Judgment :- 1. These petitions are for revising the orders passed in execution in O.S. 300 of 1097 of the Munsiff's Court, Attingal, and in O.S. 242 of 1116 of the Munsiff's Court, Alleppey, respectively. The revision petitions raise certain important questions of law, and both of them were referred for decision by a Full Bench. Since the questions raised in both the cases were to some extent inter-related, they were heard together. The questions raised will also be considered and decided together. 2. In the case dealt with in C.R.P. 429 of 1124, the suit was dismissed on 3.6.1100. It was restored to file and again dismissed on 29.10.1107. In appeal, the trial court decree was reversed and the suit decreed on 24.11.1113. In execution of that decree, certain properties attached before judgment were proclaimed for sale when the revision petitioner intervened and objected to the sale of item 2 in the proclamation schedule. He stated that the proclamation was issued on the assumption that the property had been attached before judgment, that there was no such attachment, that even if there was such an attachment, it was not in force, that the same should be deemed to have been raised when the suit was dismissed twice by the trial court, and that for these and other reasons the execution was to be stopped as regards item 2. The execution court held that though the trial court dismissed the suit it was decreed by the High Court and hence the attachment before judgment had revived, and that there is no substance in the objection that the attachment ceased with the dismissal of a prior execution application. The claim petition was dismissed and the claimant has filed this revision petition. 3. In C.R.P. 562 of 1124, the plaintiff had obtained an ex-parte decree on 11.6.1116. In execution of that decree certain properties were attached and the Amin filed his report of attachment on 20.2.1117. The ex¬parte decree was set aside on 5.6.1118 and the suit restored to me. The suit was then decreed in plaintiff's favour on 28.6.1120. In the meanwhile, i.e., on 11.2.1119, the revision petitioner had obtained a sale of the attached property from the defendant. The decree-holder, on 10.4.1122, applied for sale of the property without a fresh attachment. He relied on the attachment of 1117. The suit was then decreed in plaintiff's favour on 28.6.1120. In the meanwhile, i.e., on 11.2.1119, the revision petitioner had obtained a sale of the attached property from the defendant. The decree-holder, on 10.4.1122, applied for sale of the property without a fresh attachment. He relied on the attachment of 1117. The claimant objected to the liability of the property as he had become the owner of the same at a time when there was no attachment on the property. The execution court dismissed the claim petition and this petition is to revise that order. 4. The argument of the learned Advocates appearing in both the cases were heard. The questions that arise for consideration are: (1) whether an attachment before judgment, which ceases to be in force with the dismissal of the suit, will revive when the decree dismissing the suit is subsequently reversed and a decree in the plaintiff's favour passed; (2) whether an attachment which had been effected in execution of a decree, and which should be deemed to have been raised with the setting aside of that decree would revive when a decree was subsequently passed in favour of the plaintiff; and (3) whether an attachment before judgment shall cease to be operative, when the execution application seeking to execute the decree pursuant to that attachment is dismissed for default of the decree-holder as contemplated in 0.21, R. 57 C.P.C. 5. First Question: The relevant rule that has to be considered in this connection is R. 9 of 0.38 C.P.C. (Indian). It reads as follows: "Where an order is made for attachment before judgment, the Court shall order the attachment to be withdrawn when the defendant furnishes the security required, together with security for the costs of the attachment, or when the suit is dismissed". There is difference of opinion as to the revival of the attachment before judgment if the suit dismissed by the trial court is decreed by the appellate court in reversal of the decision of the trial court. 6. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Balaraju v. Masilamani (I.L.R. 53 Mad. 334) - (A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 514) had held that upon the dismissal of a suit, the attachment before judgment necessarily ceased under 0. 38, R. 9, even though the Court did not pass an order withdrawing it. 6. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Balaraju v. Masilamani (I.L.R. 53 Mad. 334) - (A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 514) had held that upon the dismissal of a suit, the attachment before judgment necessarily ceased under 0. 38, R. 9, even though the Court did not pass an order withdrawing it. The attachment before judgment itself is allowed to be effected so that the defendant may not alienate his properties with intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that might be passed in the suit against him. So the attachment is to enure for the benefit of a decree that has to be passed thereafter and if no decree is passed and the suit is dismissed without much argument it can be held that the attachment will go or die with the dismissal of the suit. It has been found necessary to stress this point here, because of certain observations in some other cases indicating that even if the suit is dismissed, the attachment before judgment will survive if there is no order withdrawing the same. Walsh, J. who wrote the leading judgment in the case reported in A.I.R. 1930 Madras, referred at page 515 of the report to the rulings of all the Indian Courts and came to the conclusion that the consensus of authority therefore was very