JUDGMENT : K.S. Govinda Pillai, J. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 4. Defendants 3 to 7 have joined hands with the 1st defendant and preferred this appeal against the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs. This appeal was valued at 31560 fanams. The plaintiffs had filed a cross-appeal claiming the share of their mother-the 2nd defendant - also in the suit. This cross appeal was valued at 3945 fanams. Thus the value of the appeal and cross-appeal came to over 35,000 fanams and under the Travancore High Court Act which was in force at the time when this appeal was filed, it was to be heard by a Full Bench of not less than three Judges. When this appeal was heard by us on 6.3.1952, the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act I of 1952 had been passed. By this amendment, the provision for hearing appeals of the value of Rs. 5000/- and above, as mentioned in S. 25 of the High Court Act of 1125, had been deleted. 5. The respondents’ learned Advocate therefore raised a preliminary objection that we had no jurisdiction to hear this appeal as the rights of the parties to have the appeal heard and decided by a Full Bench of not less than three Judges was a vested one, and that such right could not be taken away by a later legislation which had no retrospective effect or at any rate which purported to have no retrospective effect. The appellants’ learned Advocate further stated that Act I of 1952 was not assented to by His Highness the Rajpramukh, and that therefore it could not be deemed to be a valid Act of legislation. We shall record our decision on this preliminary point before we proceed to consider the appeal on the merits. 6. Entry 78 in List I (Union List) in the seventh schedule to the Constitution of India reserved “Constitution and organisation of the High Courts except provisions as to officers and servants of High Court; persons entitled to practise before the High Courts” for legislation by the Parliament. The State Legislatures could pass the necessary law regarding other matters. (Vide entry No. 3 in the State List and No. 13 in the concurrent list). The State Legislatures could pass the necessary law regarding other matters. (Vide entry No. 3 in the State List and No. 13 in the concurrent list). There can therefore be no doubt that the State Legislature can legislate the procedure to be followed in the High Court as to the filing and disposal of appeals etc., there. The present Act I of 1952 amending the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act of 1125, to make provision for regulating the business in the High Court, is within the competency of the State Legislature. Under Art. 200 of the Constitution of India, when a Bill has been passed by the State Legislature, it shall be presented to the Rajpramukh and the latter shall declare that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President. When a Bill is reserved for the consideration of the President, the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom. Act I of 1952 was published in the gazette (Supplement) of 22.1.1952 with the notification that the Act of the Travancore-Cochin Legislature had received the assent of the President on the 8th January 1952. This is published with a notification to that effect issued by the order of His Highness the Rajpramukh when assent to the Act was given by the President (vide Art. 255). The notification issued by the order of His Highness the Rajpramukh shows that the Bill in question had been reserved for the assent by the President, and this implies the declaration contemplated in Art. 200. The Act was therefore valid. 7. As to the question whether appeals which were provided for being heard by a Bench of not less than three Judges could be heard by a lesser number of Judges, there is no doubt that a right of appeal provided for by the Civil Procedure Code is a vested right that could not be defeated by a subsequent legislation. The rulings in Colonial Sugar Refining Company, Limited v. Irving (1905 A.C. 369), Kripa Singh v. Rasalldar Ajaipal Singh (A.I.R. 1928 Lah. 627) and Suryanarayanan v. Ratanlal (A.I.R. 1952 Hyderabad 34) are authorities for this position. The rulings in Colonial Sugar Refining Company, Limited v. Irving (1905 A.C. 369), Kripa Singh v. Rasalldar Ajaipal Singh (A.I.R. 1928 Lah. 627) and Suryanarayanan v. Ratanlal (A.I.R. 1952 Hyderabad 34) are authorities for this position. But except in urging that an appeal filed in the High Court under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code should be heard and decided by the High Court, no litigant has a vested right to compel that it should be heard by a particular number of Judges. The Judges exercise the powers conferred by the Statute and when the new provision is that a matter attended to by three Judges can be disposed of by two Judges, it is only one affecting the procedure to be followed in the High Court. Such procedural law will apply to all proceedings pending in the High Court. This question had come up for consideration before the Chief Court of Cochin in Simon v. Varki (14 Cochin L.R. 6) and