Judgment.- This is a second appeal which is sought to be preferred against the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Vizagapatam in A.S. No.45 of 1952 confirming the decree and judgment of the learned District Munsif of Vizagapatam, in O.S.No.101 of 1951. O.S.No.101 of 1951 was tried along with two other suits. O.S.Nos.102 and 103 of 1951 and a common judgment was delivered. The plaintiffs in all these suits were the same and the first defendant in all these suits was different. But the controversies between the plaintiffs and these defendants were the same and were in regard to three parcels of land situated within the municipal limits of Vizagapatam town. The first defendant in O.S.No.101 of 1951 preferred an appeal in A.S. No.45 of 1952 and we are not concerned with the first defendant in the other two suits. The case for the plaintiffs in regard to these lands situated as just now mentioned inside the Vizagapatam Municipality and which are being enjoyed as residential sites and on which sheds have been put up is as follows: The lands along with other lands originally belonged to Ankitham people. One branch of Ankitham people gave permanent cowle of their share of lands, of which the suit sites form part, to Eluru Appalaswami, Polamuru Chellayya, Dandu Atchanna and Duvvapu Pathanns by registered document, dated nth July, 1888, registration extract of which is Ex. A-7, while the second branch of Ankitham people gave a similar permanent cowle of their share to others under Exhibit A-13. Eluru Appalaswami sold his share in Exhibit A-7 to Dandu Atchanna, his co-sharer, by registered sale deed, dated 13th July, 1901, Exhibit A-11. Polamuru Chellayya sold the share got by him under Exhibit A-7 to Chilla Appalaswami under registered sale deed, dated 2nd April, 1901, Exhibit A-9. Dandu Achanna sold his interest in the property covered by Exhibit A-7 to Chilla Appalaswami by registered sale, deed, dated 20th April, 1901 Exhibit A-12. Duwapu Pothanna sold his share under Exhibit A-7 to Chilla Appalaswami by registered sale deed, dated 2nd April, 1901, Exhibit A-10. Chilla Appalaswami sold the lands acquired by him under the sale deeds mentioned above to Messrs. Rednam Venkata Krishna Rao and Gurunatha and Jonalagadda Appanna Pantulu under registered sale deed, dated 12th March, 1919, Exhibit A-8. Duwapu Pothanna sold his share under Exhibit A-7 to Chilla Appalaswami by registered sale deed, dated 2nd April, 1901, Exhibit A-10. Chilla Appalaswami sold the lands acquired by him under the sale deeds mentioned above to Messrs. Rednam Venkata Krishna Rao and Gurunatha and Jonalagadda Appanna Pantulu under registered sale deed, dated 12th March, 1919, Exhibit A-8. At the partition between the three sharers the suit sites fell to the share of the plaintiffs in these suits, and this is admitted by D.W.2. The site was managed by Sri Rednam Venkata Krishnarao during his lifetime and later by his son Sri Rednam Dharmarao, the second defendant. During the aforesaid management, defendants were inducted into possession of the sites, first defendant’s mother having executed a kadapa dated 15th June 1940. The site in question was required by the lessee for residential purposes; but however as printed agricultural leases were readily available, the kadapa was obtained on a printed form describing the site as “nivesanam” with a condition that it should be vacated with 15 days’ notice. After the expiry of the lease, the lessee continued in possession as tenant holding over, paying yearly rent from time to time. The first defendant held possession of the site as tenant after her mother’s death, paying rent therefor to the lessor. Later she defaulted in the payment of rent. The contention of the present appellant Muthyala Lakshminarayana, wife of Sankarayya, 50 years, trader and residing at Vizagapatam is that she was inducted into possession of the present suit site by Chilla Appalaswami, that Chilla Appalaswami conferred occupancy rights and that this appellant had been cultivating the suit lands. Then there was a great storm which is now admitted to be the cyclone of 1925 and this site became unfit for cultivation. Then this lessee constructed a residential shed and has not been cultivating the land and has been continuing to pay the rents. This is one stage. The second stage is stated to be that when Sri Rednam Venkata Krishna Rao Naidu started managing these properties he told this appellant that she might continue on the suit site with permanent tenancy rights and that this appellant has been paying the rents occupying the site in the residential shed. Therefore the plaintiffs are not entitled to evict this permanent occupancy tenant and secondly, that the House Rent Controller alone has jurisdiction to order eviction. Therefore the plaintiffs are not entitled to evict this permanent occupancy tenant and secondly, that the House Rent Controller alone has jurisdiction to order eviction. Therefore, the two points which arose for consideration in the lower courts were whether the appellant first defendant had acquired permanent rights of occupancy either under the Madras Estates Land Act or by means of a grant from Chilla Appalaswami and Rednam people and secondly, whether the suit for eviction is barred by the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946. Both the courts below came to the conclusion on the facts that the first, defendant appellant is not a permanent occupancy tenant either under the Madras Estates Land Act or by means of a grant and that the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act has no application to this case. The