Judgment.- The only question in this civil miscellaneous second ‘appeal is whether the usufructuary mortgage deed, dated 16th April, 1908, has been completely discharged under the provisions of section 9-A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. One Audinarayana executed a usufructuary mortgage deed, Ex. D-1,. dated 16th April, 1908, in favour of Suryanarayana, Appalanarasimhulu, Narasiah and Chiranjeevulu. The sons of the mortgagor sold the equity of redemption to one Appalanarasimhulu and Venkata Narasimhulu under Ex. P-3, dated 24th February, 1920. The heirs of Venkata Narasimhulu sold their interest in the mortgage to Appalaswami under Ex. P-2, dated 28th October, 1945. Venkata-ramanayya is the heir of Appalanarasimhulu. Appalaswami and Venkatarama-nayya have therefore become the owners of the equity of redemption. Appalaswami filed O. P. No. 33 of 1948 on the file of the District Munsiff, Vizianagaram, under section 19-A of the Madras Act IV of 1938, to declare the sum due under the mortgage deed, dated 16th April, 1908. To that application Venkataramanayya, the owner of the half share in the equity of redemption, was made the fifth respondent. The original mortgagees having died, their legal representatives were impleaded as respondents 1 to 4. The learned District Munsiff, and in appeal, the learned District Judge, Vizagapatam, held that the mortgage debt was completely discharged under section 9-A of the Act. The respondents, i.e., the legal representatives of the original mortgagees, prefer the above appeal. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that as the petitioner purchased the interest of Venkata Narasimhulu on 28th October, 1945, so far as he was concerned, the debt is not discharged under the provisions of section 9-A. The relevant provisions of section 9-A may now be read: “Section 9-A(3): Where a usufructuary mortgagee has been in possession of the property mortgaged to him for an aggregate period of thirty years or more, then, not withstanding anything contained in sections 8 and 9 or the fact that the time, if any, fixed in the mortgage deed for redeeming the mortgage has not arrived, the mortgage debt shall be deemed to have been wholly discharged, with effect from the expiry of such period, or where such period expired before the commencement of the Madras Agriculturists Relief (Amendment) Act, 1948, with effect from the commencement of that Act. Section 9-A(7).-Nothing contained in this section except sub-section (1) shall apply to any usufructuary mortgage- (ii) in respect of property situated in any other area in the cases mentioned below: (a) Where during the period after the 30th September, 1937 and before the 30th January, 1948, the equity of redemption in the property subject to the usufructuary mortgage has devolved either wholly or in part on a person by or through a transfer inter vivos either from the original mortgagor or from a person deriving tide from or through such mortgagor otherwise than by a transfer inter vivos, then, to the whole or such part, as the case may be.” If a transaction conveying the equity of redemption is effected between the 36th September, 1937, and 30th January, 1948, in the manner prescribed in section g-A (7) (ii) (a), the mortgage is taken out of the operation of section g-A, i.e., such, a mortgage will not be deemed to be discharged under the section. But the section has not been artistically drafted and has lent ample scope for conflicting arguments. The discussion in the Legislative Assembly at the time of enacting of the aforesaid clause does not afford any clue and it is also not permissible to search for any light in that quarter. I would therefore construe the provisions of the section strictly in accordance with the plain meaning of the words used therein. Omitting that part of the clause which is irrelevant for the present purpose, it reads: “the equity of redemption.....has devolved either wholly or in part on a person, by or through a transfer inter vivos from a person deriving tide from or through such mortgagor otherwise than by a transfer inter vivos.” Devolution of a property otherwise than by a transfer inter vivos may include court sales, succession, survivorship, etc. To get an exemption therefore, a person should have acquired a title to the equity of redemption by a transfer inter vivos from another person who in his turn acquired a right to the same by one of the modes mentioned above, namely, succession, survivorship, court-sale, etc. To illustrate, A is the owner of the equity of redemption. A dies and B succeeds to him. B sells the equity of redemption to C between 30th September, 1937, and 30th January, 1948. To illustrate, A is the owner of the equity of redemption. A dies and B succeeds to him. B sells the equity of redemption to C between 30th September, 1937, and 30th January, 1948. C comes directly under this exception and therefore his usufructuary mortgage debt will not be deemed to have been discharged wholly or in part under the provisions of section g-A of the Act. To take a different illustration, if B sells the equity of redemption to D before 30th September, 1937, and D sells it to C between the aforesaid two dates, can it be said that the equity of redemption has devolved on C through a transfer inter vivos during the aforesaid period from B, the heir of A? In the second illustration, the equity of redemption has not devolved during the prescribed period on a person through a transfer inter vivos from a person who acquired the property otherwise than by a transfer inter vivos. The first transfer from the heir, i.e., the sale of B to D, may come within the terms of the clause; but that took place prior to 30th September, 1937. The second sale which took place between the aforesaid two dates would only be by a transfer inter vivos from a person who himself got it by transfer inter vivos. That is what happened in this case. From the aforesaid fact it will be seen that the first petitioner purchased the equity of redemption frbm the heirs of Venkata Narasimhulu and that Venkata Narasimhulu purchased the same from the sons of the original mortgagor in the year 1920. The petitioner therefore purchased the equity of redemption from the heirs of a person who in his turn purchased from the heirs of the original mortgagor in 1920. The purchase of the petitioner therefore between the aforesaid two dates was not from a person deriving title through the mortgagor otherwise than by transfer inter vivos. He purchased it not from the mortgagor’s heirs but from the heirs of the purchaser from the mortgagor’s heirs. The trans- action therefore does not strictly fall within the terms of the clause. It was said there is no apparent principle for making a distinction between a purchase from a heir of a mortgagor and a purchase from a purchaser from the heir of a mortgagor. The trans- action therefore does not strictly fall within the terms of the clause. It was said there is no apparent principle for making a distinction between a purchase from a heir of a mortgagor and a purchase from a purchaser from the heir of a mortgagor. The same anomaly may also be pointed out in the case of a devolution of the equity of redemption on a person by or through a mortgagor, dealt with in the first part of the clause. There too the transaction to be hit by the section should have been a transfer inter vivos from the original mortgagor between-the aforesaid two dates. The clause would not apply if the transfer effected between the aforesaid dates is from a transferee from the original mortgagor prior to 30th September, 1937. If it be permissible to read the mind of the Legislature, it may be suggested that the clause is intended to affect transfers inter vivos of an equity of redemption from the original mortgagor or his heirs etc., directly between the aforesaid two dates. The section was presumably enacted to hit at speculators who might have purchased the property after 30th September, 1937, hoping to get relief under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. If a mortgagor or his heir or a person who acquired the property from the mortgagor otherwise than by a transfer inter vivos, transferred the interest in the equity of redemption to another before the 30th September, 1937, the legislature presumed that a purchase during the aforesaid period from the first purchaser would be bona fide. But as I have already said, this is only a surmise and it is not necessary to make one if the terms of the clause are otherwise clear, as I have held them to be. I therefore hold that Ex. P-2 dated 28th October, 1945, is a transfer not covered by the provisions of section 9-A(7)(ii)(a). The learned District Judge was therefore right in applying the provisions of section 9-A(3) of the Act. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.