RAM LABHAYA Ag. C. J.: Hanuman-(2) It is alleged by the petitioner that he is the owner of the land measuring about 5 lessas of Dag No. 1633/Kha of periodic patta No. 962. The land has got a two-storyed pucca building on it. The petitioner was doing business in Desangmukh in the District of Sibsagar. Feel­ing that life was insecure there on account of the outbreak of subversive activity in that area, he shifted his residence and business to the town of Sibsagar. The land in question was originally in occupation of tenants. He got vacant possession of it by evicting them. One of the tenants was evicted on or about the 26th March 1949 and the petitioner occupied the part of the premises vacated by him. His (petitioner's) eldest son and some member a of the family shifted to that building and have been in continuous possession jointly with other tenants. On the 8th April 1950, he suc­ceeded in ' getting exclusive possession of the entire property. The double-storeyed house consisting of 4 rooms in all was said to have been built at a cost of Rs. 35,000/-. It became partially fit for occupation in September 1950, and was actually occupied on the 20th October 1950. It was further alleged by the petitioner in paras 6 to 8 of his petition that some members of his family were still in a village in the inte­rior of the District of Sibsagar which was unsafe for habitation and there was urgent necessity of removing them to Sibsagar town. Another house belonging to and in possession of the petitioner consisting of 2 living rooms only could not accommodate his entire family and also serve the needs of his business. The two-storeyed house in question was built by him for the residence of his three sons from his first wife and also for use as his business premises. On the 30th October 1950, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sibsagar, served on him a copy of an order dated the 26th October 1950, purporting to have been issued by him under the powers conferred on him by Government Notification No. RPQ 56/49/43 dated the 15th October 1949 under Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (Assam Act XXV (25) of 1948), as amended by Assam Act XVI (16) of 1949. The order was in the following terms: "In exercise of the powers vested in me by the Government Notification No. RPQ 56 / 49/43 dated the 15th October, 1949, I. B. M. Dam, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sibsagar, hereby requisition the land as per Sch. I, below for providing accommodation for the Sibsagar Branch of the Assam Co-operative Apex Bank, Ltd., under S. 3 (1) of the Assam Act XXV (25) of 1948 as amended by Assam Act XVI (16) of 1949, on the requisition of the Branch Manager of the said Bank. The amount of compensation, rent, etc., if .any, which shall be payable by the allottees, will be subject of a subsequent order which shall be passed as early as possible after neces­sary enquiries." (3) It is claimed that the Assam Co-opera­tive Apex Bank, Ltd., is suitably accommo­dated. It was a private Bank registered under the Co-operative Societies Act and that it was not an institution necessary for maintaining supplies and services essential to. the life of the community within the meaning of S. 3 of the Assam Act XXV (25) of 1948 and there­fore the Sub-Divisional Officer had no jurisdic­tion to requisition the premises for providing accommodation to the Sibsagar Branch of the Bank. It is further alleged that the property had been in continuous possession of the peti­tioner or his tenants for more than a year im­mediately preceding the date of the order and on this ground also the property could not be the subject-matter of a requisitioning order. (4) The petitioner appealed from the order to the Provincial Government under S. 3 (3) of the Assam Act XXV (25) of 1948 which will hereafter be referred to as the Act. The ap­peal* it is alleged, was heard by the Parliamentary Secretary, Revenue Department to the Government of Assam on the 5th March, 1951. This appeal was dismissed. The order purports to have been signed by Mr. G. C. Phukan, De­puty Secretary to the Government of Assam, and it was issued in the name of the Governor of Assam. It is contended that the Parliamen­tary Secretary was not a competent authority to hear and dispose of the appeal, and therefore the appellate order is without jurisdiction. (5) The petition is supported by an affida­vit. We have also a counter affidavit of the Sub-Divisional Officer who issued the order in question. It is contended that the Parliamen­tary Secretary was not a competent authority to hear and dispose of the appeal, and therefore the appellate order is without jurisdiction. (5) The petition is supported by an affida­vit. We have also a counter affidavit of the Sub-Divisional Officer who issued the order in question. The deponent stated that the nor­thern room of the premises of the house in question with the room in the upper storey on it was vacant at the time of the order re­quisitioning it. It was also vacant when pos­session was taken. He further stated that the petitioner had three other houses in Sibsagar town suggesting that accommodation available to him was enough for his needs. The allega­tion that the requisitioned house was in pos­session of either the landlord or the tenant for a period of one year immediately before the date of the order