suit of the plaintiffs was decreed and time was given for vacating the property. I find that on the facts both the lower courts came to the correct conclusion that the first defendant appellant has not made out the permanent occupancy rights set up by her either under the Madras Estates Land Act or by grant. Taking the case put forward under Madras Estates Land Act, first of all, on the facts it has not been shown that this area forms part of an estate to which the Estates Land Act is applicable. Secondly, in order to acquire occupancy rights the land in which the right is claimed should be ryoti land. Land fit for pasturing cattle and not for ploughing and raising crops is not ryoti land: Raja of Venkatagri v. Ayyappa Reddi1. Where for great many years lands have not been cultivated, the onus of proving that the lands are cultivable is on the person contending that they are ryoti lands, that is to say, cultivable lands. Maharaja of Venkatagiri v. Rami Reddi2. Saline grazing ground which has been enjoyed as pasture land for many years is not cultivable land: Seshayya v. Rajah of Pithapuram3. The mere fact that lands may have been occasionally cultivable with some dry crops will not make any difference. Waste lands usually submerged in water in the rainy season, though actually cultivated in a few years were held to be not ryoti lands: Subbayya v. Sree Raja Venkataramiah Apparao Bahadur4. The mere fact that lands may have been occasionally cultivable with some dry crops will not make any difference. Waste lands usually submerged in water in the rainy season, though actually cultivated in a few years were held to be not ryoti lands: Subbayya v. Sree Raja Venkataramiah Apparao Bahadur4. Where ryoti land is defined as cultivable land, it means land permanently cultivable for all practicable purposes and not land which might be occasionally cultivated. It means land that is ordinarily and usually cultivated and does not refer to waste land even though waste land can at times be cultivated with labour and expenditure of money. Though lands were actually cultivated in the remote past but used for building purposes at the time of the passing of the Act in 1908, and since then, such lands will not be presumed to be ryoti lands: Thirumalai Tirupati Devastanam Committee v. Komarappa Mudali5. But since lands have been proved to have been cultivated at the time of the passing of the Act or at some time while the Act had been in force, whatever the actual use to which a ryot may put a land to, the land continues to be ryoti land, so long as he continues to have the right to use it for agricultural purposes: Appalaswami v. Rajah of Vizianagaram6. In the instant case the land has ceased to be cultivable long ago, even if at any time it had been cultivated and concerning which both the courts found no substantial evidence and in fact the case for the appellant herself is that her occupation of the land has been by putting up a residential shed and that she cannot be evicted therefrom except under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Thirdly, the Estates Land Act has no application whatsoever to a Lopayakari or sub-lessee tenant like the defendant appellant. The reason is the possession of the sub-lessee must be treated as the possession of the Kudivaram tenant himself: In re K. Pothuraju7. The possession of the respondent has clearly been found to be that of a lessee from the Ankitham people under the permanent cowle Exhibit A-7. The position of the appellant is that of an under-lessee. Under section 19 of the of the Madras Estates Land Act there can be no acquisition of occupancy rights by these Lopayakari tenants under this Act. The position of the appellant is that of an under-lessee. Under section 19 of the of the Madras Estates Land Act there can be no acquisition of occupancy rights by these Lopayakari tenants under this Act. Section 19 states: “Except as otherwise specially provided in this Act, the relations between a ryot and his tenants, or between a landholder and a tenant of his private land, and the rights of any other owners of land: are not regulated by the provisions of this Act.” In other words, unlike the Bengal Tenancy Act, the Madras Estates Land Act does not recognise the acquisition of occupancy rights by these sub-lessee tenants. In fact this has been considered as a blemish by Sri V. Vedantachari in his Madras Estates Land Act, Vol. I at page 187 and he has hoped that when legislation was next taken up, this would require consideration. The legislature has however simplified this problem by abolishing the estates. Therefore, in any event this appellant could not acquire occupancy rights under the Madras Estates Land Act. It is true that a sub-tenant or a sub-lessee from a ryot could not acquire a right of occupancy; but he can do so, by custom or usage or by grant: Rajah Peary Mohun v. Badal Chunder Bagdi8. In this case no custom or usage is set up. But on the other hand, the case for the appellant is a specific grant both by Chilla Appalaswami in the first and second instances. In regard to the lease, if it is expressly granted to be in perpetuity, no difficulty arises; but when nothing is known about its duration, certain presumptions are called into aid to determine it. In regard to the express grant in perpetuity, there is no evidence worth mentioning as found by both the courts below. There was no averment with regard to the tenure of these sites in the written statement and the kist receipts granted to the mother of the appellant and to the appellant respectively throw no further light on this matter. And apart from