This is a revision petition filed by the Union Territory of Tripura and Land Acquisition Collector, Tripura who were defendants 1 and 2 in T. S. No. 45 of 1959 before the Subordinate Judge, Agartala, against the order of the Subordinate Judge dated 10-8-SO, rejecting, the plea of the petitioners that the suit filed by respondents 1 to 4 was liable to be dismissed for want of notice under Sec. 80 C. P. C. (2) Respondents 14 herein, as plaintiffs, filed the suit on 23-9-59 claiming the relief of declaration that their taluka right in the plaint land was still subsisting, that the land acquisition proceedings relating to the said land under L. A. Case No. 1 of 1959 were illegal, ineffective., null and void, ultra vires and without jurisdiction and that the alleged posting of jhanda on 11-9-59 did not amount to valid, legal or effective possession and was not binding on the plaintiffs. They also claimed a permanent In­junction against the petitioners restraining them from taking actual possession of the lands and from changing its character in any way or making excavation or construc­tion thereof. They further prayed that if the petitioners be found to be in possession of the land by virtue of their illegal or void orders or if the petitioners took forcible and illegal and actual possession during the pen­dency of the suit, the plaintiffs should be given delivery of possession also. In paragraph 27 of the plaint, they stated that the cause of action for the suit arose from 11-9-59 when the plaintiffs were informed that a jhanda has been posted on the suit land by the defendants and when the plaintiffs found a notice alleging to be a notice under Sec. 9 of the L. A. Act hanging on their cute-house. In paragraph 28 of the plaint, the plaintiffs stated that notices as contemplated by Sec. 52 of the L. A. Act were served on the defendants in the month of May, 1959 seeking the necessary reliefs including cancellation of L. A. orders and quashing of the proceedings. In paragraph 28 of the plaint, the plaintiffs stated that notices as contemplated by Sec. 52 of the L. A. Act were served on the defendants in the month of May, 1959 seeking the necessary reliefs including cancellation of L. A. orders and quashing of the proceedings. (3) Before I proceed further, I have to make if clear that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is not a suit contemplated under Sec. 52 of the L. A. Act and that it is not enough if the plaintiffs state in the plaint that the notice provided for under Sec. 52 of the said Act has been given. This suit is a regular suit against the Government for which under Sec. 80 C. P. C. the plain­tiffs are bound to give the notice provided under Sec. 80 !€. P. C. and the plaint should have contained a state­ment to the effect that due notice under Sec. 80 C. P. C. has been given. Before a Court could accept a plaint against the Government, the Court must be satisfied that two months' time has expired after the notice under Sec. 80 has been delivered to the Government. If there is no such statement in the plaint that the notice under Sec. 80 C. P. C. has been given and if the plaint did not show that the suit was filed after the expiry of two months' time from the delivery of the notice, Or. VII, R. 11(d) :. P. C. would apply and the suit would be barred under Sec. 80 C. P. C. and the Court has to reject the plaint, it is not known why the office of the Subordinate Judge or the Subordinate Judge himself did not keep in mind 4he provisions of Sec. 80 C. P. C. and Or. VII, R. 11 C. P. C. and how this plaint was accepted at all. The Subordinate Judge will submit an explanation on this matter within 15 days of the receipt of the records. (4) It turned out at the time of hearing of the suit on this question of notice that even a notice under Sec. 52 of the L. A. Act was not given by the plaintiffs as stated in paragraph 28 of the plaint. No copy of the notice was filed along with the plaint. (4) It turned out at the time of hearing of the suit on this question of notice that even a notice under Sec. 52 of the L. A. Act was not given by the plaintiffs as stated in paragraph 28 of the plaint. No copy of the notice was filed along with the plaint. Actually defendants 1 and 2 produced in Court on 234-60 the notice dated 19-5-59 received by them from the plaintiffs and subsequently the plaintiffs filed a copy of the said notice in Court on 15-7-60. It is seen from the said notice that it was not given under Sec. 52 of the L. A. Act, nor under Sec. 80 C. P. C. It was a notice stating that no notice was issued or served upon the plaintiffs in connection with the acquisition proceedings, that the acquisition order was, therefore, illegal, ultra vires, null and void and without jurisdiction, that no delivery of possession can fee taken on the strength of such an order, that their fundamental rights have been interfered with and that they would move the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari or other appropriate Writ to quash the order of acquisition which had been made without jurisdiction and in violation of their fundamental rights. (5) What was contended for the respondents before we was that the said notice must be treated as suffi­cient notice of the filing of a suit, that the object of Sec. 80 C. P. C. was to give intimation to the Govern­ment of the grievance of the notice-givers and to give the Government an opportunity to redress their grievance before it was brought to Court and that the section was not intended to be an instrument of oppression against the subject and that therefore the notice that they intend­ed to file a Writ of Certiorari was sufficient