much in favour of the view that an attachment before judgment ceased automatically when the suit was dismissed. Later on, His Lordship proceeded to consider whether the attachment before judgment that ceased with the dismissal of the suit would revive if the decree of the trial court was set aside and the suit was decreed by the appellate Court. At page 581 of the same report, the learned judge states thus: "To say that on a suit being decreed in appeal all the interlocutory orders passed in the course of the suit are at once revived appears to be going too far and might lead to serious difficulties." At page 519, he continues thus: "The object therefore of the attachment is to satisfy any decree which may be passed in the suit, and if this is read with R. 9, it seems clear that so far as this attachment is concerned, the decree passed in the suit is the decree passed by the trial court and not the appellate decree". 7. 7. With great respect to the opinion of the learned judge, referred to above, it has to be mentioned that this position, if accepted as correct, would lead to difficulties. In case the suit was decreed by the trial court and dismissed by the first appellate court, R. 9 allowing withdrawal of the attachment could not be made applicable. It must be far from the intention of the Legislature to pass an enactment that will lead to such obvious difficulties, and so it is the duty of the court to interpret the provisions in the statute in such a way as to give them a reasonable and practical meaning. It is now a concluded theory that proceedings in appeals are only continuation of the proceedings in the suit and that the decree of the appellate court must be taken as the decree in the suit. So it will be more proper to interpret the words "when the suit is dismissed" to mean when the suit is dismissed by the final court. 8. In the Madras case cited above, His Lordship Walsh, J. apprehends that serious difficulties will arise if it is held that all interim proceedings are revived when a suit dismissed by the trial court is decreed by the appellate court. In support he quotes the following instance at page 518 of the report. "A temporary injunction might be granted against the defendant, say, prohibiting the manufacture and sale of certain goods pending the disposal of the suit. If the suit were to be dismissed and on appeal it were decreed, would the defendant be liable to be proceeded against if he had continued to manufacture the articles after the suit had been dismissed by the first court"? It can be said, that on the plea of bona fides, the defendant cannot be punished for contempt of court; but other legal consequences for disobeying the order of injunction may follow in case the order of injunction like an order for attachment before judgment revives after the suit is decreed by the appellate court. If the injunction against the defendant was to restrain him from alienating his properties or from executing documents, that would also revive if under similar circumstances the attachment before judgment would revive. But such difficulties, as apprehended by His Lordship in this case, seldom crop up, particularly in cases of attachment before judgment. If the injunction against the defendant was to restrain him from alienating his properties or from executing documents, that would also revive if under similar circumstances the attachment before judgment would revive. But such difficulties, as apprehended by His Lordship in this case, seldom crop up, particularly in cases of attachment before judgment. The principle laid down in the above case is seen to have been accepted in two single bench decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Dular Sing v. Ram Chander (A.I.R. 1934 All. 165) and Ghulam Dastgir v. Mohammad Amin (A.I.R. 1937 All. 682). In the following decisions, (Pindi v. Thaw Ma & another, A.I.R. 1931 Rang. 281; Jali Basappa v. Heerada Rudrappa, A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 167; Jyothis Chandra Sen v. Har Chandra Saha, A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 234; and Parma Nand v. Tharu Lal, A.I.R. 1937 Lah.169) also the principle enunciated in A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 514 is adopted. 9. In Alamelu Ammal v. Krishna Ayyar (19 Cochin L.R. 316), it was held that the attachment before judgment taken out in a case ceases with the dismissal of the suit and that the filing of an appeal has not the effect of automatically restoring it. In this case, Their Lordships have not considered what the effect would be if the trial court decree was reversed and the suit decreed by the appellate court. There was a decision reported at Page 159 of the Select Decisions Vol. III, Cochin taking a contrary view; but this was not followed. It was mentioned that they were not following the previous ruling because it was against the ruling in Sasirama Kumari v. Meherban Khan (13 Cal. L.J. 243), Abdul Rahman v. Amin Sharif (45 Cal. 780) and Ram Chand v. Pitam Mal (10 All. 506) which according to them correctly interpreted the provisions of the C.P.C. on the subject. This ruling was distinguished in Gopalakrishnan Embranthiri v. Padmanabhan Unni (30 Cochin L.R. 510). L.J. 243), Abdul Rahman v. Amin Sharif (45 Cal. 780) and Ram Chand v. Pitam Mal (10 All. 506) which according to them correctly interpreted the provisions of the C.P.C. on the subject. This ruling was distinguished in Gopalakrishnan Embranthiri v. Padmanabhan Unni (30 Cochin L.R. 510). It was held, following the ruling in Veerasami v. Ramanna (A.I.R. 1935 Mad, 365), that where an order dismissing the suit for default was set aside on an application for that purpose, the suit remained as it was on the day when it was dismissed, and all proceedings taken up to that date must be deemed to be in force, and that, when the dismissal was set aside, all the interlocutory orders would be revived including an order for attachment of the property. But the learned judges who decided this case were not prepared to apply the rule when the suit was dismissed by the trial court and decreed by the appellate court as can be seen from the decision in Narasimha Padiyar v. Augusti (33 Cochin L.R. 279). 