Judgment.- The plaintiff executed a deed of simple mortgage in favour of one Kandaswami Pillai for Rs. 500 on 12th October, 1922. The money due under that deed was payable at the end of three years. On 6th May, 1925, the plaintiff executed Exhibit A-1, a deed of usufructuary mortgage, in favour of the first defendant. As part of the purchase price, the defendant was directed to pay off the money due to Kandaswami Pillai under the first mortgage. It was common ground that the defendant never paid this amount,. Kandaswami filed a suit to enforce the mortgage and obtained a decree, Exhibit A-2, on 30th August, 1938. In execution of that decree the hypotheca was brought to sale on 3rd March, 1943. The sale was confirmed on 10th April, 1943. The plaintiff instituted the suit, out of which this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal arose, on 1st April, 1946, claiming damages for the breach of the contract between the plaintiff and the first defendant evidenced by Exhibit A-1, under which the first defendant had undertaken to redeem the mortgage effected by the plaintiff in favour of Kandaswami. The learned Munsif held that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by limitation. Hence the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge held that Article 83 of the Limitation Act applied, and that the period should be computed from 10th April, 1943, on which date the sale was confirmed, thus finally extinguishing the right of the plaintiff as well as the first defendant to redeem the mortgage which had been effected in favour of Kandaswami. The learned Subordinate Judge further held that, as the learned Munsif had not decided specifically either the liability of the defendant to pay the damages claimed by the plaintiff, or the quantum of those damages, the suit would have to be remanded for determination of those issues in accordance with the directions given in the appellate judgment. There was also the claim that the first defendant, as an agriculturist, was entitled to the benefits of Madras Act IV of 1938. The second defendant, one of the legal representatives of the first defendant, preferred this appeal against the order of remand by the learned Subordinate Judge. There was also the claim that the first defendant, as an agriculturist, was entitled to the benefits of Madras Act IV of 1938. The second defendant, one of the legal representatives of the first defendant, preferred this appeal against the order of remand by the learned Subordinate Judge. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that, since the liability of the defendant to pay the amount due to Kandaswami under the mortgage effected in his favour arose on 12th October, 1925, that is three years after the date of mortgage in favour of Kandaswami, the present suit filed in 1946 was barred by limitation. Learned counsel relied on Doraisinga Thevar v. Arunachalam Chetti1. All that could be held on the basis of that case, is that in such a contingency the plaintiff could, at any time after 12th October, 1925, have filed a suit claiming damages for breach of contract occasioned by the failure of the vendee to discharge his obligations to pay a portion or the whole of the purchase money to clear off a pre-existing encumbrance. Doraisinga Thevar v. Arunachala Chetti1 is not an authority for the position, for which learned counsel for the appellant contends now, that the vendee, i.e., the plaintiff in this case, had no other remedy open to him. The learned Subordinate Judge rightly came to the conclusion, that the damage sustained by the plaintiff in this case was on the final extinction of the right to redeem the mortgage in favour of Kandaswami, and that that exinction was on 10th April, 1943. I see no reason to differ from the learned Subordinate Judge. On that finding the learned Judge-was right in holding that Article 83 of the Limitation Act applied and that the suit filed on 1st April, 1946, was in time. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that there was no necessity for a remand at all. The plaintiff’s claim was for an ascertained sum based upon the amount which the defendant had failed to pay to Kandaswami with interest thereon. But the learned Subordinate Judge rightly pointed out that that may not be the only basis for ascertaining the damages which the plaintiff claimed he sustained by the breach of contract by the defendant. The market value of the property could give a fair basis for ascertaining the actual loss sustained by the plaintiff. But the learned Subordinate Judge rightly pointed out that that may not be the only basis for ascertaining the damages which the plaintiff claimed he sustained by the breach of contract by the defendant. The market value of the property could give a fair basis for ascertaining the actual loss sustained by the plaintiff. As the learned Subordinate Judge pointed out, it may even eventually mean that the plaintiff suffered no damages at all. Since there was no evidence on the market value of the property and since the trial court did not assess the quantum of damages .on any basis, the learned Subordinate Judge had no option but to remand the suit for ascertaining the correct basis for assessing the damages to which the plaintiff would be entitled. There is also, as I have pointed out earlier the question whether the defendant would be entitled to any relief under Act IV of 1938. The order of the lower Court is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with: costs. Leave to appeal is refused. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.