it was held that while it is well settled that a right of appeal was a vested right, and that in the absence of express words an enactment will not be so construed as to take away a right of appeal, a party cannot be held to have a substantial right to have his case heard by a particular number of Judges. We respectfully adopt this view. 8. There is a Full Bench ruling of the Punjab High Court reported at page 103 of A.I.R. 1952 Punjab (Gordhan Das Beldev Das v. Governor General-in-Council) which held that a provision of law which deprives a litigant his right of appeal to a superior tribunal cannot be regarded as a provision which affects only the procedure and practice of the court and that the amendment of the High Court Rules and Orders which provided that certain appeals which were heard by a Bench of two Judges should in future be heard by a single Judge sitting alone takes away the vested right of appeal to the Supreme Court and can therefore be deemed to operate only in respect of appeals which arise out of suits instituted after the rule was amended. Under Art. 133(1) of the Constitution, an appeal under certain restricted conditions would lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court; but Art. 133 (4) prohibited appeals to the Supreme Court from judgment, decree or final orders of one Judge of a High Court. It was therefore stated that the amendment enabling a single Judge to hear and dispose of appeals which were being heard by two Judges took away the right of the defeated party to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court and that therefore the amendment could not have retrospective effect to affect pending appeals. The amendment does not really take away or restrict the vested right. It appears to me that the right has only been enlarged. An appeal against the decision of a Single Judge is provided for, in case the Judge certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal. So if it is a fit case, a division bench of two Judges can hear the appeal, and then the aggrieved party can take up the matter in proper case to the Supreme Court. Thus in fit cases, instead of one appeal two appeals are provided for. Bhandari, J. in the said case was of the view that by adopting this procedure, a hurdle is placed fettering the rights of the litigant. Even if the appeal is decided by a Bench, the defeated party could not straightaway prefer an appeal before the Supreme Court. He has to satisfy the conditions laid down in Art. 133 (1). The hurdle is always there and it can be got over only if there is a fit case for appeal before a Division Bench or the Supreme Court. The rule referred to in the Punjab Case corresponds to the amendments in Act I of 1952 granting powers to single Judges to hear appeals of a particular type. But this has no application to cases decided by a Bench of two or three Judges. Whether the decision was by two or more Judges, the party aggrieved had to satisfy the conditions laid down in Art. 133 (1) of the Constitution to enable him to prefer the appeal to the Supreme Court. But this has no application to cases decided by a Bench of two or three Judges. Whether the decision was by two or more Judges, the party aggrieved had to satisfy the conditions laid down in Art. 133 (1) of the Constitution to enable him to prefer the appeal to the Supreme Court. This ruling however has no application to appeals which were being heard by three or more Judges before, and which are now being posted for disposal before a Bench of two Judges. 9. In the Civil Court Act XXII of 1951, a change as to right of direct appeal from the Munsiff’s and Sub-Judges’ Courts to the High Court was made. The appeals from suits in the Munsiff’s Courts in the Travancore area, the value of which was above Rs. 1000 were allowed to be filed in the High Court. This is now modified, and such appeals are to be filed in the District Courts. But special provisions have been made in S. 30 (1) that such appeals pending disposal in the High Court on the day the said Act came into force should be heard and disposed of by the High Court. There is no corresponding provision in Act I of 1952, though Act XXII of 1951 and Act I of 1952 were passed by the Legislature at its same sitting. We are therefore of the view that the preliminary objection has no force, and we overrule the same. * * * * * * * * * * * * 15. Subject to these directions we hold that the plaintiffs have not made out a case for setting aside Ext. A. In reversal therefore of the decree of the court below, this appeal is allowed, but in view of the close relationship between the parties, we do not think it necessary to allow the 1st defendant his costs in both the courts. We therefore direct the parties to bear their costs throughout. The cross appeal is dismissed. K.T. Koshi, C.J.:- I have had the advantage of reading the judgment my learned brother Govinda Pillai, J. proposes to deliver in this case and I agree with his conclusion is to how the appeal should be disposed of. The preliminary objections raised at the Bar were then and there overruled and we stated that our reasons therefore will be set out in the appeal judgment. The preliminary objections raised at the Bar were then and there overruled and we stated that our reasons therefore will be set out in the appeal judgment. As this is the first of a series of appeals in which these objections have been raised I think it proper to add a few words of my own regarding them. 2. Counsel appearing for the parties were agreed in questioning our competence to hear and dispose of the appeal, but we had the benefit of the learned Advocate General’s arguments for the opposite view. We express our indebtedness to him for the ready assistance he gave us at our request. 