10. The rigour of the principle enunciated in A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 514, had been considerably slackened later on. The Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Veerasami v. Ramanna (A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 365) referred to in 30 Cochin L.R. 510 and Nayudamma v. Siveraju (A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 515) are instances for this. In the first case, when on an application, a suit dismissed for default was restored to file, it was held that the suit remained as it was on the day when it was dismissed, and that all interim orders passed till the disposal of the suit would revive. In the latter case, (A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 515) the suit was restored to file on review and it was held that the attachment before judgment effected before the suit was dismissed revived. In this, the decision in A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 514 was distinguished, and that in A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 365 followed. In Chetty Lal v. Sohrab Ali Khan (1925 Oudh. 592), it has been held that a surety who had executed a bond to get an attachment before judgment raised would be liable under the surety bond even if the suit was dismissed in the first instance and then restored to file. 365 followed. In Chetty Lal v. Sohrab Ali Khan (1925 Oudh. 592), it has been held that a surety who had executed a bond to get an attachment before judgment raised would be liable under the surety bond even if the suit was dismissed in the first instance and then restored to file. If the words "the suit is dismissed" in R. 9 of 0.38 were not intended to control the attachment if the suit was dismissed for default, it could be interpreted to mean that the dismissal was to be by the highest court where an appeal against the decree had been filed. The ruling in Muthayya Pillai v. D'Cruz (21 T.L.J. 841) is also in support of this view. The whole case law till then, including the ruling in 1930 Mad. 514, had been considered in that case. It was held that, where an attachment before judgment (under S.467 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1065) had been granted in favour of the plaintiff, and the suit was dismissed for default, but subsequently restored on the application of the plaintiff, and there was no special order of court withdrawing the attachment at the time of dismissal of suit, the attachment subsisted and could be availed of by the plaintiff in execution. Mr. Justice Joseph Thaliath who wrote the leading judgment in that case was further of opinion that there was no reason why there should be any difference in the effect of attachment when a claim petition was allowed, but reversed in suit, and when a suit was dismissed but restored to the file and decreed. As shown already, it is unnecessary to have a special order withdrawing the attachment at the time of the dismissal of the suit. One of the reasons given in the rulings holding against the revival of the attachment in cases of attachment effected before judgment, is because of the absence of a provision in 0.38 similar to the one in 0.21, R.63 C.P.C., which lays down that "where a claim or an objection is preferred, the party against whom an order is made may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute, but subject to the result of suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive". This problem has been solved by a Full Bench ruling of the Madras High Court in Arunachalam v. Periasami Servai (I.L.R. 44 Mad. 902). In this case, pursuant to the attachment before judgment the decree-holder applied in execution to sell the property and an order for sale was obtained, and a claim to the property was preferred and allowed by the court. On a suit to contest the order on the claim, being filed more than a year after such order, it was held that the property must be deemed to have been attached in execution of a decree by virtue of 0.38, R.11 C.P.C., and so a claim put in objecting to that attachment, after the order for sale, may properly be regarded as a claim petition filed in execution of the decree, so that a suit to set aside the order on the claim thus preferred could be filed within one year of that order. Thus an attachment before judgment was placed on the same footing as an attachment in execution of the decree when the decree-holder applied to enforce the attachment before judgment in execution. The findings of Thaliath, J. in 21 T.L.J. 841, that no distinction need be drawn between the effect of attachment when a claim petition was allowed but reversed in a suit, and when a suit was dismissed but restored to file and decreed, would make the position stronger that the attachment before judgment which ceased to be in force when the suit was dismissed would revive when the suit was decreed. When a claim petition was allowed and the attachment raised, the order of attachment would be held to be in suspense, if ultimately the claim order was set aside in a suit for the purpose. The attachment would therefore be in a state of suspense, and when that is revived, it is to have effect from the date on which the original attachment was put into force. This dictum was followed in Meerasayu v. Narayanan (25 T.L.J. 320), and it was held that no hardship would result to the owner of a property attached before judgment, being told that the attachment would be terminated only by the final disposal of the dispute involved in the suit. This dictum was followed in Meerasayu v. Narayanan (25 T.L.J. 320), and it was held that no hardship would result to the owner of a property attached before judgment, being told that the attachment would be terminated only by the final disposal of the dispute involved in the suit. It has to be mentioned that apart from strict legal aspects of the question, considerations of equity also prevailed with their Lordships in coming to the above conclusion. 