intimation to the Government that the notice-givers intended to take the matter to Court. The following decisions were also cited in support of the said contention, namely, Surajmal Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1956 Pat 478 ; Dominion of India v. Eversharp Agency, (S) AIR 1955 Bom 98 ; Sankunni Menon v South Indian Rly., AIR 1952 Mad 502 ;" Sourendra Wlohan Sinha v. Secy, of State, AIR 1934 Pat 701; Governor-general in Council v. Kasiram Marwari, AIR 1949 Pat 268; Mohomed Farooq v. .Governor-General in Council, AIR 1949 Pat 93; Buridehing Tea Co. Ltd. v. Dominion of India, (S) AIR 1955 Cal 360 ; Union of India v. Muralidhar Agarwalla, AIR 1952 Assam 141; F. E. Chrestien v. Jaideo Prasad Rai, AIR 1934 Pat 274; Dharamsi Liladhar v. Union of India, AIR 1952 Gal 439, and Lady Dinbai Dinshaw Petit v. Dominion of India, AIR 1951 Bom 72 . But none of the decisions above-cited apply to the circumstances in our present case. Each case has to depend on the parti­cular circumstances therein and the question has to be decided separately in each whether there has been proper compliance with the provisions of Sec. 80 C. P. C. (6) Reading Sec. 80 C. P. C.( we find that the statute has provided a special provision in the case of a suit against the Government. If a person contemplated to file such a suit, he has to give notice in writing stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been delivered and the suit can be brought only at the expiration of two months after the notice has been so delivered. As pointed out by the Privy Council in Bhagchand Dagdusa v. Secretary of State, AIR 1927 PC 176, Sec. 80 C. P. C. was express, explicit and mandatory and admit of no implications or exceptions. (7) In our present case, no notice has been given under Sec. 80 stating that a suit was going to be filed and mentioning the cause of action and the relief which the plaintiffs claimed against the Government. The notice dated 19-5-59 cannot be taken as a notice of the intention to file a suit. (7) In our present case, no notice has been given under Sec. 80 stating that a suit was going to be filed and mentioning the cause of action and the relief which the plaintiffs claimed against the Government. The notice dated 19-5-59 cannot be taken as a notice of the intention to file a suit. It is not known whether the plaintiffs filed the threatened Writ application after giving the said notice and if they did file, what the result -of the Writ applica­tion was. What was pointed out was that the cause of action and the reliefs which they claimed in the said notice were the same as the cause of action and the reliefs which they claimed in the present suit. But this argu­ment of the respondents is not correct. As 1 have stated earlier, the cause of action is stated in paragraph 27 of the plaint as having arisen from 11-9-59, and the suit itself was filed on 23-9-1959. Thus the cause of action mentioned in the plaint has arisen long after the notice dated 19-5-59 was given. Hence, the statement that the cause of action has been given in the notice cannot possibly be correct. But it was argued that the cause of action mentioned in paragraph 27 of the plaint was what gave immediate cause for the suit and that the real causes of action were the illegal proceedings taken under the L. A. Act and that the reliefs of declarations claimed in the suit were the same as the reliefs claimed In the notice. Even this argument is not fully correct as one of the declarations claimed was that the alleged posting of jhanda on 11-9-59 did not amount to valid, legal or effective possession and that it was not binding on the plaintiffs. This relief of declaration in any case arose out of the cause of action on 11-9-59. Again, the prayer for delivery of possession also arose out of the posting of jhanda in the suit land on 11-9-59. This relief of declaration in any case arose out of the cause of action on 11-9-59. Again, the prayer for delivery of possession also arose out of the posting of jhanda in the suit land on 11-9-59. (8) Thus it was necessary for the plaintiffs if they contemplated to file a suit on the strength of the posting of jhanda on 11-9-59 and they claimed reilef against the Government for the said action of the Government to give notice to the Government under Sec. 80 C. P. C. mentioning the particular cause of action and mentioning the reliefs which they claimed. In that connection the deci­sion cited for the petitioners Braham Dutt v. East Punjab Province, AIR 1958 Punj 351 is relevant in which it was held that so long as the cause of action, which has to be expressly mentioned in the notice, has not actually arisen, the notice cannot possibly be regarded as sufficient compliance with the mandatory provisions of the section. Again, the decision Bhairabendra Narayan Bhup v. State of Assam, AIR 1953 Assam 162 lays down that Sec. 80 has to be construed with common sense and with due consideration of the object which it is intended to serve and that if there was no subsisting cause of action when the notice under Sec. 80 was given, it cannot be held to be legal and valid and where there was no cause of action at the date of the notice under Sec. 80 C. P. C., the fact that some cause of action arose before the insti­tution of the suit cannot validate the action. The above two decisions arose out of cases where notice under Sec. 80 was actually given. But our present case is even worse where no notice under Sec. 80 C. P. C. was in fact given. (9) I also find that the main relief for which court-fee has been paid by them is the relief of delivery of possession under Sec 7 Cl. V of the Court Fees Act. This