3. Mr. Kayalam Parameswaran Pillai, who appeared for the appellants contended that Act I of 1952 was invalid in that it did not ex facie show that the Bill to amend the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125 was presented to His Highness. The Raj Pramukh after it was passed by the legislative Assembly or that His Highness. The Raj Pramukh had made a declaration reserving the Bill for the consideration of the President. Reference was in this connection made to Art. 200 of the Constitution. 4. Mr. Varadharaja Iyengar, the learned counsel for the respondents who joined hands with the appellant’s counsel in contending that Act I of 1952 cannot have any retrospective operation, was not however prepared to agree with Mr. Parameswaran Pillai about the invalidity of the Act. S. 114 of Evidence Act enacts: “The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.” Illustration (e) to the section states that the Court may presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. This is a particular application of the maxim “omnia praesumntur rite esse acta” i.e., all acts are presumed to have been rightly and regularly done. Unless therefore the contrary is established the Court has to presume that the impugned Act, has been validly enacted and that all the necessary formalities for its enactment have been duly complied with. Apart from this, there is the added fact that the promulgation of the Act is heralded by a notification issued “By order of His Highness the Raj Pramukh” published in the Official Gazette. Apart from this, there is the added fact that the promulgation of the Act is heralded by a notification issued “By order of His Highness the Raj Pramukh” published in the Official Gazette. That notification reads as follows: “The following Act of the Travancore-Cochin Legislature received the assent of the President on the 8th January 1952 and is hereby published for general information.” It is in these circumstances idle to contend that the Act is invalid and I unhesitatingly repel it. 5. The more serious objection is the contention that the Act cannot have any retrospective operation. According to Counsel appearing on either side appeals falling under S. 25 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125, that were pending when the amending Act came into force and appeals that hereafter arise from suits instituted before the enactment of the amending Act have to be heard and disposed of as heretofore, that is by a Full Bench of not less than three Judges. It is a well-established rule of construction of statutes that in general when the law is altered during the pendency of an action the substantive rights of the parties remain unaffected and are decided according to the law as it stood when the action was commenced, unless the new amendment is made retrospective either expressly or impliedly. It is equally well-settled that if the statute merely deals with procedure and does not affect the substantive rights of the parties it is held to apply prima facie to all actions pending as well as future. In Delhi Cloth Mills v. I.T. Commr. A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 242 Lord Blanesburgh in pronouncing the judgment of the Judicial Committee said:- “The principle which their Lordships must apply in dealing with this matter has been authoritatively enunciated by the Board in the Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving (1905) A.C. 369, where it is in effect laid down that, while provisions of a statute dealing merely with maters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment.” 6. So long ago as 1889 Wilson, J. (Sir Arthur) had enunciated the same principle in a judgment pronounced by him on behalf of a Full Bench of five Judges of the Calcutta High Court. See Deb Narain Dutt v. Narendra Krishna (1889) I.L.R. 16 Cal. 267. At page 272 of the report the learned Judge is seen to have observed that retrospective effect is not ordinarily given to an enactment so as to affect substantive rights but the provisions affecting mere procedure are applied to pending proceedings. In this context an extract from a decision of Sir John Edge, Kt., C.J., in Fateh Chand v. Muhammad Bakush (1894) I.L.R. 16 All. 259 may be usefully quoted. The learned Chief Justice pronounced the judgment on behalf of a Bench of six Judges and the question there was whether Act VII of 1889 enacted after the institution of that suit could be made to apply to it. S. 4 of Act VII of 1889 enjoined that no