11. Reference had also been made in that case to the non-withdrawal of the attachment when the suit was dismissed. But though some importance had been given to this aspect of the case, it would be clear that for the other reasonings given there the conclusion arrived at in that case could be supported. The question is therefore answered in the following terms: 12. An attachment before judgment which ceased to be in force with the dismissal of the suit will revive when the decree dismissing the suit is subsequently reversed and a decree in the plaintiff's favour is passed, even by the same court or by a superior court and this revival will be in force from the date on which the attachment before judgment is effected as provided for in the Civil Procedure Code. 13. Second Question: An answer to this will depend on the construction to be put on 0. 21, R. 55(c) C.P.C. (Indian) = 0. 21, R. 53 C.P.C. (Travancore). This Rule lays down that, where in execution of a decree the attachment has been effected, such attachment shall be deemed to be withdrawn if the decree is set aside or reversed. The attachment is a process in execution and it depends on the subsistence of the decree in execution of which the attachment is effected. So, when this decree goes, the attachment also ceases. If the suit is again decreed by the same court which set aside the decree, or by a superior court which reversed the decree, it is this latter decree with a fresh starting point of limitation that has to be executed subsequently, and so the previous attachment under a decree which no longer existed cannot revive. 14. If the suit is again decreed by the same court which set aside the decree, or by a superior court which reversed the decree, it is this latter decree with a fresh starting point of limitation that has to be executed subsequently, and so the previous attachment under a decree which no longer existed cannot revive. 14. As observed by Mitter, J., in Sri Rammanik v. Tincowri Rai (4 Bengal Law Reports 63) an attachment prior to a decree is not an attachment for the enforcement of the decree, but is a step taken merely for the purpose of preventing the debtor from delaying or obstructing such enforcement when the decree subsequently passed shall be sought to be executed. An attachment after the decree is, on the other hand, an attachment made for the immediate purpose of carrying the decree into execution, and it presupposes an application on the part of the decree-holder, to have his decree executed. This distinction is also explained in Basiram Malo v. Kattyayani Debi (I.L.R. 38 Cal. 448). According to this ruling an attachment before judgment does not for all purposes stand on the same footing as an attachment in execution proceedings. This, indeed, is obvious from first principles. The attachment does not of necessity ensure the property to the person who attaches it. He becomes entitled to proceed against it only if he eventually gets a decree. The plaintiff must not only wait until he has obtained a decree; it is not competent for him to proceed against the property attached until he has also taken the primary steps which the law requires for its enforcement; in other words, he must apply for execution, just like any other creditor. This distinction also came up for consideration in a recent decision of this court in Kuncheria Kochouseph v. Ouseph Chandy (1952 K.L.T. 144) wherein the decisions mentioned above were quoted with approval. Thus, an attachment in execution is a process in execution, and such process can be in force only so long as the decree pursuant to which the attachment is effected is alive. When that decree is set aside or reversed the attachment must go. This principle had been accepted in Narayana Pillai v. Chandrasekhara Pillai (1945 T.L.R. 289). It was held there, in the first instance, that an attachment in execution of a decree would terminate with the reversal of that decree. When that decree is set aside or reversed the attachment must go. This principle had been accepted in Narayana Pillai v. Chandrasekhara Pillai (1945 T.L.R. 289). It was held there, in the first instance, that an attachment in execution of a decree would terminate with the reversal of that decree. However this ruling added a rider that though the attachment would cease with the reversal of the decree and, if that decree were reversed on appeal or annulled on review, this later decree did not revive the attachment so as to affect alienation made before the date of such reversal, and that subject to this qualification the attachment would revive. With due respect to the learned judges who decided that case, it has to be mentioned that this qualification cannot find support on a strict and grammatical interpretation of 0. 