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. This clause has, therefore, no application. The learned counsel also urged in the alternative that the provisions contained in the Act contravene Art. 19 (l), cl. (f) of the Constitution. Clause (f) of Sub-s. (l) of Art. 19 of the Constitution guarantees to the citizen the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. Article 19 (l) (f) can have no applica­tion where the State has the right to deprive a person of his property under any law validly enacted under Art. 31. The right to acquire, hold and dispose of property is subject to the qualifica­tion that a person may be deprived of his pro­perty by authority of law. The right to enforce the decree by execution which was allowed to the decree-holder by Art. 4, cl. (3) of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, has been taken away by this Act, and if the right is property, as contended by Mr. Lahiri, it could be taken away by authority of law, but not otherwise, as provided by cl. (l) of Art. 31. There is nothing in Art. 19, cl. 1 (f), to prevent its being taken away by authority of law. If the Act de­prives the respondent of property, the Constitution permits it, when it is done under the authority of Jaw. The power to deprive a person of his property or to take possession of or acquire t for public purposes under the authority of law, are much wider than the power to acquire, hold and dispose of property under Art. 19 (l) (f) of the Constitution. The impugned Act does not involve any contravention of Art. 19 (l) (f) either, on Mr. Lahiri's own showing. [12] Mr. Lahiri has also argued that the impugned Act offends against the provisions contained in Art. 300 of the Constitution. This contention also has no force. Article 300 provides that the Government of India and any State Government may sue or be sued in the name of the Union and in the name of the State respec­tively in relation to their respective affairs. Mr. Lahiri did not clearly indicate the process by which he discovers any violation of Art. 300 on the part of the Legislature by enacting the im­pugned Act. Mr. Lahiri did not clearly indicate the process by which he discovers any violation of Art. 300 on the part of the Legislature by enacting the im­pugned Act. The process of his reasoning may well be that the right of suit against the Union Government, which Art. 300'concedes, includes the right to execute a decree against it, and the taking away of that right would contravene Art. 300. This would be rather far-fetched. Article 300 does not merely lay down the name in which the Govern­ment of India may sue or be sued. It clothes the Government of India with the status of a juristic person. It therefore could be sued. The word 'sue' would cover execution proceedings also. It is not limited to suits only. The only immunity that the Government of India and the Provincial Govern­ments enjoy is for acts done in the exercise of sovereign functions. This is correct so far as it goes, but it does not mean that the Government of India cannot lay down or even alter methods of enforcement of foreign decrees even though such decrees may be against itself. Article 300 was not intended to place any such restriction on he legislative powers of the Government of India in this respect. Its purpose is to bring out that the Government of India and the State Govern­ments are juristic persons. They can sue and be sued in the same manner as they might have sued or been sued if the Constitution had not been enacted. It has no reference to the legis­lative powers of the Government of India, which admittedly include the power to deprive any person of his property by authority of law and also to take away vested rights even against the Government by authority of law. The impugned legislation does not in any way contravene Art. 300. [13] Mr. Lahiri concedes that if the provisions of the Constitution relied on by him (Art. 31 (l) & (2), Art. 19 (l) and Art. 300) are not contravened, the legislation was within the competence of the Central Legislature and would not be in excess of its authority. In these circumstances, consider­ing the conclusion I have reached, the impugned Act must be found to be intra vires. The effect of the Act is to render the decree ineffective for purposes of execution. In these circumstances, consider­ing the conclusion I have reached, the impugned Act must be found to be intra vires. The effect of the Act is to render the decree ineffective for purposes of execution. It is not necessary in these circumstances, to deal with other objections against the execution of the decree, and the appeal must succeed on this ground alone. [14] The appeal is, therefore, allowed, but, considering the fact that the act which renders the decree incapable of execution came into force during the pendency of this appeal, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. [15] Deka J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.