decree could be passed in favour of the legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff unless a Probate, Letters of Administration or a succession certificate was produced. One of the plaintiffs in that case had died pending the suit and in holding that the Act applied to the pending proceeding Sir John Edge, C.J. stated as follows at pp. 264 and 265 of the report: “There was much confusion in the argument in this case between the right of action and a right to have an action conducted in a particular way. The former is a vested right, the latter is merely a question of procedure in which no litigant or intending litigant has any vested right whatever. It is competent to the Legislature by enactment to deprive a subject of a vested right of action, but the intention to do so must be clearly and unmistakably expressed in the Statute or Act. No right of action vested or otherwise was intended to be or was taken away, or in any respect modified, altered or interfered with, by the repeal of S. 2 of Act No. XXVII of 1860. In Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger - L.R. 3 Ch. D. 69 Mellish, L.J., held that “no one has any vested interest in the course of procedure.” In Warner v. Murdoch - L.R. 4 Ch. In Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger - L.R. 3 Ch. D. 69 Mellish, L.J., held that “no one has any vested interest in the course of procedure.” In Warner v. Murdoch - L.R. 4 Ch. D 752 James, L.J., held that “no one had a vested right in any particular form of procedure.” In Wright v. Hale - 69 H. and N. 227, Pollock, C.B., said:- “There is a considerable difference between new enactments which affect vested rights and those which merely affect the procedure in Courts of Justice, such as those relating to the service of proceedings, or what evidence must be produced to prove particular facts.” Late on that learned Judge said:- “When an act alters the proceedings which are to prevail in the administration of justice and there is no provision that it shall not apply to suits then pending, I think, it does apply to such action.” In the same case Channell, B., said:- “In dealing with Acts of Parliament which have the effect of taking away rights of action, we ought not to construe them as having a retrospective operation, unless it appears clearly that such was the intention of the Legislature; but the case is different where the Act merely regulates practice and procedure.” In the same case Wilde, B., said: “I am prepared to decide this case upon principle. The rule applicable to cases of this sort is that when a new enactment deals with rights of action, unless it is so expressed in the Act, an existing right of action is not taken away. But where the enactment deals with procedure only, unless the contrary is expressed, the enactment applies to all actions whether commenced before or after the passing of the Act. That this is the true principle sufficiently appears from the cases that have been referred to on both sides.” Such we also believe to be the true principle, and that is the principle which was recognised and acted upon by a Full Bench of this Court (Stuart, C.J., dissenting) in Ganga Sahai v. Kishan Sahai - I.L.R. 6 All. 262. That this is the true principle sufficiently appears from the cases that have been referred to on both sides.” Such we also believe to be the true principle, and that is the principle which was recognised and acted upon by a Full Bench of this Court (Stuart, C.J., dissenting) in Ganga Sahai v. Kishan Sahai - I.L.R. 6 All. 262. Such alterations as was made in the law by S.4 of Act No. VII of 1989 was an alteration in procedure only not affecting any vested rights of action; and in our opinion the procedure provided by that section applied in this case as soon as Act No. VII of 1889 came into force:” 7. The answer to the question on hand must therefore depend upon whether the provision in S. 25 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125 now repealed gave the litigant any vested right or whether it enacted only a rule of procedure. The right of a disappointed suitor to prefer an appeal to superior Court has always been considered to be a vested right. The leading case on the subject is (1905) A.C. 369 relied upon in A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 242. In that case Lord Macnaghten said that to deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. This case has since been followed in India by several High Courts. The decisions in Sadar Ali v. Doliluddin A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 640 (F.B.); Ram Singha v. Shankar Dayal A.I.R. 1928 All. 437 (F.B.); Kripa Singh v. Rasal Rasalidar Ajaipal Singh A.I.R. 1928 Lah. 627 (F.B.); Vasudeva Samiar In Re A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 381 and Bhagawantrao Anandaro v. Damodar Govindrao A.I.R. 1938 Nag. 112 may be referred to as instances. The deletion of S. 25 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125 does not however directly or indirectly affect any right of appeal a party to a pending litigation had when the amending Act came into force. 