21, R. 55 (c), Civil Procedure Code. 15. There is another ruling of the Travancore High Court reported in Krishna Iyen v. Parvathinath Pillai (28 T.L.J. 1218) which had been referred to in the 1945 T.L.R. case mentioned above. In the 28 T.L.J. case relying on the principles enunciated by Ss. 108 and 115 of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code, corresponding to Ss. 114 and 151 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code, it had been held that an attachment effected in execution of an ex-parte decree which was subsequently set aside resulting in the restoration of the suit to file, would revive if the suit was again decreed in plaintiff's favour. It is doubtful whether S. 144 of the Indian C.P.C. could be made applicable to execution proceedings, for, the procedure prescribed under this section is made applicable only to original proceedings. At any rate, the provisions in S. 144 can be attracted only on the satisfaction of three conditions, namely, (I) the restitution sought must be in respect of the decree which had been varied or reversed; (II) the party applying for restitution must be entitled to a benefit under a reversing decree and (III) the relief claimed must be properly consequential on the reversal or variation of the decree. The court can make an order for restitution only if these conditions are satisfied. In order to get a revival of an attachment which had terminated, none of these conditions could be applied, and so S. 144 would have no application. The court can make an order for restitution only if these conditions are satisfied. In order to get a revival of an attachment which had terminated, none of these conditions could be applied, and so S. 144 would have no application. It is always open to the party who thinks that his rights are deferred to satisfy the court that he is entitled to a particular relief and obtain the necessary orders to protect his interests. If in execution of a decree an attachment had been effected, and if the decree was reversed or set aside, the aggrieved party could move the court which was then seized of the case to effect an attachment of the property, which should be deemed to have been terminated by the reversal of the decree. When the party has the right to claim such a relief it is seldom that the provisions of S. 151 C.P.C. are invoked to help them. It does not therefore appear that the basis for the decision in 28 T.L.J. 1218 is correct. 16. The ruling in Parma Nand v. Tharu Lal (A.I.R. 1937 Lah.169) is also in support of the position that when a decree is reversed the attachment shall be deemed to have been withdrawn and that a subsequent reversal of this decree will not revive the attachment. No doubt, an attachment which is raised by an order on a claim petition will revive if the claim order is subsequently set aside in a suit. But this is by virtue of the provision in 0.21, R.63 C.P.C. An attachment raised by an order in a pending application because of the dispute between the parties to the decree will also revive if that order is reversed in appeal, because the proceedings in execution are continued in the appellate court if the appeal is filed against that order. But this analogy will not apply when the attachment is deemed to be withdrawn under Cl. (c) of O. 21, R. 55. 17. The answer to question two is therefore, that an attachment effected in execution of a decree which is subsequently reversed or set aside, shall be deemed to be withdrawn, and that there will be no revival of this attachment when the suit is decreed by the same court, or a superior court. 18. (c) of O. 21, R. 55. 17. The answer to question two is therefore, that an attachment effected in execution of a decree which is subsequently reversed or set aside, shall be deemed to be withdrawn, and that there will be no revival of this attachment when the suit is decreed by the same court, or a superior court. 18. Third Question: There is considerable difference of opinion between the several Indian High Courts in treating the attachment before judgment as an attachment in execution within the meaning of 0.21, R.57 C.P.C. The Madras, Bombay, Sind, Cochin and Nagpur High Courts, and the Travancore High Court in its two later rulings, have taken the view that an attachment before judgment would cease to be in force if an application for execution in furtherance of the attachment before judgment was dismissed for default. The earlier rulings of the Travancore High Court, and the Allahabad, Calcutta and Patna High Courts take the opposite view. 0.38, R.11 C.P.C. reads thus: "Where property is under attachment by virtue of the provisions of this Order and a decree is subsequently passed in favour of the plaintiff, it shall not be necessary upon an application for execution of such decree to apply for a re-attachment of the property". 0.21, R.57 is as follows: "Where any property has been attached in execution of a decree but by reason of the decree-holder's default, the court is unable to proceed further with the application for execution, it shall either dismiss the application or for any sufficient reason adjourn the proceedings to a future date. Upon the dismissal of such application the attachment shall cease". 0.21 R. 55 is the corresponding provision in the Travancore C.P.C. There, after the words "the attachment shall cease", the words "unless the court expressly directs that it shall continue in force" are added. Apart from this, there is no difference in this provision in the two statutes. 19. The question to be considered is whether the attachment before judgment would cease on the dismissal of an execution application for default, where a decree-holder had in execution of the decree obtained by him applied to enforce the decree pursuant to the attachment before judgment. Apart from this, there is no difference in this provision in the two statutes. 19. The question to be considered is whether the attachment before judgment would cease on the dismissal of an execution application for default, where a decree-holder had in execution of the decree obtained by him applied to enforce the decree pursuant to the attachment before judgment. One of the arguments advanced to hold that the attachment would not cease was, that while a suit to set aside an order on a claim petition had been provided for in the case of attachment in execution of a decree, there was no corresponding provision in the case of attachment before judgment. It was therefore urged that it was the intention of the Legislature to treat these two categories of attachments as separate. As already mentioned, this question had come up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Madras High Court, reported in I.L.R. 44 Madras 902. A reference to this had also been made while dealing with the first question. Accepting the conclusions arrived at there, it will be seen that there is no scope for the distinction sought to be drawn because of the absence of such a provision in 0.38. 