can arise only under the cause of action which arose on 11-9-59. Thus s suit filed on 23-9-59 for a cause of action which arose on 11-9-59 without giving the notice provided under Sec. 80 C. P. C. should have been rejected by the Subordinate Judge under Or. V of the Court Fees Act. This can arise only under the cause of action which arose on 11-9-59. Thus s suit filed on 23-9-59 for a cause of action which arose on 11-9-59 without giving the notice provided under Sec. 80 C. P. C. should have been rejected by the Subordinate Judge under Or. VII, R. 11 C. P. C. Instead of doing so, I find that the Subordinate Judge net only admitted the plaint without checking it, but even after the Government came forward and pleaded that the suit was bad under Sec. 80 C. P. C. issued an injunction against the Government not to enter the suit land or make any construction thereon till disposal of the suit, even though one of. the main prayers of the plaintiffs in the suit was itself for delivery of possession of the land to them. I find also that no reasons were given by the Subordinate Judge for the issue of the temporary injunc­tion. (10) It is true that there was some laches on the part of the Government in not filing an objection to the application for temporary injunction in spite of time being given. But temporary injunction is not something which is to be granted mechanically or merely because the defendant fails to file objection to it. The Court has to be satisfied that the plaintiffs had a prima facie case, that irreparable injury may be caused to the plaintiffs if temporary injunction was not granted and that the balance of convenience was in favour of granting the injunction. I nave pointed out that the plaint itself should not have been accepted by the Court and it was clear that the suit itself cannot stand. The way in which the Subordinate Judge dealt with this matter is thoroughly unsatisfactory and it is hoped that he will bestow a little more attention before he issues such serious orders of injunction and that too against the Government. The above observations in this para are strictly speaking not quite relevant for the purpose of this case. But I have made them, be­muse the Subordinate Judge appears to have dealt with the matter in a most mechanical fashion, as if it is just routine work and does not seem to have applied his mind to the case at all. The above observations in this para are strictly speaking not quite relevant for the purpose of this case. But I have made them, be­muse the Subordinate Judge appears to have dealt with the matter in a most mechanical fashion, as if it is just routine work and does not seem to have applied his mind to the case at all. (11) I am not prepared to accept the contention ad­vanced for the respondents that a notice stating that Writ proceedings will be started against the Government will be sufficient notice of a suit under Sec. 80 C. P. C. When such a notice is received by the Government, the Government may very well decide to resist the Writ ap­plication and if a notice of suit is given, it may very well be that the Government may act in a different manner. A Writ application stands on a quite different footing from a suit. It is when a party contemplates a suit that he has to give a notice. When notice of a Writ application is received by the Government, they have no reason to think that the party would file a suit. We also know that the plaintiffs themselves did not contemplate to file a suit until the posting of jhanda on 11-9-1959. When therefore the plaintiffs decided to file a suit on such posting of jhanda, it was their duty to have given two months' notice as provided under Section 80, C. P. C. Under those circum­stances, I am not prepared to accept the argument that the notice given on 19-5-1959 was sufficient. I have already pointed out that the notice did not give the particulars name­ly, the cause of action or the reliefs which have got to be stated in a notice under Section 80, C. P. C. (12) The way in which the Subordinate Judge has dealt with this matter is again very cursory. He has stated in his order that the learned lawyer for the defendant argue* that notice given upon defendant was under Section 52 of the L. A. Act and not under Section 80, C. P. C. It was. pointed out for the petitioners that no such argument was advanced before the Subordinate Judge and that the peti­tioners did not accept that a notice was given even under Section 52 of the L. A. Act. pointed out for the petitioners that no such argument was advanced before the Subordinate Judge and that the peti­tioners did not accept that a notice was given even under Section 52 of the L. A. Act. I have already pointed out that no notice under Section 52 of the L. A. Act was in fact given. I can, therefore, accept the statement of the petitioners' Advocate that what was stated by the Subordi­nate Judge was totally wrong. It is clear that the Subordi­nate Judge did not bestow any attention to the facts of the case when he passed the order. (13) The Subordinate Judge did not even frame an issue before he disposed of this matter. Actually the plea of the defendant should have been treated as a preliminary issue and a finding should have been given after framing an issue.. It is a most unsatisfactory way of dealing with the case. (14) The order of the Subordinate Judge is set aside and it is held that the suit is bad for. want of notice under Section 80, C. P. C. and the suit has, therefore, to te dis­missed as not maintainable. The respondents will pay the costs of the petitioners both here and in the Court below-Advocate's fee Rs. 257- in this Court. Order set aside.