was repudiated and it was stated that the petitioner's son occupied only two rooms and that too since the 15th Octo­ber. 1950. As regards the Co-operative Apex Bank, his statement was that it is an institution financed by the Government and its officers were also appointed by the Government. It afforded banking facilities to local Co-operative Socie­ties and these Societies were meeting the needs of the public in the matter of supply of con­trolled commodities and textile goods. The building in which the Bank was housed pre­vious to the order in question it was alleged was not strong or commodious enough for the purposes of the Bank. All these statements of facts had been made on information which the Sub-Divisional Officer believed to be true. (6) It is stated in the requisitioning order that the land in question was being requisition­ed for providing accommodation to the Sib­sagar branch of the Assam Co-operative Apex Bank, Ltd. Clause (1) of Section 3 provides that if in the opinion of the Provincial Gov­ernment or any person authorised in this be­half by the Provincial Government it is neces­sary so to do for purposes specified in the clause, the Provincial Government or the per­son so authorised, as the case may be, may, by order in writing, requisition any land and may make such further orders as appear to it or to him to be necessary or expedient in con­nection with the requisitioning. (7) The Sub-Divisional Officer, Sibsagar, was a person authorised to requisition lands and buildings under this clause. (7) The Sub-Divisional Officer, Sibsagar, was a person authorised to requisition lands and buildings under this clause. He, therefore, had the power to requisition the house in question if in his opinion it was necessary to requisition it for any of the purposes specified in S. 3, cl. (1) of the Act. Clause (3) of Sec. 3 fur­ther provides that when the order for requisi­tion is made by any authority other than the Provincial Government, any person interested in the land, within 30 days from the date of issue of the order, may appeal to the Provin­cial Government and the decision of the Pro­vincial Government in such appeal shall be final. The question that arises for determina­tion in the case in these circumstances is whe­ther writs of prohibition and certiorari could issue in respect of the original order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the appellate Order of the Provincial Government. (8) Before a writ of certiorari or prohibition could issue, it is necessary that there should be a tribunal or an officer having authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and having a duty to act judicially. In this case, Section 3 (1) of the Act invests the Pro­vincial Government and any other person au­thorised in this behalf by the Provincial Gov­ernment to requisition land and make neces­sary consequential orders. Both the Provincial Government and the Sub-Divisional Officer who was authorised to act under Section 3(1) had the legal authority to form the opinion before acting under Section 3(1), that the requisition of the land was necessary for any of the pur­poses denned in Section 3(1). It is obvious that action under S. 3(2) would involve inter­ference with the rights of subjects. The ques­tion, is whether there was any duty on the part of the Provincial Government or the Sub-Divisional Officer to act judicially. (9) The language used in S. 3(1) indicates that a judicial approach was not contemplated. A judicial or quasi-judicial authority has to give its decision on the question of rights in­volved objectively. Its conclusions have to be arrived at by fixed and recognised standards. Even the discretion with which a judicial au­thority may be invested is to be exercised ac­cording to recognised principles. No such ap­proach is expected from administrative autho­rities. This is one of the distinguishing features. Its conclusions have to be arrived at by fixed and recognised standards. Even the discretion with which a judicial au­thority may be invested is to be exercised ac­cording to recognised principles. No such ap­proach is expected from administrative autho­rities. This is one of the distinguishing features. The contemplated approach affords a basis for trading out whether the authority determining the questions affecting the rights of subjects is an administrative authority or judicial or quasjudicial in character. Section 3, clause (1) leaves the decision of the question whether requisitioning of land is necessary for certain purposes to the determination of the Provin­cial Government or any other officer authoris­ed to act under that clause. They are left to form the opinion that requisitioning is neces­sary for some purpose specified in clause (1) of the Section 3 of the Act. Both the existence of a recognised purpose and also the need for requisitioning are matters to be decided by the authorities acting under Section 3(1). For de­termining these matters no objective standards or tests are laid down. The determination is left to the subjective discretion of the authori­ties concerned. There is no other indication of 'a contemplated judicial approach in any provi­sion of the Act. '(10) As to what is indicated by a judicial approach, observations of Fazl Ali, J. in 'PRO­VINCE OF BOMBAY v. KHUSHALDAS S. ADVANI', 1950 SCR 621 , at p. 639, may be