20. S.51 of the Civil Procedure Code prescribes the procedure in execution. One of the procedures prescribed is that the court, may, on the application of the decree-holder, order execution of the decree by attachment and sale or by sale without attachment of any property. Where the decree itself directs the sale of properties, as in the case of mortgage decrees, it is clear that no attachment is necessary for bringing the property to sale in execution of that decree 0. 21, R. 30 C.P.C. provides that a money decree may be executed by the detention in the civil prison of the judgment debtor or by the attachment and sale of his property, or by both; and this provision read along with 0. 21, R. 64, which provides, that any court executing a decree may order that any property attached by it shall be sold, will clarify the position that in execution of money decrees, an attachment is necessary before ordering sale. Thus an attachment of the judgment-debtor's property in such circumstances is necessary. S.51, Cl. 21, R. 64, which provides, that any court executing a decree may order that any property attached by it shall be sold, will clarify the position that in execution of money decrees, an attachment is necessary before ordering sale. Thus an attachment of the judgment-debtor's property in such circumstances is necessary. S.51, Cl. (b) therefore empowers the court in general terms to attach and sell in execution any property and this has to be interpreted to mean that the court has jurisdiction to attach and sell in execution any property which the decree-holder puts forward as the property of the judgment-debtor. Thus an attachment of the debtor's property is necessary though in some cases it has been held that a sale without an attachment might be only an irregularity and not an illegality. At any rate, ordinarily there must be an attachment of the property before sale of the same can be ordered by the court. 21.0.38, R.11 provided that in case there was an attachment before judgment there was no necessity for a reattachment of the property in execution. This could be taken to mean that when the property attached before judgment was sought to be proceeded against in execution, the attachment before judgment would be deemed to be an attachment in execution of the decree. 0.21, R.57 does not say that the attachment mentioned there is pursuant to an application for execution which is subsequently dismissed for default. If the execution application was filed only to enforce such attachment, viz., and attachment before judgment, then it has to be taken that the attachment shall cease with the dismissal of that application. According to the Travancore decisions, it was clear that the attachment subsisting need not have been pursuant to an application for execution; for even while dismissing the application it was open to the court to keep in force the attachment effected pursuant thereto. As already mentioned, when the decree-holder applies to enforce an attachment before judgment in execution, such attachment becomes an attachment in execution, and there is no reason why it has to be treated otherwise. So, if the execution application which wanted to enforce the attachment is dismissed for default of the decree holder then by force of the order in 0.21, R.57 the attachment will cease. So, if the execution application which wanted to enforce the attachment is dismissed for default of the decree holder then by force of the order in 0.21, R.57 the attachment will cease. This identical question has been elaborately considered by a Full Bench of five judges in Mayyappa Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar (A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 494 = I.L.R. 47 Mad. 483). Three of the learned judges took the view that the attachment before judgment becomes an attachment in execution when an application for execution of the decree is admitted and that such attachments are governed by the provisions of 0.21, R.57. Two of the learned judges took a different view. 22. The reasoning given at pages 499 and 500 of the report by Coutts-Trotter, J.; who wrote the leading judgment in support of the majority view can be quoted with advantage. It runs thus: "The whole point here is whether 0.21, R.57, operates on an attachment which had been obtained before judgment or is to be confined to an attachment first sought and obtained after decree and in execution of that decree. It is well settled that attachment creates no title in the decree-holder or the prospective decree-holder as the case may be. It is merely a process whereby the Court puts its hand on the property attached and keeps it in custodia legis until something else happens. It appears to me that 0.38, R.11, provides that, when property has been attached before judgment, it remains attached when in due course after judgment, the decree holder applies for execution of his decree. It has resolved doubts alluded to in Ramakrishna Das Surrowji v. Surfunnissa Begum, 6 Cal. 129 P.C., as to whether after decree it might not be necessary for the attaching creditor to re-attach the property and it provides in terms that the property shall remain attached upon an application for execution of the decree. I am unable to see that there is any difference in rerum natura between an attachment before judgment and an attachment in execution of decree except that the one is prospective and, after the condition is fulfilled which brings it into active operation, namely the obtaining of a decree, confers a priority in time. I am unable to see that there is any difference in rerum natura between an attachment before judgment and an attachment in execution of decree except that the one is prospective and, after the condition is fulfilled which brings it into active operation, namely the obtaining of a decree, confers a priority in time. But an attachment before judgment is not a remedy of a kind higher than, or different from, an attachment applied for and obtained for the first time in execution of a decree already passed. Language is used in some of the cases which might suggest that the mere passing of a decree converts an attachment before judgment into an attachment in execution. I do not adopt that view for the reasons pointed out by Wallis, C.J., in Arunachalam Chetty v. Periyasami Servai [44 Mad. 902 F.B.]