This is an appeal from the judg­ment and decree of the Additional District Judge, U. A. D., by which an order of the Subordinate Judge, Cachar, granting the plaintiff a decree for Bs. 1305 with proportionate costs, was reversed and plaintiff's suit dismissed. [2] The plaintiff's case, shortly stated, was that he was a lessee of what is known as the Katakhal Perry. According to him, it was a public ferry under the control of the P. W. D. and it was leased to him under the terms of a deed of lease (Ex. l). According to the terms of the lease, the plaintiff was to ply one big marboat for crossing vehicular traffic and one small boat for crossing passengers. The agreement was for a period com­mencing from 1-3-1943 and ending on 31-3-1944. It was War period, and there was unexpected increase in Military traffic; in consequence, the use of another big marboat on that ferry was found necessary in order to avoid delays. The S. D. O. and the Overseer, P. W. D., supplied the plaintiff with another big marboat, and under their direc­tions the plaintiff-appellant engaged certain addi­tional boatmen for plying the additional marboat on the assurance given both by the S. D. O. and the Overseer that the additional expenditure in­curred by him in plying the 2nd marboat would be paid to him on his submitting bills. [3] One of the defences raised was that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to hear the suit. The learned Sub-Judge found that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was not excluded, and that the plaintiff was entitled, on the merits of the case, to a decree for a sum of Bs. 1305. The learned Addi­tional District Judge, on appeal, found that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was excluded by S. 34, Northern India Perries Act (XVII [17] of 1878). In view of his finding on this point, he did not determine the other issues that arose in the case. [4] On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, it is urged that S. 34, Northern India Perries Act, does not at all oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court in this case. This contention, in my opinion, is well founded. In view of his finding on this point, he did not determine the other issues that arose in the case. [4] On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, it is urged that S. 34, Northern India Perries Act, does not at all oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court in this case. This contention, in my opinion, is well founded. Section 34, Northern India Perries Act, provides that : "No suit to ascertain the amount of any compensation payable, or abatement of rent allowable, under this Act, shall be cognisable by any civil Court." The suit is admittedly not for any abatement of rent; it is also not for ascertaining any compensa­tion payable under the Act. Compensation under the Act can be claimed only under S. 5 of the Act "for any loss sustained by any person in conse­quence of a private ferry being taken possession of under S. 4 . . .", under S. 10, when any lease is cancelled under that section, under S. 11, -when there is a surrender of a lease, and under S. 33 for possession and use of boats or their equipment or any materials or appliances suitable for setting up a ferry. It is conceded by the learned Government Advocate that the claim put forward by the plain­tiff in this case is not covered by any of the sections under -which compensation may be claim­ed under the Act. It is only suits for compensa­tion under the Act of which cognizance cannot be taken by the civil Courts by virtue of the provi­sions contained in S. 34. The jurisdiction of civil Courts is not excluded in suits not answering the description given in S. 34. In this case, what the appellant claimed was additional remuneration for employment of labour which he had to engage under the directions of the S. D. 0. for plying an additional marboat for meeting needs arising out of the war situation. Section 34 of the Act has no application to this case and does not exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to hear and dispose of the suit out of which this appeal arises. The learned Government Advocate has referred me also to the provisions of S. 6, Indian Tolls (Army and Air Force) Act, (l90l), as amended. Section 34 of the Act has no application to this case and does not exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to hear and dispose of the suit out of which this appeal arises. The learned Government Advocate has referred me also to the provisions of S. 6, Indian Tolls (Army and Air Force) Act, (l90l), as amended. Section 6(1) of the Act provides that if any owner or lessee of any Company, Railway Administration or Local Authority claims compensation for any loss alleged to have been incurred owing to the operation of this Act, the claim shall be submitted to the Central Government. It does not provide for the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The learned Advocate also cannot show that the plaintiff in this case is claiming compen­sation for loss alleged to have been incurred owing to the operation of this Act. The exemption of persons and property falling under S. 3 of the Act from liability to pay toll was part of the agree­ment in favour of the plaintiff. No loss occurred to the plaintiff by reason of the operation of the Act. It was the plying of the additional marboat under the directions of the S. D. O. and the overseer with an assurance for compensation, that forms the basis of the action. Section 6, Indian Tolls Act, also has no application to the facts of this case. The order of the learned Additional Judge is, not sustainable, in the view which is based on the assumption the case set up by the appellant in his plaint, is true or correct. [5] The appeal is allowed. The appellate order is reversed. The records shall be sent back to the lower appellate Court for disposal of the appeal on the merits. The costs in this Court shall be costs in the case. Appeal allowed.