Judgment.- On 5th August, 1947, one Narayanaswami Mudaliar and his younger brother Ramakrishna Mudaliar executed two mortgage deeds one for Rs. 10,000 and the other for Rs. 27,500 in favour of one Sundararaja Iyengar. Both these documents were presented for registration on 19th November, 1947. They were registered so far as one of the mortgagors, Ramakrishna is concerned, on 8th December, 1947 and it was compulsorily registered as regards the other mortgagor Narayanaswami on 17th February, 1948. On 14th April, 1948, that is to say more than three months after the date on which the documents were presented for registration, but less than three months from the date on which the documents were registered as regards Narayanaswami, two creditors filed a petition under section 9 of the Provincial Insolvency Act to adjudicate Narayanaswami, Ramakrishna and three other members of their family as insolvents. This petition was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge on the ground that so far as Rama-krishna was concerned the petition has been presented more than three months after the date of the registration of the document. He dismissed the petition so far as Narayanaswami is concerned on the ground that he had already been adjudicated insolvent in the Sub-Court, of Guntur. On appeal the learned District Judge agreed with the conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge that the documents must be deemed to have been registered on 19th November, 1947 and since, computing from that date, the petition had been presented more than three months later, it was out of time. Mr. Umamaheswaram, the learned advocate for the petitioning creditors contended that this view of the court below is wrong. According to him the date from which time must be computed is 17th February, 1948, the date on which the document was registered so far as Narayanaswami the first respondent, is concerned. I shall examine how far this contention is sound. Mr. Umamaheswaram, the learned advocate for the petitioning creditors contended that this view of the court below is wrong. According to him the date from which time must be computed is 17th February, 1948, the date on which the document was registered so far as Narayanaswami the first respondent, is concerned. I shall examine how far this contention is sound. Section 54 of the Provincial Insolvency Act provides: “Every transfer of property.....made.....by any person unable to pay his debts as they become due from his own money in favour of any creditor.....shall if such a person is adjudged insolvent, on a petition presented within three months after the date thereof, be deemed fraudulent and void as against .......” Now it is obvious that before this section can be availed of there must be a transfer which is legally complete and which the law will recognise and take notice of. It follows, therefore, that where the law enjoins that before a transfer can be effective, the document in question must be registered, the transfer would become complete in the eye of the law only on the date the document is registered. It will be noticed that in the expression “the date thereof” the word “thereof” relates to “transfer” so that time must be computed not from the date which the instrument bears, but from the date when the instrument becomes effective as a transfer. If authority were required for this position it may be found in Iswarayya v. Subbanna1 and Venkatadri Somappa v. Official Receiver, Bellary2. These decisions lay down that if the date of the execution of the document is different from the date on which it is registered, then the date on which it is registered shall constitute the starting point for the computation of time. The difficulty in this case arises out of the fact that the date of registration is different not merely from the date of the execution of the document but also from the date on which the document was presented for registration. In such a case from what point should time be computed? Section 75(3) of the Registration Act provides, it seems to me, clear guidance in this matter. In such a case from what point should time be computed? Section 75(3) of the Registration Act provides, it seems to me, clear guidance in this matter. Dealing with cases where compulsory registration is ordered by the District Registrar, this sub-section provids that such registration shall take effect as if the document had been registered when it was first duly presented for registration. The effect of this provision is that the statute fixes the date of presentation as the date of valid registration. On that date the transfer would become complete. For purposes of section 54 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, the date of the transfer referred to in it, would therefore, be the date on which the document is presented for registration, which date by force of the statute is deemed to be the date of the registration. Authority for this position is to be found in Venkatadri Somappa v. Official Receiver of Bellary2. In that case a mortgage was executed on the 5th of March, 1933. The document was presented for registration on the 27th of June. The mortgagor denied registration and the Sub-Registrar refused to register the document. The District Registrar directed the document to be registered and this was finally done on the 11th of December, 1933. After referring to the provisions of section 75(3); of the Registration Act, the Court held that the mortgage deed must be deemed to have been registered on the 27th June. Mr. Umamaheswaram argued that section 47 of the Registration Act provides, that a registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required and not from the time of its registration. The decisions of this Court, said Mr. Umamaheswaram have refused to apply the principle of section 47 of the Registration Act when computing the three months’ time referred to in section 54 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Consistently with that, he argued, this Court must refuse to compute time retrospectively for the purpose of section 75 also. I am unable to see any logical connection between these two provisions. Considerations which would be relevant under section 47 of the Registration Act have no application to section 75(3) of the same Act. Consistently with that, he argued, this Court must refuse to compute time retrospectively for the purpose of section 75 also. I am unable to see any logical connection between these two provisions. Considerations which would be relevant under section 47 of the Registration Act have no application to section 75(3) of the same Act. The question, for decision here is this: was the transfer complained of made within three months preceding the date on which the insolvency petition was filed? In order to find out when the transfer was made, we have to ascertain when the transfer became complete. That date must be the date on which the document was actually registered or deemed by the law to have been registered. Section 75 of the Registration Act provides that registration shall take effect from the time when the document was first duly presented for registration. It follows that the time must be computed from the date of the presentation of the document for registration which in this case was 19th November, 1947. As the petition was filed only on 14th April, 1948, it is clearly out of time. The decision of the Court below is correct and this civil revision petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate’s fee two sets. R.M. ----- Revision dismissed.