. The reasoning appears to be this -and I respectfully regard it as perfectly sound - that a decree-holder need not proceed in execution unless he chooses to do so, and it would therefore be absurd to say that an attachment is an attachment in execution when there is no execution. The turning point comes in my opinion when the decree-holder by filing an execution petition has shown that he means to execute his decree and I am myself unable to escape from what seems to me the logical conclusion that, when he has elected to proceed in execution, an attachment which he has obtained an on which he must necessarily base his petition and demand for sale, becomes automatically an attachment in execution. That seems to me to underlie the reasoning of the judges in the Full Bench case to which I have referred, particularly of Spencer, J., with whom I find myself in complete accord. I think it is also implied in the reasoning of the judgment in Vavuddin Sahib v. Arunachala Mudali, 26 M.L.J. 215. I confess I am not impressed by the argument that 0.21, R.57 is a penal enactment which takes away rights which would otherwise exist and must therefore be construed verbatim at liberatim. No common law rights are here involved. The whole position of the decree-holder and all his rights are alike the creatures of a bundle of statute-made provisions. The statute punishes lack of diligence on the part of the decree-holder. No common law rights are here involved. The whole position of the decree-holder and all his rights are alike the creatures of a bundle of statute-made provisions. The statute punishes lack of diligence on the part of the decree-holder. I am unable to see any logical reason why his lack of diligence should be punished only if he has attached the property after decree but excused if he attached it before decree. Nor do I think that the grammatical construction of 0.21, R.57, can really bear the construction sought to be put on it. The words are "where any property has been attached in execution of a decree". That I construe as meaning "where any property has been in a state of attachment in execution of a decree" and not confined to cases where the first act of attachment was made subsequently to the decree. To put it in the technical language of grammer, I regard "has been attached", as a perfect and not an aorist tense. In my opinion, when a decree-holder having obtained his decree takes out an execution petition, he has, in effect, elected to take the benefit of 0.38, R.11, and asks the court to treat his attachment henceforth as an attachment in execution of the decree which he is seeking to execute. When he has made that election it seems to me that his attachment thereupon becomes subject to those requirements of diligence laid down by 0.21, R.57. I cannot assent to the view that attachment before judgment and attachment in execution are two such wholly different things as to make any provision applicable in express terms to the one in no event applicable to the other, because, in my view, as soon as a decree-holder applies for execution on the strength of the attachment that he has obtained before judgment and which he seeks after judgment to use as validating the sale for which he is applying, he thereby by his own act asks the Court to treat his attachment as being an attachment in execution. I would, therefore, answer the question propounded in the negative" 23. Ramesan, J., who had agreed with Coutts-Trotter, J., had also elaborately considered the question and the view expressed by His Lordship can be adopted. The same view is also adopted in the following decisions. Hari v. Shrinivas (I.L.R. 55 Bom. 693) =1931 Bom. I would, therefore, answer the question propounded in the negative" 23. Ramesan, J., who had agreed with Coutts-Trotter, J., had also elaborately considered the question and the view expressed by His Lordship can be adopted. The same view is also adopted in the following decisions. Hari v. Shrinivas (I.L.R. 55 Bom. 693) =1931 Bom. 550, Pribhomal v. Krishnomal (A.I.R. 1941 Sind 13) and Ganapati v. Mahadeo (A.I.R. 1921 Nag. 57). In Travancore National and Quilon Bank v. Ouseph Thomas (35 T.L.J. 627), a Division Bench of the Travancore High Court, held that there is no difference in rerum natura between attachment before judgment and attachment in execution except that the former is prospective and confers a priority in time, and that when a decree is passed, an attachment before judgment becomes as much an attachment in execution by virtue of the provision of 0.36 R.11 (Travancore) corresponding to 0.38, R.11 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code. The same principle was followd by the same learned judges in Palpu v. Narayanan (36 T.L.J. 499 at 501). It was held that the life of the attachment before judgment appeared to be bound up with the decree that if the decree was reversed in appeal, the attachment would end but if in second appeal, the first decree was restored the attachment would revive, and if the decree be dead for want of any application for execution, attachment must be deemed to have died with it. They also referred to Narayana Pillai v. Chandrasekhara Pillai (35 T.L.J. 310) corresponding to (1945 T.L.R. 289) which held that the revival did not relate back so as to affect alienation effected before the date of such reversal. As already shown while dealing with the first question of this reference, this is not a view that can be accepted. 