refer­red to with advantage: "An order will be a judicial or quasi-judicial order if it is made by a Court or a Judge or by some person or authority who is legally bound or authorised to act as if he was a Court or a Judge. To act as a Court or a Judge necessarily involves "giv­ing an opportunity to the party who is to be affected by an order to make a representation, making some kind of en­quiry, hearing and weighing evidence, and considering all the facts and circumstances bearing on the merits of a controversy, be­fore any decision affecting the rights of one or more parties is arrived at. The procedure to be followed may not be as elaborate as in a Court of law and it may be very summary, but it must contain the essential elements of judicial procedure as indicated by me." (11) Where the determination of a question is left to the exercise of subjective discretion, the decision is administrative in character. The reason is that in such a case the Legislature confides the power to a particular body with a discretion how it is to be used. When power is reposed in a certain authority and it is in­vested with discretion about its exercise, it would be beyond the powers of the Courts to question the exercise of that discretion or to investigate into the grounds or the reasonable­ness of the decision arrived at in the exercise of that discretion. In such a case, the Court can enquire into the validity of the decision if bad faith in the authority is alleged or if the act done is in excess of the powers conferred on the authority or the officer concerned. (12) Section 4 (1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, provides that "The Provincial Government may, if in its opi­nion the public interests require, revoke a licence in the following cases: (a) Where the licensee, in .the opinion of the Provincial Government makes wilful and unreasonably prolonged default............" It was held in 'HUBLI ELECTRICITY CO. LTD. v. PROVINCE OF BOMBAY', AIR 1949 PC 136, that there was nothing in this Section to sug­gest that the opinion of the Government could be subjected to objective tests. (13) Section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisi­tion Ordinance of 1947 provides that "If in the opinion of the Provincial Govern­ment it is necessary or expedient to do so, the Provincial Government may by order in writing requisition any land for any public purpose............" The provision had to be interpreted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in 'PROVINCE OF BOMBAY v. KHUSHALDAS S. ADVANI', AIR 1950 S C 222. The Supreme Court by a majority held that "when the Executive authority has to form an opinion about an objective matter as a preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact and the exercise of the power based thereon are alike matters of an administrative character and are not amen­able to the writ of certiorari. When- the law under which the authority is making a deci­sion, itself requires a judicial approach, deci­sion will be quasi-judicial." On the language of S. 3, it was found that only a subjective approach was contemplated and therefore the decision of the requisition­ing authority in that case was held to be an administrative act against which a writ of cer­tiorari could not issue. It is noteworthy that according to this decision it is necessary that the obligation to act judicially should exist in the Statute establishing the body which makes the decision. In the language of the Ordinance, which their Lordships interpreted, they did not find any requirement for a judicial approach. The language of S. 3 of the Ordinance which came to be interpreted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court is identical with that em­ployed in the operative part of cl. (1) of S. 3 of the Assam Act. The provision, therefore, is susceptible of the same interpretation and the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court covers it. Mr. Barua concedes that cl. (1) of S. 3 of the Act cannot be differently interpreted. He, how­ever, urges that though the Provincial Govern­ment is fully authorised to come to its decision by a subjective approach, the same cannot be said of the Sub-Divisional Officer notwithstand­ing that under cl. (1) of S. 3 the powers con­ferred on both the Provincial Government and any other officer authorised by the Provincial Government in this behalf are the same. He draws a distinction between the powers of the Provincial Government and that of the Sub-Divisional Officer in this case on the basis of the provision contained in cl. (3) of the section. Clause (3) provides for an appeal from the order of any authority other than the Provincial Gov­ernment acting under cl. (1) of S. 3. He urges that if the decision of an inferior authority is subject to appeal, a judicial approach to the determination of the question is necessarily indi­cated. An enquiry and a statement of the reason for a decision would be needed to enable the appellate authority to see the basis on which the decision of the inferior authority rests. The necessary implication of the right of appeal is that the inferior authority is required to per­form a quasi-judicial function. An enquiry and a statement of the reason for a decision would be needed to enable the appellate authority to see the basis on which the decision of the inferior authority