381 and Bhagawantrao Anandaro v. Damodar Govindrao A.I.R. 1938 Nag. 112 may be referred to as instances. The deletion of S. 25 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125 does not however directly or indirectly affect any right of appeal a party to a pending litigation had when the amending Act came into force. S. 76 of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code (corresponding to S. 96 of Act V of 1908) provides inter alia that save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of the Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Courts authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such Courts. The Travancore Civil Courts Act II of 1084 was the relevant legislation when the suit and the present appeal were instituted. S. 16 thereof so far as relevant stated that appeals from original or appellate decrees or orders of a District Court shall, when such appeals are allowed by law lie to the High Court. S.11 of the Travancore High Court Act IV of 1099 enacted that a Full Bench shall hear and decide all appeals from the decrees of the District Courts in which the amount or value of the subject-matter is not less than five thousand rupees and the amount or value of the matter in appeal is not less than that sum. When the two States of Travancore and Cochin were integrated this provision was incorporated into the Travancore-Cochin High Court Ordinance and it also found its place in the subsequent Act, the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125 in S. 25 thereof. The amending Act whose operation is now under consideration deleted the provision. As stated earlier the question for decision is whether that deletion affected any vested right or introduced only a change in the procedure relating to the hearing and disposal of a particular class of appeals. 8. Reference made to the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Courts Act showed that while the provision in the former gave a right of appeal to a party aggrieved by a decision in an original suit, the forum where the appeal should be instituted was prescribed by the Civil Courts Act. 8. Reference made to the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Courts Act showed that while the provision in the former gave a right of appeal to a party aggrieved by a decision in an original suit, the forum where the appeal should be instituted was prescribed by the Civil Courts Act. The right of a disappointed suitor to prefer an appeal against a decree of the District is to prefer an appeal to the High Court. S. 6 of the Travancore High Court Act enacted inter alia that the High Court may exercise all the powers vested in it by that Act and by any other Act then in force or which may thereafter be passed. The succeeding sections deal with the powers of a Single Judge, of Division Benches and of Full Benches. 9. To my mind it looks fairly clear that the provisions of the High Court Act prescribing the powers of Single Judges, Division Benches and Full Benches are only matters affecting procedure or the conduct of the business in the High Court. The same is the case with the corresponding provisions of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125. The right of appeal is conferred by the Civil Procedure Code while the Civil Courts Act prescribes the forum. The High Court Act regulates the procedure as to the hearing and disposal of appeals that are filed in the High Court. 10. To my knowledge no Court has said that a suitor has a vested right to have his appeal heard and disposed of by a particular number of Judges Reference can be made to several decisions which take the view that there is no such vested right. 11. My learned brother has referred to a decision of the Cochin Chief Court reported as Simon v. Varki 14 Cochin L.R. 6. An attempt was made at the Bar to show that the law or notification in question there was on the face of it retrospective and that the statement of Varugis, J. (as he then was) in his judgment that a party cannot be held to have a substantial right to have his case heard by a particular number of Judges was mere obiter dicta. No doubt the other learned Judge had based his decision on the fact that the impugned notification was ex facie retrospective. No doubt the other learned Judge had based his decision on the fact that the impugned notification was ex facie retrospective. The references made in the judgment of Sir John Edge, C.J. in I.L.R. 16 All. 259 (F.B.) and the authorities to be referred to presently will show that the opinion Varugis, J. expressed is plainly sound. 12. Before referring to decided cases one extract relevant to the context may be reproduced here from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes. In the Ninth Edition of that book at page 232 is seen stated as follows:- “That the presumption against a retrospective construction has no application to enactments which affect only the procedure and practice of the Courts, even where the alteration which the statute makes has been disadvantageous to one of the parties. Although to make a law punish that which, at the time when it was done, was not punishable, is contrary to sound principle, a law which merely alters the procedure may, with perfect propriety, be made applicable to pass as well as future transactions, and no secondary meaning is to be sought for an enactment of such a kind. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being, by or for the court in which he sues, and, if an Act of Parliament alters that mode of procedure, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode.” 13. The authorities relied upon for the principle embodied in the above extract are Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger; Wright v. Hale; Warner v. Murdoch and Attorney General v. Sillem. Relevant extract from the first three of these above four cases are found in the quotation made earlier from the judgment of Sir John Edge, C.J. in 16 All. 259 (F.B.). In the fourth case Attorney General v. Sillem 10 H.L. Cas. Relevant extract from the first three of these above four cases are found in the quotation made earlier from the judgment of Sir John Edge, C.J. in 16 All. 259 (F.B.). In the fourth case Attorney General v. Sillem 10 H.L. Cas. 704 at 764 (11 E.R. 1200 at 1225) the following instructive passage occurs in the judgment of Lord Wansleydale: “The right of the suitor is to bring the action, and to have it conducted in the way and according to the practice of the Court in which he brings it; and if any Act of Parliament, or any rule founded on the authority of the Act of Parliament, alters the mode of procedure, then he has a right to have it conducted in that altered mode. That, therefore, takes away nothing. The right of action does not constitute a title to keep all the consequences of the right as they were before. It gives the right to have the action conducted according to the rules then in force with respect to procedure.” The principle enunciated in these old English cases have been adopted in large many Indian decisions. The first case I would refer in this connection is Har Prasad v. Lala Bool Chand A.I.R. 1937 All. 19. This is a decision of Sulaiman, C.J., and Allsop, J. and as that case is on all fours with the present I take the liberty to quote here the full text of the order: “The question referred to this Bench is whether the appellant can claim as of right that this appeal should be heard by a Bench of two Judges of this Court. The valuation of the appeal is Rs. 1,200 and at the time when it was filed it was cognizable by two Judges under the rules made by this Court. Recently the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Single Judge has been raised up to Rs. 2,000 and the appeal is now cognizable by a Single Judge. The learned Counsel for both the parties urge before us that there was a substantive right vested in the appellant to have the appeal heard by a Bench of two Judges only and not by a Single Judge. No doubt it is well-established that the right of appeal is a substantive right and any rule taking away the right of appeal cannot have a retrospective effect so as to destroy that right. No doubt it is well-established that the right of appeal is a substantive right and any rule taking away the right of appeal cannot have a retrospective effect so as to destroy that right. But under S. 100, Civil P.C., the appellant had a right of appeal to the High Court from the decree passed in appeal by the Subordinate Judge on the grounds mentioned therein. The right was to appeal to the High Court and not to any particular Bench of this Court. Under S. 108 [1] Government of India Act, this High Court has made its own rules providing for the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction by one or more Judges or by Division Courts constituted of two or more Judges. This rule is exclusively for regulating the procedure in this Court as regards the constitution of Benches. We are unable to hold that the appellant has any vested right in such a constitution. If by an amendment of the rules the constitution of the Benches is altered the appeal still lies to the High Court and the appellant cannot claim that the appeal must be heard by a Bench as constituted before the rule was amended. We accordingly hold that the appeal was cognizable by a Single Judge of this Court.” There the change affected related to the hearing of second appeals. Here it is a regular appeal that we are concerned with. The principle applicable is however the same. 14. I shall now refer to a batch of cases which arose out of the amendment to the Letters Patent of the High Courts or of the rules High Courts had framed by virtue of the provisions of the Letters Patent or of the Government of India Acts. The changes introduced were all similar and they took away the right of an unsuccessful suitor in a second appeal to prefer an appeal as of right to a Bench of the High Court which was the rule before the amendments. The amendments provided that there shall be no appeal unless the Judge disposing of the second appeal declared that the case was a fit one for further appeal. It was contended in those cases that the amendments affected the vested right of appeal and were not therefore retrospective in