RAM LABHAYA C. J.: This is a second Miscellaneous Appeal from the order of the First Additional District Judge, U. A. D., by which the order of the Sadar Munsiff of Silchar disallowing the objection raised by the judg­ment-debtor to the execution of the decree was reversed and the decree found to be in executable. The decree-holder has questioned the correctness of the appellate decision. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows: (2) A suit was pending in the Court of the Munsif at Habiganj in the district of Sylhet in 1947. Judgment was delivered in the case on the 8th August 1947. The decree was signed by the Munsiff on the 21st August 1947. It was transferred to the Court of the Munsiff at Silchar for execution after the 15th August 1947 and the decree-holder applied for its exe­cution. The State of Assam, the judgment-debtor, put in objections contending that the decree could not be executed at Silchar, a Court within the Dominion of India. The learned Munsiff found that as the decree was signed on the 21st August 1947. the suit in which it was passed was a pending proceeding within the meaning of S. 4 of the Indian Inde­pendence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, and effect could be given to the decree under S. 4(3) of the said Order. (3) The learned Additional District Judge was of the view that even though the decree was actually signed on the 21st August 1947, the proceeding terminated on the 8th August 1947 and it could not be treated as a pend­ing proceeding for the purposes of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order. In his view the decree was of a foreign Court though passed before the 15th August 1947 and it could not have been transferred for exe­cution to a Court in this Dominion. (4) The question on which the Courts below have come to different conclusions has ceased to be material at this stage. Decrees and orders falling within the scope of S. 4(3) of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, cannot now be given effect to by any Court in this Dominion by reason of the provisions contained in the Indian Indepen­dence Pakistan Courts (Pending Proceedings) Act, 1952. Decrees and orders falling within the scope of S. 4(3) of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, cannot now be given effect to by any Court in this Dominion by reason of the provisions contained in the Indian Indepen­dence Pakistan Courts (Pending Proceedings) Act, 1952. Even if the decree, in this case, was covered by the provisions of S. 4(3) of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, it cannot be given effect to now. We have already held in 'UNION OF INDIA, NEW DELHI REPRESENTING THE ASSAM RAIL­WAY ETC. v. MAHIM CHANDRA', First Misc. Appeal No. 9 of 1950, that the Act applies to pending execution cases if the decree had not been given effect to before the Act came into force. This case is covered by that decision. The decree in this case not having so far having been given effect to has become incapable of execution as no Court in this Dominion has * now got any jurisdiction to give effect to it. (5) The learned counsel for the appellant was, in the alternative, contended that the case was decided on the 8th August 1947 be­fore partition and if the proceeding terminated on that day, the decree should be still capable of execution in this Dominion. In support of this argument, he has relied on the provi­sions contained in S. 18 of the Indian Inde­pendence Act. This section deals with exist­ing laws. Clause (3) of S. 18 provides that "save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the law of British India and of the several parts thereof existing immediately ' before the appointed day shall, so far as applicable and with the necessary adapta­tions, continue as the law of each of the new Dominions & the several parts thereof until other provision is made by laws of the Legislature of the Dominion in question or by any other Legislature or other authority having power in that behalf." The effect of the provision was that the laws which applied to the whole country were made applicable to the two Dominions in which the country was divided. These laws which con­tinued to apply had the extent of their terri­torial operation reduced. The Civil Procedure Code applies to both the Dominions. But in each case its applica­tion is limited to the Dominion which was a part of undivided India. These laws which con­tinued to apply had the extent of their terri­torial operation reduced. The Civil Procedure Code applies to both the Dominions. But in each case its applica­tion is limited to the Dominion which was a part of undivided India. Order 21, Civil P. C., thus is applicable to all Courts within the Dominion of India. Similarly, it is appli­cable to all Courts within the Dominion of Pakistan. But its provisions could not be availed of by any Court of any one Dominion for transfer of its decrees to a Court in the other Dominion. Transfers of decrees for execution under O. 21 are possible only within the Dominion. The Court at Habiganj (in Pakistan), therefore, had no jurisdiction to transfer this decree for execu­tion after the appointed day to the Court at Silchar within the Dominion of India. The Court at Habiganj is a Court in a foreign territory. Its decree though passed at a time when it was not a foreign Court could not be received for execution at Silchar as it came from a Court in a foreign territory with which there was no reci­procal arrangement for execution of decrees. The learned counsel urges that at the time the de­cree was passed, the Court at Habiganj was not a foreign Court. This is true. But the result of the partition was that the Court became a foreign Court after the 15th August 1947 and will have no jurisdiction to utilise the provi­sions of O. 21, R. 5 of the Civil P. C., for transferring its decrees to Courts in the Indian Dominion. I do not discover anything in S. 18 of the Indian Independence Act which justifies the view that Courts which passed the decrees before the appointed day in that part of the territory, which as a result of the parti­tion is now foreign territory, have retained the rights to transfer their decrees for execu­tion to Courts in this country. This right was given in relation to certain pending proceed­ings and that privilege has now been with­drawn even in relation to those proceedings. The decree, therefore, in this case could not be transferred for execution to Court in the Indian Dominion under the provisions con­tained in O. 21 of the Civil P. C.4 and there­fore the Court at Silchar will have no juris­diction to execute it. The decree, therefore, in this case could not be transferred for execution to Court in the Indian Dominion under the provisions con­tained in O. 21 of the Civil P. C.4 and there­fore the Court at Silchar will have no juris­diction to execute it. In order that the trans­feree Court should have jurisdiction to execute a decree transferred to it for execu­tion, it is not only necessary that the procedure provided for the purpose in O. 21, R. 5 should be complied with; the two Courts also have to be within the same dominion. The provi­sions contained in O. 21, R. 5 apply when the transferor and the transferee Courts are in the same Dominion & if the transfer is to be made to a Court in another District the decree has to be sent to the District Court. Compliance with the requirements of the rules is not possible when the transferor and the transferee Courts are in different Domi­nions. The view that I take of the matter re­ceives support from 'DOMINION OF IDNIA v. HIRALAL', AIR 1950 Cal 12 , in which it was laid down as follows: "From after 15th August 1947 the Jamalpur Court has become, .in relation to the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, a foreign Court and the judgment on the basis of which a decree had been passed on 15th May 1947 by that Court is a foreign judgment. Ac­cordingly provisions of S. 13 read with S. 44A will be attracted. Pakistan is not a recipro­cating territory and hence the Court of Small Causes cannot entertain an application for starting proceedings in execution of such decree after the 15th August 1947. (6) It may be argued that a decree passed by a Court now in Pakistan before the 15th August 1947 may not be described as a decree of a foreign Court as at the time of the passing the decree the Court was not in a foreign terri­tory. It is a possible way of looking at the matter but there can be no doubt that the Court in Pakistan became foreign Court from the 15th August 1947 and by reason of that change it will not be able to transfer its de­crees for execution to Courts within thjs Domi­nion. It is a possible way of looking at the matter but there can be no doubt that the Court in Pakistan became foreign Court from the 15th August 1947 and by reason of that change it will not be able to transfer its de­crees for execution to Courts within thjs Domi­nion. This could have been possible only if the Courts in both the Dominions could under some valid law utilise the procedure for trans­fer of decrees for execution as if they were Courts in one Dominion but no such legislative authority exists for the purpose. (7) This appeal, therefore, must fail and is dismissed. I make no order as to costs. (8) DEKA, J.: I agree. Appeal dismissed.