rests. The necessary implication of the right of appeal is that the inferior authority is required to per­form a quasi-judicial function. In support of this proposition he has relied on the observa­tions of Kania C. J. made in 'PROVINCE OF BOMBAY v. KHUSHALDAS S. ADVANI', AIR 1950 SC 222 at page 226, when he was dealing with the case of the 'KING v. POSTMASTER-GENERAL', (1928) 1 KB 291. The learned Chief Justice noticed that in that case "A surgeon's certificate which gave or deprived a person of the right to compensation was considered a judicial act and if the person had no jurisdiction to give such a certificate .a writ of certiorari was considered the pro­per remedy." He justified this view on the ground that in that case a procedure of inquiry was provided under the Act. The case was under those pro­visions of the Workmen's Compensation Act which 'inter alia' gave a right of appeal against the surgeon's decision. He also noticed that the subsequent right to obtain compensation start­ed with the certificate and was not an indepen­dent act of the deciding authority having no connection or concern and not influenced by this decision. It is clear that these observations do not sup­port the contention that the mere existence of a right of appeal against an order is enough to indicate that the officer whose order is subject to appeal is under an obligation to act judicially. The basic thing in the case which the learned Chief Justice was examining was that there was a procedure of inquiry provided by the Act. The procedure at the initial stage involv­ed a judicial approach. This view was reinforc­ed by the fact that there was the right of ap­peal. But the right of appeal by itself was not regarded as the sole and the conclusive basis for adjudging a proceeding as of judicial or quasi-judicial character. In the present case, the learned counsel concedes that clause (1) of S. 3 of the Act with which we are concerned does not require any judicial approach. It casts no obligation on the Sub-Divisional Officer to act judicially. It provides no procedure of in­quiry and lays down no objective standard for him to follow. In the present case, the learned counsel concedes that clause (1) of S. 3 of the Act with which we are concerned does not require any judicial approach. It casts no obligation on the Sub-Divisional Officer to act judicially. It provides no procedure of in­quiry and lays down no objective standard for him to follow. The matter is left to his sub­jective discretion. This distinguishes the pre­sent case from the case 'KING v. POSTMASTER GENERAL', to which the learned Chief Justice referred in the case of 'PROVINCE OF BOM­BAY v. KHUSHALDAS S. ADVANI'. (14) No other authority has been cited in sup­port of the contention that a proceeding or an act merely requiring a subjective approach both in the original and appellate authority would be converted into a quasi-judicial proceeding by the mere existence of the right of appeal. On the contrary, this Court held in 'DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, GOALPARA v. UPENDRA SARAN', reported in AIR 1950 Assam 25, that the mere fact that an officer or authority exer­cised appellate jurisdiction would not convert him into a Court. This view was based on a Calcutta case reported in 'SASHI BHUSAN v. FUL KHAN', AIR 1940 Cal 454. In that case it was held that like Debt Settlement Boards an appellate officer was also not a Court within the meaning of Section 195 of the Cr. P. C. The learned Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court when considering whether the Debts Set­tlement Tribunal was a Court came to the con­clusion that the functions of the Debts Settle­ment Tribunal on the original as well as appel­late side did not come within the wider defini­tion of the word 'Court.' The fact that the law provided an appeal did not convert the Debts Settlement Tribunal into a Court. Here the nature of the functions of any officer that may be authorised to act under Section 3(1) by the Provincial Government is exactly the same as of the functions of the Pro­vincial Government. The Provincial Govern­ment and any other officer of the Provincial Government who may be authorised to act under Sec. 3(1) have an administrative func­tion to perform. There is no difference in the nature of their function or du­ties. Even as an appellate authority, the Provincial Government is under no obliga­tion to act judicially. It is authorised to come to its decision by the exercise of its subjective discretion. There is no difference in the nature of their function or du­ties. Even as an appellate authority, the Provincial Government is under no obliga­tion to act judicially. It is authorised to come to its decision by the exercise of its subjective discretion. Orders of the inferior and of the appellate authority both therefore would be ad­ministrative in character. Mr. Barua concedes that in these circumstances, no writ of prohibi­tion or certiorari can issue. Discovering now that the appeal was heard by the Deputy Minis­ter who was in charge of the Revenue depart­ment and not by a Parliamentary Secretary as alleged in the petition, he has also not pressed that the appellate order is without jurisdiction. (15) This petition, therefore, must fail and is dismissed. The rule is discharged. (16) DEKA J.: I agree. Petition dismissed.