Subba Rao, J.- This appeal raises the question of the factum of and validity of the adoption of the first defendant by the second defendant. The parties are Vaisyas by caste. In or about 1912 Venkayya, the last maleholder died possessed of a large estate more particularly described in schedules A, B and C appended to the plaint. As he had no issue, his wife Ademma, the second defendant inherited his properties. On 10th February, 1947, she is said to have taken the first defendant in adoption to her deceased husband. The plaintiff who is the nearest reversioner along with the third defendant, being Venkayya’s brother’s son, filed O.S. No. 90 of 1947 on the file of the court of the Subordinate Judge, Guntur, for a declaration that the adoption of the first defendant by the second defendant was not true, valid and binding on the reversioners to the estate of Venkayya. He questioned the factum of adoption and pleaded that even if it had taken place, it was invalid on the ground that the consent of the next reversioners was not taken. The first defendant is the alleged adopted son. The second defendant is Ademma, the widow of Venkayya. The third defendant is the son of Venkayya’s brother, Guruvayya. The third defendant supported the plaintiff in so far as he questioned the factum and validity of the adoption. Defendants 1 and 2 supported the adoption. They also questioned the correctness of the schedules attached to the plaint. The following issues were framed: (1) Is the adoption of the first defendant by the second defendant true and valid? (2) Are the stipulations in the compromise in O.S.No.30 of 1917 under which second defendant could adopt not valid and binding on second defendant? (3) Even so is she bound by them after the death of the third defendant’s father ; if not is the refusal by the plaintiff and third defendant to consent to adoption by her proper ? (4) Are the schedules correct? (5) To what relief is plaintiff entitled. The learned Subordinate Judge found on issues 1 to 3 in favour of defendants 1 and 2. In the result he dismissed the suit with costs. The plaintiff and the third defendant have preferred the aforesaid appeal. The first question in the appeal is whether the alleged adoption was true. (5) To what relief is plaintiff entitled. The learned Subordinate Judge found on issues 1 to 3 in favour of defendants 1 and 2. In the result he dismissed the suit with costs. The plaintiff and the third defendant have preferred the aforesaid appeal. The first question in the appeal is whether the alleged adoption was true. [* * *] Their Lordships after discussing the evidence conclude: We therefore hold that the second defendant took the first defendant in adoption on 10th February, 1947, after going through the necessary formalities. The next question is whether the adoption, even if true, is valid. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the adoption was invalid as the consent of the nearest sapindas the plaintiff and the third defendant was not taken. He Would also argue that even if for one reason or other they could be ignored the consent given by the other sapindas would not be legal consent within the meaning of the decided cases. At this stage it may be convenient to notice the law on the subject as it would facilitate the application of accepted principles to the facts of this case. The necessity for the consent of the sapindas in the case of an adoption by a widow whose husband died divided was laid down by the Judicial Committee in the Ramnad Case1as follows: “In such a case, therefore, their Lordships think, that the consent of the father-in-law, to whom the law points as the natural guardian and venerable protector of the widow, would be sufficient. It is not easy to lay down an inflexible rule for the case in which no father-in-law is in existence. Every such case must depend upon the circumstances of the family. It is not easy to lay down an inflexible rule for the case in which no father-in-law is in existence. Every such case must depend upon the circumstances of the family. All that can be said is, that there should be such evidence of the assent of kinsmen as suffices, to show, that the act is done by the widow in the proper and bona fide performance of a religious duty, and neither capriciously nor from a corrupt motive.” Their Lordships stated the reason for the rule in the following terms: “The assent of the kinsmen seems to be required by reason of the presumed incapacity of women for independence, rather than the necessity of procuring the consent of all those whose possible and reversionary interest in the estate would be defeated by the adoption.” It will therefore be seen that the reason for the rule is not the possible deprivation of the proprietary interests of the reversioner but the state of perpetual tutelage of Women under Hindu law. The consent of the kinsmen was considered to be a sufficient guarantee against any capricious action on the part of the widow in taking a boy in adoption. In Vellanki Venkatakrishna Rao v. Venkatarama Lakshmi2, the Judicial Committee proceeded to elaborate on the scope of the consent of the sapindas. Their Lordships observed: “All which this Committee in the former case, intended to lay down was, that there should be such proof of assent on the part of the sapindas as should be sufficient to support the inference that the adoption was made by the widow, not from capricious or corrupt motives, or in order to defeat the interest of this or that sapinda, but upon a fair consideration, by what may be called a family council, of the expediency of substituting an heir by adoption to the deceased husband.” This judgment introduces a new concept of a “family council” which in its turn gave rise to doubts and conflicts. The concept of a family council has been explained by Mr. The concept of a family council has been explained by Mr. Ameer Ali in Veerabasavaraju v. Balasuryaprasada Rao3 as follows: “Division does not affect her personal dependence or give her an independent status to alter by her own authority the succession to the estate which she takes as the widow of her husband she is still dependent for counsel and protection upon the nearest sapindas of her husband, who are the most closely united to him by ties of blood, or, to use the language of Hindu lawyers by ‘community of corporal particles.