Judgement MOHAPATRA, J. :- This appeal arises out of an order under S.47, Civil P.C. passed in the execution proceedings which arose out of a decree obtained in Original Suit No.31 of 1947 wherein the plaintiffs brought a suit for declaration that defendant 3, a minor, was not the adopted son of the deceased husband of defendant 1. Defendant 2 was made a party as the natural father of defendant 3. The decree was in terms of a compromise where the adoption was accepted; but the terms of the compromise ran to the effect that certain of the items "were agreed by defendants 1 and 3 to be given and defendants 1 and 3 have hereby given absolutely." Objection having been raised before the execution Court to the effect that the decree to that extent was not executable, the executing Court passed an order rejecting the objection petition and allowing the decree-holders to proceed with the execution. The present appeal has been filed against that order. 2. By the learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection is taken that the appeal (was not?) by the guardian, who was acting as the guardianad-litem in the suit and the execution proceedings. The appeal has been filed by defendant 2 for self and as guardian of defendant 2, We find from the decree that as a matter of fact the minor defendant 3 was represented by defendant 1 as the guardian-ad-litem. In the execution proceedings also the minor defendant 3 was represented by defendant 1. The present appeal has been filed by defendant 2 on his own behalf and also as representative of minor defendant 3 who was judgment-debtor 3. The objection is a valid objection and must prevail in view of the provisions of O.32, R.3(5), which runs as follows: "(5) A person appointed under sub-r.(1) to be guardian for the suit for a minor shall unless his appointment is terminated by retirement, removal or death, continue as such throughout all proceedings arising cut of the suit including proceedings in any appellate or revisional Court and any proceedings in the execution of a decree." The language is perfectly clear and is supported by several authorities including the cases reported in - Gulab Chand v. Mt. Kishori Kuer, AIR 1942 Pat 348(A) and - Ganesh Singh v. Govinda Ganesh, AIR 1944 Nag 78(B). Kishori Kuer, AIR 1942 Pat 348(A) and - Ganesh Singh v. Govinda Ganesh, AIR 1944 Nag 78(B). There is nothing before us to show that defendant 1 has retired or has been removed from the guardianship. It appears, therefore that the present appeal, not having been filed by the proper guardian, that is, defendant 1 or judgment-debtor 1, is not competent. 3. It has been contended by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellants that the appeal can be said to be competent as it has been filed by one of the judgment-debtors, that is, defendant 2 on his own behalf. Such an appeal filed by one of the judgment-debtors would be competent provided the provisions of O.41, R.4, Civil P.C., are satisfied. The language of O.41, R.4 runs thus: "Where there are more plaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit, and the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground common to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants any one of the plaintiffs or of the defendants may appeal from the whole decree and thereupon the Appellate Court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be." The appeal could be found to be competent only if defendant 2 was jointly interested in the decree along with other defendants. On the contrary, the language of the compromise is perfectly clear to show that it was only defendants 1 and 3 who "agreed to give and have hereby given absolutely" the properties, in dispute. As such, defendant 2 had absolutely no interest in the properties which were given on were agreed to be given to the plaintiffs. 4. It has to be made clear here that in fact defendant 2, under the terms of the compromise, stands under no obligation to deliver possession of the properties which were the subject-matter of the compromise. As such, the execution proceedings against defendant 2 would not be maintained. The appeal, therefore, fails subject to the above observations. 5. Narasimham, J. :- I agree. Appeal dismissed.