24. The Cochin High Court has followed A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 494 and held that the only privilege the decree holder in such a case enjoys is that there is no necessity for him to re-attach the property. But it does not exempt him from the penalties that await negligence on the part of the attaching decree-holders in general as provided for in 0.21, R. 57 C.P.C. = 0.21, R. 55, Cochin C.P.C. (Vide the Full Bench ruling Krishnan Namboori v. Madhavan Namboori 30 C.L.R. 258.) 25. But it does not exempt him from the penalties that await negligence on the part of the attaching decree-holders in general as provided for in 0.21, R. 57 C.P.C. = 0.21, R. 55, Cochin C.P.C. (Vide the Full Bench ruling Krishnan Namboori v. Madhavan Namboori 30 C.L.R. 258.) 25. The opposite view is taken in Shibnath Singh Ray v. Sheikh Saberuddin Ahmed (I.L.R. 56 Cal. 416). It was mentioned there that 0.21, R.57 C.P.C. was intended to provide a remedy for the grievance or inconvenience which is apt to arise, where after an attachment in execution, the application for execution cannot further be proceeded with by reason of the decree-holder's default; and that it was no part of the intention of this rule to say that an attachment before judgment which existed before any application could be made in execution and which prima facie continue to have effect if no application for execution had been made, should fall to the ground merely because a subsequent application for execution has come to nothing. 26. If the provision in R. 57 of 0.21 C.P.C. is to avoid the grievance or inconvenience of the judgment-debtor, it is necessary to apply the rule in regard to all attachments of his properties. After decree, an attachment before judgment cannot have an independent existence apart from its association with the decree, and when the decree is sought to be enforced in furtherance of the attachment already effected the attachment becomes an attachment in execution. The other rulings that hold the same view are: Anjaneyulu v. Subbiah (A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 860), Motijha v. Jowala Prasad (A.I.R. 1937 Pat. 626) and Ayezali Mir v. Mahanandbarui (A.I.R. 1949 Cal. 320). The Travancore rulings which take the opposite view are Eapen Thomas v. Iffy Kurien (6 T.L.J. 252), Ussan Kannu v. Sahul Ameethu (20 T.L.J. 898), Yakob Kathanar v. Nainan (23 T.L.J. 753) Parvathi Bai v. Kanthimathi Ammal (24 T.L.J. 587) and Nilakanta Pillai v. Padmanabha Pillai (32 TLJ 121). 27. The decision in the 6 T.L.J. case was under the Civil Procedure Code of 1065 (Travancore) in which there was no provision corresponding to 0.21 R.57 of the Indian C.P.C. In 24 T.L.J. 587, Their Lordships did not fully consider this question. 27. The decision in the 6 T.L.J. case was under the Civil Procedure Code of 1065 (Travancore) in which there was no provision corresponding to 0.21 R.57 of the Indian C.P.C. In 24 T.L.J. 587, Their Lordships did not fully consider this question. They had mentioned that it was noticeable, however, that all the British Indian Courts did not speak with one voice on the matter, and that it would therefore require careful consideration before disturbing the course of the authorities in Travancore and starting a new current. Their Lordships therefore did not go particularly into that question as it was possible for them to decide that case on another point. 28. In 23 T.L.J. 753, though it was unnecessary to consider this question for the disposal of the case, Their Lordships had expressed their view on the matter. This is what Their Lordships say, at page 755 of the report, particularly referring to I.L.R. 47 Mad. 483. "Even according to the British Indian decisions, in order that an attachment before judgment should come to an end under 0.21, R.57, it is necessary that the decree-holder should have applied for execution by sale of the attached property and his application been dismissed for default". This has not happened in the present case. Hence it is manifest that 0. 21, R. 55 = 0.21, R.57 (Indian) has no applicability. Thus, the question now before us, did not directly arise for consideration, any where in the above cases. 29.20 T.L.J. 898 definitely held that the provisions in 0.21, R.57 (0.21, R.55 Travancore) would apply in terms only to attachment in execution. Since a simple money decree can be executed against the judgment-debtor's properties only after attachment of his properties, when properties are proceeded against, an attachment is a necessary act to be done before execution can be enforced. When the attachment before judgment is relied and enforcement of the attachment before judgment depended upon the decree itself, it will be expedient and proper to treat an attachment before judgment as an attachment in execution when further steps to proceed against the properties attached are applied for, and to apply the provisions of 0.21, R.57 C.P.C. in case of dismissal of execution application for the decree-holder's default. It is therefore held that an attachment before judgment shall cease to be operative when the execution application seeking to execute the decree pursuant to such attachment is dismissed for reasons stated in 0.21, R.57 C.P.C. (Indian). 30. The orders passed by the courts below in the two revision petitions require re-consideration in view of the decisions on the points mentioned above. These orders are therefore set aside, and the cases sent back for fresh disposal of the matters involved in these revision petitions.