‘The father of the deceased, if still alive, continues to be her”natural guardian and venerable protector.“He has furthermore a direct interest in the protection of the estate, for in case of her death without leaving her surviving a daughter or the mother of her deceased husband, he has a right to the reversion. His authorisation is, therefore, essentially requisite to the validity of an adoption by her to her husband. If there is no father the divided brothers take his place by virtue of the tie of blood as her husband’s nearest sapindas; they become her natural guardians and the protectors of her interests. They also have an interest in the protection of the inheritance. In the absence, then, of the father the assent of the divided brothers is equally requisite for the validity of the widow’s adoption. If a majority assent and one refuses, his objection may be discounted. But the absence of their consent or in case there is only one, of his consent, cannot be made good by the authorisation of distant relatives remotely connected whose interest in the well being of the widow or the spiritual welfare of the deceased, or in the protection of the estate is of minute character, and whose assent is more likely to be influenced by improper motives.” The aforesaid passage indicates that His Lordship laid equal emphasis on the protection of the estate as on the spiritual welfare of the deceased. Indeed His Lordship made his meaning clearer when he said at a later stage, “that rights to property cannot be left out of consideration in the determination of the question.” But what is relevant for the present purpose is that this decision seems to indicate. that the consent of the remoter relatives is not a substitute for the consent of nearer sapindas. that the consent of the remoter relatives is not a substitute for the consent of nearer sapindas. But this does not consider the further question, namely, what would be the position if the nearer sapindas refuse to give the consent on improper grounds. That question fell to be considered in Kristnayya v. Lakshmipathi1. There one Narasamma made an adoption on 20th February, 1907, with the alleged assent of her husband’s sapindas. At the time of the adoption there were five next reversioners, but the adoption was admittedly made with the assent of only one of them and some of the remoter sapindas. Both the courts in India had concurrently found that the widow never applied to the remaining four next reversioners for their assent, and had consequently held that the adoption in question was invalid. At page 654, Viscount Cave dealing with the observations of Mr. Ameer Ali in Veerabasavaraju v. Balasurya Prasada Rao2made the following observations: "The reference in the last mentioned case to a ‘family council’ gave rise to some doubt whether, where there were agnatic relations closely related to the deceased the assent of those standing in a remoter degree was either necessary or sufficient, but this doubt was resolved in the recent case of Veerabasavaraju v. Balasuryaprasada Rao2‘where it was held that the absence of consent on the part of the nearest sapindas cannot be made good by the authorisation of distant relatives whose assent is more likely to be influenced by improper motives. This does not mean that the consent of a near sapinda who is incapable of forming a judgment on the matter, such as a minor or a lunatic, is either sufficient or necessary ; nor does it exclude the view that where a near relative is clearly proved to be actuated by corrupt or malicious motives his dissent may be disregarded. Nor does it , contemplate cases where the nearest sapinda happens to be in a distant country, and it is impossible without great difficulty to obtain his consent, or where he is a convict suffering a term of imprisonment. The consent required is that of a substantial majority of these agnates nearest in relationship who are capable of forming an intelligent and honest judgment on the matter. The consent required is that of a substantial majority of these agnates nearest in relationship who are capable of forming an intelligent and honest judgment on the matter. It must however be added that, save in exceptional cases such as those mentioned above, the consent of the nearest sapindas must be asked, and if it is not asked it is no excuse to say that they would certainly have refused." The Judicial Committee restated with approval the following extract from Raghunadha v. Sri Brozo Kishoro3. "But it is impossible not to see that there are grave social objections to making the succession of property-and it may be in the case of collateral succession, as in the present instance, the rights of parties in actual possession-dependent on the caprice of a woman, subject to all the pernicious influences which interested advisers are apt in India to exert over women possessed of or capable of exercising dominion over, property. It seems, therefore, to be the duty of the Courts to keep the power strictly within the limits which the law has assigned to it." In the aforesaid extracts the Judicial Committee explained the scope of the passage