their operation. Divergent views have been taken on the question by different High Courts. It was contended in those cases that the amendments affected the vested right of appeal and were not therefore retrospective in their operation. Divergent views have been taken on the question by different High Courts. Those decisions have no direct bearing for the present controversy and for my part I consider it more proper to deal with that question if and when it is raised before this Court that the amendment introduced by Act I of 1952 investing a Single Judge with power to dispose of second appeals whose valuation is Rs. 1000/- or less cannot have retrospective operation. It is however interesting to notice that all the decisions I propose to refer contain observations which are uniformly in support of the view I take here on the preliminary point now under consideration that a party cannot be held to have a vested right to have his case heard by a particular number of Judges. 15. The first case I would refer to here is A.I.R 1928 Cal. 640 (F.B.) which has already been referred to in another connection. In that case at page 641 Sir George Rankin, C.J., who was presiding over a Full Bench of five Judges is seen to have made the following observations:- “Again as the right of second appeal is the right given by S. 100, Civil P.C., to appeal “to the High Court” it does not seem unreasonable that a litigant should take the internal arrangements of the High Court as he finds them when he gets there. If under the Letters Patent all Second Appeals had been required to come before two Judges and a new Letters Patent had provided that one Judge should be competent to exercise this jurisdiction, leaving the right of appeal to the High Court and from the High Court as before, it would have been difficult, in my opinion, to hold that any litigant had a right to a hearing before two Judges. Again it is difficult to suppose that the amendment made by the Letters Patent which came into force in January last was made with any other view than to obviate unreasonable or unreasonably prolonged, litigation, or to suppose that the date of the suit has any rational bearing upon that object or as distinguishing one case from another for this purpose. It may also be thought difficult to arrive at any opinion that the reform introduced is reasonable and necessary, but that it should in effect be postponed for years.” Here the case related to the amendment of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court. Similar amendments elsewhere gave rise to similar cases, but it is unnecessary to refer to all of them here. A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 381 (Special Bench) referred to earlier, is one of the such cases. 16. In Radhakishan v. Shridhar A.I.R. 1950 Nagp. 177 (F.B.) the Nagpur High Court was called upon to decide whether the amendment of the rules which introduced the provision that a certificate of fitness from a Single Judge disposing of a second appeal was a necessary pre-requisite for a further appeal to a Bench was retrospective in its operation. The Full Bench held in favour of the retrospective operation. That apart, the observations in paragraph 21 fully support the view I take here. “If no question of any vested right of arose the amendment of the rules could not be objected to because all that the rules determine is the procedure to be followed. A party cannot be heard to say that his case should be heard by so many Judges any more than by such and such Judges. No litigant has a vested right in procedure and must take the rules in force as he finds them. In other words, the rules prescribing the number of Judges is really a matter of procedure and all changes in the procedure of the Court made even during the pendency of an action must be taken to apply to that action unless such changes and alterations touch a substantive right.” In the next paragraph the learned Judge (Hidayatullah, J.) quotes with approval the judgment of Sulaiman, C.J. and Allsop, J. in A.I.R. 1937 All. 19. 17. The next case I desire to refer is referred to by my learned brother in his judgment, I mean the recent Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court reported in Gordhan Das Baldev Das v. G.G. In-Council (F.B.) A.I.R. 1952 Punjab 103. In that case the Punjab High Court refused to follow A.I.R. 1950 Nag. 177. As indicated earlier I do not here feel called upon to state which of the two rival views appeals to me as correct. In that case the Punjab High Court refused to follow A.I.R. 1950 Nag. 177. As indicated earlier I do not here feel called upon to state which of the two rival views appeals to me as correct. That can more conveniently be done on a more appropriate occasion. The judgment in that case contains observations supporting the view I take regarding the retrospective character of the provision of Act I of 1952 now under consideration. Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 contain useful observations for our present purpose and I quote them here: “There is not at least one exception to the general principle that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation and that is that statute which affect only the procedure and practice of the Court, as distinguished from those affecting substantive and substantial rights, are valid even in their application to pending suits and appeals. Ordinarily, a suitor has no vested right in any course of procedure and he cannot claim that the rules which were in force at the time of the suit was brought should continue to apply until his suit is finally decided. He must prosecute or defend the suit in accordance with the procedure which has been prescribed by the law for the time being in force and if the law-making or the rule-making authority chooses to alter the procedure and to make it applicable to pending proceedings he has no alternative but to allow his action to be regulated by the new procedure. So long as the new rules are made in exercise of the powers conferred by law and so long as they do not affect or destroy vested rights, no litigant can come forward and say that his case should not be regulated by those rules. The general principle seems to be that alteration in procedure are retrospective, ‘Gardner v. Lucas’ [1878] 3 A.C. 582, unless they have the effect of disturbing or destroying vested rights. It has been held that even procedural changes cannot be carried to the point of destroying accrued rights. S. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and Cl. The general principle seems to be that alteration in procedure are retrospective, ‘Gardner v. Lucas’ [1878] 3 A.C. 582, unless they have the effect of disturbing or destroying vested rights. It has been held that even procedural changes cannot be carried to the point of destroying accrued rights. S. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and Cl. 26 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Lahore empower this Court by its own rules to provide that any function which is directed to be performed by this Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction may be performed by any Judge or by Divisional Courts constituted by two or more Judges of this court. It is thus within the competence of this Court to make a rule that certain appeals where the amount in controversy does not exceed a certain figure should be heard and disposed of by a Judge sitting alone and that certain other appeals where the amount exceeds that figure should be heard and disposed of by a Bench of two or more Judges. If, therefore, a rule of this Court provides that a certain type of second appeals shall be heard by a Judge sitting alone the appellant cannot claim that it should be heard by two or more Judges any more than he can claim that it should be heard by a particular Judge. He has a right of appeal to the ‘High Court’ and all that he can claim is that he should be heard by the High Court, i.e., by a Judge or Judges who are exercising for the time being the function of the High Court in respect of an appeal of that particular kind or value. He is not concerned with the internal arrangements of the High Court and so long as his appeal is heard by the appropriate Bench, that is, the Bench which is competent to hear the appeal in accordance with the rules framed by the High Court, he can have no legitimate grievance. He is not concerned with the internal arrangements of the High Court and so long as his appeal is heard by the appropriate Bench, that is, the Bench which is competent to hear the appeal in accordance with the rules framed by the High Court, he can have no legitimate grievance. As the power to make rules carries with it the corresponding power to vary or amend the rules, the High Court has full power to alter or amend the rules made by itself and to provide that certain types of appeals which were being heard and disposed of by a Bench of two Judges should in future be heard and disposed of by a Judge sitting alone. The rules affect only the practice and procedure of the Court and can be made or unmade at the will and pleasure of the rule-making authority ‘Har Prasad Sadar Ali v. Lal Bool Chand’, I.L. [1937] All. 191; ‘Sadar Ali v. Doliuddin Ostagar’ 56 Cal. 512; ‘In re Vasudeva Samiar’. 52 Mad. 351. If alterations in rules or procedure are retrospective and if a rule that a particular type of appeal should be heard by a Judge sitting alone is a matter of appellate procedure it is obvious that, like all other rules of procedure, it would apply not only to appeals which are instituted after the date on which the rule comes into force, but also to appeals which were awaiting disposal on the said date...........................” I have quoted thus at a length which may be called wearisome to show that on principle and on authorities the preliminary objection that a Division Court of two Judges is incompetent to hear and dispose of this appeal is devoid of merit. The provision in the Act enabling a Division Court of two Judges to hear appeals specified in S. 25 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125, now deleted, clearly has retrospective operation. The preliminary objection will as stated at the hearing stand overruled in this aspect as well.