this, there is no other documentary evidence in regard to the tenancy on behalf of the appellant. Therefore, we have to rely practically upon the oral evidence in this case and the oral evidence did not advance the case of the appellant any further. And apart from this, there is no other documentary evidence in regard to the tenancy on behalf of the appellant. Therefore, we have to rely practically upon the oral evidence in this case and the oral evidence did not advance the case of the appellant any further. The evidence of D.W.2 that she and her mother put up residential house with the advice and consent of the lessors is an interested statement uncorroborated by other independent evidence. The first defendant in O.S.No.103 of 1951 examined as D.W.4 did not put forward any such advice and consent of the lessors. Therefore, we have to find out whether we can infer permanent tenancy from long possession and unvarying rent. But where the origin of the tenancy is known as in this case, mere possession, however long will not confer a permanent right and in such cases it is not for the landlord to explain the possession but for the tenant to show that his holding leads to inference of the permanent tenure: Vasudeva Patrudu v. The Zamindar of Salur1, Srinivasa Chetti v. Nanjunda Chetti2; Thiagaraja v. Giyana Sambanda Pandara Sannadhi3; Linga Reddi v. Venkatakrishna Row4; Bai Ganga v. Dullabh Parag5; Endar Lala v. Lallu Hari6; Narayan Visaji v. Lakshman Bapuji7; Narayan Bhat v. Davlata8; Kalidas Laldas v. Bhaiji Narayan9, Secretary of State v. Luchmeswar Singh10. Permanent tenancy may also be inferred when the tenancy is made for building purposes; but the mere fact that a lease of land is made for dwelling purposes does not make it permanent, unless there is something to show that the building was intended to be or was in fact a masonary building: Barada Prosad v. Prasanna Kumar11. Here the structure put up is a shed. Other pieces of evidence showing permanency like transfer of the tenant’s interest to the knowledge of the landlord by selling, mortgaging, partitioning or receiving compensation for lands acquired by Government or subsequent conduct of the parties showing with reasonable certainty that the grant was intended to be perpetual by evidence of long and uninterrupted enjoyment effecting of valuable improvements and descent from father to son or by other evidence to that effect, have been absent in this case. Rajaram v. Narasinga12 ; Foulkes v. Muthuswami Goundan13; Foulkes v. Rajaratna Mudali14; Viswanatha Row v. Chinnakolandai Nainar15, Palaniandi Malavarayan v. Vadamalai Odayan16; Audi Thevan v. Palani Thevan17; Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi v. Veerama Reddi18. Rajaram v. Narasinga12 ; Foulkes v. Muthuswami Goundan13; Foulkes v. Rajaratna Mudali14; Viswanatha Row v. Chinnakolandai Nainar15, Palaniandi Malavarayan v. Vadamalai Odayan16; Audi Thevan v. Palani Thevan17; Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi v. Veerama Reddi18. On the other hand, the plaintiffs have shown that the evidence of D.Ws.2 and 4 that the Chilla people admitted them into possession is false and that they got into possession only through Sri Rednam Venkata Krishna Rao, the paternal uncle of the plaintiffs. The case for the defendants was that Sri Rednam Venkata Krishna Rao gave in writing that he would give these sites with permanent occupancy rights and that it was an unregistered instrument. But apart from the fact that there can be no grant of permanent occupancy rights by parcels or by unregistered document, even this alleged unregistered document is not forthcoming because the convenient explanation put forward for the absence of any documentary evidence was that they were all lost in the cyclone, though curiously enough two of the receipts produced by D.W.2 relate to the years 1921 and 1924. Why should the great storm take away the material documents which would prove the case of this appellant that she was inducted into possession by Chilla Appaswami and then raised this structure with the help and encouragement of Sri Rednam Venkata Krishna Rao, and leave only these two receipts ? There can be no doubt, as pointed by the learned District Munsif, that this story of the storm carrying away all the important papers has been invented to explain the otherwise inexplicable version of the defendant appellant. In short it has not been shown that the appellant defendant has acquired occupancy rights by grant. Both the courts have found that the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act has no application to this case because the lease was in respect of a vacant site and not in respect of a residential house or hut and secondly it is now well settled that a decree in ejectment can be passed by the civil court and all that the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act ensures is that during the subsistence of that Act the civil court cannot execute the decree but the landlord will have to take appropriate steps under the provisions of the said Act. There is no taking away of the jurisdiction of the civil court but only imposition of restrictions in regard to the mode of execution; Muhamadunny v. Unniri1and Madhavakurup v. Muhammad Sukhi2. In the result, both the lower courts on adequate and acceptable evidence have found that the defendant appellant has not acquired permanent occupancy rights and that the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act has no application to this case. There is no point of law in this second appeal. It is dismissed. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.