in Veera Basavaraju v. Balasurya Prasada Rao2which without the commentary may appear to lay down an implacable rule of law that a widow cannot look up to the consent of a remoter sapinda even if the nearer one is not in a position to give consent or refused to give consent for malicious motives. Madhavan Nair and Jackson, JJ. considered the scope of this rule in Muraharai Brahma Sastri v. Sumitramma4. There a Hindu widow took a boy in adoption. She did not get the consent of her deceased husband’s daughter, one of the two nearest sapindas and two of the four remoter sapindas. She did not call a family council to consider the propriety of the adoption. It was found that one of the nearest sapindas capriciously withheld his consent. On the evidence the learned Judges found that the consent obtained by her of a majority of her deceased husband’s kinsmen would support the adoption. It was argued that the consent of the sapindas should be sought in accordance to the degree of propinquity to the last maleholder. On the evidence the learned Judges found that the consent obtained by her of a majority of her deceased husband’s kinsmen would support the adoption. It was argued that the consent of the sapindas should be sought in accordance to the degree of propinquity to the last maleholder. Madhavan Nair, J., repelled that argument with the following observations at page 420: "It is no doubt obligatory on the part of the widow to consult the nearest sapindas but if their consent is capriciously withheld it is not necessary that a family council should be held to consider the propriety of the adoption, or that the reversioners should be consulted in the order of their degree of relationship to the deceased husband, or that even that all the reversioners should be consulted." After citing the relevant passages from the judgment of the Judicial Committee which we have already extracted above, the learned Judges proceeded to state: "These passages which form the basis of the law on the point, read together, do not make it obligatory that a family council of the agnates should be called by the widow to consider the propriety of the adoption or even that all the reversioners should be consulted before the adoption is made. The nearest sapindas of course should be consulted; but when it becomes necessary to consult the reversioners all that is wanted is that there should be such evidence of consent as would show that the widow in making the adoption is not acting improperly or capriciously or from a corrupt motive. This would he proved no doubt by showing that the opinion of a substantial majority of the reversioners is in favour of the adoption ; but it does not mean that each and every reversioner should be consulted or that if one or two are omitted from consultation the adoption would be necessarily invalid.“ This decision was cited with approval by the Judicial Committee in Ramasubbayya v. Chenchuramayya1. An exhaustive and, if we may say so, an instructive treatment of the subject is found in the judgment of Satyanarayana. Rao, J. and Viswanatha Sastri, JJ., in Sundara Rama Rao v. Satyanarayanamurthi2. An exhaustive and, if we may say so, an instructive treatment of the subject is found in the judgment of Satyanarayana. Rao, J. and Viswanatha Sastri, JJ., in Sundara Rama Rao v. Satyanarayanamurthi2. The question there was whether in the case of an undivided family a widow can travel outside the family and seek the consent of the divided sapindas when the only coparcener improperly refused and withheld his assent for the valid act of adoption. The learned Judges held that she could do so. They traced the law on the subject and restated the principle governing the doctrine of the consent of sapindas. The following relevant portion of the headnote brings out clearly their conclusion: ”It is well settled in Southern India that a widow in the absence of an authority from the husband, can make a valid adoption with the assent of her husband’s sapindas. The proof of assent on the part of the sapindas was required to establish the inference that the adoption was made by the widow without any capricious or corrupt motive, or with a view to defeat the interests of this or that sapinda. It is not necessary to obtain the consent of all the nearest sapindas, it is enough if they are all consulted. The duty of the widow to ask for the consent of the nearest sapindas as far as possible is imperative. In matters of adoption devolution of property is of secondary importance and the validity of the adoption is to be judged and determined by spiritual rather than by temporal considerations. The doctrine of consent in adoption had not its origin in any specific Hindu Law texts. A remote connection may be discovered in the state of the perpetual tutelage assigned to women by Hindu Jaw expressed so tersely and clearly in the well-known text of Yajnavalkya in Chapter I, verse 85: “Let her father protect a maiden; her husband a married woman; sons in old age; if none of these other Gnatis (kinsmen). She is not fit for independence.” Gradually and imperceptibly the Judicial Committee and the High Courts have developed a doctrine of consent affording a suitable substitute in the absence of an express authority by the husband. This doctrine is built upon three principles: (1) The adoption of a son to deceased husband by a widow is a meritorious act conducive to spiritual welfare. This doctrine is built upon three principles: (1) The adoption of a son to deceased husband by a widow is a meritorious act conducive to spiritual welfare. (2) The consent of the sapindas is a guarantee against the widow abusing her position and acting with capricious or corrupt motives. (3) The validity of the consent depends upon qualitative and quantitative test laid down by decisions. But the real difficulty lies not so much in formulating the test but in applying them to different situations. The words used in various decisions such as kindred, sapindas, competent advisers, family council, etc., have given rise to doubts and difficulties till the Judicial Committee finally and definitely explained the scope of the doctrine in Kristnayya v. Lakshmipathi3. The general principle is that the court in judging the adequacy and the validity of the consent given in a particular case will have to take an over all picture of the entire situation and decide whether the sapindas giving the consent occupy sufficient importance or carry adequate weight in the fictional family council, judged from the standpoint of propinquity, age, wisdom, availability, numbers and other relevant considerations, so that the consent given by them may establish the inference that the adoption was made by the widow without any capricious or corrupt motive but only in the interests of her husband’s salvation. Difficult and delicate questions may arise in drawing the picture. It is true that the nearest sapinda or sapindas must be consulted; but there may be circumstances where his or their advice is not available. His whereabouts may not be known; he may refuse to give advice; he may improperly refuse to give consent on unjustifiable grounds, he may have left the country for foreign parts with no prospect of early return. The instances are not exhaustive and there may be other instances where a nearest sapinda is not available for consultation. Nor is it possible to give a descending or ascending order fixing grades of consent based upon the law of inheritance to the property of the last male holder or otherwise. In the final analysis it is a question of fact in each case for the court to come to the conclusion whether the consent of the sapindas is sufficient to validate the adoption having regard to the conditions laid down in the aforesaid decisions. In the final analysis it is a question of fact in each case for the court to come to the conclusion whether the consent of the sapindas is sufficient to validate the adoption having regard to the conditions laid down in the aforesaid decisions. The only legal test is that there should be such evidence of the assent of kinsmen as suffices to show, that the act is done by the widow in the proper and bona fide performance of a religious duty, and neither capriciously nor from a corrupt motive. Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind we shall now turn to the consent of the reversioners obtained by the widow in the instant case. [* * * *] After reviewing the facts their Lordships concluded: Now taking an overall picture, it is clear that the widow first approached the nearest sapindas; but they had improperly refused to receive the notices and give her the requisite consent. She therefore took the consent of the remoter reversioners from the different branches of the family including the two eldest members of the family, Pitchayya and Punnayya. Having regard to the circumstances of the case we cannot hold that the persons who gave the consent were not competent advisers to the widow. Their advice satisfied the test laid down in the decided cases, namely, the consent required is that of a substantial majority of those agnates nearest in relationship who are capable of forming an intelligent and honest judgment on the matter and the assent must be such as to show that the act was done by the widow in the proper and bona fide performance of a religious duty and neither capriciously nor from a corrupt motive. We therefore agree with the court below that the adoption made by the widow with the consent of the sapindas was valid. Learned counsel for the appellants then contended that the authority embodied in Exhibit B-11 is inadmissible in evidence as it was not registered. In support of this contention reliance is made on section 17(3) of the Indian Registration Act. It reads: “Authorities to adopt a son, executed after the first day of January, 1872, and not conferred by a will shall also be registered.” This objection was not raised in the court below. We are not therefore justified in allowing the appellants to raise this point before us. It reads: “Authorities to adopt a son, executed after the first day of January, 1872, and not conferred by a will shall also be registered.” This objection was not raised in the court below. We are not therefore justified in allowing the appellants to raise this point before us. Further, even if Exhibit B-11 is excluded, there is clear evidence on record by the signatories of the document to establish that they all gave consent for the adoption. We cannot also accept the contention as sound. There is an essential distinction in Hindu law between an authority conferred by the husband on a widow to take a boy in adoption and a consent given to her by the sapindas after his death. In the case of a husband, he confers a power or authority upon the widow to take a boy in adoption, whereas in the case of sapindas, their assent is required for the purpose of establishing that the act is done by the widow in the proper and bona fide performance of a religious duty and neither capriciously nor from a corrupt motive. Therefore it is not correct to describe the assent given by the sapindas as an authority conferred by them on the widow to take a boy in adoption. Section 17(3) of the Registration Act in our view should be confined only to authorities conferred upon a widow by her husband. Exhibit B-11 being only a record of the consent given by the sapindas does not require registration. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.